Even before our primate ancestors began to walk upright, there were wars—times when whole human communities or groups within a community tried to kill each other. Scholars have reached this conclusion partly on the basis of Jane Goodall’s discovery that our closest primate relative, the chimpanzee, engages in war,(1) and partly on the basis of archaeological evidence. One site of skeletons was found in Kenya dating back 9,500 to 10,500 years showing that a group of 27 people had been massacred together.(2) Indeed, there is strong evidence that levels of violence were higher in prehistoric times than today.(3) One example is a cemetery about 14,000 years old where about 45 percent of the skeletons showed signs of violent death.(4) An estimated 15 percent of deaths in primitive societies were caused by warfare.
But life did not consistently become friendlier as our species spread and developed. By one estimate, there were 14,500 wars between 3500 BC and the late twentieth century. These took around 3.5 billion lives.(5)
Can we conclude, then, that war is simply an intrinsic part of “human nature,” so that one cannot reasonably hope to overcome it? No, for there is more variation in the frequency and extent of warfare than can be attributed to genetic differences. In some societies, war is completely absent. Douglas Fry, checking the ethnographic records, identified 74 societies that have clearly been non-warring; some even lacked a word for “war.” The Semai of Malaysia and the Mardu of Australia are examples.(6)
We may gain insights about solutions to warfare by exploring the variations in its distribution, type, and intensity. We begin with the best news: We are probably living in the most peaceful period in human history!
Steven Pinker is the scholar who most convincingly argues that violence has declined, both recently and over the millennia. Pinker’s book Enlightenment Now, contains a graph showing the numbers of battle deaths by year from 1945 to 2015. A huge spike represents World War II, of course, for that was most lethal war in human history, causing at least 55 million deaths. How can we reconcile that ghastly number with any claim that the modern era is a peaceful epoch?
Pinker’s proof is based on distinguishing sharply between absolute numbers and rates. To be sure, 55 million is a huge number, but the Mongol Conquests killed 40 million people back in the thirteenth century, out of a world population only about one-seventh the size of the world’s 1950 population. Pinker says that if World War II had matched the Mongols’ stupendous rate of killing, about 278 million people would have been killed.
And there was an even worse war than the Mongol Conquest: the An Lushan Revolt of eighth century China, an eight-year rebellion that resulted in the loss of 36 million people — two-thirds of the empire’s population, and a sixth of the world’s population at the time. Had it matched that level of atrocity, considering the size of the world’s population in the 1940s, World War II would have killed 419 million people! Pinker calls An Lushan the worst war in human history. By his calculations, based on rates or percentages, World War II was only the ninth worst in history and World War I was the 16th worst.(7)
Moreover, Pinker shows that the two world wars were huge spikes in a graph of war deaths that has declined remarkably since 1950. There has been a slight upward bump since 2010, representing the civil war in Syria, but even that increase is minuscule in comparison to the rates of battle deaths over the preceding centuries.(8)
Pinker admits that there is no guarantee that this civilizing trend will continue, but he marshals much empirical evidence to explain it in terms of several historical changes. One was the transition to agriculture from hunting and gathering. This brought about a fivefold decrease in rates of violent death from chronic raiding and feuding.(9)
A second factor occurred in Europe between the Middle Ages and the 20th century when feudal territories were consolidated into large kingdoms with centralized authority and an infrastructure of commerce. This led to a tenfold-to-fiftyfold decline in homicide rates. There have been numerous other changes since then, including the abolition of such practices as slavery, dueling, sadistic punishment, and cruelty to animals. Since the end of World War II the downward trend has been remarkable.(10)
Nature
Unlike Steven Pinker, who attributes the current relatively wonderful degree of peacefulness to cultural and social changes in history, Dave Grossman attributes it to nature itself. In contrast to those who claim that human nature destines us to be killers, Grossman argues that people are “naturally” reluctant to kill members of their own species. In this respect we resemble other animals, for it is normal for animals to avoid killing their own species. When, for example, two male moose bash each other with their horns, they rarely do much real damage.
In fact, the human reluctance to kill their own kind poses a real problem for military leaders, who must induce their soldiers to fight wars. Lt. Col. Grossman himself had been responsible for training US Army Rangers, and he seems to have taken considerable pride in overcoming nature’s inhibitions.
Grossman cites Brigadier General S. L. A. Marshall’s book Men Against Fire, which showed that only 15 to 20 percent of the individual riflemen in World War II fired their weapons at an exposed enemy soldier.(11) Similar results can be shown in earlier wars as well, including for example the battlefield of Gettysburg, where of the discarded muskets later found there, 90 percent were still loaded.(12)
On the other hand, soldiers who work together as crews (e.g. in launching cannon-fire or flamethrowers together) do not show the same hesitation, nor do soldiers whose officers stand nearby, ordering them to fire. And distance matters too; stabbing an enemy is harder to do than shooting one a few meters away, and the farther away the enemy is, the easier it is to shoot him. Bombardiers rarely hesitate to drop shells on the people below, nor do drone operators sitting at controls in a different continent. Distance, team spirit and authority can apparently overcome nature’s misgivings.
In response to Marshall’s discovery, the U.S. military developed new training measures to break down this resistance. For example, instead of having soldiers fire at bulls-eye targets, the army now provides realistic human-shaped silhouettes that pop up suddenly and must be shot quickly. The training also relies on repetition; soldiers are required to shoot many, many times so they stop thinking about the possible implications of each shot.(13)
The best technological innovation for inuring fighters for battle is the video training simulator. As a result of using the equivalent to violent videogames, the military successfully raised soldiers’ firing rates to over 90 percent during the Vietnam War. Because of this “superior training,” Grossman claims that today “non-firers” are almost non-existent among U.S. troops.
While lauding the military for developing such excellent training systems, Grossman is scathing in criticizing the use of video games as entertainment. He maintains that the very methods that turn soldiers into superb killers will, and do, influence the players to become violent in real life. He blames the epidemic of school shootings, for example, largely on the exposure of teen-aged boys to violent films and especially violent video games.(14)
Moreover, the training of soldiers for battle does not protect them from the psychological consequences of fighting. In a study of World War II soldiers, after sixty days of continuous combat, 98 percent of all those surviving had become psychiatric casualties. One-tenth of all American military men were hospitalized for mental disturbances between 1942 and 1945.[14] Moreover, upon their return to civilian life, the incidence of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder remains high, and more veterans commit suicide than had been killed during the war. Also, the U.S. Army dismissed more than 22,000 soldiers for misconduct between 2009- 2016 after they returned from war with mental health problems or brain injuries.(15)
These facts clearly disprove the assertion that human nature itself destines us all to be killers; indeed, one might argue that, on the contrary, nature intends for us all to be peaceful. However, even that assertion is hard to sustain when we look at the evidence showing how widespread is the cultural pattern of glorifying war and warriors.
The Hero Warrior
Not everyone is reluctant to kill. On the contrary. For example, consider Mr. L, an Asian friend of ours whose brother was found decapitated on a forest trail. Mr. L knew who had done it — the army of Burma — so he went to the jungle and joined the resistance army. For seventeen years he was a sniper. Now living in Canada, he finds the memory hard to explain:
“Actually, I loved it. I probably killed about thirty men in all, and it was the greatest feeling! I was always so elated after killing an enemy soldier that I couldn’t sleep that night. That’s what I went to there to do, after all. But now? Well…”
No one in Canada glorifies Mr. L’s achievements, but in another time or place he might be considered a war hero. Brave, effective warriors have been honored by their own societies at least as far back as the ancient Assyrians and Greeks.
There were good reasons for it. When our ancestors still lived in caves, presumably some strong fellow volunteered to stand guard at night to keep out the saber-toothed tigers. His mother must have felt proud of him, and perhaps also praised him and his brave buddies for raiding the neighbors’ cave and bringing home valuable loot.
The Iliad is one long bloodcurdling story about heroes seeking to outdo each other in courage and brutality. Militarism is the belief or the desire of a government or a people that a state should maintain a strong military capability and use it aggressively to expand national interests and/or values.(16) Among the most intelligent militarists who glorified war was the philosopher Georg Hegel,(17) whose views were perfectly ordinary in the Prussian society of his day.
A century later in America militarism was not quite as popular, but the great American psychologist William James, who was a pacifist, could nevertheless understand and even respect it as a moral stance. He pointed out that young males need a thrilling opportunity to test their capacity for enduring physical hardship and surmounting obstacles. That is what sports are for, but James wanted this experience to involve sacrifice and a sense of service as well. He was seeking to innovate a rigorous substitute for military discipline whereby youths could instead contribute positively to society. James understood the emotional value and even romance of militarism, as shown in his sardonic depiction of war from the militarists’ point of view:
“Its ‘horrors’ are a cheap price to pay for rescue from the only alternative supposed, of a world of clerks and teachers, of co-education and zoophily, of ‘consumer’s leagues’ and ‘associated charities,’ of industrialism unlimited, and feminism unabashed. No scorn, no hardness, no valor any more! Fie upon such a cattleyard of a planet!”(18)
James believed that this “manly” yearning for hard challenges ought to be fulfilled. He proposed a system of national service whereby all young males would be conscripted to serve in a challenging role. (He called it a “war against nature,” which is a shocking notion today; we’d prefer to call it a “war for nature.”) He thought that privileged youths should have to experience at least once the hardships that poor people endure throughout their lives. And indeed, since James’s day, the United States and many other prosperous societies have developed programs such as the Peace Corps to fill that need. It is unlikely, however, that the challenges they offer overseas are comparable to the emotions of killing or stepping onto a landmine.
If Pinker’s fond hopes (and our own) could be fulfilled, the planet might indeed resemble what James’s militarists consider a boring “cattleyard” — but that seems unlikely to occur. Our war heroes are still celebrities. And many of them still commit suicide.
The Evolution or the Death of Warfare?
Pinker’s statistics are correct, but it is far too early to celebrate the impending death of war. Weaponry continues to become ever more deadly, and the history of warfare is best described in terms of the evolutionary improvement of weapons. We present in Table 1 the summary of those developments provided by Dave Grossman and Loren Christensen— who, oddly, have omitted today’s worst weapons of mass destruction, as well as the future of autonomous weapons and cyber weapons. These innovations require our utmost concern.
Table 1. Landmarks in the Evolution of Combat
Dates generally represent century or decade of first major, large-scale introduction
c. 1700BC Chariots provide key form of mobility advantage in ancient warfare
c. 400BC: Greek phalanx
c. 100BC: Roman system (pilum, swords, training, professional leadership)
c. 900AD: Mounted knight (stirrup greatly enhances utility of mounted warfare)
c. 1300: Gunpowder (cannon) in warfare
c. 1300: Wide scale application of long bow defeats mounted knights
c. 1600: Gunpowder (small arms) in warfare, defeats all body armor
c. 1800: Shrapnel (exploding artillery shells), ultimately creates renewed need for helmets, c. 1915
c. 1850: Percussion caps permit all-weather use of small arms *
c. 1870: Breech-loading, cartridge firing rifles and pistols
c. 1915: Machine gun
c. 1915: Gas warfare
c. 1915: Tanks
c. 1915: Aircraft *
c. 1915: Self-loading (automatic) rifles and pistols
c. 1940: Strategic bombing of population centers
c. 1945: Nuclear weapons
c. 1960: Large scale introduction of operant conditioning in training to enable killing *
c. 1960: Large scale introduction of media violence begins to enable domestic violent crime
c. 1965: Large scale introduction of helicopters in battle
c. 1970: Introduction of precision-guided munitions in warfare
c. 1980: Kevlar body armor provides first individual armor to defeat state-of-the-art small arms in over 300 years *
c. 1990: Large scale introduction of operant conditioning through violent video games begins to enable mass murders in domestic violent crime
c. 1990: First extensive use of precision guided munitions in warfare (approximately 10 percent of all bombs dropped), by Unites States forces in the Gulf War
c. 1990: Large scale use of combat stress inoculation in law enforcement, with the introduction of paint bullet training
c. 2000: Approximately 70 percent of all bombs used by United States forces in conquest of Afghanistan and Iraq are precision-guided munitions
c. 2000: Large scale use of combat stress inoculation in United States military forces, with the introduction of paint bullet combat simulation training *
* Represents developments influencing domestic violent crime.
Source: Grossman and Christensen, Evolution of Weaponry. Loc. 2058 in Kindle version
In a nutshell, weapons keep get more and more effective at killing, and the population keeps increasing (especially during the past century), so this might suggest a gloomy prediction: that we must expect a world war vastly larger than either of the two previous ones.
But neither Pinker nor Grossman have concluded that the magnitude of a war will inevitably be determined by either the population or the effectiveness of weapons. Pinker believes that the records of history show that war is rather randomly distributed over time and space, not following any discernable pattern.
Scholars know quite a lot about warfare in early civilizations, for we have epic stories such as Gilgamesh in Mesopotamia (about 2500 BCE) and Achilles versus Hector in Homer’s Greece (supposedly 1184 BCE).
The Hittites invented the chariot, and the Egyptians adopted it from them, though there were long intervals when chariots were not used in any Middle Eastern wars. Though the Greeks often used chariots, they would sometimes stop and dismount for hand-to-hand combat. The Greeks invented the phalanx, or row of middle-class citizen-soldiers(19) fighting side by side with their shields overlapping, with long pikes against an enemy’s phalanx.
But the elite warriors worked differently. Achilles, for example, would individually single out the enemy he considered a worthy match. Such a noble warrior might stroll across the battlefield to the enemy’s side, and call out their best fighter by name to come and fight him to the death. This kind of semi-organized warfare also has been practiced until recently in some paleolithic societies, such as in Papua New Guinea.(20)
We need not trace the complete evolution of weaponry from ancient times to now, except to mention a few dramatic innovations. One was the invention of gunpowder, which of course made it easy to kill large numbers of opponents. It was discovered in China during the late ninth century, but was not used in that country except for fireworks. It was adopted in the West, and ironically, much later, the Chinese were defeated by Westerners with firearms.
Historians debate why the Chinese did not use gunpowder(21) for military purposes, but the more interesting point is simply the fact that they did not. We can take this as evidence that technological innovation does not take an inevitable course, for sometimes a society opts not to perfect a weapon that offers the every prospect of improved effectiveness.
Much later, there were other extraordinary military discoveries that have been prohibited almost everywhere. Chemical weapons (notably chlorine, phosgene, and mustard gas.) were used in World War I. Although the Germans soon developed powerful nerve agents such as sarin, no chemical weapons were used in World War II. Some say that Hitler ruled out using them against troops because he had experienced gas poisoning during World War I. However, he did not hesitate to use them in his death camps. In the Geneva Protocol of 1925 the international community banned the use of chemical and biological weapons. In 1973 and 1993 the prohibition was even strengthened by the Chemical Weapons Convention, which bans the development, production, stockpiling and transfer of these weapons. By now 193 states have ratified that treaty and the whole world expresses shock whenever it is violated, as in the Syrian civil war in 2017.(22)
Likewise, biological agents could be, and have sometimes been, used effectively in warfare. For example, in 1763 the British forces defending Fort Pitt, near Philadelphia, gave blankets from smallpox patients to Indian chiefs who had come to negotiate an end to their conflict.(23)
Epidemics of disease have been a regular feature of warfare throughout the ages. Indeed, more people died of “Spanish flu” during World War I — between 20 million and 50 million(24) — than were killed by military action. When troops move around, they may be exposed to pathogens and carry them with them. However, such epidemics are not spread intentionally, and there is not only a norm against the use of biological agents to kill enemies, but it is also prohibited by the same treaty that bans the use of chemical weapons.
Thus it is evident that at times even the most horrible technological means of killing — gunpowder, chemical, and biological weapons — have been banned and the prohibitions against them have generally been obeyed. People sometimes opt not to use weapons that are available to them. Take heart, for this proves that war is not inexorable.
Yet not all of the worst weapons have been banned, and until they are abolished, one cannot be as optimistic as Steven Pinker in expecting the end of warfare. There are four crucial initiatives going on now to ban weapons. If all are fulfilled, such optimism will be wholly justified. These propose to (a) regulate the trade in conventional arms among nations to prevent the violation of human rights; (b) ban the existence of nuclear weapons, and (c) prohibit the development of lethal autonomous weapons — those sometimes called “killer robots” — and (d) regulate the potential for cyberattacks. Our Platform for Survival promotes each of these bans in specific planks.
The Arms Trade Treaty
It is not now realistic to ban all firearms or other conventional weapons, if only because we depend on states to authorize the use of weapons by police to protect citizens whenever necessary. Nevertheless, it is possible to reduce the incidence and violence of contemporary wars by preventing the transfer of conventional weapons (e.g. assault rifles and other military hardware such as armored personnel carriers) to insurgent groups or lawless states.
Most of the real wars in today’s world differ from what we previously thought of as war. Mary Kaldor calls them “new wars.”(25) For centuries, war had meant conflicts between states with the maximum use of violence. But these “new wars” combine war, organized crime, and human rights violations. They are sometimes fought by global organizations, sometimes local ones; they are funded and organized sometimes by public agencies, sometimes private ones. They resort to such tactics as terrorism and destabilizing the enemy with false information on the Internet.
What is a suitable response to such wars, given our historical assumption that, according to Max Weber’s definitions, a sovereign state is any organization that succeeds in holding the exclusive right to use, threaten, or authorize physical force against residents of its territory.(26) In a time of globalization, Kaldor insists that the monopoly of legitimate organized violence must be shifted from a national to a transnational level and that international peacekeeping must be redefined as law enforcement of global norms. Kaldor’s proposal is consistent with our Platform for Survival’s plank 25, which promotes the cosmopolitan notion of “sustainable common security.”
This approach can begin with the development of a treaty regulating (though not completely banning) the international trade in conventional weapons. Such an international law — the Arms Trade Treaty — was adopted in 2013, when 155 UN member states voted in favor of it and three against, with 23 abstentions. It entered into force on 24 December 2014 after the fiftieth state ratified it.
The treaty, if well enforced, can reduce the incidence and violence of wars. Although one might suppose that the main source of weaponry for “new wars” is the black market trade in illegal arms, that is not the case. Until now, most violent movements have obtained their weapons by purchasing them openly from states that are indifferent as to whether or not the “end users” are responsible. The Arms Trade Treaty prohibits countries from permitting the transfer of weapons to any group or state that violates human rights or international humanitarian law. However, the treaty is only a regulation between states, having no bearing on nations’ internal gun laws.
The Nuclear Bomb: The “Perfect Weapon”?
If there is such a thing as a “perfect sword,” or a “perfect storm,” then what would be a “perfect weapon”? Probably it would be a thermonuclear bomb. A nuclear bomb manifests precisely every attribute of an ideal killing machine; it is the consummate device for destroying enemies on an unlimited scale.
The largest hydrogen bomb that was ever exploded was the Soviet invention, Tsar Bomba, which was exploded by the Soviet Union on 30 October 1961 over Novaya Zemlya Island in the Russian Arctic Sea. It was equivalent to 58.6 megatons of TNT, and its fireball was five miles wide and could be seen from 630 miles away. It was ten times more powerful than all of the munitions expended during World War II combined. The blast wave orbited the earth three times. And even so, Tsar Bomba was only half the size that the inventors had originally planned to build. They had realized that exploding that a full-sized version might have been self-destructive. Indeed, such a weapon is too big ever to be used in a war. It is the “perfect weapon” — so good that it can kill everything, including its creators. No war with such weapons can ever be won. And, as Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan agreed, no nuclear war must ever be fought.
Tsar Bomba was only one bomb, and logically a single such perfect weapon ought to be enough — indeed, it should be “one too many.” You would want to dismantle it as soon as possible. But suppose your crazy enemy has such a bomb too. You might reasonably fear that, seeing you without one, he would take the opportunity to use his. To prevent that, you might want to keep some of these “perfect weapons” and declare that you will retaliate if he starts a fight.
That is what happened. The owners of nuclear weapons each kept a growing stockpile of them. Each side knew that any nuclear war would involve “mutual assured destruction” or “MAD” — the total annihilation of them all. Each side also knew that to explode one them in war would be an act of suicide, yet by 1986 there were 64,449 nuclear bombs on the planet.(27) Madness! But once such a situation of mutual deterrence is established, how can you end it?
The creators of “mutual assured destruction” proposed that the situation be reversed gradually by a process of “arm control.” The adversaries would meet, discuss their predicament, and agree to reduce their stockpiles in equal amounts, one step at a time. But this was tricky, for each side considered every weapon to be, not only a terrible threat, but also a necessity for “security.” It would be used only to deter the other side, keep the adversary from using his bomb.
But when your arsenals contain bombs of different sizes, in different types of delivery systems, it is hard to decide which combination of weapons to offer as your package, or what combination your adversary should offer to match yours. You could go on haggling over this kind of thing for decades.
As indeed the arms controllers have done. Negotiations for nuclear disarmament are supposed to take place by 55 states in Geneva — an organization called the Conference on Disarmament — “CD.” However, all decisions there require the unanimous consent of all parties— which never happens. No progress has been made at the “CD” since the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was negotiated in August 1996. In fact, the nuclear weapons states make it clear that they do not intend to relinquish their bombs within the foreseeable future, since they claim that their “security” depends upon retaining them.
In a strange sense, they are right. However weak a country may be, if it acquires a nuclear arsenal, any unfriendly country will think twice before threatening it. On the other hand, that is obviously an insane notion of “security.” The existence of a “perfect weapon” creates a logical paradox as well as a practical dilemma that no military leaders have solved.
The most humane solution to the paradox is one that the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev recognized and adopted in dealing with President Ronald Reagan during the Cold War. In this he was influenced by the German politician Egon Bahr, who explained in a 1994 interview:
“I came to a very astonishing result at that time. I thought, based on the mutual assured destruction, it’s quite obvious that neither side in a major nuclear exchange can win a war. So if this is true, then the result is in the political sphere — that the potential enemy becomes the partner of your own security and the other way around. In other words, despite the fact of the East-West conflict, both sides can live together or can die together. If this is true, we live in a period de facto of common security.
“And when I reached this result, I was surprised because this was against the experience of history. In history, when you fought, you had to beat the enemy. To become secure, you had to win a war. So, I wrote this down and I thought, better think it over.”(28)
This notion of common security became the guiding principle in the Palme Commission, which was then seeking solutions to the Cold War. The Russian participant in the Palme Commission, Georgy Arbatov, conveyed Bahr’s ideas to Mikhail Gorbachev, who was then the Soviet Minister of Agriculture. Evidently Gorbachev fully assimilated the notion to his own thinking. Shortly after he came to power, Egon Bahr met him and Gorbachev began explaining to him the idea of common security as if he had thought of it himself.(29)
Actually, however, Gorbachev’s notion of common security seems to have differed from that of Bahr, who believed that the situation of common security was created by, and even depended on, the existence of the relationship of mutual assured destruction. Gorbachev cannot have believed that, for it was he, more than anyone else, who sought to abolish all nuclear weapons for the sake of common security. And for about one day, October 11, 1986, in Reykjavik, Iceland he almost got his wish.
President Ronald Reagan shared Gorbachev’s recognition that nuclear war could never be won, and when the two men met in Iceland’s capital, Gorbachev offered to disarm every one of his nuclear weapons if the Americans would do the same with theirs. Since between them the two countries owned the vast majority of the world’s nuclear weapons, such a deal would have ended the arms race and moved humankind back closer to a state of genuine security.
Unfortunately, Ronald Reagan wanted to have both nuclear disarmament and a defence against nuclear weapons, lest any be kept and used to bomb the United States. He had developing a project called “Strategic Defense Initiative,” (then popularly called “Star Wars”) that he hoped would be able to intercept and destroy incoming nuclear missiles before they could reach their targets. If it worked, such a system would only be defensive; it could not attack an enemy but only defend against an enemy’s bombs. However, any country with such a “shield” would enjoy vast superiority over an enemy if it retained even a few nuclear weapons secretly, for its enemy would be helpless. Mutual Assured Destruction would no longer exist to confer its perverse version of “security” on both sides. Gorbachev realized that he could not trade away MAD for such partial progress. Thus the deal collapsed — much to the relief of Reagan’s advisers who had never wanted to give up their country’s nuclear arsenal at all. The subject was never officially broached again in the United States.
However, the conversation between the two superpower leaders did have benign effects. A year later the Soviet Union and the United States agreed to a new treaty, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of 1987. Both sides agreed to ban ground-launched missiles with a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. This removed the most frightening danger of that era, when both the Soviet side and the NATO side had been toe-to-toe, nearly installing weapons in Europe that would almost inevitably have led to a real nuclear war.
Indeed, Gorbachev went even further, removing Soviet troops from Eastern Europe and no longer promising to support any of the Communist regimes in that region, should their citizens wish to leave the Soviet sphere of influence — as indeed they did. In 1989, protests swept through those states and forced the Communist regimes, now lacking the support of Soviet military intervention, to relinquish power to formerly dissident political activists.
Nor was the Soviet Union itself exempt from opposition movements. In 1991 Gorbachev had to lower the Soviet flag from the Kremlin, for nationalism and the economic strains of transitioning to capitalism were fragmenting the union that he had led.
But the Cold War was over, and nuclear disarmament continued for several years, though relations between East and West never quite became cordial. Their last arms reduction agreement, the “New START” Treaty, was signed by Presidents Dmitri Medvedev and Barack Obama in 2010. Today there are still about 15,000 nuclear weapons on the planet, 90 percent of which belong to the US or Russia.(30) Moreover, to win approval of that treaty by the U.S. Senate, Obama had found it necessary to consent to modernizing the American nuclear arsenal, which is expected to cost about $1.5 trillion over the next thirty years—unless the Democrats now controlling the House of Representatives reverse that plan.
Tensions are still increasing, with Russia complaining that the US broke the promise it made to Gorbachev not to move NATO “one inch to the east” when he was so readily dismantling the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Indeed, he should probably have insisted that such a promise be recorded in a treaty, for most of the formerly Soviet bloc countries now hope to join NATO and several already have been admitted.
Moreover, although “Star Wars” never lived up to its promoters’ hopes, there is a continuing interest in defensive systems that can intercept incoming missiles in flight. NATO (read “the US”) is installing such a system called Aegis on ships in the Mediterranean, as well as ashore in Romania and Poland. Russia objects that these are not merely defensive, and in a recent paper Theodore A. Postol has shown that their objections are well founded. The canisters from which missiles can be launched in the Aegis Ashore system can easily have software installed that can launch cruise missiles, in violation of the INF Treaty.(31)
For its part, the US has accused Russia of violating the INF Treaty too by preparing to install a new missile that count hit Western European cities. Indeed, President Trump has announced his intention of withdrawing from the INF Treaty in six months and President Putin says he will develop new nuclear weaponry in response. We are in a new arms race.
Thus we see that the long experiment with arms control has failed to abolish nuclear weapons. What other options might succeed instead?
Though there is no prospect of speedy progress, the best alternative initiative is the “Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons” (TPNW), which was adopted (by a vote of 122 States in favour (with one vote against and one abstention) at the United Nations on 7 July 2017. It will enter into force 90 days after the fiftieth ratification has been deposited.(32)
The TPNW was the result, not of official arms control negotiations, but of action by civil society—notably an organization called the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN). According to all international public opinion polls, the majority of citizens of virtually every country have always wanted nuclear weapons to be abolished, but they have lacked any means of forcing the nuclear weapons states to comply. But the governments of Norway, Mexico, and Austria convened several conferences that flatly denied that nuclear weapons can ever make the world safer. The participants reminded everyone of the catastrophic humanitarian effects of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and showed that on numerous occasions nuclear missiles have nearly been exploded, sometimes by intention, sometimes by mistake. ICAN’s argument has been convincing, and nations are ratifying the TPNW more quickly than with most previous treaties.
So far, the nuclear weapons states just ignore the treaty. Nevertheless, ICAN was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2018 and continues pressing the nuclear states to comply, invoking shame to motivate them. To be sure, the leaders of all nuclear weapons states are shameless and are unmoved by humanitarian appeals to any ethical principles. On the other hand, they can no longer pretend to be progressing toward disarmament with the methods that they have used so far.
So the greatest threat lies ahead, when states are no longer inhibited by the INF treaty or, possibly, even by the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which may also be terminated if the nuclear arms race heats up. The US is making a new nuclear weapon only one-third the size of the Hiroshima bomb. One might consider such smaller bombs less dangerous than large ones, but that is not so. A small nuclear weapon is designed to be used in battle, not merely rattled ominously to intimidate or deter an enemy. We are in a post-MAD world now, and something new must be done to counter the threat.
Killer Robots and Cyberattacks
Gunpowder and nuclear weapons were “breakthroughs” in the development of weaponry. Now we must act quickly to prevent the development of other innovations with shocking potential: the application of artificial intelligence, robotics, and cyber-hacking to the development of weapons. Fortunately, we may still have enough time to stop lethal autonomous weapons, for the Pentagon is not yet working on producing them.(33) It is much harder to stop a weapons program after investors have sunk their savings into it and workers’ jobs would be lost by banning the weapon. Stopping cyberattacks will be harder to achieve, for there are already huge institutions using such systems.
In a way, it is entertaining to imagine two shiny robots fighting a duel — a nicer replay of the Iliad, when Achilles and Hector went mano-a-mano at Troy. If the two machines would merely kill each other we might even enjoy cheering for our side’s tin soldier, since no real blood would be shed. Unfortunately, lethal autonomous weapons will not be so restrained. Instead, they will be programmed to hunt down you or me–human adversaries. And if they have artificial intelligence, they may even learn to plan how to take over the world. Or at least such is the warning of some widely respected persons, including Elon Musk and Stephen Hawking.
