As far back as 1975 Judy La Marsh, a lawyer, journalist and former member for the Liberal Government of Canada was appointed by the Government of Ontario to chair the Royal Commission on Violence in the Communications Industry. It was empowered to study the effects on society of increasing violence in the media of the day and make appropriate recommendations on measures to be taken by different levels of government, by industry and the public at large. Most of the 80 plus recommendations have never been implemented. Some have been repeated in subsequent studies but still not implemented.

In my doctoral thesis, completed at OISE/UT in 1995, I reviewed the research findings conducted by the La Marsh Commission and other studies done up until that time, subsequent recommendations and evidence or lack thereof regarding implementation. Two books on the subject followed. The first published in 2000 and the second earlier this year. A complimentary copy of either one is available upon request. The latest is titled, MIND ABUSE Media Violence And Its Threat To Democracy, (2021) Over the past 30 years I have watched the problems mushroom with increasing evidence of commercial reliance on themes of sex and violence in media production. In addition we have had fading boundaries between different forms of media. These include news, fiction, advertisements and educational programming, leading to catch phases such as edutainment and infotainment.

Digital technologies and the internet have magnified the problems with policy makers loath to take on the challenge of much needed and overdue regulation, frequently to avoid accusations of censorship. Inadequate distinctions between individual freedom of expression and corporate freedom of enterprise have persisted. Periodic studies funded by industry are released into the public domain countering evidence of harmful effects thus ensuring no interruptions to business as usual. For decades the cultural industries have been given carte blanche to determine what we see, hear and read.

In 1996, along with 250 other scholars and media activists representing over 88 organizations from around the world, I helped the late George Gerbner, an internationally renowned media scholar, launch the Cultural Environment Movement at Webster University in St. Louis. That Convention was preceded by the International Summit on Broadcast Standards attended by Keith Spicer, then chair of the CRTC and other Canadians representing business and non-profits. In his work, Gerbner frequently referred to violence creep in popular culture and other forms of media, including news and advertisements, as the hidden curriculum for a Mean World Syndrome.

My colleague, retired U.S. Lte. Col. David Grossman, a psychologist and Military Expert, has written 5 books on the subject of violent first person shooter video games and the dangers of indiscriminately marketing these games to the youngest most vulnerable people on the planet. In his latest book, Assassination Generation Aggression, Video Games and the Psychology of Killing (2016) he provides chilling detail on how these have led to mass murders and fueled terrorism. Grossman reveals how violent video games have ushered in a new era of mass homicides worldwide. The trends have led to what he calls Acquired Violence Immune Deficiency Syndrome.

The kind of online hate and extremism that led to the January 29, 2017 mass murders at the Centre culturel islamique de Quebec, and on March 15, 2019, in Christchurch, New Zealand, is inherent in the thematic content of numerous video games played by the killers. In both cases news coverage identified evidence of heavy diets of first person shooter video game playing on the part of these perpetrators. This is a pattern that is described over and over again by other researchers among them, Mark Bourrie, author of Martyrdom, Murder and the Lure of Isis, and Megan Condis, author of Gaming Masculinity, Trolls, Fake Geeks, and the Gendered Battle for Online Culture.

What must be recognized is that the Government’s focus on regulating social media and combating harmful content online cannot be confined to “speech only”. Violent forms of fictional entertainment such as video games depict storylines that glorify violence, hatred, anti semitism and sexual exploitation. It would be duplicitous and of marginal value to address the problems involving work place harassment, misogyny and other excesses on the internet but to leave such content in popular culture unaddressed and unregulated. Countless studies over the years have demonstrated that these fictional depictions lead to learned behaviours based on psychological conditioning that result in distorted value systems, a tendency to resort to violence as a conflict resolution strategy, addiction and feelings of victimization, among other harmful effects.

It has also been demonstrated that violent, first person shooter video games provide fertile soil for sowing the seeds of resentment among young vulnerable white males. An “us versus them” mentality is encouraged, helped along by social media algorithms that capitalize on our genetic tendencies to respond quickly to negative themes. It has also been reported that white supremacist groups watch the latest releases of video games that are most amenable to their purposes of recruitment. Some have taken to producing their own.