But the Chinese rejected gunpowder, and we can reject killer robots and cyber war. The mechanism for opposing lethal autonomous weapons is a UN body that reviews and enforces a treaty called the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. Of course, killer robots are not plausibly considered “conventional,” but they are officially categorized as such because they are not chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. The common trait shared by all the banned so-called “conventional” weapons is that they are deemed “inhumane.” (Some of us do not consider any weapons humane except perhaps the darts that are used to tranquilize wild animals for medical treatment.) We must expect that lethal autonomous weapons, if allowed to select their own targets, would not be gentle, so there is an urgent need for such innovations to be prohibited.(34)
Cyberattacks are already a familiar experience for most of us, since we receive fraudulent phishing attacks or fake news in our social media all the time. Banks experience large losses through cyber theft, but prefer not to publicize that fact. There are even ransom attacks on civilians and hospitals, whereby the hacker promises to restore one’s computer to proper functioning only after receiving a large payoff. But these are mere annoyances when compared to an organized cyber war.
Indeed, a malevolent adversary can wreak terrible effects on any society today without firing any weapon. Already you are probably receiving “likes” on your Facebook account from foreign “bots” — fake accounts purporting to belong to someone who shares your values. The purpose is to lure you into reading posts that influence you to accept more extremist ideas or even to participate in extremist street demonstrations. We lack any easy means of identifying and intercepting these messages, though the political effects can indeed be significant in a democracy.
Still the effects of a violent cyber war can surpass these problems. It would be easy for the anti-ballistic missile defence system of any country or alliance to knock out the satellites belonging to its enemy. Already our electric grid and municipal water purification systems are vulnerable to attack, and we are entering the era of the “Internet of Things.” All our digital equipment— e.g. cars, door locks, kitchen stoves, phones — will be managed through remote systems that are vulnerable to hacking. If ten million electric cars stall at the same time on our streets, we will be helpless.
The plans to manage these threats are almost exclusively military: deter your enemy by proving that you can retaliate powerfully to any cyberattack. In 2010 the Obama Administration established a military Cyber Command in the military, and the US is not unique. Out of 114 states with some form of national cyber security programs, 47 assign some role to their armed forces.(35) Russia has already used cyberattacks against Estonia and Georgia; Israel has used them against Syria in conjunction with its bombing of a covert nuclear facility; and the US has used them (a cyber “worm” called “Stuxnet”) against Iran’s nuclear enrichment plant. None of these advanced countries seem genuinely interested in reaching an international agreement to regulate or ban any of their cyber activities.
On the other hand, there have been ostensible efforts to create limits. Obama’s administration called for some action and In 2011 China and Russia submitted a Code of Conduct for Information Security to the UN General Assembly. Most of the proposals in it were innocuous, but one clause asserted all states’ sovereign right to protect their ”information space”. The vagueness of this principle left others wondering whether the whole code of conduct was meant as a serious proposal or as only a cover for problematic intentions. There is an urgent need for international law to prevent cyber war.
Is Militarism the Main Problem?
War and weapons constitute only one of the six global threats that we must urgently address, since any one of them could destroy civilization within a short interval. If we are to strategize and decide how to solve the six threats together, it may be useful to identify which option may have the largest payoff. Probably the answer is this: reduce militarism.
You may ask: Why militarism? Answer: Because war and weapons cause or exacerbate all five of the other global threats. By reducing the national armed forces (we probably cannot eliminate them entirely) we will reduce all the other risks.
Global warming is a danger on the same scale as war. To solve it we must urgently halt the emissions of greenhouse gas from every expendable human activity. And war is not only expendable, but abolishing it would benefit every person involved.
Moreover, it harms all the rest of us by emitting vast amounts of carbon. Manufacturing each gun, each airplane, each tank, each bomb, each bomb or bullet emits greenhouse gas. Flying the planes, shooting the bullets emits it too. The Pentagon is the largest consumer of fuel in the world. When it conducts a military operation overseas, such as in Afghanistan or Iraq, forty percent of the cost goes for transporting the fuel for use there. Then that fuel is used for injuring people and destroying buildings that later must be reconstructed, emitting even more carbon.
Suppose every country reduces its military by, say, 80 percent by the year 2030. No one can say with certainty how much this would reduce the CO2 in the planet’s atmosphere. However, one of the strongest arguments for cutting military expenditures is to limit climate change.
But militarism imposes huge opportunity costs. Diverting the money from militarism could enable other essential innovations, including limiting climate change. Global military expenditures between 1995 and 2016 hovered at about 2.3% of the world’s total Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The Sustainable Development Goals could be met with about half of that amount. In other words, such a shift in expenditures would enable humanity’s unmet needs to be provided, for health, education, agriculture and food security, access to modern energy, water supply and sanitation, telecommunications and transport infrastructure, ecosystems, and emergency response, humanitarian work, plus climate change mitigation and adaptation.(36)
The most grave threat besides the risk of nuclear war is climate change, and the most promising way of reducing CO2 in the air is by planting about a trillion trees. But that will cost vast sums. The only likely source of such funds is by diverting budgets from military activities to afforestation. Reducing militarism is the best — maybe the only realistic — way to reduce climate change. Unfortunately, in Kyoto and Paris accords, no country is even obliged to report /em> its military activities as part of its commitment to reduce CO2 emissions.
The other global threats are also all connected to militarism. For example, the only famines in the world today are not the result of food shortages. They are all created deliberately as acts of war or to subdue a population. For example, Saudi Arabia has blockaded food shipments into Yemen precisely to starve the Yemeni population into submission. And the people of Venezuela are starving because of their government’s deliberate policies to suppress protests against a military-backed regime. Famines are designed to violate human rights. Ending militarism would be a decisive step toward ending famine.
Likewise, ending militarism would reduce the incidence of epidemics. Historically, soldiers on the move carry diseases with them and spread them wherever they go. Germ warfare is prohibited by international law now but, as usual, more of the famine victims in Yemen are dying from diseases such as cholera than are actually starving to death or dying in battle. When people are weakened by stress and deprivation, they succumb to diseases. War is a cause.
Furthermore, ending militarism would reduce the risks of massive exposure to radioactivity. The original reason for creating reactors was to produce plutonium for nuclear bombs. Only later did anyone think of using the heat from these reactors as a means of generating electricity. Today large swathes of land are poisoned by radioactive waste, as for example around Hanford, Washington, where the Manhattan Project produced the radioactive ingredients for America’s nuclear arsenal. Seventy years later, the Hanford area is still poisonous and, as Ronan Farrow has reported, “Clean up of the toxic material at the Hanford Nuclear Site is expected to take 50 years.”(37) Numerous other contaminated military sites exist around the world, including battlefields in Syria and Iraq littered with depleted uranium(38) and a leaking dome-shaped dump in the Marshall Islands.(39)
There are countless ways of using radioactivity as a weapon of war. Crashing a plane into an enemy’s reactor may create a plume that would circle the planet, falling everywhere or polluting the oceans. Terrorist organizations are known to be seeking access to radioactive materials, probably for “dirty bombs” that will not explode but will contaminate large areas. The more radioactive waste there is in the world, the more opportunities will inevitably exist for these to become weapons. A solution to the problem requires two approaches: (a) managing the radioactive waste itself for many thousands of years, and (b) reducing the militarism that misuses these wastes as weapons. The technological challenge of burying the waste is probably easier than the social challenge of changing militaristic thinking.
Finally, reducing militarism obviously will reduce the risk of cyberattacks. Indeed, when we speak of cyberattacks, most people assume that we are speaking of a military attack, though there are probably more such attacks waged every day by civilian criminals stealing from businesses and individuals than are sponsored by foreign governments.
All six threats tend to interact causally, so that we need to address them together as a system. Nevertheless, there may be more “leverage” available by quickly demanding a reduction of militarism than through any other direct policy changes.
Still, this will not be easy. People have their jobs and their live savings tied up in the military-industrial complex and will not readily change to projects that can actually save the world. And they will argue that their security depends on having a robust military to defend their country from attack. Their concerns cannot properly be disregarded. If militarism is to be reduced, some other form of armed protection is necessary. We would not, for example, abolish the police in a country or city, for doing so always results in more crime and violence. A few countries (notably Costa Rica) have abolished their armed forces, but they still have police. Something similar must be provided at the international level. Two planks in the Platform for Survival call for the development of “sustainable common security” and a United Nations Emergency Peace Service, which would quickly rush to protect people anywhere in the world who are in danger of attack.
But how many people would trust the United Nations to protect them? There are surely good reasons for skepticism, since the Security Council is controlled ultimately by the veto power of five major states. Only a more democratically accountable body in the United Nations can be trusted to protect people equally, without regard to alliances and enmities between states. Hence, in the Enabling Measures section of the Platform for Survival, we consider some reforms of the United Nations that will make the United Nations a more reliable source of security.
All of these reforms, if introduced together, can reduce militarism and the risks that flow from war and weapons. This argues for a policy assigning top priority to the drastic, worldwide reduction of armed forces as the best means of saving the world from all six global threats.
Footnotes for this article can be seen at the Footnotes 1 page on this website (link will open in a new page).
CHAT BOX FOR EPISODE 570 GLOBAL TOWN HALL SEPT 2023
14:04:18 From Adam Wynne To Everyone:
I will be back in a moment.
14:04:58 From Kolavennu K K Chand To Everyone:
Good Day to all.
14:05:38 From Kolavennu K K Chand To Metta Spencer(Privately):
Good morning Metta. Its odd time in Australia.
14:15:12 From Adam Wynne To Everyone:
Dinesh – can you please make a note of the attendees.
14:15:37 From Adam Wynne To Everyone:
I am grateful you are here in case Metta has issues. I will rejoin later.
14:20:39 From Mike S Goodmann To Everyone:
BRICS will rise again!
14:25:41 From Mike S Goodmann To Everyone:
there’s also still child labour and caste in India!
14:30:39 From Kolavennu K K Chand To Everyone:
The timing for this issue between India and Canada brings surprise for India that there is some mischief by external to these two Nations to create drift for their own interest.
14:32:56 From Paul Werbos To Everyone:
India has real problems, yes. So does every major nation on earth. So we must be wary but move and help.
14:34:00 From Paul Werbos To Everyone:
CLIMATE was pushed hard by Senator Swarner and Roscoe Bartlett on climate, but Bartlett got kicked out by means I do not like. Now a problem.
14:40:34 From Paul Werbos To Everyone:
CLIMATE: Navy has unique capabilities to track the changes in ocean current (Gulf Stream and Humboldt) which are the worst climate threat of all to human life. I wish that capability could be better mobilized!
14:41:23 From Mike S Goodmann To Everyone:
Bombardier also made cars for the NY subway system!
14:56:04 From Mike S Goodmann To Everyone:
at least the “Golden dawn” self-destructed there!
15:03:41 From Mike S Goodmann To Everyone:
Ukraine would probably have to concede the Crimea in such a case.
15:06:31 From Mike S Goodmann To Everyone:
In the case of Crimea, it was unilaterally ceded by Krushchev in 1954 to Ukraine, with dubious legality.
15:10:40 From Don Smith To Everyone:
How about the corporate-militarist regime in D.C.?
15:10:59 From Paul Werbos To Everyone:
Putin will substantially strengthen its hand
15:12:10 From Mike S Goodmann To Everyone:
Pundits were long predicting that Putin would, for health reasons, not survive 2023. Today that prediction looks much less likely!
15:12:45 From Paul Werbos To Everyone:
When Russia annexed Crimea, my JCH contacts hoped for a deal for UN sponsored plebiscites, which would allowCromeans to go with Russia if they choose by Galicia to Poland.
15:13:42 From Mike S Goodmann To Everyone:
Paul, Is there a desire by Galicians to join Poland?
15:14:00 From Don Smith To Everyone:
Andre seems to be assigning all blame on Putin. I thought that most people in this group realize that the U.S. shares a large proportion of the responsibility for what’s happening, due to overly aggressive NATO expansion
15:14:01 From Paul Werbos To Everyone:
Galicia: when I was in Lvov, they were Catholic.
15:14:42 From Mike S Goodmann To Everyone:
Paul, Of course it’s now called Lviv, since the war began! lol
15:17:38 From Mike S Goodmann To Everyone:
To say nothing of the colossal US mistake in Afghanistan!
15:17:49 From Paul Werbos To Everyone:
Every major nations on earthnhas made horrendous errors. Only a new agreement, like Pareto optimal path, offers any hope of humans surviving.
15:19:50 From Mike S Goodmann To Everyone:
Include the greatest mistake-make Henry Kissinger who recently celebrated his centennial!
15:20:01 From Don Smith To Everyone:
Please read https://progressivememes.org/senior-US-diplomats-academics-journalists-and-secretaries-of-defense-say-the-US-provoked-Russia-in-Ukraine.html
15:20:27 From Don Smith To Everyone:
Former U.S. Ambassador to the USSR Jack Matlock says in Ukraine: Tragedy of a Nation Divided:
“Interference by the United States and its NATO allies in Ukraine’s civil struggle has exacerbated the crisis within Ukraine, undermined the possibility of bringing the two easternmost provinces back under Kyiv’s control, and raised the specter of possible conflict between nuclear-armed powers. Furthermore, in denying that Russia has a “right” to oppose extension of a hostile military alliance to its national borders, the United States ignores its own history of declaring and enforcing for two centuries a sphere of influence in the Western hemisphere.”
15:21:05 From raptisl@queensu.ca To Everyone:
When it is a superpower, they DO have to be more careful. Small countries make mistakes but they do not blow up the world…
15:21:22 From Don Smith To Everyone:
Ambassador Michael Gfoeller and David H. Rundell: in Newsweek‘s Lessons From the US Civil War Show Why Ukraine Can’t Win:
“Before the war, far right Ukrainian nationalist groups like the Azov Brigade were soundly condemned by the US Congress. Kiev’s determined campaign against the Russian language is analogous to the Canadian government trying to ban French in Quebec. Ukrainian shells have killed hundreds of civilians in the Donbas and there are emerging reports of Ukrainian war crimes. The truly moral course of action would be to end this war with negotiations rather than prolong the suffering of the Ukrainian people in a conflict they are unlikely to win without risking American lives.”
15:22:03 From Don Smith To Everyone:
Christopher Caldwell: in the New York Times‘ The War in Ukraine May Be Impossible to Stop. And the US Deserves Much of the Blame:
“In 2014 the United States backed an uprising – in its final stages a violent uprising – against the legitimately elected Ukrainian government of Viktor Yanukovych, which was pro-Russian.”
15:22:29 From Don Smith To Everyone:
Neoconservative Robert Kagan writes in an otherwise hawkish Foreign Affairs essay from May, 2022, The Price of Hegemony: Can America Learn to Use its Power?:
“Although it is obscene to blame the United States for Putin’ inhumane attack on Ukraine, to insist that the invasion was entirely unprovoked is misleading. …. the invasion of Ukraine is taking place in a historical and geopolitical context in which the United States has played and still plays the principal role, and Americans must grapple with this fact.”
15:22:45 From Don Smith To Everyone:
I will stop. Again, see https://progressivememes.org/senior-US-diplomats-academics-journalists-and-secretaries-of-defense-say-the-US-provoked-Russia-in-Ukraine.html for many more such quotes.
15:23:16 From raptisl@queensu.ca To Everyone:
The Azov brigades persecuted all minorities in Crimea, including Greeks.
15:27:26 From raptisl@queensu.ca To Everyone:
Thank you very much for the link!
15:28:31 From Don Smith To Everyone:
Pope Francis said: The real “scandal” of Putin’s war is NATO “barking at Putin’s door.”
15:29:30 From Don Smith To Everyone:
Pope Francis said it, not me!
15:30:58 From Don Smith To Everyone:
“mistake” is an understatement.
15:33:17 From Don Smith To Everyone:
The U.S. is using the poor Ukrainians as pawn in a vicious chess game. As Henry Kissinger said, “To be an enemy of America can be dangerous, but to be a friend is fatal.” That applies double to Ukraine.
15:33:35 From Charles David Tauber To Everyone:
If anyone is interested in trauma work in conflict regions and the human side of conflict, please contact me at cwwppsummer@gmail.com. Our website is http://www.cwwpp.org
15:33:40 From Paul Werbos To Everyone:
A real worry: if that propaganda machine keeps working overtime, will we get a Manchurian candidate in US in 2024? Will Putin make a deal like Stalin’s supporting worse?
15:35:11 From Mike S Goodmann To Everyone:
what I fear most is that we’ll get Trump back in ’24, unless he’s convicted on the classified documents chagres before Nov. ’24!
15:38:49 From raptisl@queensu.ca To Everyone:
The problem is that even if he IS convicted, he will have support and get elected. Mindboggling! Impossible to comprehend.
15:40:35 From Paul Werbos To Everyone:
Russian popularity changed after they started killing so many.
15:42:21 From Alexey Prokhorenko To Everyone:
This is exactly why Putin’s regime is waiting for a presumed victory of Donald Trump next year.
15:44:16 From Don Smith To Everyone:
Carnegie Endowment for Peace and Foreign Affairs documented that a majority of the people of Crimea welcomed Russia’s annexation of their territory in 2014: Denis Volkov and Andrei Kolesnikov’s My Country, Right or Wrong: Russian Public Opinion on Ukraine (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 7, 2022); John O’Loughlin, Gerad Toal and Kristin M. Bakke’s To Russia With Love: A Majority of Crimeans are Still Glad for Their Annexation (Foreign Affairs, April 3, 2020
15:46:25 From Don Smith To Everyone:
NATO
15:47:06 From Paul Werbos To Everyone:
I keep hoping the more effective and intelligent people in Russia might relearn and enhance Hegel — and {Putin is sheer antithesis.
15:47:15 From Alexey Prokhorenko To Everyone:
So does it mean that we agree that one country can dictate others what they should do?
15:48:26 From Paul Werbos To Everyone:
It means we need intelligent synthesis, win win, Pareto step by step, including transparent cyber systems containing weapons.
15:48:53 From Don Smith To Everyone:
The U.S. has about 700 military bases in over 70 countries. It bombs and drones all over the world. It sanctions many countries. Yet it’s $33 trillion in debt. It’s a dying empire.
15:49:11 From Mike S Goodmann To Everyone:
stack – brief comment
15:49:38 From Don Smith To Everyone:
The U.S. dictates things all over the world.
15:50:47 From Don Smith To Everyone:
The U.S. is now occupying 1/3 of Syria.
15:52:33 From Paul Werbos To Everyone:
Dat is money. Money is now an internet app. We need new ecybercontracts to balance money.
16:00:45 From Don Smith To Everyone:
They were civil.
This is the report of the CWWPP for 2022. It indicates that there can be no peace without work on the trauma of war. We welcome correspondence and discussion to cwwppsummer@gmail.com
Would you like to end war and to create a culture of peace? Join our 6 hour course Ending War 101 that looks at “Can War be Ended?, Is a “Just War” even possible?, What does Tolerating War Cost Us? and What Can We Do?” please register at https://actionnetwork.org/forms/ending-war-101-making-the-impossible-possible/ The course is on now in Sept. 2023
CHAT BOX FOR EPISODE 564 GLOBAL TOWN HALL JULY 2023
Chat Global Town Hall July 2023
14:05:12 From Paul Werbos : I still cannot hear anything. my wife might fix it but you have ai e session so.
14:05:18 From Marilyn Krieger, CCBC : My latest article–I welcome feedback/comments: https://urbanedgewildlife.org/you-can-make-a-difference/
14:12:15 From Marilyn Krieger, CCBC : Sandy, please send me an e-mail. our work and interests overlap: Marilyn@urbanedgewildlife.org
14:12:48 From Sandy Greer : Sandy Greer’s email address is sandygreer36@gmail.com, and invite addresses from fellow participants to continue conversations. Thanks so much to Metta for providing this forum. 🙂
14:31:04 From Peace And Justice Alliance : From Peace And Justice Alliance, Now western countries become safe haven for the Bangladesh dirty money owners, many kleptocrats of Bangladesh present autocratic regime (Since 2009 regime keeping power without people mandate) perpetrators politicians, businessmen & bureaucrats has been transferred billions of billions dollars illicit assets to USA, Canada, Europe, UAE, Malaysia, Australia. When millions of marginalized people dying without basic needs. Now poor & disadvantages people of Bangladesh urgently calling to Global leaders and international community to freeze & recover stolen poor people assets also take necessary action against the autocratic regime of Bangladesh and dirty money owners to bring peace, stability and equality. Kindly assist our campaign for Bangladesh people human rights & Democracy thanks email: peaceandjusticealliance@gmail.com;
14:36:18 From judithhand : Delighted by the interests of everyone here that relate to creating a more peaceful, nurturing future. My work, as a Ph.D., is specifically focused on how we might end war, and I approach it from the perspective of evolutionary biology. My extensive website, developed over 20 years, offers a broad perspective via videos, essays, book and film reviews, and much more. Most distinctive is the perspective on the issue conflict with respect to gender differences, stressing the critical role women would play in securing a treaty that might end international wars. The website is http://www.afww.org. Under the “Overview” you will find a dropdown list offering a “Study Guide” that can direct you to topics of particular interest to you.
14:37:12 From Peace And Justice Alliance : Hi from Peace And Justice Alliance, There is no space for peaceful protest & criticize Bangladesh autocratic regime abuse of power, corruption and human rights violation. In 2014 & 2018 people of Bangladesh has observed stolen election. Since 2009 every day critics & opposition activist are facing Gov’t oppression, inhuman torture and illegal imprisonment. Gov’t has politicized whole Electoral, Judicial & Administration system. Also has been patronizing mass corruption and bribery. How your organization, UN & Transatlantic mechanism will take urgent necessary measures under The Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability act 2016, The Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018 and the Global Fragility Act-2019 to avoid internal conflicts & crisis also restore neutral vote, democracy, social justice and human rights in Bangladesh soon, kindly assist our campaign peaceandjusticealliance@gmail.com.
14:38:28 From WINDOWS 11 : This is an invitation to all those with Peace ideas and proposals to the 2-day International Summit for Global Peace in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Ideally, it would be great if individuals or organizations they represent could finance the trip (the host will provide all meals throughout the Summit). However, as the event will be live-streamed, registered speakers will be able to make their presentation via Zoom. Please enter hufud.org for all basic details and names of the Peace and Human Rights organizations already registered for participation. If interest, do get in touch with me asap through this e-mail address: info.hufud@gmail. com Look forward to hearing from many Peace activists and Peace lovers. Alberto (HUFUD President)
15:04:24 From Charles David Tauber : Hi, just to show that I’m still alive and recovering very slowly. I won’t stay long. I’m trying to come back as quickly as possible. There are enough traumatized people, so that, if I recover, I have enough work to do.
15:13:47 From WINDOWS 11 : What does it mean Civil Council on Defense? defense only exists if their is attack. There is no Defense industry, as politicians call it. Theree is War industry. Attackers and Defenders use the same killing toys. And it is wrong to call Russia the ‘invader’. Simply Russia started the game of war, negotiated over months with Ukraine. No war in the world is an ‘accident’. If war breaks out, it means all fighting parties agreed to the game, to the delight of the War industry. If you really do not agree with the war, abolish Militarism, abolish Armed Forces, abolish the War industry.
15:14:14 From Civil Council on Defense and Security/Shorena : non governmental organization http://www.civilcouncil.org
15:14:28 From Civil Council on Defense and Security/Shorena : http://www.nonproliferation.ge
15:16:54 From Peace And Justice Alliance : As you knew that Bangladesh is a fragile country, since 2009, Bangladesh present autocratic regime to keep power without people vote, to avoid conflict & crisis we have been working with Bangladesh people to restore democracy, human rights and social rights, we never received any grant or fund from funders, our organization needs urgent fund to implement our programs and events in Bangladesh. We would be grateful to you and your organization to kindly assist us with fund and other resources and solidarity and support us as soon as possible to bring peace and stability in Bangladesh. Look forward to hear from you soon, thanks, Email : peaceandjusticealliance@gmail.com;
15:21:47 From WINDOWS 11 : Canada makes and exports billions of dollars in tanks, air-fighters and many more killing toys. Many people the world over die from Canadian artillery and munitions. I suggest you Canadians start by campaigning to stop Canadian contribution to so much human suffering, to producing so much death, injured people, destroyed families, societies, communities, buildings, economies and Nature. And work towars the end of this immorality and inhumanity worldwide.
15:21:47 From Bruna Nota To Metta Spencer(privately) : Thank you, Metta, most interesting and stimulating … unfortunately I need to leave now. Will tray to come back soon.
15:21:58 From Liz : Thank you Anita, for bringing up these points. I’m also struggling with these alternative/competing narratives.
15:23:56 From WINDOWS 11 : Planting Armed Forces to create Peace is as absurd as planting an apple sewed to grow bananas
15:27:57 From Liz : Governments have too much power
15:28:51 From Richard Denton : https://worldbeyondwar.org/endingwar101/ for an excellent 6 hour course on Ending War by World Beyond War and Helen Peacock, a Rotarian from Collingwood, Ontario.
15:31:31 From Rose Dyson : SOME governments have too much power. Demonizing the power of democratic regimes to establish rules and regulations for the purposes of ensuring peace, order and good government, addressing climate change and addressing corporate excesses involving media are some examples of the need for government
15:31:43 From Richard Denton : Yes, CANSEC is the largest arms sales in North America and is held annually in Ottawa. Various peace people have protested and this year delayed our Minister of “Defence” by over an hour to speak. We have protested Canada buying F35s.
15:33:22 From Leda Raptis : The peace group is called CODEPINK. I got the book from Amazon (~15$). Authors: Medea Benjamin and Nicolas Davies. Title: War in Ukraine, making sense of a senseless conflict. Medea Benjamin was awarded the US peace memorial foundation’s peace prize, the 2014 Gandhi peace award and the Martin Luther King Jr peace prize. Supported by Mairead McGuire (Nobel peace prize), Noam Chomsky and others
15:33:41 From Richard Denton : We have 16 cities that have signed the ICAN Cities Appeal that support the TPNW. These are the largest cities and others.
15:35:59 From WINDOWS 11 : I invited World Beyond War to my Summit for Global Peace but they are not interested because they do not agree with HUFUD. They, like the International Peace Bureau, promise to achieve Peace whilst Governments go on promoting War, which is the ONLY thing you can do with machine guns, bullets, landmines, grenades, bombs, rockets, rocket launchers, tanks, torpedoes, bombing helicopter, drones and airFIGHTERS, and WAR ships.
15:36:15 From Richard Denton : We continue to interest the public by remembering Hiroshima and Nagasaki this 6th and 9th of August.
15:39:11 From WINDOWS 11 : waste of time, United Nations keeps promoting nuclear research at their Centre in Geneva, Switzerland. Most nuclear weapon scientists trained there. And Japan is now militarized again.
15:41:19 From Marilyn Krieger, CCBC : Windows 11 would you please write your name here in the chat. I must have missed it when you initially told us in the intros. Thank you.
15:44:37 From WINDOWS 11 : A nuclear explosion destroyed so much of Beyruth. Underwater nuclear explosions have cased tsunamis. The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament achieved NOTHING. Alberto. You can find me here hufud.org
15:45:10 From WINDOWS 11 : what’s your name?
15:45:53 From Marilyn Krieger, CCBC : Marilyn
15:47:31 From WINDOWS 11 : what moves you to be involved in Peace movements?
15:48:36 From Leda Raptis : The cold war tried to convince Gleek schoolkids that “Russians and Greeks were age-old enemies”. Lots of BS!!! Why are Russians orthodox? Two Greek (Byzantine Empire) monks, Kyrrilos and Methodios went to Russia and taught the alphabet and the religion. Later, Catherine the Great of Russia was an admirer of Byzantine etc culture, she named Odessa after Odysseas, ie Ulysses. In Odessa the revolution against the turks started in ~1810. Why? Because the Russians gave cover.
15:55:16 From WINDOWS 11 : The past is the past and we cannot change it but we can change the future. The tragic current war between Ukraine and Russia is also possible because brainwashing people is so easy. Hitler was amused to see this phenomenon; used to say “when I came to Germany there was a handful of anti-Jews and now there are 60 million of them because of my talent for brainwashing.
15:55:16 From Jill Carr-Harris : Richard Denton: Could you give me the dates of the course you are running…??
15:57:12 From Richard Denton : Course starts 4th of September for 3 weeks
15:57:16 From Richard Denton : https://worldbeyondwar.org/endingwar101/
15:57:26 From Leda Raptis : An attempt was made in ~March 2022 to negotiate peace in Ukraine and stop the war. Erdogan invited everybody in Antalya, Turkey. The talks failed, why? Because The US-side said that now is the opportunity to “weaken Russia”, they are weak, we can blast them now. I do not think it will be possible to stop the war if NATO proclaims that they want to expand… NATO is a military organisation, formed in 1949 specifically against Russia…. And they are a nuclear superpower, so if they are pushed in a corner, they may use them and then, godhelpus… So, negotiation, ie talking is the only way.
15:57:46 From Richard Denton : adam – what is the link to your calendar please
15:58:47 From Jill Carr-Harris : Thanks Richard.
16:00:33 From WINDOWS 11 : Erdogan makes millions out of wars. The last thing he cares about is human life. What he did was a ‘political’ entrance into the international arena
UKRAINE NEEDS A PEACE PLAN – AND SOMEONE TO CHAMPION IT
By Cesar Jaramillo
Well over a year into the devastating armed conflict in Ukraine, discussions on how to end it are disconcertingly absent from public and political discourse. Such silence not only indicates the fractious state of global affairs but constitutes a disservice to the people who continue to suffer in this brutal war. It also perpetuates a perilous gamble, with the very real risk of nuclear escalation.
Both Ukraine and Russia persist in pursuing a decisive military victory that can only prolong the fighting. At the same time, the fervour for a battlefield win stands in stark contrast with a lack of clarity and consensus on what victory would entail in practice – or what all the ongoing sacrifice and pain and loss are ultimately for.
Rather than clinging to the notion of military triumph, the international community must shift the focus to an exploration of diplomatic and negotiated solutions. It is crucial for all parties involved in the war –including allies – to engage in meaningful dialogue, recognize the limitations of military force, and seek a negotiated settlement that is built on the principles of fairness, justice, mutual security, and respect for territorial integrity and the right to self-determination.
Ukraine is in dire need of a comprehensive peace plan that is championed by a credible party who is willing to invest the necessary political and diplomatic capital. Unfortunately, after hundreds of thousands of casualties, no one has stepped forward to shepherd such a plan.
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A credible third party
In theory, Ukraine and Russia could engage in direct negotiations, with no third party. But bilateral talks usually occur when the parties have established channels of communication, trust, and a shared willingness to resolve conflict peacefully. These conditions do not exist.
A credible third party can act as guarantor and assist in establishing communication, facilitating dialogue, and guiding the negotiation process. This party must be demonstrably impartial and able to garner broad-based support and trust from all parties with a stake in the conflict.
The United Nations (UN), with its resources and experience in conflict resolution, could serve as a trusted mediator. It has facilitated peace talks in conflicts around the world and possesses the diplomatic channels to engage with both Russia and Ukraine.
The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), a regional security organization that includes both Russia and Ukraine, is also well placed to facilitate negotiations. The OSCE’s experience in conflict resolution, its extensive network of diplomatic contacts, and its commitment to promoting dialogue and cooperation could provide a solid foundation for the negotiation process.
The European Union (EU) has capacity and could draw on its mediation experience and economic influence to facilitate peace processes. The EU’s history of mediating conflicts between member states, as in the Balkans, demonstrates a capacity to engage in peace processes. Moreover, the EU has a stake in the stability and security of the region and in a stable Ukraine and Russia.
The Normandy Format – comprising Germany, France, Russia, and Ukraine – was instrumental in previous peace talks and could continue to play a significant role. Building on the Minsk agreements, this format brings together key stakeholders with a vested interest in resolving the conflict and could be expanded to include additional international actors.
Undoubtedly a global diplomatic power, the United States has, on paper, the potential to contribute significantly to peace negotiations in Ukraine. It is well positioned to facilitate dialogue, provide resources, and exert diplomatic pressure.
However, extensive American military support of Ukraine has further strained already tense relations with Russia, which would be unlikely to accept the United States as a neutral mediator. The same would be true for some of the groups mentioned above, which have members that align firmly with Ukraine, providing it with military and other support.
China also has the necessary diplomatic influence and global stature. However, China’s diplomatic efforts have been met with profound skepticism in the West, as was seen in the dismissive response to the Chinese peace proposal for Ukraine this past February. Its failure to garner significant support from Western nations reflects underlying concerns about China’s geopolitical motivations and potential influence on the negotiation process.
Setting the stage
Each passing day of the conflict in Ukraine exacts a growing toll and increases the likelihood of nuclear disaster. To stop the carnage and avoid the worst consequences, it is critical that negotiations begin without delay. At this point, it should be abundantly clear that the determination of both Ukraine and Russia to pursue military gains will not secure real peace. At a minimum, a parallel commitment to negotiations is needed.
However, for negotiations to be effective, leaders in both Russia and Ukraine must be willing to engage in meaningful dialogue. At present, there is no indication that either side is open to a diplomatic solution.
It is up to the international community to create an environment that fosters dialogue, builds trust, and displays a sincere commitment to resolving the conflict through diplomatic means. Only in such an atmosphere can effective negotiations begin.
The status of battle lines
A building in Lebedyn, in southern Ukraine, destroyed by shelling on March 9, 2023. Photo by ADifferentMan – Own work, CC BY-SA 4.0
One of the key hurdles in initiating peace negotiations is the fear that agreeing to talks would result in accepting or freezing the battle lines as they then exist as permanent borders. Ukraine, the state whose territories have been illegally annexed by Russia, is, naturally, unwilling to make such a concession.
However, this fear should not and cannot deter the pursuit of negotiations. It should not be assumed that negotiations automatically signify the acceptance of existing battle lines as permanent borders between states. National borders must be determined through negotiations, not force.
In the current conflict, battle lines and territory won and lost carry historical, political, and emotional significance. At the same time, the illegal annexation of Crimea and the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine have created complex challenges that cannot and will not be resolved by sheer military force.
Negotiations can explore various options, including ceasefire lines, power-sharing arrangements, and semi-autonomous governance. The focus should be on finding a sustainable resolution that addresses, to the greatest extent possible, the concerns and interests of all parties involved, and one that might realistically be accepted by both Russia and Ukraine.
Balancing a ceasefire and peace negotiations
In certain scenarios, negotiations only begin after a formal ceasefire or a significant reduction in hostilities. The ceasefire establishes a more stable environment and reduces the risk of disruptions by ongoing violence. It creates a conducive atmosphere for negotiations, enhancing the prospects of reaching a meaningful and sustainable resolution to the conflict.
But there are arguments for the commencement of negotiations during ongoing conflict – especially if the only alternative is continued fighting. Ina situation in which violence is out of control, negotiations can de-escalate conflict and decrease bloodshed. This approach takes advantage of any opportunity to lay the groundwork to tackle the substantive issues that contributed to hostilities in the first place. However, without a comprehensive cessation of hostilities, it is difficult to build trust and sustain progress in negotiations. As well, ongoing violence can undermine the confidence and commitment of the parties involved.
It is essential that the appropriate sequence of ceasefire and negotiations be agreed to so that progress toward the cessation of violence can be achieved. Sooner or later, of course, it will become necessary to establish a sustainable ceasefire so that negotiations can be successfully concluded.
Participants in the peace process
Achieving a comprehensive and inclusive negotiated settlement in Ukraine requires the active participation not only of Ukraine and Russia, but of all the stakeholders involved, including neighbouring countries, the populations of the illegally annexed territories, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
Although NATO insists that it is not a party to the conflict, its consequential role in assisting Ukraine militarily cannot be overlooked. Ukraine has used the military assistance provided by NATO members to strengthen its defence capabilities and put up a formidable resistance to Russia’s invasion. Such assistance has also heightened preexisting tensions between NATO and Russia.
It is important to consider the implications of NATO’s support and the potential impact on prospects for a negotiated settlement. However, it is also difficult to conceive of a robust negotiated agreement without NATO’s involvement and approval. An agreement opposed by NATO would face significant challenges and could be rendered virtually ineffective.
While Western capitals publicly claim that the terms and direction of any resolution to the current conflict will be determined by Ukraine and its people, it would be disingenuous to discount the influence and interests of other stakeholders. A successful process to resolve conflict will both prioritize Ukrainian agency and recognize the interconnectedness of regional and global security challenges. Both perspectives are necessary to address the valid security concerns of all parties – including Russia – and to mitigate the risk of further escalation or future armed conflict.
Topics for negotiations
While it is impossible to predict the exact agenda for eventual negotiations, clearly the process will be complex and multifaceted. The specific circumstances and the interests of the parties involved will determine some topics. However, it seems likely that negotiations will touch upon some or all of the following.
1. Ukraine’s NATO membership bid
Ukraine’s bid to join NATO must be addressed as part of any negotiations. The current conflict in Ukraine is deeply influenced by geopolitical dynamics, particularly the competing security interests of Russia and NATO. Any solution designed to achieve a sustainable and lasting peace must consider the concerns and security interests of all parties involved.
A viable path might be for Ukraine to take a neutral stand and renounce any intention to join any military alliance, including NATO, while upholding its independence and sovereignty. This neutral status could help to address the security concerns of both Russia and NATO, fostering a more favourable environment for constructive dialogue and diminishing the potential for further escalation.
In this context, it will be crucial to distinguish the proposed neutrality from Ukraine’s status prior to the invasion. The previous situation lacked sufficient safeguards and failed to protect Ukraine’s sovereignty. The new neutrality should entail a comprehensive framework that ensures Ukraine’s independence and territorial integrity, while also addressing the concerns and security interests of all relevant parties, including neighbouring Russia.
Given the current regional and global conditions, maintaining Ukraine’s neutrality would require robust mechanisms and international guarantees. This could involve the establishment of an international monitoring mission composed of representatives from Ukraine, Russia, and NATO, along with other relevant stakeholders.
Ukraine’s desire to join NATO could hinder negotiations; opting for neutrality could help to kickstart the talks. However, it is essential to recognize the complexities and challenges associated with maintaining neutrality in the current context. Exploring related dimensions, such as regional dynamics and global security concerns, can provide valuable insights and contribute to the development of a viable and sustainable solution for Ukraine’s neutrality as well as regional and global stability.
2. Illegally occupied territories
Resolving the status of Ukrainian territories currently occupied by Russia will require careful navigation around longstanding tensions. The occupied regions of Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk hold immense strategic, economic, and symbolic significance for Ukraine. The Ukrainian government and citizens rightly view the return of these territories as an indispensable condition of a lasting and just peace.
However, it must be acknowledged that a pragmatic approach is needed, one that balances the pursuit of justice with an objective view of the sort of settlement that is feasible. Because Russia also views control of the occupied territories in eastern Ukraine as critical to its own security interests and geopolitical ambitions. The demographic shifts, economic dependencies, and parallel governance structures established in the occupied territories have already had profound effects. In the end, a viable and sustainable agreement will require compromise.
Finding a resolution to the status of the occupied territories may involve various approaches related to autonomy and decentralization, or a combination of political arrangements that respect the interests and aspirations of the local populations while upholding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. Achieving a sustainable agreement will require a nuanced understanding of the complexities involved and a willingness to explore innovative solutions.
3. War crimes
There have been calls for the prosecution of individuals, including Russian president Vladimir Putin, for war crimes. But the pursuit of this form of justice, at this time, could well render a negotiated settlement impossible. Instead, a pragmatic measure of amnesty might be necessary.
Offering the possibility of amnesty would acknowledge the reality that the participation and support of all parties involved are needed to resolve the conflict. Amnesty incentivizes armed parties to engage in the peace process and contributes to the overall stability and sustainability of the agreement.
Amnesty provisions in peace agreements are almost invariably controversial, with many critics seeing them as rewards for aggression. One recent example is the inclusion of amnesty provisions in the Colombian peace process between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia(FARC). Critics argued that granting amnesty to individuals involved in grave human rights violations would undermine justice and accountability.
While such criticisms are valid, it is important to acknowledge that some level of amnesty has proven to be a necessary trade-off to achieve successful negotiations. The inclusion of amnesty provisions in the Colombian peace process aimed to facilitate the transition from conflict to peace, promoted reconciliation, and ultimately ended the protracted violence. While controversial, the strategic use of limited amnesty was viewed as a pragmatic approach that achieved the broader objectives of stability and long-term peace.
The provision of amnesty for war crimes must balance justice with reconciliation. Striking the right balance requires careful consideration and a nuanced approach that takes into account the needs and concerns of all stakeholders. Ultimately, the goal is to achieve a just and lasting resolution to conflict.
4. The risk of nuclear weapons use
A top priority of negotiations must be defusing the risk that nuclear weapons will be used. The risk of such use is only too real in the current conflict, with most of the world’s nuclear arsenal potentially in play by Russia and NATO’s nuclear-armed members. So far, most of the threats to employ nuclear weapons have come from Russia and have been soundly rejected and denounced by the West. But the mere presence of nuclear arsenals on both sides keeps the threat of use alive, even when unexpressed.
Beyond this, it is crucial to consider the reaction of Russia to certain versions of a decisive Ukrainian military victory. It seems only too possible that some scenarios could push Russia into a last-resort attempt to gain a victory by using nuclear weapons. There is some evidence that Russian leaders –and the president in particular – feel that this is a war they cannot lose. Military defeat would likely be seen to threaten not only Putin’s leadership but Russia’s national security.
From this perspective, the pursuit of a military solution that backs Russia into a corner does not guarantee peace for Ukraine. Engaging in further escalation without a clear path to de-escalation could have unintended and dire repercussions, not only for Ukraine and its allies but also for regional and even global security. Any use of nuclear weapons would result in unimaginable devastation and loss of life. Such a catastrophic outcome must be prevented.
5. Security assurances
All parties in eventual peace negotiations will expect security assurances that in some way address the concerns and interests of each side, while also ensuring stability, trust, and a sense of security moving forward.
Ukraine must be confident that its territorial integrity, sovereignty, and population will be safeguarded. Ukraine would seek guarantees that its borders will be respected, and that Russia will not engage in further encroachments or aggression against it. Assurances could include provisions to demilitarize the conflict zones, establish effective border control measures, and provide robust mechanisms to monitor and enforce compliance.
Even the invader, Russia, would seek security assurances. They could include measures to alleviate Russia’s apprehensions about Ukraine’s joining NATO or the deployment of foreign military forces close to its borders. Russia could insist that Ukraine pledge not to join any military alliance and that Russian strategic interests would not be compromised in the aftermath of the conflict.
Beyond bilateral security assurances between Ukraine and Russia, international actors would need to recognize and accept these assurances. A respect for the agreement by all significant parties would help to foster an environment of stability and trust.
The horse before the cart
Ukraine is at a critical crossroads, with the mounting humanitarian toll and the constant spectre of escalation demanding urgent action. The international community, including NATO, must actively pave the way to a peace process, while supporting Ukraine and contributing to the development of a comprehensive and inclusive negotiation framework.
A comprehensive peace plan, backed by ample support and resources, is needed. The international community must shift its focus from providing military aid to supporting diplomatic activities that establish a favourable environment and framework for productive negotiations.
Because setting predetermined outcomes will hinder progress, negotiators must embrace the complexity and uncertainty inherent in negotiations. Successful negotiations require flexibility and compromise; rigid expectations are destined to result in failure.
A commitment to diplomacy, realistic expectations, and international support for the negotiation process – these are what will finally silence the guns in Ukraine.
RUSSIANS’ SUPPORT FOR THE WAR MAY BE SOFTER THAN YOU THINK
RESPONSIBLE STATECRAFT
May 25, 2023
A close examination of credible polling in the country suggests a clear desire for negotiations to end the conflict.
by David Cortright and Alexander Finiarel
David Cortright is professor emeritus at the University of Notre Dame’s Keough School of Global Affairs and former director of policy studies at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies. He is currently serving as visiting research fellow at the Alva Myrdal Centre on Nuclear Disarmament, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Sweden. Alexander has a Master’s degree in political science from the Higher School of Economics in Moscow. He has worked as an analyst of electoral campaigns in Moscow. After the Russian invasion of Ukraine, he became involved in with multiple anti-war organizations as a researcher, studying the reaction of the Russian society to the war and events related to it.
https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2023/05/25/russians-support-for-the-war-in-ukraine-isnt-as-widespread-as-you-might-think/
Over the past year, as thousands of Russians have fled their country to avoid serving in the war, European countries have closed their borders and have cancelled or suspended visas for Russians seeking refuge. Rather than accepting war refusers as potential allies for peace, political leaders seem to hold them responsible for the war.
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The Levada Center is the principal polling firm in Russia, an agency trusted by the Kremlin and relied upon by most Western observers. It releases a monthly report on the war based on an iterative survey of identical questions.
At first glance the results seem to confirm a pro-war stance. In the poll for March 2023, 72 percent of respondents say they support the military activities in Ukraine, a number that is consistent with earlier surveys. The number of “definitely” yes responses has declined slightly, but stands at 41 percent.
Consider the question being asked, however. “Do you support or oppose the actions of the Russian armed forces in Ukraine”? The words “war” and “military force” are not mentioned, in line with Kremlin propaganda. The “actions” in question are not specified. The question obfuscates the reality of the war and projects a veiled meaning that could be understood as “do you support the troops?” Keep in mind that repressive laws adopted since the start of the invasion make “discrediting” the armed forces a criminal offense.
The second question is more specific and shows that a plurality of respondents prefer to start negotiations rather than continue military action. In the March results, 48 percent want to negotiate while 42 percent want to continue the military operation.
The Levada surveys have found consistent support for negotiations over war. On one level, that’s unremarkable, since Putin himself has advocated negotiations, no doubt hoping to take advantage of a truce to strengthen the occupation of annexed territories and rebuild his battered forces. Support for negotiations can mean many things to different people, and demands for preconditions such as giving up Crimea would undoubtedly reduce Russian support for diplomacy significantly. The preference for negotiations is nonetheless significant in showing support for an alternative to war and reinforces the view of many in the West and internationally who believe a diplomatic process can help to end the war.
Findings from other surveys provide further insight into public opinion. In its February, 2023 poll, the Chronicle survey differentiates responses to a range of questions to identify the degree of core support for and against the war. They find a core group of 22 percent of respondents who express support for the war, believe that public funds should be spent primarily on the army and not on the social sphere, and do not support the withdrawal of troops from Ukraine or peace talks without achieving military goals.
Conversely, they find a core group of 20 percent of respondents who do not express support for the war, believe that public funds should be spent primarily on the social sphere and not on the military, and would support a decision to withdraw troops and launch peace talks without achieving military goals. The latter finding is consistent with the “no” results in the Levada surveys, but the Chronicle survey shows that the faction of active opponents of the war and the faction of its active supporters are approximately equal amidst an apathetic but perhaps persuadable society.
The Russian Field polling group released a survey in July finding that 65 percent of Russians would support Putin’s decision to end the war and sign a peace treaty immediately, and at the same time 60 percent would support his decision to start a new offensive on Kyiv. To the question, “What would you do first if you wake up tomorrow as Vladimir Putin?” the most popular response was “end the fighting.” The Field group also reported reluctance among many Russians to talk about the war, reflected in a growing number of refusals to participate in their surveys.
Taken together the studies indicate that most people in Russia tend to go along with Putin’s decisions and many feel disenfranchised and powerless to do anything about the ongoing conflict. Many prefer negotiations to war, however, and there is a solid base of antiwar sentiment, which is also evident in the many thousands who have protested and been arrested, and the hundreds of thousands who have escaped the military draft.
In the West we should avoid blaming the Russian people for a policy they did not start and many do not want. As we stand firmly against the war, we should show understanding and encouragement for the Russian people and help to nurture antiwar sentiments. We should assist and welcome the many Russians who have fled the country to oppose the war and should invite more to join them. We should support negotiations to achieve the withdrawal of Russian troops.
Foreign Affairs
April 7, 2023
Putin’s Second Front:
The War in Ukraine Has Become a Battle for the Russian Psyche
By Andrei Kolesnikov
ANDREI KOLESNIKOV is a Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russian-federation/putins-second-front
For more than two decades, ordinary people in Vladimir Putin’s Russia could count on at least one fundamental right: the right to remain passive. As long as they were willing to turn a blind eye to corruption at the top and the never-ending rule of the Putin regime, they were not required to demonstrate active support for the government. Whatever Russia was doing in the world need not concern them. Provided that they did not interfere in the affairs of the elite, they were free to live their lives.
Since the Russian government announced its “partial mobilization” in September–October 2022, that right has been taken away. No longer is it possible to stay disengaged. More and more, Russians who are economically dependent on the state are finding that they have to be active Putinists—or, at the very least, pretend to be. Conforming to the regime and showing support for the “special operation” have now become almost essential to good citizenship. It is still possible to avoid showing feality to the autocrat, and Russia is not yet a fully totalitarian system. But a significant stratum of society—teachers, for example—are forced to participate in public acts of support, such as the patriotic lessons that are now mandatory in schools on Mondays. Often these are mere rituals, but sometimes the sentiments are real. Voluntary denunciations have become frequent and are, in fact, encouraged. Consider the infamous case of the teacher who denounced a 13-year-old girl for drawing an antiwar picture: the girl’s father was arrested, and she was placed in an orphanage. In April, former President Dmitry Medvedev called on civilians to denounce those who receive money or jobs from Ukrainian sources.
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BASIC INSTINCTS
Russia’s war at home was set in motion well before the invasion of Ukraine. Over the past decade, as his hyperauthoritarian model of government matured, Putin was able to awaken in the Russian public a demand for imperial greatness that had long lain dormant. As it slowly replaced bourgeois consumerism with great-power rhetoric and an assault on civil society, the government found a mostly pliant audience in a population that was accustomed to market relations but that did not understand the practical meaning of democracy. But a qualitative leap in public sentiment came with Putin’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. “That’s it. We have become great again!” many thought. In turn, this imperial impulse and also Russia’s growing separation from the West encouraged people to embrace a more primitive understanding of the world.
That does not mean that Russians wanted war: they wanted a normal life. But the motherland, represented by Putin, came calling: We were attacked. We responded with a preemptive strike, and must stay united. Those who are against are national traitors. After more than a year of war, these attitudes have become entrenched in the popular consciousness. Yes, there is war fatigue, and more than half of respondents in polls by the independent Levada Center say they want peace—though, as a rule, while still keeping Donbas and Crimea for Russia. But the erosion of public morality has been dramatic.
Amazingly, for ordinary people, Putin’s selling point is no longer modernization and the economic rewards and rising standards of living it promised, but regression to a more brutish past. There is a growing pride in Russia’s reliance on its own resources and its self-image as a uniquely tough country armed with both nuclear weapons and savage mercenaries. Since the war began, a small but highly vocal segment of Russian society—perhaps 15 percent, as some sociologists estimate—has demanded ruthlessness to Russia’s enemies and suspicion toward any fellow citizens who do not toe the party line—and who might turn out to be a threat to the nation or, to use Putin’s term, “scum.” An increasingly arbitrary justice system now hands down hefty prison sentences to dissenters, and a public culture of extrajudicial violence is being normalized by Yevgeny Prigozhin, the head of Wagner, the paramilitary contractor with close ties to the Kremlin.
But the shift in public attitudes has also coincided with a different and more important change: how Russians relate to the regime. Previously, Russian society was defined by an us-versus-them model. The “us” were ordinary Russians, powerless but mostly left alone; “they” referred to those at the top, in the Kremlin and at other imposing addresses, those who lived in palaces and holidayed on yachts and looked down with contempt on the people. As a result of the war, however, that vertical model has been transformed into a different, much more horizontal one. Now, “us” means all Russians, including Putin and his entourage; “they” refers to the hostile powers—Europe, NATO, and the United States—that are trying to tear away Russia’s historical territory. According to this model, all previous differences between the people and the regime must be forgotten because Russia is under attack. People must come together for the motherland; indeed, they must be ready to give up their lives for it. It is important to emphasize that these dictates are not accepted by all, but their incessant repetition has had a hypnotic effect on many, and some, in order not to stand out, have made a habit of repeating them.
As for the economic damage caused by this confrontation with the West, Russians have learned to cope. Even a fortress under siege has ways to acquire vital necessities, and the regime has proved adept at exporting goods to the east and importing contraband through, for instance, Turkey or some Central Asian countries. So far, relatively effective Central Bank policies and technocratic economic management have saved Putin from accusations of socioeconomic failure (and this is despite the serious state budget revenue problems that are already apparent). As a result, Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, who is closely identified with the country’s economic policies and has studiously avoided being portrayed as a war economist, has become increasingly popular. According to the Levada Center, when Russians are asked which politician they trust the most, Mishustin is now named more often than Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and is second only to Putin.
For both active Putin supporters and passive conformists, the war is no longer just a part of everyday existence. It is a way of life. And instead of rationalizing it as a prolonged disruption, they have begun to see it as something more permanent. Sure, everyone understands that victory is the goal. But that goal has been pushed so far into the future that it has become as symbolic and distant as the final stage of communism was for several generations of Soviet people. To enter a permanent state of war, many Russians have had to come to terms with the twisted logic of the person who initiated the conflict and dragged the nation into it. In other words, they have sought psychological comfort in the regime and the idea of national unity it embodies, no matter how damaging that might be to their own lives and the country’s future. Either you are with us, supporters of Putin have learned to think, or you are a national traitor.
DICTATOR WITHOUT BORDERS
How has it been possible for so many Russians to accommodate this extreme situation so readily? First, many feel the compulsion to stay in the social mainstream and go with the flow: this is what twentieth-century psychoanalyst Erich Fromm, writing about the social conditions that contributed to fascism, famously called “escape from freedom.” No one wants to be branded an outcast or enemy of the people. But second and equally important is the ability of ordinary people to accept radically changed circumstances—as long as some elements of normal life can be maintained. Thus, everything about the war has been done only part way: there has been a partial mobilization, a partial wartime economy, a partial mass repression, a partial erosion of living standards. In this form of partial totalitarianism, people have had time to adjust and experience each step in the decline from their previous way of life as a new normal.
Yet another explanation for Russians’ readiness to adapt is that Putin has alternated mobilization—in both its military meaning and emotional sense—with demobilization. Right now, the country is in a demobilization phase: in his speeches and state visits, Putin stresses socioeconomic issues, and to the extent that the government is seeking a further military draft, it avoids calling it that, using instead such bland bureaucratic phrases as “clarification of military record data.” In other words, Russian society has entered another period of getting used to war. And as long as Russians experience the war as partial, rather than total, they are unlikely to feel overly concerned about it. According to the Levada Center, ordinary Russians continue to show declining interest in events in Ukraine. In September, when the partial mobilization was announced, some 66 percent of the population said it was following the war to a greater or lesser degree. By March, however, that figure had dropped to a bare majority of 53 percent, with 47 percent admitting that they were paying little or no attention to the war.
But Russians have also been helped by the new historical narrative that Putin has given them. Here, a mythologized version of national history has been used to justify hostility to both the West and enemies at home. The Kremlin has conjured a pantheon of true defenders of the motherland, in which the medieval prince Alexander Nevsky, the sixteenth-century despot Ivan the Terrible, and Joseph Stalin sit side by side with the tenth-century Prince Vladimir, the seventeenth-century tsar Peter the Great, and Vladimir Putin. This grandiose, mostly imperial, and always glorious story also helps many Russians come to terms with their current reality: since they were always special, and since they have always been under attack, they have no choice but to keep living in a state of permanent conflict with the West.
It is still possible to choose another path: inner emigration—opting out of the political process—is still an option for many people, as is actual exile. Russian society now inhabits a strange borderline between authoritarianism and totalitarianism, between the obligation to consider the demands of the state in everything and the ability to exercise certain freedoms, however limited, in private life. The country has become a borderline state, in all senses of the word. Russia’s borders are mobile right now. They depend largely on events at the front and, crucially, are not recognized by the rest of the world. Existing in this uncertainty is not exactly comfortable, but it is possible. The post-Soviet era gave rise to the phenomenon of unrecognized states—Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria—and they have existed in limbo for years. Now Crimea and the Donbas find themselves in the same situation. There appears to be no end to that status either—at least not before the end of Putinism.
TRAIN TO NOWHERE
At this point, it is very hard to determine what victory or defeat would look like for Putin and his active or passive supporters. Even if a cease-fire can be negotiated, the conflict seems likely to be doomed to periods of freezing and unfreezing. And no matter what happens in Ukraine, Putin’s regime will continue its repression of anyone who thinks differently or who puts up any resistance—or even just refuses to publicly support it. These policies will continue regardless of whether Russia is actively fighting the war against Ukraine and the West or finds itself in a cold or dormant phase of conflict. And they may well find support from the Putinized public.
In addition to the new hatred directed against those who have retained a conscience and who feel guilt about the disaster wrought by their government, there is the question of the many Russians who come back from the trenches. What do they think, and what will they do? Who are they, and who will they target with their own anger? Will they hold their own political power, or will they become yet another group of outcasts? What impact will their war syndrome have on the public atmosphere? These important questions remain unanswered.
For now, Putin may be under the impression that there is genuine unity among his people; that the war is becoming—as the Kremlin spin doctor Sergey Kiriyenko puts it—a “people’s war”; that a group of frustrated soldiers and their families is emerging who would like to see vengeance wrought against the West and Ukrainians for everything they have been through. So far, Putin has managed to keep the elites in check. He has also managed to bring back chauvinistic and messianistic ideology and reverse the modernization of a society that had been de-ideologized and modernized. He has mobilized a lot of people to support the war—in both the social and the military sense. No wonder he considers himself omnipotent.
Putin has managed to concentrate enormous power in his hands. But the more power he accumulates, the harder it will be for him to relax and hand over the reins. He cannot afford to liberalize the system or decrease his dictatorial authority. There is only one way left open to him: to cling to power until the bitter end. Putin is in the same position in which Stalin found himself at the start of the 1950s. It was in those late years that the Soviet dictator had to resort to absurd and irrational measures to shore up his power, from paranoid threats to his own closest companions to combating “rootless cosmopolitans” and supporting obscurantist theories in science. For this reason, Putin needs a permanent war with those he deems “foreign agents” and national enemies—his own “rootless cosmopolitans.” It is a war that has to be carried out at home and abroad, whether hot or cold, direct or hybrid. And Putin has to keep moving all the time: stopping is a luxury he cannot afford.
Recognizing this fact offers little comfort to those hoping for a resolution to the war. But when a train has no brakes, it may crash into a wall. It might also simply run out of fuel and grind to a halt. For now, it is full steam ahead—to nowhere, because no one knows where it is going. That includes the driver.
New report documents 235 nonviolent resistance actions in Ukraine
EXCERPT: Since March, the International Institute for Nonviolent Action (Novact), the Catalan Institute for Peace (ICIP), and the NGO Corridors – Dialogue through Cooperation have been collecting stories of civil resistance in Ukraine. The result of their work, Ukrainian Nonviolent Civil Resistance in the Face of War, analyzes the trends, impacts and challenges of nonviolence in Ukraine from February 24 through June 30. In cooperation with students from the National University Kyiv-Mohyla, the authors identified and systematized 235 nonviolent actions during this period; detailed information of this process can be found in this map.
• English version: https://novact.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/ENG_VF.pdf
• Ukrainian version: https://novact.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/UKR_VF.pdf
The authors found that nonviolent resistance 1) has hindered some of the long-term military and political goals of the Russian authorities, such as the institutionalization of the military occupation and repression in the occupied territories; 2) has protected many civilians; 3) undermined the Russian narrative; 4) built community resilience; and 5) strengthened local governance.
Read on:
https://paxchristiusa.org/2022/10/28/new-report-documents-235-nonviolent-resistance-actions-in-ukraine/
N O N V I O L E N T R E S I S T A N C E TO R U S S I A ’ S I N V A S I O N O F
U K R A I N E
By Andre Kamenshikov, Demitro Zvonok and a team of civil society activists, many of whom were personally involved in organizing on violent resistance in the temporarily occupied territories.