The work being done by technology experts like the Institute of Electric and Electronic Engineers (IEEE)on a roadmap for 5G and global integration to facilitate the more efficient use of energy must also focuson the nature of energy use. Spokesmen on behalf of the Institute now stress that more efficient use of what is rapidly becoming unsustainable energy demand on the internet is essential and required to reduce both collective and individual carbon footprints. But, clearly, emphasis on discretionary use is also required. Assuming we are put on a war time footing, as advocated by Seth Klein in his book, A Good War: Mobilizing Canada For The Climate Emergency (2021), rationing of internet use will have to be adopted. In December, 2020, Nicholas Kristoff wrote in the New Yor k Times that Pornhub, owned by Mindgeek in Montreal, was the third most visited and influential website on the Internet. It is inconceivable, in a world focused on sustainability and transitioning to clean energy that, on the Internet, harmful excesses are overlooked and excused as essential components to be protected under the umbrella of civil liberties. Surely the expertise in electronic engineering should not be misdirected in the race against time to ensure internet use that fosters social harm.

There are also concerns expressed by health advocates, such as Devra Davis, author of DISCONNECTThe Truth About Cell Phones, What the Industry Has Done To Hide It and How To Protect Your Family(2010), about harmful radiation from digital devices that can cause cancer. In this context it behooves thegovernment to take note of the recent United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuitjudgement in favour of environmental health groups. It found the Federal Communications Commission(FCC) in violation of the Administrative Procedures Act for not responding to comments onenvironmental harm. In short, the FCC failed to respond to record evidence that exposure to low levelradiation from digital devices may cause negative health effects

Re: Strategy to combat hate speech and other harms:

We endorse the move to amend the Canadian Human Rights Act to enable the relevant Commission and Tribunal to review and adjudicate hate speech complaints.

* But, over reliance on industry, itself, to monitor social media content, has proven in the past to be an exercise in futility. One minor exception involves the Canadian Broadcast Standards Council which was set up in 1993 by the Canadian Association of Broadcasters to respond to complaints of inappropriate content on radio or television programming. This Council could be expanded or duplicated to monitor online content. However, the Council has always been reactive rather than proactive with no oversight for industry excesses unless complaints arise from the public at large. That needs to change. Allowing the fox to guard the henhouse with no government oversight has never worked.

* Second, definitions of obscenity and sections on child pornography need to be updated and

expanded. Research conducted in the latter part of the last century, demonstrates how all pornography can be addictive. In addition it involves social learning theories that lead to themes of aggression and dominance. These tendencies can trickle down to the most vulnerable targets of exploitation which are children. Before the bill on child pornography, making possession, production and distribution a crime was passed in 1993, considerable attention was paid by the Government’s Standing Committee on Culture and Communications set up at that time. It came out with a number of additional recommendations that were never implemented. One of them was to determine the criminal legislative measures needed to include extremely violent forms of entertainment in the Criminal Code in ways that would conform with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. See MIND ABUSE Media Violence In An Information Age (Dyson, 2000).

* The objective to authorize the Government to include or exclude categories of online communication service providers from the application of the legislation within certain parameters is important but there must be complete transparency on how this will be done and who will provide expert advice on these parameters. Advice must be sought from health providers and other researchers not beholden to industrial interests.

* Film and video game monitoring of media content for entertainment purposes is now undertaken by provincial classification boards. A national system would be much more efficient. While great care has been taken over the years to ensure gender and racial diversity on most boards the overall tendency has been for them to bend to the will of industry. Criteria on what is age appropriate should involve input from child development experts. This has yet to happen. Indeed, the prevailing standard for most classification boards throughout the developed world has been set by the industry funded and operated, Hollywood based Motion Picture Association of America. That needs to change.

* Legislation should be passed on a national level to ban advertising to children 13 years and under. Such legislation has been in effect in Quebec for over 25 years. From time to time, bills for implementation have been introduced in Canada at the national and provincial levels of government, boards of health and in 2016 even an editorial in Globe and Mail, called for one. Most developed countries have already adopted this kind of legislation, citing various concerns, among them, protecting children from harmful sexual exploitation, violent content, all advertising, the marketing of junk food known to cause physical health problems such as obesity and heart disease and the dangers of exposure to low level radiation from the internet.

* The Committee must not allow itself to be intimidated by industry push back. On January 14, 2019, it was reported in The Globe and Mail, that a proposal from Health Canada to amend the Food and Drug Act by restricting food and beverage marketing to children had hit a familiar snag: industry protests that such regulation was “unrealistic”, “punitive” and “commercially catastrophic”. The huge jump in commercial exploitation of children in recent decades is nothing short of tragic. According to the Harvard Medical School founded, Boston based, Campaign for a Commercial-free Childhood, over $17 billion was spent by the industry in 2006 in the U.S. alone to market products to children, a staggering increase over $100 million spent in 1983. Over $500 billion in purchases annually by that time was estimated to be influenced by children under the age of 12 years. These trends are clearly at odds with efforts focused on reducing consumer driven habits to facilitate future sustainability.