P E A C
O C T O B E R 2 0 2 2
The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, which began on February 24, 2022, resulted in the largest war on the European continent since 1945. Besides the armed resistance of Ukraine to Russia’s aggression, a process of great importance was taking place on the territories that were occupied by Russian forces. In nearly all occupied territories of Ukraine, Russian forces were confronted by a clear rejection of their actions on the part of ordinary Ukrainian citizens. To a great extent, civil nonviolent resistance blocked the achievement of Russia’s long-term objectives, which relied on cooperation from the local population, making its aggression meaningless.
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Nonviolent resistance to Russian aggression included various kinds of activities, such as:
• Confronting occupiers by nonviolent means – organizing demonstrations, roadblocks, picketing, playing Ukraine’s national anthem, warning about Russian troop advancements, etc.
• Demonstrating Ukrainian identity through leaflets, writing pro-Ukrainian signs, wearing Ukrainian traditional clothes, holding inter-faith religious services in Ukrainian language, etc.
• Refusing to cooperate with the occupying force – refusing aid from the Russian forces, setting up alternative administrative centers, refusing to communicate in Russian, refusing to accept Russian currency, refusing to organize educational programs according to Russian standards.
• Mutual support and self-organization – patrolling streets, preparing shelters, delivering aid and providing psychological support, setting up alternative internet hubs, hiding pro-Ukrainian activists, providing education according to Ukrainian programs, etc.
CHANGES IN THE OCCUPYING REGIME
As the occupation continued, the regime of the occupiers became much more repressive, characterized by intimidation, threats, “disappearances” of civil activists, cases of torture, bringing people for interrogations, arrests of relatives of civil activists, violently dispersing protests. The need to survive, safety concerns, the need to earn a living in the very difficult circumstances of Russian occupation, uncertainty regarding the future, drove people toward accepting some of the rules being imposed by the new de-facto authorities, affecting the forms and intensity of nonviolent resistance. While nonviolent resistance continued, its format, as well as its level of visibility, changed.
Open, demonstrative activities were replaced by other forms of nonviolent resistance, such as:
• Supporting the Ukrainian identity among the population in the occupied territories.
• Noncooperation with the occupiers, sabotaging their efforts and events.
• Information resistance – helping people overcome the information vacuum imposed on them.
ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGES OF LIFE IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND SUPPORTING NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE
If the Ukrainian state and society expects its citizens remaining under Russian occupation to continue to resist the regime of the occupying force, it needs to properly understand the huge challenges and serious dangers that people in such areas face in their daily lives. Ukrainian government policies must become more sensitive to the realities faced by people in occupation. In order to survive under Russian occupation and maintain their Ukrainian identity, in order to maintain their capacity and willingness to resist, these people need moral support, material support, support in obtaining information and they need to be assisted in addressing safety concerns. Certain steps can be undertaken in order to address these needs of people in temporarily occupied territories and support nonviolent resistance:
• Provide people living in occupied areas with realistic information and practical advice on how they can respond to the challenges they have to deal with.
• Openly recognize the value and demonstrate support of any forms by which people in occupied territories express their Ukrainian identity (using relevant clothing, language, currency, etc.)
• Use the capacity of various volunteer networks to provide support to people in occupied territories.
• Use any possibility to improve communication with people in temporarily occupied territories – for example, by enhancing the capacity of cell-phone transmitter stations located near the contact line.
• Easing access, on the Ukrainian side, for crossing the contact line by volunteers carrying medicines and other important items.
• Set up mechanisms (like special advisers in key state institutions) to bring the concerns of civil activists and ordinary people in occupied territories to the attention of the Ukrainian government and society.
• Have national politicians mention cases of nonviolent resistance in occupied territories and encourage foreign political leaders, weld-known celebrities to do so, encouraging people to continue their efforts.
• Support civil activists from occupied areas who continue to work remotely with their communities.
• Support civil activists from occupied areas who continue to work remotely with their communities.
•Support Ukrainian education in temporarily occupied territories. Introduce a position of an adviser on education in the temporarily occupied territories in the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine. Develop special educational modules for people in occupied territories. Organize exchange of experience between educators, working with people in various occupation zones.
CHALLENGES EXPECTED DUE TO CHANGES IN RUSSIA’S POLICIES TOWARD THE TEMPORARILY OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
The decision of the Russian leadership to officially annex the territories of Ukraine under Russian occupation will definitely have significant consequences for the lives of people in the occupied areas.
It is likely that due to new restrictions, travel of Ukrainian citizens across the “contact line” will become practically impossible. It may be expected that in the near future Russian authorities, in cooperation with local collaborators, will start mobilizing Ukrainians into the ranks of their military or security services.
In these new realities the key objectives of nonviolent resistance in occupied territories may be linked to maintaining communication with other parts of Ukraine and preventing the involvement of Ukrainians in Russia’s military or security institutions.
WAYS IN WHICH INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS CAN SUPPORT NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE IN THE TEMPORARILY OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.
1. Highlighting the importance and role of nonviolent resistance when engaging with Ukrainian officials.
2. Assisting Ukrainian government institutions in developing the capacity to access the realities faced by people in occupied territories, supporting the work of relevant consultations/advisers in key government institutions.
3. Providing training to civil servants, civil society, journalists, improving their understanding of the realities of life under occupation and of the potential and methods of nonviolent resistance.
4. Supporting civil initiatives and volunteer networks that assist people in occupied territories when working with them – put safety concerns over transparency requirements.
5. Using all available mechanisms to protect the human rights of people living in occupied territories.
6. Setting up a specialized fund, aimed to support various forms of nonviolent resistance, in temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, in cooperation with both Ukrainian and international activists.
Great article
Russia Withdraws Its Nuclear Weapons from US inspections
Yehven Kizilov | Pravda | 8 August 2022
https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/08/8/7362406/
On 8 August, Russia informed the United States that it was suspending inspections of its nuclear weapons under the bilateral Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).
Source: the Russian newspaper Kommersant, quoting the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
Quote from the statement from the Russian Foreign Ministry: “Statement of the Russian Foreign Ministry regarding the situation with the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)
On 8 August 2022, the Russian Federation officially informed the United States of America through diplomatic channels that our country is temporarily withdrawing its facilities subject to inspections under the START Treaty from the scope of inspections under this Treaty. This withdrawal also applies to facilities where screenings stipulated by the Treaty can be held.”
Reference: Under the bilateral treaty between Russia and the United States on the mutual reduction of their arsenals of deployed strategic nuclear weapons, each of the parties undertook to reduce their deployed nuclear warheads. It has been in effect since 1991.
On 29 January 2021, Russian President Vladimir Putin extended the treaty once again until 5 February 2026.
A Nuclear Review Conference Amidst Loud War Drums
By Thalif Deen
UNITED NATIONS (IDN) — The Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which runs from August 1-26, takes place amidst a raging battle: a nuclear Russia vs a non-nuclear Ukraine and potential military conflicts on the horizon, including a nuclear China vs a non-nuclear Taiwan, a nuclear North Korea vs a non-nuclear South Korea and a nuclear Israel vs a non-nuclear Iran.
And in equally serious development, US non-proliferation experts have written to US President Joe Biden, echoing concerns expressed by both China and Indonesia, about a proposed plan by US and UK, two major nuclear powers, to sell Australia atomic submarines under the 2021 AUKUS partnership.
Tariq Rauf, former Alternate Head of NPT Delegation, and Head of Verification and Security Policy at the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), told IDN the Tenth NPT Review Conference is “taking place in the worst international situation in the 54-year history of the NPT”, as he recounted the following:
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** A proxy war in full form over Ukraine
** A complete cut-off of nuclear arms control negotiations between Washington and Moscow,
** Nuclear-weapon use doctrines of Russia and the US increasing the dangers of nuclear war,
** A continuing stalemate on setting up a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the region of the Middle East
** The after-effects of Trump’s rejection in Hanoi of North Korea’s offer to dismantle its Nyŏngbyŏn nuclear facility, rising tensions between Washington and Beijing
** The CTBT (nuclear-test-ban treaty) has been languishing since September 1996, NATO extending its defence perimeter to the Asia-Pacific, and
** The only nuclear arms control treaty—New START—hanging by a thread between Russia and the US with an expiry date of February 2026.
“All these and other deleterious developments are casting a heavy shadow over the NPT review conference,” he cautioned.
“Having attended all NPT meetings as an official delegate since 1987, I am sympathetic to the NPT President Gustavo Zlauvinen’s plight in trying to herd the delegates to rise above their petty discourses, and unrealistic world views to find the “better angels of their nature” to hammer out an action plan for the implementation of NPT obligations and agreed commitments by August 26—the last day of the review conference,” he said.
In a statement ahead of the conference, US President Joe Biden said: “As the world gathers for the Tenth Review Conference for the NPT Treaty, the United States renews its commitment to the world to be a responsible steward of its nuclear arsenal and to continue working toward the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons”.
“That commitment is why the United States joined together with the other Nuclear Weapons States in January to affirmatively state our shared belief that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, and it is why my administration has prioritised reducing the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy,” he noted.
In this moment of uncertainty and upheaval on the global stage, Biden said, “reaffirming our shared commitment to the grounding principles of the global nonproliferation regime has never been more crucial”.
“The world can be confident that my Administration will continue to support the NPT and seek to strengthen the nonproliferation architecture that protects people everywhere,” he declared.
Ned Price, the US State Department Spokesperson, told reporters on July 25 that the United States stands by the NPT. “We think it is extraordinarily important to underline the obligations that the NPT puts forward for nuclear weapon states and for non-nuclear weapon states alike.”
“In the face of challenges to the global nonproliferation regime, we think it’s important that the United States stands with the signatories of the NPT to make clear that even though it has been in effect for some time now, its relevance, its importance, has not diminished a single iota over the years and the decades,” he added.
In a statement released July 27, a spokesman for the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Project (NPPP) said U.S. experts urged President Biden not to proceed with the planned sale of eight submarines fueled by tons of nuclear weapons-grade, highly enriched uranium (HEU), arguing it would “undermine the nuclear nonproliferation regime”.
The experts said any such submarines should instead be fueled with low-enriched uranium (LEU), which is unsuitable for nuclear weapons.
Indonesia similarly submitted to the UN conference a working paper that “notes with concern the potential consequences of nuclear-powered submarine capability sharing to the global non-proliferation regime,” highlighting that it, “increases the associated risks … posed by potential proliferation and conversion of nuclear material to nuclear weapons, particularly HEU in the operational status of nuclear naval propulsion”.
In China last week, a government-affiliated report likewise warned that “The AUKUS nuclear-powered submarines collaboration is a serious violation of the object and purpose of the NPT, sets a dangerous precedent for the illegal transfer of weapons-grade nuclear materials from nuclear-weapon states to a non-nuclear-weapon state, and thus constitutes a blatant act of nuclear proliferation”.
The confluence of criticism is unusual and reflects the radical nature of the AUKUS plan, according to Alan J. Kuperman, professor at the University of Texas at Austin and coordinator of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Project (http://www.NPPP.org).
“For half a century, the world has phased out bomb-grade uranium fuel to reduce proliferation risks,” he said, “but now the United States would export massive quantities of it as submarine fuel, creating a precedent for other countries to demand the same right to import or produce their own HEU—which would be game-over for nonproliferation.”
Rauf said the 15 September 2021 “AUKUS” agreement’s provision that the US would provide Australia with nuclear-powered submarines is one of the more irresponsible decisions of the hapless Biden administration.
Despite the AUKUS partners—Australia, UK and US—stated commitment to set a “gold standard” as regards IAEA safeguards (verification), in reality, the only “gold standard” that can be set is that of blowing a gaping hole through the IAEA’s NPT verification system by exempting up to 2000 kilogrammes of weapon-grade highly-enriched uranium from IAEA safeguards.
The first and still most authoritative study, “Opening Pandora’s Box: Nuclear-Powered Submarines and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons”, I wrote in 1988, clearly shows the inability of the IAEA to monitor and verify the nuclear fuel and nuclear reactor of nuclear-powered submarines.
“I have called for the Tenth NPT Review Conference to reject any possibility of non-nuclear-weapon States, such as Australia, to operate nuclear submarines outside IAEA safeguards.”
Speaking at the opening of the Conference on August 1, UN Secretary-General António Guterres said: “We are all here today because we believe in the Treaty’s purpose and function. But carrying it into the future requires going beyond the status quo. It requires renewed commitment and real, good faith negotiations. And it requires all Parties to listen, compromise and keep the lessons of the past—and the fragility of the future—in view at all times.”
Guterres also said that humanity is in danger of forgetting the lessons forged in the terrifying fires of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Geopolitical tensions are reaching new highs. Competition is trumping co-operation and collaboration.
Distrust has replaced dialogue. Disunity has replaced disarmament, he noted.
Rauf said, in his view, the Secretary-General’s NPT statement is “disappointing and weak on several accounts and misses the opportunity to show leadership at this important juncture in international relations”.
It is shocking that the SG fails even to mention the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), of which he is the Depositary.
The TPNW entered into force in January 2021 and held the First Meeting of States Parties in Vienna in June 2022, where an important Declaration and Action Plan on “Our Commitment to a World Free of Nuclear Weapons” was adopted, he declared. [IDN-InDepthNews — 01 August 2022]
Photo: UN General Assembly Hall. Credit: UN
IDN is the flagship agency of the Non-profit International Press Syndicate.
This article is published under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International licence. You are free to share, remix, tweak and build upon it non-commercially. Please give due credit.
With regard to our discussion of this evening, 31 July 2022 on the Global Town Hall, I have a comment that I didn’t have a chance to make.
We will not be able to heal the wounds of war or to prevent future conflicts without dealing with the psychological traumas. We must work seriously with the generation that experienced the conflict. We also must work with future generations. Wars and conflicts repeat. There is vast evidence of trans-generational transmission of the traumas.There are very large numbers of examples of this.
Unfortunately, there is insufficient capacity to deal with these traumas.
The organization with which I work, the Coalition for Work with Psychotrauma and Peace, www,cwwpp.org, cwwppsummer@gmail.com, gives training and supervision online and without charge to anyone, regardless of previous training. We also are open to cooperation with other non-profit organizations.
I propose something different: the Universal Abolition of Militarism. That is, give politicians a chance to speak the truth. The War industry forces them to lie to us, for they sre not magicians. Politicians cannot ensure their country exports the tanks, machine guns, air-fighters, bombs, rockets, and other killing toys they produce and promote Peace at the same time.
If there are no wars, countries stop buying, causing the unemployment of millions of workers in the War industry. Also the redundancy of millions who make a living a legal murderers, employed by the Armed Forces. By the way, these are the most traumatized of all people involved in war. This is a natural phenomenon, for employees of the Armed Forces are ordered to kill people they don’t know, never met before. People who’ve done nothing wrong to them. They simply have to kill to prevent whoever politicians decided to call the “enemy”, kills them.
In the process they kill old people, women and children. We have to stop this madness. A pilot flying at great altitudes and speeds while dropping bombs, destroying life, families, societies, buildings, the environment, the economy, what is he ‘defending’? throwing bombs, rockets, grenades, planting landmines, launching torpedoes from 300 miles away, can that be called “Defense” as politicians call the military ‘BUSINESS’? politicians and diplomats (specially sent to foreign countries to help promote military exports in a very competitive industry) make money for themselves, whilst causinf inflation, poverty and hunger. United Nations countries have produced, in their 75 years existence, nearly 100 million homeless (refugees).
If we don’t rid the world of this poison called Militarism, there will be no future generations. Only a well trained Police, fire-fighters, ambulance services are necessary, for social violence, accidents and natural disasters.
Wars also prove there is no Democracy, for voters never ask their government to give them a war, but politicians, though their representatives at Embassies, UN, IMF, EU, NATO, CIA and similar agencies, manage to concoct organize and negotiate all wars in the world.
We must end this absurdity and immorality.
We are pleased to provide The Simons Foundation Canada’s most recent Arctic Security Briefing Paper on military policies and practices in the Arctic region.
Arctic Security Cooperation – Still Needed, but is it Still Possible?
Arctic Security Briefing Paper
By Ernie Regehr O.C.
Senior Fellow in Arctic Security and Defence
The Simons Foundation Canada
June 21, 2022
Russia’s brazenly illegal war on Ukraine certainly means business as usual is not a serious option for relations with Russia, including in the Arctic. But the effort to repel aggression in Europe should not be the occasion to escalate tensions and reject cooperation or engagement in a hitherto stable region. Given that pan-Arctic cooperation is a professed and genuinely practiced Arctic value, shutting down dialogue forums ought not to be the go-to Arctic response to conflict and gross violations of norms and laws outside, or inside, the region.
In response to Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, NATO suspended all practical cooperation with Russia. Meetings of the Arctic Chiefs of Defence ended, and Russia, in response to sanctions, stopped participating in the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable. The decision by the seven non-Russian states of the Arctic Council to temporarily pause “participation in all meetings of the Council and its subsidiary bodies” (currently with Russia as chair) was thus not a surprise, but it does raise the broader question of why dialogue and direct engagement mechanisms cannot be designed to carry on when needed most, when relations and violations of norms and laws are at their worst, without parties to the dialogue thereby condoning, or being seen to condone, the violations.
There may be a visceral temptation to make the horrific events in Ukraine the “breaking point of Arctic cooperation” with Russia, but cooperation is not the only objective of engagement. Dialogue and engagement are also about mutual accountability – about challenging interlocutors and managing adversarial relations. Dialogue with adversaries is pursued, as realists should recognize, because refusing to talk risks having confrontation spin out of control. The American think tank, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), recognized in a 2020 report that a deficit in diplomacy meant lost opportunities. It called for “annual meetings of the foreign and defense ministers of the eight Arctic Council nations, outside of the Arctic Council venue,” along with “more <button onclick=”myFunction()” id=”myBtn”>Read more</button> frequent meetings of the five Arctic coastal states to discuss management of the [Central Arctic Ocean].”
Security Dialogue
The contention, in Arctic Today, that “peaceful engagement” at the Arctic Council table is untenable as long as Russia threatens Sweden and Finland with “military and political consequences” if they join NATO, ignores the long history of Russia and the West threatening each other to the point of nuclear annihilation without leaving dialogue tables. In the Cold War it was precisely the dangerous threats and counter-threats that required the creation of reliable avenues of sustained engagement. If, as the Norwegian Border Commissioner says, things are “back to a cold-war mode,” it doesn’t follow that all contact is ended – something retired Canadian diplomat Gar Pardy understands well in his critique of ministerial and media responses to a Canadian official attending a Russian national day event.
When “convening power” is a central strength, as it is for the Arctic Council, refusing to meet invites self-inflicted injury. And quite apart from the Arctic Council, the current absence of a reliable security forum in the Arctic ought to be especially concerning. It is in the midst of crises that engagement with adversaries or across deep political divides becomes more important than ever. A 2020 essay in Modern Diplomacy on security dialogue in the Arctic, argues that “after six years [since the 2014 annexation of Crimea] it is apparent that the ban on mil-to-mil engagement with Russia is adversely affecting all Arctic states.”
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A recent (May 2022) Council on Foreign Relations blog on the importance of engagement with Russia, argues that, “given Russia’s Arctic assets, any organization governing the region without Moscow would be attempting to oversee an area mostly outside its control.” The focus is the Arctic Council, and while the Council is a dialogue forum, not a governance body, the basic point broadly applies, especially with regard to Arctic security engagement. Engaging with adversaries is essential, and in the Arctic would be a welcome instance of “regional functionalism” taking precedence over “international geopolitics.”[i] The value or effectiveness of engagement with adversaries obviously depends on the substance of the dialogue and the seriousness with which deep differences and threatening postures are addressed. Security dialogues in the Arctic that are confined to the seven non-Russian states, the kind Canada’s Defence Minister hosted in May 2022, are bound to be helpful, but they are no substitute for pan-Arctic engagement.
The distinguished American Arctic diplomat, David Balton, wrote in 2021 that “despite serious tensions between Russia and other Arctic Nations concerning other regions and other issues, Arctic governments have largely chosen to compartmentalize the Arctic – to set aside those tensions in favor of cooperating with each other in the region.” In October 2021, for example, an Arctic Coast Guard Forum gathering included all eight Arctic states, in spite of their profound differences in other contexts, and focused on cooperation in search-and-rescue operations and marine pollution responses, and on other “threats to maritime security.”[ii]
But that was then. The Russia that now visits catastrophe on Ukraine seems to have little in common with the Russia that cooperates with Arctic coast guards, and that of course leads to the question of when the Russia of Ukraine might show up in the Arctic. Amb. Balton has thus more recently lamented that “some of what made the Arctic special, made it exceptional, seems not at hand at the moment.”
But that does not mean that all military actions taken in response are constructive. A Wilson Center paper, written before but published after Russia’s February 24 attack on Ukraine, rightfully raises concern about naval operations by the US and NATO in the Barents Sea near the homeports for Russia’s Northern Fleet. It particularly notes U.S. attack submarines operating in the waters (bastion) used by Russian intercontinental ballistic missile subs, and in sea lanes used by Russian attack subs between the Kola Peninsula and the North Atlantic. As argued before in these pages, threatening Russia’s deterrent forces does not advance strategic stability in the Arctic or beyond.
Stephen Walt, the noted international relations scholar now at the Harvard Kennedy School, was also insisting in the pre-Feb. 24 context that the pursuit of sustainable peace in Europe would not be advanced by “containment” or a “major military buildup,” but “by a serious effort to reduce the mutual suspicions that have risen between Russia and NATO since the late 1990s” – in these post-Feb. 24 times, his counsel is as relevant to the Arctic as to Europe. Writing for The Conversation, Gabriella Gricius, an American Arctic security scholar, points out that “working with Russia in the Arctic is even more important now than it was before the invasion.” Expanded engagement could, as Gricius suggests, even “precipitate a cooperation spiral” that would not only enhance Arctic stability but also help to “lessen tensions elsewhere.”
The need to engage with Russia in a region where it is obviously prominent, heightens the importance of the proposal for an Arctic security forum, made in the 2020 Modern Diplomacy essay noted earlier. Developed by Arctic experts Troy J. Bouffard, Elizabeth Buchanan, and Michael Young,[iii] the proposal reviews the multiple Arctic forums that already exist, noting that “a glaring gap in these fora is one that addresses Arctic security or defence issues.”
Indigenous communities and security
The Arctic’s dialogue gap is also reflected in the failure, as Indigenous leaders in the Arctic have confirmed,[iv] of the seven non-Russian state members of the Arctic Council to consult the Council’s Indigenous permanent participants before taking the decision to pause participation in its work. Not consulting Indigenous communities on such a consequential decision, even though they are formal participants in the Arctic Council’s work, suggests they are even less likely to be consulted on explicitly security matters, for which there is now no formal consultative table.
Neither the Gwich’in Council International nor the ICC objected to the pause, but the ICC in particular used the occasion to emphasize the importance of respecting indigenous interests in the development of Arctic security polices: “Inuit are committed to the Arctic remaining a zone of peace, a phrase coined by former USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev in a 1987 speech in Murmansk.” It noted that the ICC’s guiding documents repeat that basic message, including in 2018 when it was mandated to “lay the groundwork to declare the Arctic as a peaceful Zone.”
In 1989 Mary Simon, now the Governor-General of Canada but then the President of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, wrote a seminal article entitled, “Toward an Arctic Zone of Peace,” in Peace Research journal. She reasserted the need for indigenous communities to become directly involved in shaping Arctic approaches to peace and security, reminding Arctic states that the “vital starting point” was for them to recognize “that vast regions in Northern Canada, Alaska, Greenland and eastern Siberia constitute first and foremost the Inuit homeland.” She said, “we do not wish our traditional territories to be treated as a strategic military and combat zone between eastern and western alliances.” She pointed out, among other things, the dangers of military powers abusing “freedom of navigation” in Arctic waters and calling for an examination of “how naval uses of the Arctic and other seas might be limited” in order to “advance arms control and the common security of all nations.”
Northern perspectives highlighted in a 2020 publication of the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network (NAADSN), Voices from the Arctic,[v] recalls a series of resolutions, beginning in 1977, calling for “peaceful and safe uses of the Arctic Circumpolar Zone.” Ambitious and challenging in many of the details, the indigenous scholar, writer, and Chair of the International ICC, Dalee Sambo Dorough nevertheless reminds governments that those resolutions remain relevant and important calls to demilitarize the Arctic. These Inuit Circumpolar Conference calls for the Arctic to be respected as a zone of peace have been consistent over the decades, emphasizing an ongoing commitment to dialogue and cooperation that is not conditional on the willingness of the major powers to cooperate with each other.
That raises the question of how the ICC’s “political universe” intersects with the state and military centred security universe that now holds sway in the Arctic. Bridget Larocque, also writing in Voices from the Arctic, points out that the credible pursuit of a peaceful and prosperous Arctic cannot happen without direct Indigenous involvement in decision-making. A northern indigenous leader with extensive experience in indigenous organizations, self-government negotiations, and government, Larocque warns that “policies developed without the knowledge and wisdom of indigenous expertise, which we bring as life-long Northerners, is nothing more than the continuation of the colonial methodology that perpetuates antagonism.”
NATO and Arctic bridge building?
One can only guess at Vladimir Putin’s appreciation of irony, but a war begun in large measure to blunt the spread and influence of NATO that has succeeded in elevating it into one of the more coveted clubs to join surely qualifies as such. And while Putin may have a genuine irony to contemplate, for the Arctic, where cooperation is not just an option but a necessity, a heightened Russia/NATO divide looks more like tragedy. With seven of eight Arctic states destined to be in NATO, Russia seems to be left on its own, but of course the most prominent, dominant, presence in the region will not be isolated – it will have to be reckoned with.
Geography determines neighbors, not political preferences, and strategic realism should recognize that stability is not achieved by shunning powerful or prominent neighbours but by managing neighborhoods. And here is the critical point, the management of intra-Arctic stability cannot credibly be outsourced to NATO. A Western defence alliance is not the institutional medium through which to pursue mutuality and stability in a region that includes Russia.
Acknowledging and collectively responding via NATO to perceived military vulnerabilities on the alliance’s eastern flank or in the North Atlantic is obviously central to its defence mandate, but it does not follow that NATO’s institutional military presence is required, or could be constructive, in the high Arctic, or especially that NATO could be an effective vehicle for addressing political/security controversies with Russia. The requirement in the Arctic is cooperation and the search for mutuality across the gaping geostrategic and indigenous/state divides. That means bridge-building, which is not the purpose, and certainly not the hallmark, of defence alliances.
Pan-Arctic engagement on security, with a view to resuming cooperation on the full range of issues on which Arctic well-being depends, is needed now more than ever. It is thus the collective responsibility of all the diverse custodians of Arctic region security to muster the will, prudence, and uninterrupted engagement to advance the shared interests and well-being of the people of the Arctic, without giving an unintentional or implied pass to Russia on its gross violations of the well-being of Ukrainians and Ukraine.
Click here for the .pdf version
Talk to the Russians in the Arctic?
Maybe the best way to begin taking care of the well-being of the Arctic people is by talking to them, person-to-person. Most younger people in Russia now speak English. There are huge numbers of the living in the Arctic — at least in comparison to the numbers in other Arctic countries. They have cities with universities. I bet they even have Zoom there. (I don’t actually know, but I bet they do.) Why not get the names of some scholars in a city like Norilsk and send them a note to get acquainted? Here is a picture of a street in Norilsk.
Pugwash Note on Present Dangers
The present global situation is very dangerous. Not since the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis have we had such a dangerous environment. But while the Cuban missile crisis lasted 13 days, the present situation has continued for over 100 days since February 2022.
Of course, the main problem now is the war in Ukraine. There are many underlying motivations for this war. The history of relations between what is now Ukraine and Russia is several centuries old and very complex. More recently, antagonism between the Russian- and Ukrainian-speaking populations has been revived, together with the separatist movement in the eastern part of Ukraine (the Donbas) where, according to the UN, between 2014 and the end of 2021 more than 14,000 people have been killed. The annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 also raised concerns in Ukraine.
The eastward expansion of NATO that reached many of the countries bordering Russia—despite informal assurances given at the end of the Cold War between Russia and the US—is also an important factor of concern for Russia. Russia is obviously worried not only by the loss of its “external zone of influence,” but also about its own territorial integrity. On the other hand, the 2014 election in Ukraine changed the leadership and strengthened the pro-Europe sentiment (evidenced by the Euromaidan demonstrations). Between 2014 and the beginning of 2022, the tensions inside Ukraine grew considerably, as did the number of people killed, especially in the Donbas area.
On 24 February 2022, Russia decided to invade Ukraine. The goals cited for this invasion have shifted over time, from forcing a new leadership in Ukraine to the occupation of the Donbas and part of the Ukrainian Black Sea shore. Understanding the Russian motivations is possible, but this is of course very different from justifying in any sense this attack. By signing the Charter of the United Nations, all states committed to refrain from the threat or use of force against the political independence and territorial integrity of any other state.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has certainly been catastrophic for the Ukrainian population. It is hard to assess the number of civilians and soldiers from both sides who have been killed in Ukraine since 24 February 2022; estimates are 10,000 civilian casualties and 100,000 soldiers. Beyond the tragedy for the Ukrainian people, concerns have been raised about the increasingly tense relations between Russia and most NATO countries.
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Specific considerations:
1. NATO countries, and particularly the US and the UK, are actively providing weapons to the Ukrainian army. Since the understanding is that these weapons should never be used against the territory of Russia, the continuous shipping of weapons to Ukraine has resulted in enabling the Ukrainian army to resist the invasion on its own soil, but with the consequence of extending the duration of the war, destroying several Ukrainian cities, reducing agricultural and industrial output, endangering nuclear power plants, and increasing the number of casualties.
2. Over six million people have fled to neighboring countries and many more are displaced within Ukraine itself.
3. Four countries possessing nuclear weapons – Russia, US, UK and France – are directly or indirectly involved in the war. If the tensions inside Europe grow, the risk of nuclear use cannot be excluded. This would be an unprecedented disaster. Nuclear deterrence was believed to be responsible for the absence of a war in Europe, but this can no longer be taken for granted. The danger of an escalation of the hostilities toward the use of nuclear weapons is clear and serious. There is no end in sight. Finding a workable solution is urgent.
4. The immediate consequences of the war in Ukraine are also evident: heavy combat is poisoning the environment and destroying the crops of grain that provide food for many parts of the world.
5. Other aspects of the global economy are heavily affected by the war in Ukraine. The supply of gas and oil for European countries is under serious constraints, inflation has crept up in most states, and there are many other negative consequences. All countries involved should work together to offset the global impact of this war.
The risks are unfortunately not only limited to the direct consequences of the war in Ukraine. The Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) is practically doomed, and this is inducing Iran to develop its nuclear program further. What Israel will do is also a matter of serious concern. In view of the non-compliance with the Minsk agreements, countries that relinquished their nuclear weapons in the past may have second thoughts and those that feel vulnerable may think twice about their treaty commitments. In South Korea and Japan, proponents of national nuclear capability have become more vocal.
Military activities in Northeast Asia between the Koreas, the US, and Japan are also a source of concern. The DPRK can find reason to believe that acquiring nuclear weapons increased its security. The situation regarding China, the US, and Taiwan is also very worrisome. The actions and rhetoric of the parties involved are far from reassuring.
The war in Ukraine is marginalizing the other nuclear dangers and this is also a serious recipe for disaster. The whole architecture of security, based on the Charter of the United Nations and on multilateral and bilateral treaties and other arrangements, is endangered.
Peace and security are common goods: no country can feel safe and secure unless all feel the same.
The entire Pugwash community should work to the maximum extent possible to:
1. Promote the widest possible awareness and understanding of the present nuclear dangers;
2. Promote in particular the end of the war in Ukraine with reasonable compromises and respect for the various regional diversities, taking into account the legitimate security concerns of the different parties. The war will not be solved by further shipments of weapons but by talking and establishing effective negotiations;
3. Support an urgent ceasefire in Ukraine that would permit meaningful negotiations and the start of the reconstruction of the devastated country with international help;
4. Support in all possible ways the restoration of the JCPOA;
5. Facilitate dialogue between China, Taiwan and other countries in order to keep the scheme of one country with two different political systems;
6. Work for dialogue and possible cooperation between South and North Korea.
These are not easy tasks but we have to remember every day that nuclear danger is not an abstract concern but a dramatically serious problem that affects the entire international community.
Sergio Duarte, President
Paolo Cotta Ramusino, Secretary-General
Animated Chart: Nuclear Warheads by Country (1945-2022)
Visualizing The Nuclear Warheads of Countries Since 1945
Despite significant progress in reducing nuclear weapon arsenals since the Cold War, the world’s combined inventory of warheads remains at an uncomfortably high level.
Towards the late 1980s, the world reached its peak of stockpiled warheads, numbering over 64,000. In modern times, nine countries—the U.S., Russia, France, China, the UK, Pakistan, India, Israel, and North Korea—are estimated to possess roughly 12,700 nuclear warheads.
The animated chart above by creator James Eagle shows the military stockpile of nuclear warheads that each country has possessed since 1945.
Nuclear Warheads Currently in Possession by Countries
The signing of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) brought about a rapid disarmament of nuclear warheads. Though not immediately successful in stopping nuclear proliferation, it eventually led to countries retiring most of their nuclear arsenals.
As of 2022, about 12,700 nuclear warheads are still estimated to be in use, of which more than 9,400 are in military stockpiles for use by missiles, aircraft, ships and submarines.
Timeline: Key Events in the Nuclear Arms Race
At the dawn of the nuclear age, the U.S. hoped to maintain a monopoly on nuclear weapons, but the secret technology and methodology for building the atomic bomb soon spread. Only 10 countries have since possessed or deployed any nuclear weapons.
Here are a few key dates in the timeline of the nuclear arms race from 1945 to 2022:
August 6 & 9, 1945:
The U.S. drops two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, decimating the cities and forcing the country’s surrender, ending the Second World War.
August 29, 1949:
The Soviet Union tests its first nuclear bomb, code-named First Lightning in Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan. It becomes the second country to develop and successfully test a nuclear device.
October 3, 1952:
The UK conducts its first nuclear test at Montebello Islands off the coast of Western Australia, and later additional tests at Maralinga and Emu Fields in South Australia.
February 13, 1960:
France explodes its first atomic bomb in the Sahara Desert, with a yield of 60–70 kilotons. It moves further nuclear tests to the South Pacific, which continue up until 1996.
October 16–29, 1962:
A tense stand-off known as the Cuban Missile Crisis begins when the U.S. discovers Soviet missiles in Cuba. The U.S. intiaties a naval blockade of the island, with the crisis bringing the two superpowers to the brink of nuclear war.
October 16, 1964:
China becomes the fifth country to test an atomic bomb in 1964, code-named Project 596. The country would conduct an additional 45 atomic bomb tests at the Lop Nor testing site in Sinkiang Province through 1996.
July 1, 1968:
The NPT opens for signatures. Under the treaty, non-nuclear-weapon states agree to never acquire nuclear weapons, and nuclear powers must make a legal undertaking to disarm.
May 18, 1974:
India conducts an underground nuclear test at Pokhran in the Rajasthan desert, code-named the Smiling Buddha. Since conducting its first nuclear test, India has refused to sign the NPT or any subsequent treaties.
September 30, 1986:
Through the information provided by Israeli whistleblower and nuclear technician Mordechai Vanunu, The Sunday Times publishes a story that leads experts to conclude that Israel may have up to 200 nuclear weapons.
October 9, 2006:
After previously signing onto the NPT, North Korea breaks from the treaty and begins testing nuclear weapons in 2006. It has since gathered 20 nuclear warheads, though the actual number and their efficacy are unknown.
Though the threat of nuclear weapons never left, the latest growing tensions in Ukraine have brought the topic back into focus. Even as work towards disarmament continues, many of the top nuclear states hesitate to fully reduce their arsenals to zero.
Feeling Around for Something Human
Why do Russians support the war against Ukraine? Shura Burtin investigates.
9:14 am, May 3, 2022
Source: Meduza
For more than two months now, many Russians have openly supported the Kremlin’s “special military operation” in Ukraine — choosing to close their eyes to executions and rapes, the shelling of peaceful cities, unthinkable destruction, and millions of people losing their homes. Journalist Shura Burtin spent several weeks talking to Russian citizens about their thoughts and feelings about the war. For Meduza, Burtin recounts how fear and a sense of humiliation defeated Russians’ humanity.
“I don’t understand why people in Russia are silent!” This cry was heard across hundreds of Ukrainian posts during the first weeks of the war. “Do they really support this? Do they not care? We’re getting bombed and they are too scared to get fined for protesting? Maybe they don’t know what is happening? Somebody, tell them!”
After Bucha and Kramatorsk, Ukrainians seem to have stopped caring what Russians think. But I too couldn’t understand how the majority of Russians could possibly support all of this. It seemed nightmarish, you just wanted to run from it.
For many decades, everyone had been asking if Germans in 1939 really didn’t understand what was going on. We’ve wondered how an entire nation, all of those regular people, decided to go along with total insanity. It occurred to me that today, we’re in a position to answer this question.
My friend Alisa, a sociologist whose name has been changed, and I started walking around Moscow and asking random people how they felt about the war in Ukraine. We thought that what was going on was so insane, everyone must have questions about it. Half of the people we asked refused to talk to us. The other half were usually open to fairly in-depth conversations. Later, I talked to people in the Kaluga and Kostroma regions. We conducted over 50 interviews in total. They are not intended to be representative. We just wanted to get some sense of what was going through people’s heads. To enter into the darkness and feel around for something human.
Chapter 1
Parroting propaganda
Subjective Opinions
Two men in their fifties hanging out next to a sports field in a Moscow park explained that they’d had a soccer club since they were kids that met here on the weekends. One of them really was wearing a soccer uniform, although neither of them had a ball. The men were drinking cranberry liquor and snacking on roast pork. They both fully supported the “special operation.”
“My buddy’s wife is from Kharkiv. They were just bombing him the other day, but it seems to be quiet now,” one of them said. “Sounds like [the Russian troops] took the city. Irka, my wife, talked to them – they were hiding out in their basement. They said they were shooting at them. But it’s not our guys doing the shooting — why would they do something like that? I’m sick and tired of talking about this, if I am going to be honest. They’ve even forgotten all about covid here now. You walk through the kitchen, the wife’s there, and the TV is just blaring the same things, over and over, blah blah blah, blah blah blah blah.”
“Do you know anyone who’s against the war?”
“Everyone is against war! What are you talking about? What, do you think I support war? I’m against it, too! It’s the politicians, that Zelensky… He handed out weapons [to everyone], it’s really awful. Of course I’m against it! We only have one life to live — how can we spend it fighting?”
“Do you think that the people in Ukraine support their government?”
“No, I don’t think so.”
“And how do you think they feel about our invasion?”
“Judging by what I’ve seen on TV, they’re extremely happy about it,” the second man said. “Everything had been planned and seen to ahead of time. The invasion of such a big country that’s spat in the face of the whole entire world. I’m no politician, this is just my extremely subjective opinion.”
the attacks on Kharkiv
We ended up hearing that phrase many times. People recited the propaganda spiels from state television verbatim, and then explained that they were only expressing their purely subjective opinions. Like the majority of the people we talked to, the men at the soccer field were against war in general, but very much in favor of this particular war, and didn’t see any contradiction in this.
In order to get people off script, we’d ask what exactly they’d felt at various specific moments: when they learned about the start of the “special operation,” when they talked about it with their loved ones, or right at the moment of the conversation that we were having. These questions usually disturbed people, we saw troubled face after troubled face. One thing was clear: what people felt was quite indirectly connected to what they told us.
“What did you feel?”
“I fully support our President’s decisions!”
This is a completely uniform and somewhat strange answer we heard again and again when asking people “What did you feel?” It came up eight times out of ten. Usually, this was stated in a provocative tone, with a bit of a furrowed brow, as if we’d already started an argument. We’d ask people to tell us more, and then they would launch into the story about the threat of NATO and “Nazis” in Ukraine.
If we dug deeper, we’d see that everyone uses these formulas for their own personal reasons. People construct their own worldviews out of the bricks provided by propaganda, but each individual does so in their own unique way. This ultimately allows us to see the person behind the wall of bricks.
Some people believe that support for the war comes out of the propaganda itself. In a way, this is true, of course. But why do people believe it? The formulas work because people can use them for their own ends. The public are the victims of propaganda but, at the same time, it’s made-to-order just for them.
How Russian propaganda works
Contradictions
Almost every conversation we had was filled with contradictory convictions that routinely astounded us.
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“Everyone’s so excited, they’re rubbing their hands together, they’re so happy they’ve pitted one nation against another,” A Moscow taxi driver told me. “Go ahead, fight, destroy one another! They’ve always wanted to take down Russia and drain its blood. Yes, it’s a bad situation, it’s really hard, but I don’t think it could have happened any other way.”
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“I exchanged some money today, I got dollars. But it’s fine, everything’s going to be alright, we’ll get off the dollar soon enough.”
“They keep pushing all that on the youth — the fascism and the anti-war stuff.”
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“Did Russia attack Ukraine?” [Editor’s note: in this section, the author’s questions are in italics]
“No. I mean yes, but we didn’t do it first.”
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“There wasn’t any other way.”
“Did you believe that a month before the war started?”
“It never even crossed our minds.”
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“We’re liberating them.”
“But what if the people there are against it?”
“Well, that may be the case. But we’re not fighting civilians. It just happened to be that they live where all that is happening.”
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“Do you think that Ukraine would have attacked us?”
“Of course, during sporting competitions they would always [shouted]: ‘string them up’ and ‘go fuck yourself.’ Next thing you know, they might have devised atom bombs.”
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“We treat Ukrainians perfectly fine here, don’t we?”
“A lot of people have told us they thought the ‘khokhols [a derogatory term for Ukrainians] need to be punished’.”
“Exactly! They need to be punished!”
○ ○ ○
“Just like they have different states in America, everyone should be united here: Ukraine, the Chuvash Republic, all of us should be together as brotherly nations, basically like the USSR with the republics. They broke all that up, divvied it up. Like a huge corporation — you break it up into parts and then buy them up cheap.”
“You don’t consider Ukraine a sovereign nation?”
“I consider Donetsk and Luhansk sovereign nations. They declared their independence, so let them have it! Why don’t you let them have it?!”
In the early days of the war, I was on a Moscow tram from Novokuznetskaya to Chistye Prudy. An older woman of about 70 sat down across from me and suddenly, out of nowhere, started cursing out “traitors”— there’d been an anti-war rally somewhere downtown that day. I told her that I am a “traitor,” too, and that set her off instantly. She turned to face me and started screaming completely insane and horrifically angry things at me.
“I would just shoot every last one of you if I could! You’re selfish! They don’t like the war! Then why don’t you go fight in it, huh? Why don’t you go to war! Those khokhols have always been that way! I worked in Ternopil, and there was a woman there, she told me back then, ‘If I could, I would shoot every last one of you moskals!’ You think that’s normal? Tell me!”
She was acting like a real ghoul, her yelling was completely absurd and totally contradictory. But there was no point in calling out her contradictions. In fact, what she really wanted to say was concealed within them.
We noticed that people’s true feelings weren’t expressed in parroted narratives, but in their offhand remarks, misstatements, threats, evasions, contradictions, intonations, glances, and gestures.
One elderly bureaucrat that we stopped in a shopping mall with his wife would turn away from me every time I asked him something uncomfortable, just like a child, and stand with his back to me. They were a really touching couple, incredibly kind, they wouldn’t hurt a fly. They passionately and sincerely supported the war. The husband listened to my questions about the bombing of Kharkiv with his eyes full of terror. And then he got out his pen and carefully took down the information from my press badge.
Cynicism
We entered a small cafe in a small town in the Kaluga region. Two neatly-dressed young women who worked at the district administration sat at the far table. They didn’t mind talking to a journalist even one bit, in fact, it made their lunch that much more exciting.
“Doesn’t the war scare you?”
“Nope. I’m a patriot,” said one of the well-kempt women cheerfully. “The only thing I’m against is the global policy toward Russian athletes. I don’t feel bad for the conscripts, or the Ukrainians, or the Russians, soldiers, or civilians — the only people that I feel bad for are athletes! They won’t let them go anywhere! H [an athlete] built his whole life around defending his country’s honor, training 14 hours a day…”
“And you find that more upsetting than young civilians dying for no reason?”
“Yep!”
The woman spoke loudly, surveying the room, like she was giving a speech. She showed off her cynicism while her friend snuck sidelong glances at me curiously.
I’d heard this ranting about the Olympics a million times already. It’s a great reason to be upset. Then you don’t need to think about how you feel about all the cities being bombed. All you need is to remember how much they hurt our athletes or Valery Gergiev (a brilliant conductor!) and then the war just retreats into the background.
“We’re not at war! There’s just some combat as part of the special liberation operation. If our troops hadn’t gone there, theirs would have come to us!”
The woman rattled off all of these tropes with obvious pleasure at their rhetorical power. It seemed she believed that this power was capable of defining what is considered the truth. I listened for her intonations: she sounded brazen and heartless.
“Why do you think that Ukraine would have attacked us?”
“[Baba] Vanga predicted Russia would become a global empire by 2026. And there’s no other way to become a great superpower. Throughout all of history, this only became possible through the annexation of various territories.”
Four of the people we talked to referred to the mystic Baba Vanga, likely out of a need to depict what’s happening as predetermined.
“So are we taking over Ukraine?”
“No, we are liberating it. We’re not trying to take anything over. They can go ahead and fiddle around over there as much as they like.”
This phrase, “fiddle around,” exemplifies the disdainful attitude toward Ukraine, which I found to be extremely popular.
The woman was not upset about contradicting herself. For her, it was all just a game of ping-pong — light-hearted trolling. All of these questions about the war were nothing but enemy discourse, she only wanted to keep hitting the ball back at her opponent. But to me, it seems that making contradictory claims also makes a certain kind of psychological sense.
There’s something trance-like about a person saying one thing and then immediately following it up with the opposite. It feels like a response to having their back up against a wall. The mind doesn’t understand how to react to what’s happening; saying things that contradict each other safely distances it from reality. It makes it so that it’s almost like you’re not even here anymore.
“So you really don’t care that people are dying?” I asked the young woman.
“Look: no matter what I tell you right now, nothing is going to change. Even if we transform how we feel about it — what good will that do, anyway? It won’t do anything. So what’s the point? Why even think about it? Think about your friends and family, instead. Show them more love.”
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That evening, at the same cafe, we ran into a fashionable young man with a goatee.
“What, you don’t like Uncle Vova? You’re into that dummy Zelensky? Uncle Vova will show him, don’t worry. And I support him whole-heartedly.”
After that guy left, my friend said she knew him. He’s a big wholesale drug dealer who runs his business far away from Moscow so he can lay low. A guy who “Uncle Vova” would only be too happy to put behind bars for 15 years still supported him.
“It’s just because he’s doing so well, he likes things the way they are,” my friend explained.
Later on, I had a many hours-long conversation with a young deacon-slash-businessman. He was trying to prove to me that Russia was the freest country in the world because no one got in the way of him making money. He also completely supported the “special operation,” comparing Ukraine to a “teenage drug addict” that needed to be “forced into rehab.”
What all three of them had in common was that they were all “doing so well.” They had something to lose so they didn’t want to think about anything so unpleasant. Aligning oneself with power is a successful survival strategy — you get much more bang for your buck that way.
No Contradictions Whatsoever
Only one of the people who I encountered had absolutely no clue what was happening in Ukraine. She was 30 and worked in a small-town bakery. It felt like she was sincerely shocked by my questions.
“What do you feel about Ukraine?”
“Well, Russia’s going to win.”
“What’s happening there?”
“People tell me they’re getting rid of the Nazis. My neighbors told me that Chechen soldiers are fighting over there on our side. It’s all good. No matter what, we will win.”
“Are they bombing the cities?”
“Are our men bombing the cities?” She paused to consider the question. “I don’t think so. The Ukrainians are staging it all and making fake videos.”
“And what do the people there feel?”
“They’re all running to Russia. They feel a lot safer here. Ukraine is filled with terrorists, they are the ones bombing them. They don’t care: women, children… They’re literally Nazis and terrorists. We stand for peace, not war. We never wanted this war. They are the ones who wanted it.”
“Ukrainian troops invaded Russia?”
“They’ve been preparing for this war for eight years. They dug trenches and stockpiled weapons. They weren’t just getting ready for nothing, were they?”
“They were getting ready to attack Russia?”
“Well, not attack…But didn’t they want that?..What, are you pro-Ukraine? I don’t really want to answer any more questions.”
I could tell that she truly didn’t even suspect that her ideas might not correspond to reality. She just believed what she heard on TV and it had never crossed her mind to actually become interested in the reality of the war, to think differently. She looked at me fearfully, like I had offered her some illicit substance.
A pair of trendy young men we ran into at the mall were a totally different story. They understood what was happening perfectly and they supported the war, the bombing of cities, and the killing of civilians. One of them, a powerfully-built young man with cold eyes calmly told me that he would gladly go kill “all of them” himself.
“I thought Uncle Vova was gonna blow up Ukraine back in 2016 when they came out to that rally carrying pictures of Bandera. The Grads [multiple rocket launchers] should’ve gone nonstop, who gives a shit about civilians.”
“You really don’t care about them?”
“Of course not. Why would I? Did the Nazis care about our civilians?”
“But maybe that was because they were Nazis?”
“To them, we were the Nazis and they were the Nazis to us.”
“Should civilians be sacrificed?”
“Uh-huh. Should we put up with fascism in the 21st century? It’s a threat to the entire world.”
But this kind of simplicity was completely unique. Everyone else we talked to had a sense of what was actually going on and was trying to defend themselves from this knowledge. “You feel bad for people, but what can you do? You gotta break eggs to make an omelet.”
Chapter 2
Us and Them
Relatives
There were a handful of bitter women of around 60 who all held the same unshakeable beliefs. They thought that Ukraine had nuclear and biological weapons (one of them even claimed that they were already having an effect on her) and generally just repeated outlandish conspiracy theories they’d heard on TV. All they knew was a hermetically contrived version of reality.
“We gave the Ukrainian soldiers food and drink then we let them go. I think that we were way too humane with them. They’re over there skinning our prisoners of war alive. You think that’s okay?”
“I was really scared that they [the Ukrainian army] were going to start bombing Rostov, Tsimlyansk. They have all that equipment, those weapons, they’re being pumped up, like, ‘Kill Russians, kill Russians’,” said another shopper at the mall, a sixty-year-old woman pulling a bag on wheels. “I know that what’s going on in Kyiv, it’s nonstop horror. No one’s in power, it’s total anarchy, [the Ukrainians] will only be grateful if we come in and get rid of the comrades who are prepared to kill every last Ukrainian. That’s what those nationalists want — to cleanse the area of Ukrainians.”
Incredibly, every one of these women had friends or relatives in Ukraine. They’d even talked to them since the war began. Only they had completely refused to listen to what the Ukrainians had told them.
“Ukrainians are bastards,” the woman with the rolling bag continued. “I have a friend over there, she wrote to me, ‘Stop calling me.’ Because they come after them if they’re pro-Russian. If she says anything good about Russia at all, they’ll come after her.”
It was extremely difficult to get these women to tell us what exactly their friends and relatives told them.
“You know…The negative…”
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I’d heard that word already, from my mother. On the third day of the war, I went over to her house and she suddenly started talking about targeted strikes and “where were we looking for the past eight years.” I started telling her about the bombings, about a girl I knew in Kharkiv who’d called me, terrified, during a break in the shelling. I explained that there was a real war going on and that I didn’t understand how people refused to see this monstrous thing. My mother sat there stupefied, staring down at the floor.
“People are tired of negativity,” she sighed.
That phrase explained something. In the past 20 years, every time I’ve happened to overhear what’s being said on television, they were frightening people with something: migrants, “Gayropa,” Banderites — the main thing is that these people are just “others.” I suppose that the audience itself had wanted this. Having something specific to fear was more manageable than the free-floating terror of the unknown that people were forced to live with during the 1990s.
On wartorn Ukraine
Now, all of these women preferred to believe in imaginary threats rather than the real ones that their loved ones were working so hard to tell them about over the phone.
“She doesn’t tell me what she actually thinks,” a woman in a Moscow mall said of her friend in Ukraine. “It’s all negativity. She talks about the negative, trying to prove to me…” the woman made some fleeting, ephemeral gestures and faces meant to convey the fact that her friend was intentionally lying to her because she was scared that her phone calls were being intercepted.
“Do you have relatives in Ukraine?” we asked another woman.
“I do. And they brainwash them good over there. They didn’t know anything about Donetsk or Luhansk, they were completely fine. But now that a missile has hit an airbase five kilometers [three miles] away from their house, they’re all ‘Oh my! Lordy-lordy!’”
“Did you call them? How did it go?”
“Badly. I was really hoping my sister would come here [from Ukraine] so I could sit her down and turn on Rossiya-24 and make her watch that for a week — maybe it’d set her straight.”
“And what do you think would happen to you if they sat you down in Ukraine?”
“I’d never go there! They’re too good at brainwashing!”
It turned out that one of the women who passionately supported the war had a Ukrainian husband.
“And how does he feel right now?” we asked her.
“How does he feel?! He’s worried about his mother, he’s scared.”
“What do you think the Ukrainians feel?”
“Are you provoking me? I told you already, I’m for it!”
I understand that her husband doesn’t think exactly like her. However, this only feeds her conviction, leaving her without any room for doubt.
“I have some friends that I went to school with and they have relatives in Ukraine,” said a clearly kind woman, the wife of a retired bureaucrat. “I went over to their house and they were so negative about it! Thank God we don’t have any relatives there.”
She knew that if she had loved ones there, she’d have to come face-to-face with an irreconcilable contradiction and wouldn’t be able to protect herself anymore. So she was glad not to have any.
“Write this down: I’m all for it! They have their propaganda and we have ours. I believe what they’re telling us here,” a cleaner at a Moscow market told me guilelessly. “My friend from school moved there, she lives in Kyiv. We correspond, we almost got married, even. Then suddenly, we have opposite opinions. They shot up an ambulance over there. She thinks that it’s the DNR militia, that they did it on purpose. But we know that it was their own men that did that. Why would we ever gun down an ambulance? I can’t get my head around it. I read that and I stopped writing her. She’s become a completely different person…”
I was surprised that he had so easily become afraid of a woman he’d been in love with. He just gave up all of his plans for his personal life in order to feel like he was right.
Ukrainians are constantly asking, “Do Russians really not know what is going on?” The answer is no, most of them don’t. But they understand anyway. Fifteen minutes into every conversation, supporters would casually mention that yes, we were probably bombing the cities, people were dying, and everyone in Ukraine hates us. On some level, they understood everything — only they didn’t know it. And they refused to know, even when being confronted with direct evidence from their loved ones.
A ‘Brotherly Nation’
I’ve noticed that the words “brotherly nation” don’t actually mean anything to the majority of people. They’re nothing but rhetoric. People in Kharkiv and Mariupol may still speak Russian but no one in Russia actually considers them “one of us.” Fraternity, the sense of belonging to a single nation, doesn’t come from having a common language, it comes from daily experience, a million tiny connections, phone calls, common causes, living relationships. There’s been incomparably less of all that since the fall of the Soviet Union.
The siege of Mariupol
“I wanted to go fight, I went down to the enlistment office,” a man selling clothes at the market admitted to me. “Wouldn’t fucking take me.”
“Why did you want to enlist?”
“I wanted to do a bit of fighting, a bit of shooting.”
“Kill some people?”
“I’m a driver and a mechanic, what do I care? I’ll go where they tell me.”
“You’d really go kill Ukrainians?”
The man looked at me like I’d suddenly started speaking English to him.
“I don’t want them to send my son. Let him raise his kids, I can go. He has a daughter, plus a baby born in December, my grandson. I can afford to go.”
“[Do Ukrainians] hate us? Well, they have the right to. The khokhols have already gone too far, to be honest,” a soldier on leave told us at a shopping center. “No one really cares what they think anymore.”
He immediately added, “Who’d want to sit in a basement, in the cold, hungry? I know what it’s like to be under Uragan fire — I wouldn’t wish it on anyone. You’re completely defenseless. It’s really scary. No one within a two-soccer field radius has any chance of survival. I know what war is.” He was a passionate supporter of the “special operation.”
I think that if Siberia had broken off from Russia during perestroika, people today would be just as calm about bombing Novokuznetsk or Kemerovo.
“You’re not shocked by the war?” I asked two women sitting together at the food court.
“No. I support the war,” one of them answered.
“Could you imagine a war between Russia and Ukraine happening in Soviet times?”
“Of course not! That’s why, as Soviet people, we’re fine with it now!”
People we talked to kept bringing up their personal experiences with “Ukrainian nationalism.” Every unpleasant incident was treated like it was systemic.
“When they blew up our airplane in Egypt, my friend was down there, and there were these Ukrainians staying at her hotel,” a woman at a mall told us. “She told me, ‘You should have seen how happy they were.’ I wanted to get a machine gun and shoot them all then and there.”
“Why can’t we bomb them?” a large elderly man selling honey at a market in the Kaluga region demanded angrily. Then he told the story of how he’d gone to Lviv when he was young at the invitation of a friend. “They said, ‘Listen up, moskal. If you weren’t here visiting one of ours, you wouldn’t get out alive.’ That was back in the eighties. Now it’s even stronger, this hatred toward me.”
This refrain, “they’ve always hated us,” came up in two out of three conversations, alongside “but they’re a brotherly nation” and “there’s no such thing as Ukrainians.”
“What is Ukraine, actually? When did it come into being? It’s a completely artificial construct!” a Moscow taxi driver maintained.
“They’re all Russians. The fact that they’ve messed with their heads and they’re all messed up now — that’s temporary,” a woman hotly debated with me. She had a sister in Ukraine. “It’ll only make us closer as brothers!”
“After this situation?”
“There’s no situation!”
○ ○ ○
Of course, the bombing of Kharkiv and Mariupol only became possible through the tireless efforts of the propagandists over the course of the past eight years. The idea that the Ukrainians hate us allows people to shield themselves from the terrible truth.
The idea that “they are strangers to us, we can bomb them” coexists with Russians’ view of Ukraine as a part of our country that should be returned to us.
The general feeling of ruin and catastrophe from the 1990s has been colored with “national humiliation”: “They’re persecuting Russians.” And the propaganda in recent years has worked to inflate that feeling. “Ukrainian Russophobia” is particularly insulting to Russians because “They know what we’re like and now they don’t want to have anything in common with us anymore: they turn away from us, they betray us, they’re leaving us behind.”
I think that the specter of the enemy in people’s minds is unconscious and ancient. For them, speeches in which Nazis and gay pride parades are actually one and the same contain no contradictions. The swastika and the rainbow flags are just different external manifestations of the Other, “There are people like us, and then there are others who are always against us.” The Ukrainians have betrayed “us” and become “them.”
There is absolutely no room for an independent Ukraine in this worldview, which is a completely dichotomous: just us vs. them. The propaganda worked hard to get to this archaic sensation in the depths of the subconscious. But I think that people needed that in order to protect an even deeper-set sense of anxiety caused by these new, completely incomprehensible times.
Russia has been afflicted with a mythical image of itself as the vanquisher of forces of evil and chaos for a very long time now; it triumphed over the 1990s, terrorism, the West. This mythic image gives us a reason to live. Putin’s decision to finally defeat this “evil” once and for all makes it especially hard for people to start questioning it now. Because if they do, it will destroy their entire worldview.