* A very popular solution for dealing with harmful media has always been better vigilance from parents, along with media and digital literacy taught in schools by teachers. Although it is obvious that the problem is too big and pervasive and that better cultural policy is also urgently needed, there is room for improvement in the provision of reliable, fact based educational resources. Over the years there has been increasing evidence of subtle, industry friendly resources creeping into school curriculums on the subject. In 1975, the La Marsh Commission recommended that an Advisory Board of educators, health professionals and parents be established at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education at the University of Toronto for the provision of public education. I reiterated the recommendation in my doctoral theses completed at the Institute in1995, and again in my two subsequent books on media violence. Nevertheless, it has yet to be established. Better government funding and support is also needed for NGOs, such as Internetsense First, founded by Charlene Doak Gebauer, which now provide urgently needed help to parents and teachers on digital supervision.

* Funding that is independent of industry donors, should be mandatory to ensure accuracy in monitor media violence and other harmful trends on the internet. Important models were established at the Annenberg School of Communication, University of Pennsylvania and Temple University in Philadelphia, by the late George Gerbner. The Cultural Indicators Model, later expanded into the “Fairness” Indicators Model and used by Paquette and de Guise at Laval University in Quebec City in their study Index of Violence in Canadian, Television done in 1994, is one example.

* An Act respecting the mandatory reporting of Internet child pornography by persons who provide an internet service is needed. But it is not clear how this would interface with the Mandatory Reporting Act.

* New legislation requiring regulated entities to monitor harmful content through the use of automated systems based on algorithms would be a useful way to use the new technology for prosocial purposes, given the widespread evidence of how algorithms are currently employed solely for the purposes of financial gain and fostering errant behaviour .

* Now, within universities across Canada and beyond, there is growing emphasis of courses offered in esport involving first-person shooter video games. This is counter productive to advocacy from experts calling for critical thinking skills, media and digital literacy and studies which point to harmful effects. There has also been ample evidence reported in The Globe and Mail, of generous subsidies given to video game industries such as Ubisoft without any regard for the nature or content involved in the productions. Tax breaks and subsidies for harmful video game production and distribution is no more justifiable than breaks for fossil fuel industries in a time of climate crisis. As pointed out by Globe and Mail business reporter Scott Barlow, this poses a moral dilemna (Barlow, October 14, 2017). Furthermore, these must also not be excused or spun by industry pundits as “funding for electronic arts”.

* It is stated that regulated entities would be required to notify law enforcement in instances where there are reasonable grounds to suspect imminent risk of serious harm to any person or property from potentially illegal content falling within the five categories of harmful – terrorist content; that which incites violence; hate speech; non-consensual sharing of intimate images; and child sexual exploitation. But it is stated that there would be no obligation to report such content to law enforcement or CSIS. Why not?

* And why would the threshold for such reporting of potentially terrorist and violent extremist content be lower than that for potentially criminal hate speech?

* The proposed legislation for a new Digital Safety Commission of Canada to support three bodies that would operationalize, oversee and enforce the new regime sounds promising. But who exactly would sit on the final stage of recourse on the Recourse Council? Diverse expertise and membership that is reflective of the Canadian population is essential to avoid having such a Council stacked with former or retired officials sympathetic to the concerns of industry. This would necessitate expertise from the health and social sciences. Transparency in public reporting obligations would also be required.

* An Advisory Board that would provide both the Commissioner and the Recourse Council with expert advice must include more than expertise on emerging industry trends, technologies and content-moderation standards. Who would be expected to provide information on “content- moderation standards”. Like the recommended advisory group for parents and teachers, with funding independent of industry sources and the Recourse Council, such a Board should include social science expertise and input from both physical and mental health experts. Having the Digital Safety Commissioner of Canada mandated to lead and participate in research and programming, convene and collaborate with relevant stakeholders and support regulated entities in reducing the five forms of harmful content will only work if input is not confined to industry related interests. Again, the composition of the Advisory Board must include, along with all the other stakeholders itemized, health expertise.