Chapter 3
Feelings
Guilt
“Whose fault is it that the war started?” I asked a taxi driver in Moscow.
“The primary blame has always and will always fall on us. We will never wash our hands of this. They will always judge us for it. They can’t stand us anymore.”
People immediately became defensive, justifying themselves like a husband who’s beaten his wife. “She made me do it, it was inevitable, I didn’t hit her that hard, just enough to knock some sense into her.” People say things like that when deep inside, they know that what they have done is wrong, and they can’t justify it. They know it, but they won’t let themselves be fully conscious of it. If we brought up innocent people dying, the people we talked to would automatically shoot back, “Didn’t they bomb Donbas for eight years?” They wouldn’t let themselves even consider the tragedy for a second, they immediately wanted to pin the blame on somebody else.
“We did the right thing! America did the same thing in Kosovo!” a 35-year-old lawyer in a Moscow shopping mall told us.
“Was it right that they did that?”
“Yes. I mean no…But why are they allowed to do it?”
Many people told me about our inexplicable, unforgivable kindness.
“You know why they don’t like us? It’s because of our kindness. We trust everyone so they pull the wool over our eyes, lie to us, and we forgive everything. The Russian soul is way too kind.”
“They’ve gotten completely brazen, they keep pushing and pushing Russia. When I was in school we helped everyone. If there was an earthquake, everyone in Russia was ready to help. Now their president wants to know: where’s the humanitarian aid? It’s coming from Russia, again! Grain, canned goods!”
“We’re bombing [Ukrainian cities]? Why did they cut off the water in Crimea? We were giving them gas and groceries. They’re just not human over there! How can you do something like that, you have to feed people. I am just amazed by our humanism.”
The war makes people ask questions that need to be radically suppressed. The fact is that we are just abnormally good people. This fairytale version of the war at least makes some sense psychologically.
“What did you feel when the war broke out?” I asked someone.
“The West has never liked us and never will.”
The subject and object switched roles. The emotions our interlocutor has experienced for the past several years shield him against all accusations. The television showed him nothing but how unfairly we were getting treated by everyone everywhere. He got fed up with that feeling and then came the war, our breakup with the entire world, a long-awaited liberation from that toxic relationship.
○ ○ ○
Walking around a small town, we saw a stuffed minivan with two teachers standing next to it. One of them was moving down to Armenia and the other one was helping him pack.
“A lot of people realize that there’s something wrong with what’s going on,” the history teacher said. “They try to find some justification just so they won’t feel so lost. They repeat what they’ve heard on TV, ‘If NATO comes..’ But you can tell that on an emotional level, they’re all having a really hard time. During the annexation of Crimea [in 2014], things were different. People would look you right in the eye and argue [that they were right]. Now, they say the same things, but they keep looking away…”
On the exodus from Russia
Anxiety
“The worst thing right now is that it’s going to be the Khasavyurt Accords [which ended the First Chechen War] all over again. They’re gonna stop the war, come to some kind of agreement,” a Moscow taxi driver told me. “But since we already started it, why stop now just to look them in the eyes? We need to fight to the end!”
“I think that we’re bombing our own people and that it’s completely shameful,” I replied. “It’s the same thing as if we were bombing Voronezh.”
When I got out of the car, the driver looked at me strangely. I’d clocked this look a few times over the past several days — it clings to you and lets you know that the person feels unsafe around you and sees you as an enemy. The naive cashier at that bakery started replying to me with that same kind of intonation after I’d asked her a few of my questions, which she had been so surprised by, not understanding what was happening in Ukraine.
One of the days we were out at a mall, we approached a man sitting down at a table. My colleague introduced herself, explained we were journalists, and asked him how he felt about the war. The man cast that same tense glance over both of us and declared, “I completely support the actions of our President.” With that, he blocked his face with the paper bag from his fast food.
We stepped away and then I noticed that the man was now heading to talk to the security guards. He’d intercepted some spies and was rushing to report on us.
“Where are you from, even? Moscow?” The man squinted at us, standing next to the security guard as he went through our documents.
“I’m from Rostov,” my colleague said.
“What’s the main street in Rostov?” he asked, hoping to catch us in the act.
Now that taxi driver was looking at me the same way, like he was wondering whether he should report me to someone. I think that they were all motivated by fear. That’s what had forced them to take a side.
“People are overwhelmed with anxiety. People are dying for no reason. Maybe not for no reason, but you still feel bad for them,” a man at a market stall in the Kaluga district told me. “We need to root out all the Banderism. Show no mercy for anyone, not women, not children, right?” It was like he was asking me. “NATO is creeping up to our borders, right? That’s what they say on TV.”
“They say one thing on our stations and something completely different on theirs,” I replied.
“Oh yeah. My brother’s over there now. A shell hit the front entrance of the neighboring building, six people died. They’re blaming the Russians.”
The man was worried about his brother and vacillated between justifications.
○ ○ ○
“I talked to my dad on the phone yesterday,” my colleague told me. “He’s really worked up even though he’s never been interested in politics before. Suddenly he’s attacking me. ‘What’s Putin ever done to you? He’s the one who made it possible for you to go to college! [Ukraine’s] full of Nazis!’ I said, ‘Papa, what’s up with you?’ He’d never believed the authorities before, he’d always maintained that they were all lying. But people are shaking in their boots right now, they’re so scared, they don’t know what to do with themselves. They don’t even let themselves ask any questions, they just spit out the first available ready-made answer. He’s also afraid that they’re going to throw me and my sister in jail and tries to get us to believe in a less dangerous version of this story.”
Many people said that they felt anxious. Mostly women who didn’t support the war. But I think that supporting the “special operation” was, paradoxically, also an expression of anxiety. Those people didn’t care about their own personal opinions as much as they cared about living through a common experience with others, entrusting themselves to someone.
I was really surprised by Putin’s 80 percent approval rating. I think that this number does not at all mean that there’s also mass support for the war. In fact, it may mean just the opposite: the numbers only demonstrate how afraid people are.
On support for the war
Humiliation
“Everybody humiliates us, when it comes down to it,” a boots and pants seller told me with a smile on his face at a market in the Kaluga region. “Everybody who isn’t Russian is always poking fun at us: when we were kids, always. The past several wars have just been Russians killing other Russians. All those Englishmen and Americans have been laughing their heads off at us, thumbing their noses. I’d launch a missile at England. And at America. So that they’d stop messing with us. No, I am not for the war. But I am sick and tired of them walking all over us!”
The theme of inexplicable humiliation was a very common thread among the supporters of the war, especially older folks.
“They’ve totally beaten down the Russian. Like he’s just a schmo, someone without any morals. I’ve had enough of that at the last few Olympic Games. No flag, no national anthem. It can’t go on like this forever!”
“We can’t have our anthem, we can’t have our flag, they didn’t even let our disabled athletes compete in the Paralympics…”
“We Russians have never lived well,” a beekeeper at the Kaluga market told me with irritation. “Everyone on the outskirts [the Soviet Republics] lived a lot better than us in Soviet times. I’ve never had it easy! Chernobyl, perestroika, all of that other junk. I’m an independent man!” he insisted, raising his voice. “I don’t care who’s in power in this country. Communists, democrats — it doesn’t matter! I’ll always earn my bread! No one can ever have any influence over my morals ever again!” the beekeeper shouted and it was clear that everything wasn’t as he said it was.
“What are you feeling right now?”
“There’s nothing to feel here! You have to wrap things up with a victory for our side. There’s no other option. And there shouldn’t be.”
It was clear that his desire for a victory was a direct response to the many years of indignity and humiliation he’d felt.
“No one cares about what Russia thinks,” the beekeeper continued. “There’s nothing but blame all around. We’re the biggest villains in history now.”
I’d already heard this lament many times, that nobody likes us. It’s some mixture of an inferiority complex and a victim complex. I could see that he, like many others, wanted to picture some external accuser and argue with him. Why? Maybe to feel self-righteous. Or just to exist for somebody else.
“I’m happy my president finally went through with it! Enough, you guys! If you don’t want to respect us, you’ll have to fear us!”
“Are we bombing Kharkiv so that the people in the West will be afraid of us?” I ask him to clarify.
I saw a frightened comprehension in the beekeeper’s eyes. He wasn’t a chump or a bad guy.
“We shouldn’t discuss what the president does while my country is fighting! If the Russian people don’t agree with my president, my country will lose, and I can’t allow that to happen.”
I can more or less guess at what he was hoping for. This is our big chance to prove how badass we are and no one will judge the victors.
For many years, people have run from this feeling of humiliation toward a reality where we have accomplished something magnificent. The sanctity of our Great Victory, the fact that we saved the world from fascism, make it feel like our government, and, by extension, all of us, are all right. The war unites people, it gives them a sense of being part of something. It’s a response to the crisis of purpose, of loneliness.
“I am a Christian so I completely support the operation,” the woman married to a Ukrainian man told us. “The Antichrist will come, you know about that. The Antichrist will come to Germany, to Europe, every Christian knows this.”
I thought she was waiting for the apocalypse so that the external world would finally correspond to her outdated internal nightmare. This sentiment sounded in other exchanges: that finally, things would become very clear. The war was like this culmination of many years of uncertainty, finally banishing it from the land.
“The war comes as a psychological relief after many years of stagnation,” a psychologist friend told me. “It’s like a fire in a prison — at least something exciting is happening.”
To Avoid Being Wrong
I was surprised by something I heard from a 60-year-old man we stopped in the doorway of his home in a small town in the Kaluga region. From his intonation, you could tell that he was a kind and compassionate man.
“What do I feel? Nazis need to be killed. My grandfather fought them and killed them. I don’t have anything against the Ukrainian people, but those ones need to be killed, to be chased into Europe.”
“Do you ever have doubts about this?”
“How could I have any doubts! My grandfather fought — what’s there to doubt? We weren’t the ones who attacked them, unlike those Nazis. Or, okay, let’s say we attacked them. But who’d we attack? Not the people. We attacked Nazis. There are good people there [in Ukraine]. This house,” he pointed at his doorway, “Some guys from Lviv built it for me. If I were to run into them would I shoot them? Of course not!”
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Unlike many of the people we talked to, there was no sense that this man was being cynical or dishonest or dumb.
“My friend told me this story. In 1979, they put them [soldiers] on alert without explaining anything. They took away their military IDs, the plane landed, and suddenly they were told where they were. ‘You’re in the Republic of Afghanistan’,” the man continued. “He told me, ‘I climb out from behind a precipice and three meters ahead of me, there’s a muhajid standing there with his back to me. How can I kill that man?’ When you go off to slaughter a piglet — you’re the one who fattened him up, but you’ll still down 100 grams [of alcohol] for courage.’ But he’d never even seen anyone killed before, he was totally green. He shut his eyes, pulled the trigger, and didn’t stop shooting until he ran out of ammo. And when the bombs start falling — of course the people get scared, of course they will hate us.”
That man really shocked me. He understood that there was a real war going on, that civilians were dying, that war was a terrible thing. But he still completely supported the “special operation.” He acknowledged that they were only showing him propaganda on TV, but chose to believe in it. It was as though these contradictory ideas lived in two separate parts of his consciousness, without intersection, not breeding a trace of doubt.
People would not let themselves see that we’d started a terrifying war and were prepared to come up with any feasible explanation in order to protect the image they had of their being good people. Why were they resisting so hard? Why did they find it so unbearable to be mistaken? I thought that this came out of the ancient belief that in the end, the world was fair. The possibility of the absence of justice seemed capable of taking away their last hopes for happiness.
It was clear that they were living inside a dream of pure righteousness, erecting increasingly thicker fortifications around it the scarier things got. In order to shield their correctness, they needed to picture it all in black and white.
When I first heard about the war, I’d had the same reaction, just from the other side. I kept catching myself thinking that I didn’t want to hear about anything that didn’t correspond to my opinions, like stories about Ukrainians who really were happy about the invasion or of Ukrainian soldiers executing wounded prisoners of war. Nuances got in the way of psychological stability, they made me physically ill. The situation demanded simplicity.
I was extremely scared of being wrong. That word rendered all my ideals worthless. I was afraid that I would be forcibly made to believe in some other ideals. I think that everyone’s feeling this kind of threat right now and is protecting themselves however they can.
For example, a friend of mine told me that when they argued about the war with her mother, her mother would always break into angry, accusatory yelling. Then, one time, she suddenly said, with a voice filled with doom, “So what, our soldiers are dying for nothing then?”
Grief
Strange as it seems, I thought that Muscovites were noticeably more ideologically charged. In Moscow, support for the war was nervy and uncompromising. In the provinces, most people also supported the “special operation,” but they were more gentle, more willing to see the complexity, to feel compassion for people in Ukraine.
Support for the war drops precipitously whenever someone is forced to face it head on. Like mothers of conscript-aged sons or people who have close relatives in Ukraine (although not all of them). The majority of the people we met who were against the war were guileless women who were not ruled by political convictions, but a visceral horror of war. 
We need to find a way to demilitarize, both to prevent an accidental or intentional nuclear exchange, and to release resources to resolve global warming. But how? Civilian defence can be part of the answer for many countries. It would not only reduce military budgets gradually, but, by lowering tensions, make nuclear disarmament more tenable. Also, nonviolent defence, when it is intended as more than a minor supplement to military defence, is a radical democratic project. That is an important consideration, in light of authoritarian tendencies worldwide.
To follow up: https://sandbroo.faculty.politics.utoronto.ca/The-Viability-of-Nonviolent-Defence-Today/
The continuing unprovoked mass-slaughter of innocent Ukrainian civilians by Russia is inexcusable. Having said that, Russian president Vladimir Putin’s apparent fear of NATO expansion, though especially the deployment of additional U.S. anti-nuclear-missile defense-system batteries, further into eastern Europe is typically perceived by the West as unmerited paranoia.
Surely he must realize that the West, including NATO, would never initiate a nuclear-weapons exchange. But, then, how can he — or we, for that matter — know for sure, particularly with America’s military past?
While Ronald Reagan postulated that “Of the four wars in my lifetime none came about because the U.S. was too strong,” who can know what may have historically come to fruition had the U.S. remained the sole possessor of atomic weaponry. There’s a presumptive, and perhaps even arrogant, concept of American leadership as somehow, unless directly militarily provoked, being morally/ethically above using nuclear weapons internationally. Cannot absolute power corrupt absolutely?
After President Harry S. Truman relieved General Douglas MacArthur as commander of the forces warring with North Korea — for the latter’s remarks about using many atomic bombs to promptly end the war — Americans’ approval-rating of the president dropped to 23 percent. It was still a record-breaking low, even lower than the worst approval-rating points of the presidencies of Richard Nixon and Lyndon Johnson.
Had it not been for the formidable international pressure on Truman (and perhaps his personal morality) to relieve MacArthur as commander, could/would Truman eventually have succumbed to domestic political pressure to allow MacArthur’s command to continue?
Opinion: Give Russia’s U.N. Security Council seat to Ukraine
Marc Thiessen | The Washington Post | 7 April 2022
In a fiery speech Tuesday, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky called out the U.N. Security Council for its utter fecklessness in responding to Russia’s horrific war crimes in his country. The United Nations is incapable of holding Russia to account, Zelensky said, because Moscow “turns the right of veto in the U.N. Security Council into a right to kill.” Member states should “remove Russia” from the Security Council, he said, or “dissolve yourself altogether.”
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Zelensky is absolutely right. But we should take his bold proposal a step further. Not only should Russia be kicked off the Security Council, its seat should be given to Ukraine. Indeed, there is precedent for doing just that.
It is not written into the U.N. Charter that the “Russian Federation” is entitled to a permanent seat on the Security Council. The U.N. Charter states that “The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council.” Two of those named countries no longer occupy seats on the Security Council.
On Oct. 25, 1971, the U.N. expelled the “Republic of China” (Taiwan) and admitted the “People’s Republic of China” (mainland China), which then became one of the five permanent members of the Security Council (or the P5). Despite its Security Council veto, Taiwan was powerless to stop its own expulsion by a vote of the U.N. General Assembly. A U.S.-led proposal to make China’s representation an “important question” requiring a two-thirds supermajority vote, failed by a vote of 59 to 55 (with 15 abstentions). The General Assembly then passed Resolution 2758 removing Taiwan by a simple majority vote of 76 to 35 (with 17 abstentions). In so doing, it set the precedent that a sitting member of the P5 could be removed and replaced by another entity with a plausible claim to the seat.
Just as Communist China now occupies the seat designated for the “Republic of China,” Russia now occupies the seat designated for the “Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.” But the “Russian Federation” and the “U.S.S.R.” are not the same country. Indeed, Putin’s justification for his invasion of Ukraine is to reclaim territory lost during the Soviet Union’s dissolution.
Just as the UNGA voted to expel Taiwan and declare that henceforth the People’s Republic of China would be deemed the legitimate occupant of the “Republic of China’s” seat, it could vote to expel Russia and declare that henceforth Ukraine will be deemed the legitimate successor state to the “Union of Soviet Socialist Republics” — giving it the old Soviet seat. One need look no further than Putin’s own 6,885-word manifesto for war — laying out a case stretching back more than 1,000 years that Ukrainians and Russians are one people descended from “Ancient Rus” — to justify declaring Ukraine to be the legitimate successor of the U.S.S.R.
The China precedent from 1971 establishes that Russia and China would be powerless to veto such a move in the Security Council. And unlike Taiwan, which did nothing to merit its U.N. ejection, Russia has earned its removal in spades.
The U.N. Charter explicitly states that a member state can be expelled if it “has persistently violated the Principles contained in the present Charter.” This past month, the General Assembly twice voted to overwhelmingly declare that Moscow is doing just that in Ukraine. On March 2, the General Assembly voted 141 to 5 (with 35 abstentions) to condemn the “aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine in violation of Article 2 (4) of the Charter.” And on March 24, it again condemned Russia for violating the Charter and creating a humanitarian crisis by a vote of 140 to 5 (with 35 abstentions).
In both cases, almost three-quarters of member states voted to condemn Russia. That is more than enough votes to replace Russia on the Security Council. Indeed, it would exceed the two-thirds supermajority required if the question of Russia’s replacement were deemed an “important matter.” On Thursday, the General Assembly voted to suspend Russia from the U.N. Human Rights Council. It can use the exact same procedure to replace Russia on the Security Council.
So, it can be done. Whether it will be done is a different matter — a question not of procedure, but of political will. It’s one thing to vote for a strongly-worded statement; quite another to impose actual consequences.
But the United States should force a vote and make every nation go on record — because Russia’s presence on the Security Council is a disgrace. The Putin regime is raping, murdering and massacring innocent men, women and children in Ukraine. If the United Nations can’t impose consequences on Putin and his henchmen for those crimes, then Zelensky is right — “the U.N. can simply be dissolved.”
Read More: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/04/07/russia-ukraine-united-nations-zelensky-right/
Hi everyone––I’ve written a short piece for Passage advocating for Canada to attend the First Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. I hope folks find it useful!
https://readpassage.com/why-wont-canada-attend-a-historic-meeting-on-nuclear-disarmament/
Matt Korda
Dmitri Trenin on the Prospect of Russia’s Invading Ukraine
Moscow Carnegie Center
January 20, 2022
What a Week of Talks Between Russia and the West Revealed
Moscow’s demands of the United States and NATO are in fact the strategic goals of Russian policy in Europe. If Russia cannot achieve them by diplomatic means, it will resort to other methods.
By Dmitri Trenin
Director, Moscow Carnegie Center
https://carnegiemoscow.org/commentary/86222
The meeting between Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and his U.S. counterpart Antony Blinken on January 21 follows on from the previous week’s intensive talks: the first round of U.S.-Russian dialogue on European security issues in Geneva, followed by sessions of the Russia-NATO Council in Brussels and the OSCE Standing Committee in Vienna. The extremely tough talks that took place last week in Europe didn’t end in a public scandal or definitive rupture, but nor did they inspire confidence that the ongoing European security crisis can be resolved any time soon.
The lack of a diplomatic solution will logically lead to a further escalation of the crisis, and increase the chances that the only way out of it will be through the use of what Russian officials call “military-technical means.” While Moscow and Washington continue to assess the situation and prepare to take new steps, it makes sense to explore the roots of the crisis, to analyze the routes and consequences of its escalation, and also to look at alternative ways of dealing with the security conundrum in Europe’s east.
Roots
The roots of the crisis can be clearly traced. With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States and its allies established a European order based on the dominant role of America and the central position of NATO as an instrument for military and political regulation, and for guaranteeing Western security and the order they had created. Russia, which had failed to become part of the West on its own terms and refused to accept the inferior role offered to it, found itself on the outside of that order, and was forced to accept the new state of affairs. The United States was aware that Russia was unhappy with the situation, but preferred to ignore it, since it viewed the country as a waning power.
History has shown, however, that if a large, defeated power has not been incorporated into the post-war order, or if it has not been offered a place in it that it finds acceptable, then over time it will begin to take action aimed at destroying that order or, at the very least, significantly altering it. This depends, of course, on the frustrated power having enough material potential, and on its leadership having the political will and public support. In Russia, these conditions began to form in the first half of the 2010s, as demonstrated by Moscow’s reaction to the crisis in Ukraine and the subsequent confrontation with the United States and breakdown in relations with the EU.
Evolution of the Confrontation
In the eight years of the confrontation with the West, Russia’s foreign policy has continued to evolve, from adapting to inconvenient new realities to attempts to at least prevent the country’s geopolitical position from deteriorating any further, and at best to change the situation to Russia’s advantage. Still, right up until the start of 2021, this policy was essentially built upon that of Mikhail Gorbachev in the sense that it sought to reach mutual understanding—and establish partner relations—with the United States and Europe. Until very recently, President Vladimir Putin spent a great deal of time during lengthy televised discussions with U.S. interviewers trying to convince the American public that Russian interests do not run counter to those of the United States, and that Moscow and Washington can and should join forces against global challenges such as universal security, terrorist threats, or the pandemic.
That attitude changed at the start of 2021. That spring, Russian troops began large-scale military exercises along the Ukrainian border. U.S. intelligence suspected the drills could be cover for preparations to invade Ukraine. Unable to ignore Russia’s actions, U.S. President Joe Biden invited Putin to meet with him in Geneva, even though Russia had not previously been among the White House’s priorities.
This tactic of forcing Washington to engage in talks with Moscow was actually voiced by Putin back in 2018, in an address to both chambers of the Russian parliament. Presenting a range of new weapons systems, the Russian president said of the United States: “No one listened to us before. Well, listen to us now.”
The sole practical results of the two presidents’ meeting in Geneva were the start of Russian-U.S. consultations on strategic stability and cybersecurity. However, on Ukraine, the Minsk process aimed at ending the conflict reached a diplomatic impasse, even as NATO increased the scale and frequency of its military exercises in the Black Sea area. In fact, the situation on Russia’s western and southwestern borders only worsened.
The situation forced the Kremlin to return to its tactic of using force to put pressure on the White House. In the late fall of 2021, U.S. intelligence reported a growing threat on the Russia-Ukraine border. An even bigger military buildup by Russian forces than that seen during the spring forced Washington to go even further than direct talks, and to agree to negotiations with Moscow on issues of European security.
Forced Negotiations
In this respect, Russia’s tactic of forcing the United States to the table had worked. So, building on this initial success, Moscow presented the Americans and their allies with a draft treaty and agreement outlining Russia’s demands of the West on the issue of European security.
Last week’s talks did not lead to a breakthrough, and nor indeed could they. It’s unlikely that even the Kremlin was expecting its demands to be accepted. The kind of conditions put forward by Russia are usually only implemented by the losing side, which the United States is not.
What’s more important is that for the first time since the talks on German reunification, the United States has sat down at the negotiating table with Russia to discuss the problems of European security. Plus, for the first time since its recent withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Washington has shown willingness to reach an agreement on not deploying short- and medium-range missiles in Europe, as well as on restricting military activity in Eastern Europe.
Not so long ago, Moscow would have viewed this as a major diplomatic win. Now, however, the bar has been set much higher. Russia insisted that the talks focus on its “binding” demands: not to expand NATO into former Soviet nations, not to position offensive weapons systems in Europe that could reach Russian territory, and to withdraw military infrastructure established by NATO in Eastern Europe since the signing of the Founding Act on relations with Russia in 1997.
Security Guarantees
Strictly speaking, there can only be one guarantee of security in the nuclear age, and that’s the threat of mutually assured destruction. That has its drawbacks, however: in the event of an armed conflict between nuclear powers, the losing side may resort to using nuclear weapons to avoid being defeated, paving the way for an escalation that could lead to an exchange of massive nuclear strikes and the death of civilization.
All other guarantees are conditional and cannot be relied upon. Arms control and reduction measures, nonproliferation efforts, confidence-building measures and transparency, moratoriums, reciprocal or multilateral restraint, and so on are all aimed at increasing mutual predictability and ensuring that military and political decisions are taken with cool heads. Still, no legally binding treaties or politically binding agreements can provide absolute guarantees that they will be implemented.
International relations are based on the principle and—for independent players—the reality of state sovereignty. Nations don’t just enter freely into agreements with each other; they are free to end those agreements too. In the last twenty years alone, the United States has unilaterally withdrawn from U.S.-Russian agreements on missile defense systems and intermediate-range missiles, the multilateral Open Skies Treaty, and the Iran nuclear deal. Cast-iron guarantees simply don’t exist.
There are no illusions about any of this in the Kremlin and the Foreign Ministry, still less in military headquarters. There is no real trust in non-aggression pacts or detargeting (or zero targeting) agreements. Given the current domestic political situation in the United States, it’s virtually impossible to reach any agreements with the country that would be ratified by two-thirds of U.S. senators. Putin himself acknowledged this when he said publicly that he wanted to see “at least legally binding agreements.”
It’s possible that this is Putin’s attempt to make up for the oversight of Gorbachev, who failed to secure legally binding undertakings not to expand NATO after German reunification. In recent times, this has once again become a hotly discussed topic among Russian officials and media.
There is, however, a broader way of looking at it. Of the five most recent waves of NATO expansion, four happened on Putin’s watch: the Baltics, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, and Bulgaria in 2004; Croatia and Albania in 2009; Montenegro in 2017; and North Macedonia in 2020. For a long time, Moscow had no way of resisting this process: it had neither enough influence in the countries in question, nor the means of putting pressure on them. Now it appears to have acquired those means, and Putin—apparently feeling a degree of responsibility for what has happened during his lengthy rule—is starting to use those means to make amends. The question is, how realistic is it for the Americans and Europeans to implement Russia’s demands?
The Limits of Possibility
Politics, as the saying goes, is the art of the possible. At the center of Russia’s draft treaty are three unconditional demands by Moscow: an end to NATO expansion; no more NATO infrastructure—in particular, offensive weapons—to be rolled out in Europe; and the withdrawal of military infrastructure deployed to Eastern Europe after 1997.
Moscow’s main demand—no further NATO expansion onto the territory of the former Soviet Union—is de facto being implemented, since the United States and its allies are not prepared to take responsibility for the military defense of their clients, Ukraine and Georgia, and that is unlikely to change. The problem is not so much the unresolved conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and the Donbas as the prospect of a direct confrontation with Russia in places where Moscow both has genuine security interests and is ready to use force to protect them if necessary. The United States, meanwhile, has no such interests or readiness to use force, and that is also unlikely to change.
Since the United States is not prepared to go to war with Russia for Ukraine, neither Ukraine nor Georgia will be accepted into NATO as long as Russia is able to prevent it. The threat of Ukraine being in NATO is, therefore, in fact a phantom one for the foreseeable future. The question of whether we might see NATO in Ukraine—in the form of offensive weapons, military bases, military advisers, arms supplies, and so on—is trickier. Having what would amount to an unsinkable aircraft carrier controlled by the United States on Moscow’s doorstep, on hostile territory, even if Ukraine is not officially part of NATO, would be far more serious than the Baltic countries’ NATO membership. This isn’t a full-fledged threat just yet, but it certainly could become one, and what happens then?
There’s a chance that an agreement could be reached on the issue of not locating U.S. missile stations in Ukraine, as attested to by the willingness of U.S. negotiators to discuss this topic in Geneva. The establishment of missile bases is not a military priority for Washington, and their hypothetical appearance around, say, Ukraine’s Kharkiv area could be countered by equipping Russian submarines coasting the U.S. mainland with Zirkon (Tsirkon) hypersonic missiles.
It’s also possible that an agreement could be reached on U.S. and other NATO members’ military bases in Ukraine. Right now Western countries are keen to avoid sustaining any losses in any fighting between Russia and Ukraine, and are therefore currently planning to evacuate their advisers from the country.
It will be harder, if not impossible, to agree on ending military and military-technology cooperation between Ukraine and the United States/NATO. The most that can be hoped for here is restrictions on the nature of arms supplied to Kyiv by the West. For that to happen, the United States will insist on a de-escalation of Russia’s military preparations on Ukraine’s borders. Any de-escalation, however, will have to be accompanied by restrictions on NATO maneuvers close to Russia’s borders in Europe.
Moscow’s demand for the withdrawal of all military infrastructure deployed to NATO’s Eastern European member states is as impossible as it is largely unnecessary in terms of Russia’s security. The several thousand U.S. soldiers located on the territory in question don’t exactly pose a serious threat to Russia. NATO battalions in the Baltics are, if anything, simply there to placate the three host countries: their presence on former Soviet territory may leave a bad taste in Moscow, but is hardly cause for alarm.
There is other infrastructure, of course, which really does pose a threat: first and foremost, U.S. missile defense components in Romania and Poland; air bases that could house planes capable of carrying nuclear weapons; naval bases; and so on. The issue of missile defense system launchers that could be adapted for intermediate-range missiles could be resolved as part of a new INF agreement. Other issues come under the umbrella of regular arms control in Europe, which has been shelved since NATO countries refused to ratify the adapted Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe.
There is a suspicion that the third key demand—effectively, a return to 1997—was put forward so that it could later be retracted, thereby demonstrating Moscow’s readiness to compromise. More potential for reaching agreements could lie in the unbundling of Russia’s raft of proposals and demands, and willingness to pursue parallel tracks—but only if there is confidence that agreements can be reached that would satisfy Russia’s security interests.
What Next?
The chances of the United States implementing Russia’s demands in the format and timeframe set out by Moscow are non-existent. Agreements are theoretically possible on two of the three key issues: non-expansion and non-deployment. But any such agreements will be of a political, not legally binding nature.
Various Russian commentators have discussed the possibility of retracting the provisions of NATO’s 2008 Bucharest Summit Declaration that stated that Ukraine and Georgia “will become members of NATO.” Yet this is unlikely to happen at the alliance’s summit in Madrid this year: there may be no real substance to such symbolism, but renouncing it would probably be too much of a loss of face for the United States and NATO.
That is not the only option, however. NATO could, at the initiative of the United States, announce a long-term moratorium on new members, for example. Biden has already said that Ukrainian membership of NATO is unlikely to be approved in the next decade, while some U.S. experts are talking about twenty to twenty-five years. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov was more specific in his choice of words: “never ever.” For the vast majority of today’s politicians and officials, however, “never” may well mean “not in my lifetime.” A figure of sixty-nine or even forty-nine years would work just as well.
It’s also possible to agree on not deploying intermediate-range missiles and other offensive weapons: not as part of a treaty, but as an intergovernmental agreement between Russia and the United States, which wouldn’t have to be ratified in the latter. It could also be possible during negotiations on the issue to address the sides’ concerns about, respectively, U.S. missile defense launchers and new Russian cruise missiles.
Finally, it would be possible to select specific areas of concern with regard to infrastructure on NATO’s eastern flank and to resolve them through confidence-building measures.
None of the measures outlined above comprise either security guarantees or legally binding documents, but, as previously noted, Russia has long had the former via its nuclear arsenal and armed forces, while the latter are effectively impossible and would in any case not be absolute. Still, they would at least provide Russia with written assurances.
Countermeasures
For now, no agreements are in sight on the issues that concern Russia. For President Putin, however, a negative result also counts as a result. The Kremlin needed to express itself with full clarity on its security concerns in Europe, and it has made itself abundantly clear.
It’s important to understand that Moscow’s demands of the United States and NATO are in fact the strategic goals of Russian policy in Europe. Their aim is not to restore the Soviet Union, as some suggest. Rather, the idea is to reframe security in Europe—particularly in Europe’s east—as a contractual relationship between the two principal strategic actors in the region, Russia and the United States/NATO, thus turning the page on an era when it was the business of the United States alone. This is regarded as a vital national security interest. If Russia cannot achieve its goal by diplomatic means, it will need to resort to other tools and methods.
Russian officials have said that if the talks fail, Moscow will take military-technical and even military measures. Those measures have not been specified in advance—unlike the Western sanctions that have been threatened in the event that Russia invades Ukrainian territory—but they are being widely discussed. A range of measures is likely to be proposed to Putin by his advisers, from keeping up the pressure with the threat of force and deploying new weapons systems to sensitive regions, to much closer cooperation with Russia’s ally Belarus and Chinese partners.
It’s important, however, that these measures be a response to existing and likely future security threats to Russia, rather than a provocation that would elicit new such threats. There’s no point in seeking to punish the West for its intransigence using military technology or military strategy. The main thing for Moscow is to maintain a robust policy of deterrence under any conceivable military, technological, and geopolitical conditions. Credible national security guarantees are not based on non-aggression pacts with a potential enemy, but on effective deterrence of any adversary.
Still, agreements can also be useful, if the terms are acceptable. The recent flurry of negotiations is just one round of the complex strategic game currently playing out before the world’s eyes. The United States and NATO have promised to present Russia with their own counterproposals (read: counterdemands). Backstage, the U.S. Congress is discussing new sanctions, the Kremlin is compiling a raft of countersanctions, and the Russian Defense Ministry is carrying out a joint exercise with the Belarusian armed forces. Major power relations remain essentially a power play.
Op-ed: Toronto’s Waterfront Shouldn’t Serve as a Stage to Promote Warplanes
Yves Engler | NOW Toronto | 29 August 2021
https://nowtoronto.com/op-ed-torontos-waterfront-shouldnt-serve-as-a-stage-to-promote-warplanes
With the Canadian military set to select a new fighter jet, the controversial F-35 stealth fighter will be participating in its first Canadian International Air Show next weekend.
As a father of a young child, I understand the appeal of some excitement in the sky, especially after the lockdown.
But flying warplanes over Lake Ontario is not innocent fun.
Since the establishment of the Royal Canadian Air Force a century ago the Department of National Defence has promoted airshows. The CF-18 Demonstration Team and Snowbirds, which will also be flying over Lake Ontario, seek to “inspire” support for an air force that has bombed Iraq, Serbia, Libya and Iraq/Syria over the past three decades. Many civilians were killed directly or due to the destruction of infrastructure.
As people seek to make sense of what’s happening in Afghanistan, it’s important to consider the death, destruction and enmity engendered by airstrikes.
The F-35 is a fighter jet that’s bombed Afghanistan. It is marketed as capable of releasing a B61 nuclear bomb. Toronto city council reaffirmed its commitment to Toronto being a Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone in 2018 and, according to an April poll, 80 per cent of Canadians believe “the world should work to eliminate nuclear weapons.” Rather than something to celebrate, the F-35 is a testament to humanity’s predilection for ploughing its resources and ingenuity into perfecting the art of killing. What could the US $1.7 trillion spent on the stealth fighter project accomplish if channeled towards fighting infectious diseases or transitioning away from fossil fuels?
The F-35 is participating in this year’s airshow as part of Lockheed Martin’s push to win the contract to provide the RCAF with 88 new fighter jets. Despite promising not to purchase the fighter during the 2015 election, the Liberals have included the F-35 in the three-jet competition set to be decided in the coming months.
The No Fighter Jet coalition opposes the purchase. The Canadian Foreign Policy Institute released a public letter last month calling on Trudeau to scrap the $19 billion ($77 billion over their full lifecycle) purchase. The letter was signed by Canadian musicians Neil Young, Tegan and Sara and Sarah Harmer, as well as authors Michael Ondaatje, Gabor Maté and Yann Martel. The statement was also endorsed by environmentalists Naomi Klein and David Suzuki, as well as three sitting MPs, four former MPs and prominent international figures such as Roger Waters, Daryl Hannah and Noam Chomsky.
Thousands of Torontonians have fled countries that have been bombed by fighter jets in recent years. The sound of low-flying warplanes can be triggering for those who have experienced such violence. There is often an influx of 911 calls whenever fighter jets fly by urban areas.
Amidst a pandemic and intensifying climate crisis, Toronto’s waterfront shouldn’t serve as a stage to promote violent, incredibly expensive and environmentally destructive warplanes.
Yves Engler is the author of Stand On Guard For Whom? — A People’s History of the Canadian Military (Black Rose).
The US spent $2 trillion in Afghanistan – and for what?
Patrick Sabga | Al Jazeera | 16 August 2021
“Since 2001, the US has spent $2.26 trillion in Afghanistan, the Costs of War Project at Brown University calculates. The biggest chunk – nearly $1 trillion – was consumed by the Overseas Contingency Operations budget for the Department of Defense. The second biggest line item – $530bn – is the estimated interest payments on the money the US government borrowed to fund the war.
Yet for all those trillions, Afghanistan still has one of the smallest formal economies on the planet. Last year, President Ashraf Ghani said 90 percent of the population was living on less than $2 a day.
The illicit economy, meanwhile, has boomed. After US forces drove the Taliban from power in 2001, Afghanistan cemented its place as the leading global supplier of opium and heroin – a crown it is likely to keep as the Taliban emerge victorious again.
If that return weren’t poor enough for the US, the Afghan army and the government it was meant to protect have now collapsed. President Ashraf Ghani has fled the country and the Taliban are taking selfies behind his desk. This is what a $2 trillion investment has yielded for the US: a chaotic, humiliating end to a 20-year war.”
Read More Here: https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2021/8/16/the-us-spent-2-trillion-in-afghanistan-and-for-what?
The Canadian public shows much greater support for serious nuclear disarmament measures than does its Government. My opinion piece based on a Nanos poll demonstrates a solid majority in favour of Canada adhering to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons: Government out of step with Canadians on nuclear weapons
THE UNIVERSAL ABOLITION OF MILITARISM
To me, the Universal Abolition of Militarism, that is of Armed Forces, Military Sciences and the War Industry are the very first thing we must campaign for and achieve. The trillions of dollars spent annually on the Military, would solve all other problems. Take health for instance, at the moment Governments spend 30 to 40 times on scientists and engineers working to destroy life, buildings and nature than what they spend on those working on medical research, to help us live longer and healthier lives. 80% of the destruction of the environment is caused by military tests and actual wars. Hunger, lack of hospitals, of schools, homelessness (though poverty of refugees) is the direct result of wars and of the money spent on them. Social violence exists because in order to have Armed Forces, Governments must produce lovers of weapons, of fighting, on killing. This is why the partnership between The Pentagon and the Hollywood Film Industry is so strong. Militarism kills Democracy. Nobody wants or likes wars. Nobody asks Governments to organize wars. But, against our will, Governments impose wars upon us. We should all unite in demanding the end of Militarism,universally. President HUFUD
Please
Canada, NATO, & The Nuclear Ban Treaty
Paul Meyer | CDI Institute | 19 January 2021
“Does the TPNW complement existing treaties? What are its aims and what gaps could it fill?
Supporters of the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) characterized it as filling a “legal gap”. This refers to the fact that of the three categories of WMDs—chemical, biological, and nuclear, only the first two categories are subject to comprehensive prohibition treaties. Nuclear weapons are only constrained by the 1968 (Nuclear) Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT has a far lower standard of restriction on nuclear weapons. The treaty commits its state parties to work towards nuclear disarmament and oppose any proliferation, but the NPT is actually silent on the possession and use of nuclear weapons. Article VI of the NPT outlines an obligation to engage in good faith negotiations to bring the arms race to a cessation at an early date, and for nuclear disarmament. But the NPT lacks the comprehensive prohibition of the other treaties. What’s especially significant is that the TPNW also prohibits the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.”
Read More Here: https://cdainstitute.ca/paul-meyer-canada-nato-the-nuclear-treaty-ban/
Canada, NATO, & The Nuclear Ban Treaty
Paul Meyer | CDI Institute | 19 January 2021
“Does the TPNW complement existing treaties? What are its aims and what gaps could it fill?
Supporters of the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) characterized it as filling a “legal gap”. This refers to the fact that of the three categories of WMDs—chemical, biological, and nuclear, only the first two categories are subject to comprehensive prohibition treaties. Nuclear weapons are only constrained by the 1968 (Nuclear) Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT has a far lower standard of restriction on nuclear weapons. The treaty commits its state parties to work towards nuclear disarmament and oppose any proliferation, but the NPT is actually silent on the possession and use of nuclear weapons. Article VI of the NPT outlines an obligation to engage in good faith negotiations to bring the arms race to a cessation at an early date, and for nuclear disarmament. But the NPT lacks the comprehensive prohibition of the other treaties. What’s especially significant is that the TPNW also prohibits the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.”
Read More Here: https://cdainstitute.ca/paul-meyer-canada-nato-the-nuclear-treaty-ban/
Canada, NATO, & The Nuclear Ban Treaty
Paul Meyer | CDI Institute | 19 January 2021
“Does the TPNW complement existing treaties? What are its aims and what gaps could it fill?
Supporters of the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) characterized it as filling a “legal gap”. This refers to the fact that of the three categories of WMDs—chemical, biological, and nuclear, only the first two categories are subject to comprehensive prohibition treaties. Nuclear weapons are only constrained by the 1968 (Nuclear) Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT has a far lower standard of restriction on nuclear weapons. The treaty commits its state parties to work towards nuclear disarmament and oppose any proliferation, but the NPT is actually silent on the possession and use of nuclear weapons. Article VI of the NPT outlines an obligation to engage in good faith negotiations to bring the arms race to a cessation at an early date, and for nuclear disarmament. But the NPT lacks the comprehensive prohibition of the other treaties. What’s especially significant is that the TPNW also prohibits the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.”
Read More Here: https://cdainstitute.ca/paul-meyer-canada-nato-the-nuclear-treaty-ban/
I don’t know either. But does it matter? I mean, we know what they are doing to the Yemen people, regardless of the national origin of their weapons, so we should not be providing them with tools that they MIGHT use to oppress people. Sell weapons only to legitimate police forces, and only certain kinds of non-military weapons at that.
Canada, NATO, & The Nuclear Ban Treaty
Paul Meyer | CDI Institute | 19 January 2021
“Does the TPNW complement existing treaties? What are its aims and what gaps could it fill?
Supporters of the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) characterized it as filling a “legal gap”. This refers to the fact that of the three categories of WMDs—chemical, biological, and nuclear, only the first two categories are subject to comprehensive prohibition treaties. Nuclear weapons are only constrained by the 1968 (Nuclear) Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT has a far lower standard of restriction on nuclear weapons. The treaty commits its state parties to work towards nuclear disarmament and oppose any proliferation, but the NPT is actually silent on the possession and use of nuclear weapons. Article VI of the NPT outlines an obligation to engage in good faith negotiations to bring the arms race to a cessation at an early date, and for nuclear disarmament. But the NPT lacks the comprehensive prohibition of the other treaties. What’s especially significant is that the TPNW also prohibits the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.”
Read More Here: https://cdainstitute.ca/paul-meyer-canada-nato-the-nuclear-treaty-ban/
I don’t know either. But does it matter? I mean, we know what they are doing to the Yemen people, regardless of the national origin of their weapons, so we should not be providing them with tools that they MIGHT use to oppress people. Sell weapons only to legitimate police forces, and only certain kinds of non-military weapons at that.
If you’re in Canada, please take action to say No to the War on Yemen,
Yemen is now the world’s worst humanitarian disaster – and 15 billion in Canadian-made weapons are going to the Saudis. Take action and call on Trudeau to stop sending munitions that fuel the war in Yemen.
Social Media Post to use:
Please kindly sign & widely share this Canadian Government petition. With enough signatures we can tell the Trudeau Govt to stop the sale of arms to Saudi & to bring them to The Hague for war crimes in #Yemen > https://petitions.ourcommons.ca/en/Petition/Sign/e-3075 #YemenCantWait #Yemen #StopArmingSaudi
Thank you
Excellent suggestion, Ali. Is there any proof that the Saudis are using Canadian weapons against the Yemen people? I am not saying that they AREN’T — I really just don’t know.
That’s an interesting point, but it sure seems contradictory to say that you are negotiating in good faith while actually continuing to possess nuclear weapons. In fact, I don’t think any NW state even pretends to be negotiating for nuclear disarmament.
If you’re in Canada, please take action to say No to the War on Yemen,
Yemen is now the world’s worst humanitarian disaster – and 15 billion in Canadian-made weapons are going to the Saudis. Take action and call on Trudeau to stop sending munitions that fuel the war in Yemen.
Social Media Post to use:
Please kindly sign & widely share this Canadian Government petition. With enough signatures we can tell the Trudeau Govt to stop the sale of arms to Saudi & to bring them to The Hague for war crimes in #Yemen > https://petitions.ourcommons.ca/en/Petition/Sign/e-3075 #YemenCantWait #Yemen #StopArmingSaudi
Thank you
Excellent suggestion, Ali. Is there any proof that the Saudis are using Canadian weapons against the Yemen people? I am not saying that they AREN’T — I really just don’t know.
That’s an interesting point, but it sure seems contradictory to say that you are negotiating in good faith while actually continuing to possess nuclear weapons. In fact, I don’t think any NW state even pretends to be negotiating for nuclear disarmament.
On Tuesday, February 9, 2021 at 12:30 p.m. Eastern Standard Time, I will be joining a conversation with Metta Spencer on her To Save The World YouTube channel. We will be speaking about my work on the McIntyre Powder Project, which is a justice project that I founded to seek answers about the health effects on miners and factory workers who were historically required by their employers to inhale finely ground aluminum dust known as McIntyre Powder – a non-consensual prophylactic medical treatment against the lung disease silicosis. My father, Jim Hobbs, was one of the affected underground miners, who ended up with Parkinson’s. After years of advocacy, researchers found a link between Parkinson’s and McIntyre Powder exposure in a groundbreaking study released in 2020.
What does this have to do with PEACE? Metta’s invitation to engage in this conversation gave me pause to think about the notion of peace and how it relates to the fight that I am engaged in to seek justice and reparation for what was at its core an industrial human health experiment. Where there is wrongdoing, human rights violations, or similar offences, the pathway to peace begins with acknowledgement of the wrongdoing, the violations, the offences. It is fundamental for healing to acknowledge the wound. I very much look forward to speaking with Metta and her guest co-host Dr. Richard Denton.
For anyone seeking background on this subject, please watch The Fifth Estate’s 2016 documentary “The Miner’s Daughter”, or read the Toronto Star’s April 15, 2017 article “In human experiment, Ontario miners say they paid a devastating price” – both of which are available under the “Media Reports” tab of the McIntyre Powder Project website. Thanks!
On Tuesday, February 9, 2021 at 12:30 p.m. Eastern Standard Time, I will be joining a conversation with Metta Spencer on her To Save The World YouTube channel. We will be speaking about my work on the McIntyre Powder Project, which is a justice project that I founded to seek answers about the health effects on miners and factory workers who were historically required by their employers to inhale finely ground aluminum dust known as McIntyre Powder – a non-consensual prophylactic medical treatment against the lung disease silicosis. My father, Jim Hobbs, was one of the affected underground miners, who ended up with Parkinson’s. After years of advocacy, researchers found a link between Parkinson’s and McIntyre Powder exposure in a groundbreaking study released in 2020.
What does this have to do with PEACE? Metta’s invitation to engage in this conversation gave me pause to think about the notion of peace and how it relates to the fight that I am engaged in to seek justice and reparation for what was at its core an industrial human health experiment. Where there is wrongdoing, human rights violations, or similar offences, the pathway to peace begins with acknowledgement of the wrongdoing, the violations, the offences. It is fundamental for healing to acknowledge the wound. I very much look forward to speaking with Metta and her guest co-host Dr. Richard Denton.
For anyone seeking background on this subject, please watch The Fifth Estate’s 2016 documentary “The Miner’s Daughter”, or read the Toronto Star’s April 15, 2017 article “In human experiment, Ontario miners say they paid a devastating price” – both of which are available under the “Media Reports” tab of the McIntyre Powder Project website. Thanks!
The following document was produced by a movement initiated by Sergey Rogov, former director of the USA/Canada Institute in Moscow. It has been endorsed by 146 experts; see their names at the end. We hope to produce a talk show on our Youtube channel with arms control experts in Moscow, Canada, and other NATO countries. Watch for it on our channel, https://youtube.com/c/ToSaveTheWorld .
— Metta Spencer
Recommendations of the Participants of the Expert Dialogue on NATO-Russia Military Risk Reduction in Europe
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This group of experts from Russia, the United States and Europe held 15 online-seminars on NATO–Russia Risk Reduction in summer and fall of 2020 and offer the following ideas:
To maintain strategic stability, we look forward to immediate action to extend the New START Treaty for 5 years.
At the same time, we are concerned by the deterioration of the European security situation in recent years. The nuclear and conventional arms control system that took decades to build is rapidly unraveling, with nothing to take its place. Incidents in the course of military activities which bring Russian and NATO forces into close proximity are worrisome in their own right and run the risk of escalation. While members of our group diff er over the root causes of the crisis, we are concerned that as tension builds between Russia and NATO, a real military confrontation becomes an increasing danger.
Given this situation, we call upon our countries’ leaders to demonstrate the political will necessary to take a number of urgent actions in order to reduce the risks of military conflict. These military and security actions should be pursued whether or not we make progress in reducing the serious political disputes among our countries. Indeed, these steps can contribute to an atmosphere, in which resolution of those difficult political issues becomes more achievable.
We propose a set of measures, recognizing that not all of these steps will be immediately feasible. The detailed recommendations below address the following areas:
1. Re-establishing practical dialogue between Russia and NATO, including direct contacts between the military commanders and experts of Russia and NATO member states.
2. Developing common rules that will reduce the risk of unintended incidents on land, air and sea.
3. Enhancing stability by increasing transparency, avoiding dangerous military activities, and providing dedicated communication channels that would avoid escalation of incidents that might occur.
4. Utilizing (and possibly supplementing) the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act to codify restraint, transparency and confidence-building measures.
5. Exploring possible limitations on NATO and Russian conventional force deployments in Europe to enhance transparency and stability.
6. Establishing consultations between Russia and US/NATO on the topics of intermediate-range missiles and ballistic missile defense, in order to prevent a new nuclear missile race in Europe.
7. Preserving the Open Skies Treaty.
SPECIFIC PROPOSALS
1.The need for dialogue
1.1. Political dialogue should be revitalized at the ambassadorial level in the NATO-Russia Council and include briefi ngs by military experts as appropriate.
1.2. As part of the NATO 2030 refl ection process, Russia and NATO member states should analyze relations between NATO and Russia with a view to developing the military-to-military dialogue. At a time when most NATO-Russia cooperation remains suspended, such a dialogue should not be viewed as a departure from NATO’s “no business as usual” policy, but as a step that is necessary to increase predictability and reduce the risk of military incidents at sea, in the air and on land escalating to the level of military conflict.
Read more
1.3 Once Russia and NATO member states reach a formal or informal understanding or agreement, they could take initial steps in the form of parallel unilateral measures that do not necessarily require conclusion of a formal agreement between NATO, or NATO member states, and Russia, which could prove politically difficult to achieve in the present environment.
1.4. Regular meetings should be held between the Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff , the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, reinforced by military experts, to address issues of current concern.
1.5. In addition, NATO member states and Russia should resume contacts at the level of military representatives in the NATO Military Committee and restore the Russian military liaison mission at SACEUR Headquarters.
1.6. Furthermore, NATO member states and Russia should enhance military contacts in OSCE forums to provide a more effi cient and inclusive format for discussion and quick decision-making on current issues relating to military activities.
1.7. NATO and Russia should consider the possibility of establishing special NATO-Russia communication channels or hotlines in sensitive regions such as the Baltic, and Black sea regions and the High North area.
1.8. While the recommendations off ered in this paper would be developed primarily in NATO-Russia channels, a number of them could be opened to discussion with and participation by other countries, such as Sweden and Finland in the Baltic and High North regions, and Ukraine and Georgia in the Black Sea region.
2.Preventing incidents
2.1. Prevention of incidents and de-escalation once they have occurred is the most urgent issue related to military interaction. NATO member states and Russia, as well as other European states, need to together formulate a minimum set of realistic measures that could be adopted as formal agreements, informal understandings or parallel, coordinated steps. While they do not have to be in the form of a legal treaty, they should have real force so as to effectively reduce the level of mutual tension.
2.2. NATO and Russia should develop a single set of common rules that would define minimum distances between military aircraft and ships as well as procedures for interaction of crews. To this end, they could resume joint work within the framework of the Cooperative Airspace Initiative (CAI), which had as one of its tasks the strengthening of confidence-building measures along the NATO-Russia line of contact. To address this task, sides should resume a navigational data exchange on the air situation along Russia’s Western border with NATO member states that was already established in the past.
2.3 As one of the options for managing incidents, the 1972 U.S.-Soviet Agreement on Prevention of Incidents at Sea and in the Airspace Above the Sea, as well as 11 similar agreements between certain NATO member states and Russia, could be taken as the basis for additional bilateral or multilateral agreements. Another source of ideas and approaches can be found in the Sino-American agreement of 2014 and Protocol of 2015 on prevention of incidents, which combines principles of prevention of incidents at sea and prevention of incidents during military activities in general.
2.4. Russia and the United States should reach agreement on notifi cation of heavy bomber patrols and fl ights near the borders of the other side, similar to the notifi cations they exchange of ICBM and SLBM launches.
2.5. NATO and Russia should develop and adopt standardized procedures for de-escalation of military incidents and confl icts. They should also conduct joint staff training exercises to prepare for de-escalation, create de-confliction mechanisms in the Baltic, High North and Black Sea regions, and establish a joint mechanism similar to the one built up by Russia and the United States in Syria.
3. Ensuring stability
3.1. NATO member states and Russia should reaffirm the reciprocal political commitments contained in the NATO-Russia Founding Act (1997) and the CFE Final Act (1999) whereby NATO and Russia agree to refrain from additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces in areas close to the territory of the other side in Europe.
3.2. They should explore the possibility of reciprocal constraints or further parallel unilateral commitments on the size and scope of military activities in contiguous areas, or on the level of armed forces permanently located in such areas, with scope wider and thresholds for advance notification and mandatory observation much lower than those required under the 2011 Vienna Document. A focus for such measures could be the Baltic Region (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, Poland and Germany), including Kaliningrad and Russia’s Western military district.
3.3. NATO member states and Russia should consider including in transparency measures land-based and sea-launched conventional intermediate (medium-range) strike systems, such as cruise missiles that may be located outside the contact zones if they can support exercises and military operations in the contact zones.
3.4. They could also draw on the experience with the provisions relating to the inner-German border area contained in the 1989 U.S.-Soviet agreement on preventing dangerous military activities. That agreement required troops to behave with caution in the border area. The sides could consider the establishment of reciprocal zones in which exercises should not be conducted, e.g. within 5 to 10 kilometers of specified borders, while also limiting personnel and certain kinds of military equipment in such zones.
3.5. Russia and NATO member states could agree that both sides will conduct large-scale military exercises, as a rule, at a militarily meaningful distance from their borders taking into account the specificity of contact zones. They should consider reducing the scale and frequency of military activities with respect to numbers and geography, in particular exercises in near borders. Generally, military exercises should be executed responsibly, not provocatively.
3.6. As for “snap exercises”, which continue to be a source of tension and are not subject to prior notification, we recommend the establishment of a regime of mutual transparency at a high military level between Russia and NATO. To that end, a “quiet notification” mode should be developed, e.g. providing confidential advance high-level notice to the other side, but with no advance warning to troops participating in the exercises. “Quiet notification” could also be applied to short-notice transit of multinational forces. An appropriate level for this sort of mutual information exchange would be the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the NATO Supreme Allied Commander.
4. NATO-Russia Founding Act
4.1. If agreements can be reached between NATO and Russia on additional confidence-building, transparency and restraint measures, these could be incorporated as additional protocols or annexes to the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act.
4.2. NATO and Russia could also agree to defi nitions of the parameters of the reciprocal measures of restraint mentioned in the Founding Act, such as “additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces.” This could be established as the equivalent of one army brigade and one air wing/regiment per country or Russian military district.
4.3. With the implementation of these additional risk-reduction measures and significant progress in the resolution of broader political differences between NATO and Russia, the sides could agree to draw up a new Code of Conduct for European security, which could also engage other European states beyond NATO and Russia.
5. Possible agreements on conventional armed forces in Europe
5.1. Confidence-building measures and possible measures of restraint should provide for eff ective collective and individual defense for all states in the region, big and small, with a view to enhancing stability and transparency, avoiding surprises, and minimizing risks of escalation. Given that a new conventional arms control treaty does not seem possible or practicable at this time, agreements may take the form of political commitments.
5.2. NATO and Russia should start negotiations to adopt certain measures to limit the arms race in the European region based on the assumption that currently deployed force levels are sufficient. Agreement should be aimed primarily at limiting destabilizing concentrations of forces and military training activities.
5.3. Both sides should consider and discuss the potentially destabilizing capabilities of some precision and long-range conventional weapons with a view to exercising restraint and ensuring transparency in this sphere. They could adopt transparency measures also with respect to conventional strike forces located outside the zone of direct contact of Russia and NATO. This refers to naval forces, long-range aviation and ground-based weapons, not covered by New START, with the range capability to reach this region.
5.4. The measures proposed in this paper should be significantly more far-reaching than the provisions of the Vienna Document 2011. They should take into account the experience of the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty and its adapted version and extend their scope.
5.5. Therefore, we recommend conducting an analysis of the Vienna Document 2011 with a view to extending the scope of its transparency and verification measures and its provisions on large-scale military exercises and other deployments to include naval forces, all large air force and air defense formations, conventional ground-, air- or sea-launched ballistic or cruise missiles, as well as logistic and communication units.
5.6. NATO member states and Russia should practice parallel unilateral arms control measures, coordinating them in advance, where practicable, and reciprocating as appropriate.
6. Missile Defenses and Intermediate Range Missiles in Europe
6.1. Russia and the United States/NATO should hold consultations on missile defense in Europe, both strategic and non-strategic, nuclear and non-nuclear, with a view to increasing transparency and overcoming existing differences.
6.2. They should consider ways to bridge the differences between NATO’s declared intention not to deploy any nuclear-armed ground-based missiles in Europe and Russia’s proposal for a moratorium on nuclear- and conventionally-armed medium-range and intermediate-range missiles in Europe. A first step could be to agree upon reciprocal transparency measures with regard to existing capabilities.
6.3. Russia, the United States and other NATO member states should enhance transparency beyond current capabilities through an annual exchange of ten-year plans for the development of missile defense in Europe, the creation of a data exchange center, and notification of new missile defense elements that have reached operational readiness.
7. Open Skies Treaty
7.1. Participants in the dialogue support preserving the Open Skies Treaty as it is one of the few remaining transparency instruments geared to promote confidence-building between states parties in Europe.
7.2. We should focus on the consequences of the U.S. withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty for the remaining 33 states parties and on preserving the treaty. All states parties, including Russia, should remain in the Treaty for a sufficient time to assess how it would function in these conditions and to allow time for possible re-entry by the United States. Russia and the United States, as well as other states parties, should discuss their concerns about the treaty and try to find agreed solutions.
7.3. Remaining states parties should consider the possibility of joint diplomatic initiatives aimed at returning the United States to the Open Skies Treaty.
Americans, Europeans and Russians, who signed the statement
Note: Each of the signers of these recommendations agrees with most but not necessarily all of them.