Re: Compliance and enforcement

* The powers of the Commissioner are necessary and sound reasonable. Re: Modifying Canada’s existing legal framework including the Canadian Security and Intelligence Act (CSIS)

* Centralizing mandatory reporting of online child pornography offences through the RCMP’s National Exploitation Crime Centre to ensure stronger requirements for internet service providers for reporting excesses would help but continuing vigilance to ensure that is happening must be provided. Not requiring judicial authorization in reports to law enforcement is necessary to expedite police response in cases where an offence is clearly evident. The same criteria should be applied to CSIS to ensure more timely access to relevant information that could help mitigate the threat of online violence extremism. For this process to take 4-6 months, as it does now, seriously diminishes their capacity to be effective.

Again, thank you for the opportunity to participate in this timely discussion. If provision is made for appearance via zoom before the committee to submit a statement I would appreciate the opportunity.

References:

Barlow, S. (2017b, October 24) Getting hooked on gaming stocks. The Globe and Mail. P.B6.

Barlow, S. (2017a, October 14) As investing theme video games score big. The Globe and Mail. P.B3.

Bourrie, M. (2016). The Killing Game: Martyrdom, Murder and the Lure of ISIS. Toronto, ON: Harper Collins Canada

Condis, M. (2018) Gaming Masculinity: Trolls, Geeks and the Gendered Battle for Online Culture. Iowa City, IA: University of Iowa Press.

Davis, D. (2010). The TRUTH About Cell Phone RADIATION: What the INDUSTRY has Done to Hide It, and How to PROTECT Your FAMILY. New York: Dutton.

Doak-Gebauer, C. (2019) THE INTERNET:ARE CHILDREN IN CHARGE? Tellwell, Canada.

Dyson, R. A. (2000). MIND ABUSE: Media Violence in an Information Age. Montreal: Black Rose Books.

Dyson, R.A. (2021). MIND ABUSE: Media Violence and its Threat to Democracy. Montreal: Black Rose Books. UT Press, AMAZON

Grossman, D. (2016). ASSASSINATION GENERATION: Video Games, Aggression and the Psychology of Killing. Boston, MA, Little, Brown & Company.

Klein, Seth. (2021). A Good WAR: Mobilizing Canada For The Climate Emergency. Amazon: U.S.

United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. EHT Victorious in Federal Court Case Against FCC on Wireless Radiation Limits. August 14, 2021.

The fate of this issue in the OEWG is relevant to that of the GGE as observers had hoped that the latter forum (operating under a very similar mandate to that of the OEWG) might be able to provide “value added” to the OEWG proceedings by clarifying this crucial relationship between state conduct and international law. Part of this hope rested on the smaller grouping of the GGE and its more private deliberations. While the issue was addressed in the GGE report it was not resolved. Essentially the question was kicked down the road by the GGE. The key sentence reads: “The Group recognized the need for further study on how and when these principles [IHL] apply to the use of ICTs by States and underscored that recalling these principles by no means legitimizes or encourages conflict”. iv As much in the way of offensive cyber operations conducted by states, which the GGE refers to as “malicious activity”, happens below the threshold of armed conflict the international community is not really any further along in its understanding of what legal constraints apply to these operations. 

This gap is all the more worrisome when one considers the major growth in damaging and disruptive offensive cyber operations carried out by states and/or non-state actors in the past couple of years that the GGE and the OEWG have been functioning. This increased level of threat is acknowledged by the GGE at several points in its report: “Incidents involving the malicious use of ICTs by States and non-state actors have increased in scope, scale, severity and sophistication”; “The Group underlines the assessment of the 2015 [GGE] report that a number of States are developing ICT capabilities for military purposes and that the use of ICTs in future conflicts between States is becoming more likely”; “The Group notes a worrying increase in States’ malicious use of ICT-enabled covert information campaigns to influence the processes, systems and overall stability of States.”; “Harmful ICT activity against critical infrastructure that provides services domestically, regionally or globally…have become increasingly serious.”; “The COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated the risks and consequences of malicious ICT activities that seek to exploit vulnerabilities in times when our societies are under enormous strain”; “New and emerging technologies expand the attack surface, creating new vectors and vulnerabilities that can be exploited for malicious ICT activity”. After such a litany of rising threats the Group’s conclusion that “Such activity can pose a significant risk to international security and stability, economic and social development, as well as the safety and well-being of individuals” comes across as understated and anticlimactic.

In the face of these burgeoning threats what defences has the GGE to offer? It basically can only revert to the eleven norms of responsible state behaviour agreed as part of the 2015 GGE. A rather limp injunction is directed at those responsible: “States are called upon to avoid and refrain from the use of ICTs not in line with the norms of responsible state behaviour”. vi The impression left in reviewing the chief body of the report, which consists of reproducing the 11 norms of the 2015 GGE with some annotation, is that matters have not progressed much beyond the norms agreed six years ago. While the GGE claims that it has “developed additional layers of understanding to these norms” these layers seem rather thin and even threadbare. Frequently, the report simply offers up a tentative recommendation for states to consider further action in realizing the normative goals. For example, in a section on the issue of attribution, the report “…recommends that future work at the UN could also consider how to foster common understandings and exchanges of practice on attribution”.vii The task is passed on to some unspecified body at some indeterminate future point in time.

Similarly, in a section devoted to cooperation to counter terrorist or criminal use, the report’s advice is that “States may need to consider whether new measures need to be developed in this respect”. viii The report notes the utility of common templates to facilitate requests for assistance and the response to them, but then merely states: “Such templates could be developed at the bilateral, multilateral or regional level”ix. On the sensitive issue of vulnerability disclosures (and the unmentioned black market in “zero-day” cyber exploits in which government buyers have driven prices up exponentially) the report again manages only a convoluted and theoretical response: “At the national, regional and international level, States could consider putting in place impartial legal frameworks, policies and programmes to guide decision making on the handling of ICT vulnerabilities and curb their commercial distribution as a means of protecting against misuse that may pose a risk to international peace and security or human rights and fundamental freedoms”.x Too often the report’s recommendations have a diffuse, aspirational quality of the “somebody might consider doing something about this at some point” variety.

The GGE like the OEWG before it, gives only a brief, ritual nod to the contribution that other stakeholders (“the private sector, civil society, and the technical community”) could make to inter-state dialogues.xi The GGE in its consideration of the existing norms also fails to recognize the positive role that accountability mechanisms for implementation could play in incentivizing states to align their cyber practices with the “norms of responsible behaviour” they have endorsed. As with the OEWG, the GGE has not really advanced tangible action to curb malicious cyber activity. Regrettably, the GGE efforts seem to have yielded more circular motion than real progress. Translating the 2015 norms from the status of declaration to one of implementation remains, six years after they were agreed, largely unfinished business for the UN. 

Link: https://ict4peace.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/GGECyber2021Circular-Motionf.pdf

These messages aim to deepen anti-American, or more generally, anti-Western sentiment. Sometimes, the “perpetrator” is the entire NATO alliance, not just the United States, a variation that the DFRLab has traced in languages other than Russian as well. The impact on an average consumer of these messages will be approximately the same: anti-Western, anti-NATO and anti-U.S. feelings often go hand-in-hand in Europe.

2. Sow chaos and panic

In the aftermath of a tragedy or crisis, pro-Kremlin media outlets often try to incite fear, panic, chaos, and hysteria. On several occasions, in the aftermath of a terror attack in Europe or the United States, pro-Kremlin outlets spread accusations that the attack was a false flag operation conducted by various governments or secret services against its citizens, or that it was staged to impose greater control over the public.

These campaigns aim to stoke and exploit emotions, among which fear is one of the strongest. An audience shaken by fear will be more irrational and more prone to further disinformation operations.

3. Undermine the target audience’s trust in credible sources of information, be it traditional media or the government

Another messaging tactic tries to convince the target audience that the truth is different from whatever is being said by government institutions, local authorities or the media, thereby undermining trust in credible information sources. Convincing people to believe bogus sources of information first requires persuading them that real sources of accurate information cannot be trusted.

4. Undermine trust in objective facts by spreading multiple contradictory messages

According to a March 2020 review of COVID-19-related disinformation cases conducted by EUvsDisinfo, one popular pro-Kremlin narrative alleges, “[t]he virus is a powerful biological weapon, employed by the U.S., the Brits, or the opposition in Belarus.” A few days after the EUvsDisinfo report, pro-Kremlin outlets then accused Latvia of producing the virus. Spreading multiple and often contradictory versions of events undermines trust in objective facts.

The Kremlin has deployed this tactic liberally: after the MH17 tragedy, after the attack on an humanitarian convoy in Syria, and after the attempted murder of Sergei Skripal. The aim here is not to persuade people to believe one particular version of events, but to persuade the average consumer that there are so many versions of events that the truth can never be found. This tactic can be rather effective: then-U.S. presidential candidate Donald Trump has previously said that “no one really knows who did it” [i.e. shot down MH17] despite available evidence and statements by US authorities.

5. Spread conspiracies to facilitate the acceptance of other conspiracies

People who believe one conspiracy theory are more likely to accept others. If your job is to spread lies, it helps to promote other conspiracies as well. The pro-Kremlin media has a history of spreading conspiracy theories and elevating conspiracy theorists. A global pandemic that naturally leads to rumor-mongering is an ideal opportunity to spread some additional unfounded beliefs.

6. Identify the channels spreading disinformation

In his book on disinformation, Romanian defector Ion Mihai Pacepa described “Operation Ares,” which used U.S. involvement in Vietnam to spread anti-American feelings both within the United States and abroad in an effort to isolate the United States on the international scene.

“All we had to do was to continue planting the seeds of Ares and water them day after day after day,” Pacepa wrote. “Eventually, American leftists would seize upon Ares and would start pursuing it of their own accord. In the end, our original involvement would be forgotten and Ares would take on a life of its own.”

When you spread disinformation, you not only try to influence the audience — you also gain valuable information from the audience. You identify the channels through which disinformation spreads and the intermediaries that help disinformation reach new audiences. You also see who counters your disinformation. Especially in a time of crisis, when rumors spread faster and travel further than normal, a well-organized disinformation campaign can lend valuable insight into how an adversary’s information environment is organized. This insight is extremely valuable for any future disinformation operations. Knowing who will help you spread the desired information, and whom to try to discredit ahead of time, makes new disinformation campaigns easier to mount and sustain.

Link: https://medium.com/dfrlab/commentary-six-reasons-the-kremlin-spreads-disinformation-about-the-coronavirus-8fee41444f60

3.Non-involvement of these Emergency Response Teamsin offensive cyber operations.

4.Non use of proxies by states in conducting offensive cyber operations.

5.Responsibility of states to prevent or prosecute malicious cyber activity originating from their territory.

6.Commitment to a responsible disclosure of vulnerabilities to help preserve the integrity of cyberspace and transparent policies for handling such vulnerabilities.

7.Transparency of policy and doctrine governing state offensive cyber operations.In addition to developing these norms, which have already been generated by theUNGGE processes, we suggest that the OEWG also develop proposals for dealing with four other pressing problems: Attribution:The necessity for substantiation of “accusations of organizing and implementing wrongful acts brought against States” is acknowledged in Resolution 73/27, but if this norm is to be implemented it will require a reliable attribution mechanism. ICT4Peace sees merit in developing a neutral, international cyber attribution agency which could take the form of a public-private partnership drawing upon capabilities in the private sector. ICT4Peace has published a paper on this theme:
https://ict4peace.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/ICT4Peace-2019-Trust-and-Attribution-in-Cyberspace.pdfDisinformation, Hate Speech and political Interference:These actions affect every means of expression at both national and international levels, but ICTs, including social media, substantially increase their impact. Any norm in this regard to be observed in practice will require definitional and operational elaboration. As these issues are somewhat distinct from the international security context of the OEWG and could complicate its efforts, ICT4Peace suggests that separate fora may be tasked with this work.

3Export Controls:
There has been increasingly concern expressed about sophisticated cyber surveillance equipment being misused by some states to monitor individuals and impinge on their civil and privacy rights. ICT4Peace would like to see the OEWG develop a recommendation that would require states to include such equipment and software in their national export control regimes.AI and Cyber Security: The potential of Artificial Intelligence to amplify some of the problematic aspects of current state conducted cyber operations will require extension of the normative framework for responsible state behaviour in cyberspace to this potent new technology.The OEWG could draw upon the earlier work of the CCW’s GGE on Lethal Autonomous Weapons (LAWS) in formulating initial guidance in this regard. Finally, we would like to stress that the cumulative economic and financial cost of cyber incidents to national economies and in particular developing and emerging economies have become enormous. Therefore, it has become evident, that national cybersecurity building has become a necessary state function. However, many developing countries lack the necessary resources to build and maintain the required national cybersecurity institutions and technical and human capacities. Cybersecurity therefore must become a priority in national development strategies and cooperation agreements. The need for cybersecurity capacity building in developing countries has already been highlighted in the UN GGE 2015 report and should also be reflected in the OEWG outcomes.

Geneva, 4August 2019
Contact: Daniel Stauffacher, President, ICT4Peacedanielstauffacher@ict4peace.org

https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/ICT4PeaceBrief-OEWG-Aug42019.pdf