Affiliations are for purposes of identification only.
1. Benoît d’Aboville, Former Ambassador and Permanent Representative to NATO, Vice President of the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS), France.
2. James Acton, co-director, Nuclear policy Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace;
3. Graham Allison, Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, “Founding Dean” of Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, until 2017 Director of its Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, former Assistant Secretary of Defense;
4. Roy Allison*, Professor of Russian and Eurasian International Relations, Director, Russian and Eurasian Studies Centre, St. Antony’s College, Oxford;
5. Alexey Arbatov, Head, Center for International Security, Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences;
6. Nadezhda Arbatova, Head, Department for European Political Studies, Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO);
7. Valeriy Baranov, Colonel General (ret.), Inspector general of the Ministry of Defense.
8. Vladimir Baranovsky*, Member of the Directorate, Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International relations (IMEMO), Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences;
9. Alexandra Bell*, former Director for Strategic Outreach in the Office of the US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, Senior Policy Director at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation;
10. Robert Bell*, former assistant to the US President, former counselor to the Secretary General of NATO, distinguished Professor of the Practice, Georgia Tech;
11. John Beyrle, former Ambassador of the United States to the Russian Federation (2008–2012), former Ambassador to Bulgaria (2005–2008), Chairman of the U.S. Russia Foundation
12. James Bindenagel*, Ambassador (ret.), Henry Kissinger Professor, em.Center for Advanced Security, Strategy and Integration Studies, Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn;
13. Hans Blix, former Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, former IAEA Director General, Executive Chairman of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC);
14. Dieter Boden, Ambassador (ret), Potsdam;
15. Michael Boyce, Former Chief of the Defence Staff and First Sea Lord of the Royal Navy; a cross bench member of the the British House of Lords;
16. Ulrich J. Brandenburg, German Ambassador to NATO (2007–2010), German Ambassador to the Russian Federation (2010–2014);
17. Karl-Heinz Brunner, Member of Parliament, Spokesman on the Sub-Committee on Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation of the German Bundestag, Berlin;
18. Corentin Brustlein, Director of the Center for Security Studies, France 19. Philip Breedlove*, USAF General retired. Distinguished Professor, Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at Georgia Tech, former US European Command Commander and Supreme Allied Commander Europe;
20. Des Browne, Chair of the European Leadership Network (ELN), Vice-Chairman of the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), Convener of the TLG and former UK Defence Secretary
21. Denis Bukonkin*, Director of Foreign Policy and Security Research Center, Minsk; Belorussia;
22. William J. Burns, President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, former Deputy Secretary of State, former Ambassador to Russia;
23. Evgeniy Buzhinsky*, Lieutenant General (ret.), Vice President of the Russian International Affairs Council; Chairman, Executive Board, PIR Center;
24. Vincenzo Camporini, former Chief of the Joint Defence Staff , Former Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Italy;
25. Samuel Charap*, former Senior Advisor to the Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, 2011–2012;
26. Pierce Corden*, former head of the department of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, research fellow at the Center for science, technologies and security policy;
27. Thomas Countryman*, former Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation, Chairman of the Arms Control Association;
28. Dmitry Danilov*, Head of Department at the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IERAS);
29. Christopher Davis*, Professorial Research Fellow, University of Oxford;
30. Lewis Dunn*, former U.S. Ambassador to the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;
31. Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, Former Danish Foreign Minister (1982–1993);
32. Victor Esin*, Colonel General (ret.), Former Head of the Main Staff of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces, Leading Research Fellow, Department for Military-Political Research, Institute for the US and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (ISKRAN);
33. Marc Finaud*, Head of Arms Proliferation and Diplomatic Tradecraft, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy;
34. Ute Finckh-Kraemer, former Member of Parliament, Foreign Affairs Committee, Sub-Committee on Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-proliferation; Alumna of Parliamentarians for Nuclear Disarmament and Non-proliferation (PNND);
35. Cornelius Friesendorf, Head, Centre for OSCE Research, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, at the University of Hamburg (IFSH);
36. Helmut W. Ganser, Brigadier-General (ret), Defence Advisor to the German NATO Delegation 2004–2008, Brussels;
37. Rainer L. Glatz, Lieutenant-General (ret), former Commander German Armed Forces Joint Force Command, Potsdam;
38. Valery Garbuzov, Director, Institute for the US and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (ISKRAN);
39. Francois Le Goff, General Secretary of the Franco-German-British Club of Three;
40. Thomas Gomart, Director, Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI);
41. Alexander Graef, Research Fellow, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH);
42. Charles Grant, Director of the Centre for European Reform (CER), UK;
43. Philippe Gréciano, Professor at Grenoble Alpes University, Jean Monnet Chair, Member of the Center for International Security and EU Cooperation, France;
44. Alexey Gromyko**, Director of the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IERAS), Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences;
45. Wolfgang Guensche, LtColonel (ret), former Head of Arms Control Unit, German Armed Forces Verification Centre, Geilenkirchen; former military advisor to the German Foreign Office on security, arms control and disarmament;
46. David Hannay, Former Ambassador to the EU and to the UN; current Chair of UK All Party Parliamentary Group on Global Security and Non-Proliferation in the UK Parliament;
47. Ruediger Hartmann, Ambassador (ret), former Commissioner of the German Federal Government for Disarmament and Arms Control;
48. Benjamin Hautecouverture, Senior Research Fellow at Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS);
49. François Heisbourg, Chairman and Special Advisor, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) / Foundation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS), France;
50. Kurt Herrmann, Lieutenant-General (ret), former Head NATO Military Liaison Mission (MLM), Moscow, and former Director NATO Communication and Information Systems Services Agency (NCSA);
51. Sven Hirdman, Ambassador to Russia 1994–2004, State Secretary Ministry of Defence of Sweden (1979–1982);
52. Matthias Hoehn, Member of Parliament, Chairman, Sub-Committee on Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation of the German Bundestag, Berlin;
53. Hellmut Hoffmann, Ambassador (ret), former Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Conference on Disarmament (2009–2013);
54. Heiner Horsten, Ambassador (ret), Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany to the OSCE in Vienna 2008–2012;
55. Hans Huebner, Brigadier-General (ret), former Director, German Arms Control Verification Centre, Geilenkirchen;
56. Hans-Dieter Heumann, Ambassador (ret.), former President of Federal College for Security Policy, Berlin;
57. Jon Huntsman, former Governor of Utah, former Ambassador of the United States to Russia, to China and to Singapore;
58. Igor Istomin, Senior Lecturer at the Department of Applied International Political Analysis, MGIMO University;
59. Igor Ivanov, Minister of Foreign Affairs (1998–2004), former Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation (2004–2007), President of Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC);
60. Juhani Kaskeala, Senior Finnish Admiral and former Chief of Defence of the Finnish Defence Forces (2001–2009);
61. Daryl G. Kimball, Executive Director, Arms Control Association;
62. Michael Kofman*, Director of the Russia Studies Program at CNA, Fellow at the Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center;
63. Bert Koenders, Former Foreign Minister of the Netherlands;
64. Lawrence Korb*, US Navy Captain (ret.), former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reagan Administration, Senior Research Fellow, Center for American Progress, and Senior Advisor, Defense Information Center;
65. Andrey Kortunov*, Director General, Russian International Affairs Council;
66. Oleg Krivolapov*, Research Fellow, Department for Military-Political Research, Institute for the US and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (ISKRAN);
67. Evgeniy Kozhokin, Dean of School of International Relations and Regional Studies of the State University for Humanitarian Studies;
68. Ulrich Kuehn, Head, Arms Control and Emerging Technologies, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH);
69. Valentin Kuznetsov*, Vice Admiral (ret.), former Chief Military Representative of the RF at NATO, Senior Research Fellow, Department for Military-Political Research, Institute for the US and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (ISKRAN);
70. Henrik Larsen, Senior Researcher, Center for Security Studies, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH Zürich);
71. Robert Legvold, Marshall D. Shulman Professor, Columbia University;
72. Imants Liegis, Latvian Ambassador to France and to Hungary, Latvia’s Defense Minister (2009–2010) and the Acting Minister of Justice (2009–2010);
73. Osman Faruk Logoglu, former Turkish Ambassador to the United States and former Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
74. Mogens Lykketof, former Minister for Finance and Foreign Affairs and Speaker of Parliament, Denmark. Former President of the United Nations General Assembly (2015–2016), Denmark;
75. Roderic Lyne, former British ambassador to the Russian Federation;
76. Ruediger Luedeking, Ambassador (ret), former Deputy Commissioner of the German Federal Government for Disarmament and Arms Control;
77. Vladimir Lukin, Russian Ambassador to the United States (1992-1994),
director on the board of the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), Deputy Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Federation Council of the RF;
78. Douglas Lute*, Lieutenant General (rt.), US Ambassador to NATO,
2013–2017, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center, Harvard University;
79. Emmanuelle Maitre, Research Fellow at FRS;
80. Michael Maclay, Chairman of the Franco-German-British Club of Three;
81. János Martonyi, Former Foreign Affairs Minister of Hungary;
82. John McColl, former NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) and Lieutenant-Governor of Jersey, UK;
83. Oliver Meier, Senior Researcher, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH);
84. Giles Merritt, Founder and Chairman, Friends of Europe;
85. Mira Milosevich-Juaristi, Senior Analyst for Russia and Eurasia, Elcano Royal Institute for International and Strategic Studies, Spain;
86. Victor Mizin*, Leading Research Fellow, Center for International Security, Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO);
87. Thierry de Montbrial, founder and Executive chairman of Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI);
88. Klaus Naumann, General (ret), former Chief of Staff of the Bundeswehr (German Armed Forces); Former Chairman of the NATO Military Committee (1996-1999);
89. Alexander Nikitin*, Director of the Center for Euro-Atlantic Security, of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (MGIMO), Honorary President of the Russian Association of Political Science;
90. Bernard Norlain, General (ret), former Air Defense Commander and Air Combat Commander of the French Air Force;
91. Joseph Nye, Harvard University Distinguished Professor Emeritus, Under-Secretary of State, former Assistant Secretary of Defense, former Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government;
92. Olga Oliker*, Director for Europe and Central Asia, International Crisis Group;
93. Sergey Oznobishev*, Head, Department of Military and Political Analysis and Research Projects, Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO);
94. William Perry, former US Secretary of Defense, Director of the Preventive Defense Project at CISAC, FSI Senior Fellow;
95. Thomas R Pickering, former US Under Secretary of State, former Ambassador to Jordan, Nigeria, El Salvador, Israel, the United Nations, India and Russia;
96. Steven Pifer*, former US Ambassador to Ukraine, William Perry research fellow at Stanford University and nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution;
97. William Potter, Director, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar Professor of Nonproliferation Studies Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, Foreign Member to the Russian Academy of Sciences;
98. Pavel Palazhchenko*, Head of the International Relations, the Gorbachev Foundation;
99. Giampaolo Di Paola, former Minister of Defence of Italy; Former Chairman of NATO Military Committee;
100. Solomon Passy, former Chairman of the United Nations Security Council, former Bulgarian Foreign Minister;
101. Friedrich W. Ploeger, Lieutenant-General (ret), German Airforce, former Deputy Commander AIRCOM Ramstein (2010–2013);
102. Ruprecht Polenz, President German Association for East European Studies, former Chairman Committee on Foreign Affairs of the German Bundestag
103. Paul Quilès, President of the Initiatives for Nuclear Disarmament (IDN). Former Defence Minister and former President of the Defence and Armed Forces Committee of the National Assembly of France;
104. Alain Richard, French Senator; Defence Minister of France (1997–2002);
105. David Richards, General (ret), former Chief of the Defence Staff, member of the UK House of Lords;
106. Wolfgang Richter*, Colonel (ret.), Senior Military Advisor of the Permanent Representation of Germany to the OSCE, Vienna (2005–2009); Senior
Associate, International Security Division, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin (SWP)
107. Malcolm Rifkind, Former Conservative MP in the UK Parliament, former chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee and former British Defence Secretary and former Foreign Secretary;
108. Cynthia Roberts*, Professor of Political Science, Hunter College, City University of New York, Senior Research Scholar, Columbia University, policy adviser, Joint Staff , US Department of Defense, 2019;
109. George Robertson, Former NATO Secretary General; Former UK Secretary of State for Defence;
110. Sergey Rogov**, Academic Director, Institute for the US and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (ISKRAN), Chairman of the International Security Advisory Board of the Scientific Council at the Security Council of the Russian Federation; Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences;
111. Kevin Ryan*, Associate at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Member of the US-Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism, former Defense Attache at the US embassy in Russia, Brigadier General;
112. Laëtitia Saint-Paul, French Politician and Vice President of the National Assembly;
113. Pavel Sharikov*, Leading Research Fellow, Department for Military-Political Research, Institute for the US and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (ISKRAN);
114. Igor Sherbak, former First Deputy of the Permanent Representative of the RF at the United Nations, Research Fellow Chief the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences;
115. Robby Schlund, Head of German-Russian Parliament Group, Deutscher Bundestag;
116. Hans-Joachim Schmidt, Senior Associate Research Fellow, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF);
117. Reiner Schwalb, Brigadier-General (ret), National German Representative at NATO Allied Command Transformation, Norfolk/VA, 2007–2010; German Senior Defense Official and Attaché to the Russian Federation, Moscow, 2011–2018;
118. Vladimir Senko, former Foreign Minister of Belarus; Former Ambassador of Belarus to the United Kingdom.;
119. Stefano Silvestri, Senior Scientific Advisor at Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), former Under Secretary of State for Defence, former President of IAI (2001–2013);
120. Hartwig Spitzer, Professor, Centre for Science and Peace Research, University of Hamburg;
121. Michael Staack, Professor, Helmut-Schmidt-University/University of the Armed Forces in Germany, Hamburg;
122. Armin Staigis, Brigadier-General (ret), former Vice President of the Federal Academy for Security Policy in Berlin;
123. Stefano Stefanini, former Permanent Representative to NATO, Former Diplomatic Advisor to the President of Italy;
124. Angela Stent, professor, Georgetown University;
125. Nataliya Stepanova* Research Fellow, Department for Military-Political Studies, Institute for the US and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (ISKRAN);
126. Goran Svilanović, Former Secretary General, Regional Cooperation Council, Serbia;
127. Strobe Talbott, Distinguished fellow in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, Deputy Secretary of State (1994–2001), President of the Brookings Institution (2002–2017);
128. John Tefft, former US Ambassador to Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, and Lithuania
129. Greg Thielmann*, Board member of the Arms Control Association, Commissioner of the U.S.-Russian-German “Deep Cuts” Project;
130. Adam Thomson*, Director of the European Leadership Network, Permanent UK Representative to NATO (2014–2016);
131. Alexander Tikhansky, military-political analyst (Belarus), professor of the Academy of Military Science of Russia;
132. Nathalie Tocci, Director of Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Italy, Special Adviser to EU High Representative/Vice President Josep Borrell;
133. Vyacheslav Trubnikov, Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service (1996–2000), Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation (2000–2004), Member of the Directorate, Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO);
134. Vygaudas Ušackas*, former Foreign Minister of Lithuania, Lithuanian ambassador to USA, Mexico and UK as well as EU ambassador to Russia and Afghanistan, Member of the Board of Directors of Avia Solutions Group;
135. Alexander Vershbow*, former Assistant Secretary of Defense, former NATO Deputy Secretary General; former US Ambassador to South Korea, NATO, Russia; Distinguished Visiting Fellow at University of Pennsylvania’s Perry World House; Distinguished Fellow at the Atlantic Council;
136. Karsten D. Voigt, former Member of Parliament and President of the NATO-Parliamentary Assembly, former German-American Coordinator in the German Federal Foreign Office;
137. Fedor Voytolovsky, Director, Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences;
138. Andrew Weber, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, and Senior Fellow, Council on Strategic Risks.
139. Igor Yurgens*, President of the All-Russian Insurance Association, Member of the Board of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs;
140. Andrey Zagorskiy*, Head, Department for Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Studies, Primakov National Research Institute for World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO);
141. Dr Wolfgang Zellner, Senior Research Fellow and former Deputy Director, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH)
142. Valery Zhuravel, Colonel (ret), chief adviser of the Department of International Security of the Staff of the Security Council of the Russian Federation (2009–2014), head of the Center for Arctic Studies of the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences;
143. Vitaliy Zhurkin, Director Emeritus, Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IERAS), Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences;
144. Pavel Zolotarev*, Major General (ret.), Leading Research Fellow, Department of Military-Political Studies, Institute for the US and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (ISKRAN);
145. Vladislav Zubok, professor, London School of Economics.
146. Per Carlsen, former Assistant Secretary of Defence (Denmark), Former Ambassador to Vilnius, Moscow and Riga
* – Members of the expert group.
** – Co-chairs of the expert group.
The following document was produced by a movement initiated by Sergey Rogov, former director of the USA/Canada Institute in Moscow. It has been endorsed by 146 experts; see their names at the end. We hope to produce a talk show on our Youtube channel with arms control experts in Moscow, Canada, and other NATO countries. Watch for it on our channel, https://youtube.com/c/ToSaveTheWorld .
— Metta Spencer
Recommendations of the Participants of the Expert Dialogue on NATO-Russia Military Risk Reduction in Europe
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This group of experts from Russia, the United States and Europe held 15 online-seminars on NATO–Russia Risk Reduction in summer and fall of 2020 and offer the following ideas:
To maintain strategic stability, we look forward to immediate action to extend the New START Treaty for 5 years.
At the same time, we are concerned by the deterioration of the European security situation in recent years. The nuclear and conventional arms control system that took decades to build is rapidly unraveling, with nothing to take its place. Incidents in the course of military activities which bring Russian and NATO forces into close proximity are worrisome in their own right and run the risk of escalation. While members of our group diff er over the root causes of the crisis, we are concerned that as tension builds between Russia and NATO, a real military confrontation becomes an increasing danger.
Given this situation, we call upon our countries’ leaders to demonstrate the political will necessary to take a number of urgent actions in order to reduce the risks of military conflict. These military and security actions should be pursued whether or not we make progress in reducing the serious political disputes among our countries. Indeed, these steps can contribute to an atmosphere, in which resolution of those difficult political issues becomes more achievable.
We propose a set of measures, recognizing that not all of these steps will be immediately feasible. The detailed recommendations below address the following areas:
1. Re-establishing practical dialogue between Russia and NATO, including direct contacts between the military commanders and experts of Russia and NATO member states.
2. Developing common rules that will reduce the risk of unintended incidents on land, air and sea.
3. Enhancing stability by increasing transparency, avoiding dangerous military activities, and providing dedicated communication channels that would avoid escalation of incidents that might occur.
4. Utilizing (and possibly supplementing) the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act to codify restraint, transparency and confidence-building measures.
5. Exploring possible limitations on NATO and Russian conventional force deployments in Europe to enhance transparency and stability.
6. Establishing consultations between Russia and US/NATO on the topics of intermediate-range missiles and ballistic missile defense, in order to prevent a new nuclear missile race in Europe.
7. Preserving the Open Skies Treaty.
SPECIFIC PROPOSALS
1.The need for dialogue
1.1. Political dialogue should be revitalized at the ambassadorial level in the NATO-Russia Council and include briefi ngs by military experts as appropriate.
1.2. As part of the NATO 2030 refl ection process, Russia and NATO member states should analyze relations between NATO and Russia with a view to developing the military-to-military dialogue. At a time when most NATO-Russia cooperation remains suspended, such a dialogue should not be viewed as a departure from NATO’s “no business as usual” policy, but as a step that is necessary to increase predictability and reduce the risk of military incidents at sea, in the air and on land escalating to the level of military conflict.
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1.3 Once Russia and NATO member states reach a formal or informal understanding or agreement, they could take initial steps in the form of parallel unilateral measures that do not necessarily require conclusion of a formal agreement between NATO, or NATO member states, and Russia, which could prove politically difficult to achieve in the present environment.
1.4. Regular meetings should be held between the Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff , the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, reinforced by military experts, to address issues of current concern.
1.5. In addition, NATO member states and Russia should resume contacts at the level of military representatives in the NATO Military Committee and restore the Russian military liaison mission at SACEUR Headquarters.
1.6. Furthermore, NATO member states and Russia should enhance military contacts in OSCE forums to provide a more effi cient and inclusive format for discussion and quick decision-making on current issues relating to military activities.
1.7. NATO and Russia should consider the possibility of establishing special NATO-Russia communication channels or hotlines in sensitive regions such as the Baltic, and Black sea regions and the High North area.
1.8. While the recommendations off ered in this paper would be developed primarily in NATO-Russia channels, a number of them could be opened to discussion with and participation by other countries, such as Sweden and Finland in the Baltic and High North regions, and Ukraine and Georgia in the Black Sea region.
2.Preventing incidents
2.1. Prevention of incidents and de-escalation once they have occurred is the most urgent issue related to military interaction. NATO member states and Russia, as well as other European states, need to together formulate a minimum set of realistic measures that could be adopted as formal agreements, informal understandings or parallel, coordinated steps. While they do not have to be in the form of a legal treaty, they should have real force so as to effectively reduce the level of mutual tension.
2.2. NATO and Russia should develop a single set of common rules that would define minimum distances between military aircraft and ships as well as procedures for interaction of crews. To this end, they could resume joint work within the framework of the Cooperative Airspace Initiative (CAI), which had as one of its tasks the strengthening of confidence-building measures along the NATO-Russia line of contact. To address this task, sides should resume a navigational data exchange on the air situation along Russia’s Western border with NATO member states that was already established in the past.
2.3 As one of the options for managing incidents, the 1972 U.S.-Soviet Agreement on Prevention of Incidents at Sea and in the Airspace Above the Sea, as well as 11 similar agreements between certain NATO member states and Russia, could be taken as the basis for additional bilateral or multilateral agreements. Another source of ideas and approaches can be found in the Sino-American agreement of 2014 and Protocol of 2015 on prevention of incidents, which combines principles of prevention of incidents at sea and prevention of incidents during military activities in general.
2.4. Russia and the United States should reach agreement on notifi cation of heavy bomber patrols and fl ights near the borders of the other side, similar to the notifi cations they exchange of ICBM and SLBM launches.
2.5. NATO and Russia should develop and adopt standardized procedures for de-escalation of military incidents and confl icts. They should also conduct joint staff training exercises to prepare for de-escalation, create de-confliction mechanisms in the Baltic, High North and Black Sea regions, and establish a joint mechanism similar to the one built up by Russia and the United States in Syria.
3. Ensuring stability
3.1. NATO member states and Russia should reaffirm the reciprocal political commitments contained in the NATO-Russia Founding Act (1997) and the CFE Final Act (1999) whereby NATO and Russia agree to refrain from additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces in areas close to the territory of the other side in Europe.
3.2. They should explore the possibility of reciprocal constraints or further parallel unilateral commitments on the size and scope of military activities in contiguous areas, or on the level of armed forces permanently located in such areas, with scope wider and thresholds for advance notification and mandatory observation much lower than those required under the 2011 Vienna Document. A focus for such measures could be the Baltic Region (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, Poland and Germany), including Kaliningrad and Russia’s Western military district.
3.3. NATO member states and Russia should consider including in transparency measures land-based and sea-launched conventional intermediate (medium-range) strike systems, such as cruise missiles that may be located outside the contact zones if they can support exercises and military operations in the contact zones.
3.4. They could also draw on the experience with the provisions relating to the inner-German border area contained in the 1989 U.S.-Soviet agreement on preventing dangerous military activities. That agreement required troops to behave with caution in the border area. The sides could consider the establishment of reciprocal zones in which exercises should not be conducted, e.g. within 5 to 10 kilometers of specified borders, while also limiting personnel and certain kinds of military equipment in such zones.
3.5. Russia and NATO member states could agree that both sides will conduct large-scale military exercises, as a rule, at a militarily meaningful distance from their borders taking into account the specificity of contact zones. They should consider reducing the scale and frequency of military activities with respect to numbers and geography, in particular exercises in near borders. Generally, military exercises should be executed responsibly, not provocatively.
3.6. As for “snap exercises”, which continue to be a source of tension and are not subject to prior notification, we recommend the establishment of a regime of mutual transparency at a high military level between Russia and NATO. To that end, a “quiet notification” mode should be developed, e.g. providing confidential advance high-level notice to the other side, but with no advance warning to troops participating in the exercises. “Quiet notification” could also be applied to short-notice transit of multinational forces. An appropriate level for this sort of mutual information exchange would be the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the NATO Supreme Allied Commander.
4. NATO-Russia Founding Act
4.1. If agreements can be reached between NATO and Russia on additional confidence-building, transparency and restraint measures, these could be incorporated as additional protocols or annexes to the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act.
4.2. NATO and Russia could also agree to defi nitions of the parameters of the reciprocal measures of restraint mentioned in the Founding Act, such as “additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces.” This could be established as the equivalent of one army brigade and one air wing/regiment per country or Russian military district.
4.3. With the implementation of these additional risk-reduction measures and significant progress in the resolution of broader political differences between NATO and Russia, the sides could agree to draw up a new Code of Conduct for European security, which could also engage other European states beyond NATO and Russia.
5. Possible agreements on conventional armed forces in Europe
5.1. Confidence-building measures and possible measures of restraint should provide for eff ective collective and individual defense for all states in the region, big and small, with a view to enhancing stability and transparency, avoiding surprises, and minimizing risks of escalation. Given that a new conventional arms control treaty does not seem possible or practicable at this time, agreements may take the form of political commitments.
5.2. NATO and Russia should start negotiations to adopt certain measures to limit the arms race in the European region based on the assumption that currently deployed force levels are sufficient. Agreement should be aimed primarily at limiting destabilizing concentrations of forces and military training activities.
5.3. Both sides should consider and discuss the potentially destabilizing capabilities of some precision and long-range conventional weapons with a view to exercising restraint and ensuring transparency in this sphere. They could adopt transparency measures also with respect to conventional strike forces located outside the zone of direct contact of Russia and NATO. This refers to naval forces, long-range aviation and ground-based weapons, not covered by New START, with the range capability to reach this region.
5.4. The measures proposed in this paper should be significantly more far-reaching than the provisions of the Vienna Document 2011. They should take into account the experience of the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty and its adapted version and extend their scope.
5.5. Therefore, we recommend conducting an analysis of the Vienna Document 2011 with a view to extending the scope of its transparency and verification measures and its provisions on large-scale military exercises and other deployments to include naval forces, all large air force and air defense formations, conventional ground-, air- or sea-launched ballistic or cruise missiles, as well as logistic and communication units.
5.6. NATO member states and Russia should practice parallel unilateral arms control measures, coordinating them in advance, where practicable, and reciprocating as appropriate.
6. Missile Defenses and Intermediate Range Missiles in Europe
6.1. Russia and the United States/NATO should hold consultations on missile defense in Europe, both strategic and non-strategic, nuclear and non-nuclear, with a view to increasing transparency and overcoming existing differences.
6.2. They should consider ways to bridge the differences between NATO’s declared intention not to deploy any nuclear-armed ground-based missiles in Europe and Russia’s proposal for a moratorium on nuclear- and conventionally-armed medium-range and intermediate-range missiles in Europe. A first step could be to agree upon reciprocal transparency measures with regard to existing capabilities.
6.3. Russia, the United States and other NATO member states should enhance transparency beyond current capabilities through an annual exchange of ten-year plans for the development of missile defense in Europe, the creation of a data exchange center, and notification of new missile defense elements that have reached operational readiness.
7. Open Skies Treaty
7.1. Participants in the dialogue support preserving the Open Skies Treaty as it is one of the few remaining transparency instruments geared to promote confidence-building between states parties in Europe.
7.2. We should focus on the consequences of the U.S. withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty for the remaining 33 states parties and on preserving the treaty. All states parties, including Russia, should remain in the Treaty for a sufficient time to assess how it would function in these conditions and to allow time for possible re-entry by the United States. Russia and the United States, as well as other states parties, should discuss their concerns about the treaty and try to find agreed solutions.
7.3. Remaining states parties should consider the possibility of joint diplomatic initiatives aimed at returning the United States to the Open Skies Treaty.
Americans, Europeans and Russians, who signed the statement
Note: Each of the signers of these recommendations agrees with most but not necessarily all of them.
Affiliations are for purposes of identification only.
1. Benoît d’Aboville, Former Ambassador and Permanent Representative to NATO, Vice President of the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS), France.
2. James Acton, co-director, Nuclear policy Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace;
3. Graham Allison, Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, “Founding Dean” of Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, until 2017 Director of its Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, former Assistant Secretary of Defense;
4. Roy Allison*, Professor of Russian and Eurasian International Relations, Director, Russian and Eurasian Studies Centre, St. Antony’s College, Oxford;
5. Alexey Arbatov, Head, Center for International Security, Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences;
6. Nadezhda Arbatova, Head, Department for European Political Studies, Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO);
7. Valeriy Baranov, Colonel General (ret.), Inspector general of the Ministry of Defense.
8. Vladimir Baranovsky*, Member of the Directorate, Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International relations (IMEMO), Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences;
9. Alexandra Bell*, former Director for Strategic Outreach in the Office of the US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, Senior Policy Director at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation;
10. Robert Bell*, former assistant to the US President, former counselor to the Secretary General of NATO, distinguished Professor of the Practice, Georgia Tech;
11. John Beyrle, former Ambassador of the United States to the Russian Federation (2008–2012), former Ambassador to Bulgaria (2005–2008), Chairman of the U.S. Russia Foundation
12. James Bindenagel*, Ambassador (ret.), Henry Kissinger Professor, em.Center for Advanced Security, Strategy and Integration Studies, Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn;
13. Hans Blix, former Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, former IAEA Director General, Executive Chairman of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC);
14. Dieter Boden, Ambassador (ret), Potsdam;
15. Michael Boyce, Former Chief of the Defence Staff and First Sea Lord of the Royal Navy; a cross bench member of the the British House of Lords;
16. Ulrich J. Brandenburg, German Ambassador to NATO (2007–2010), German Ambassador to the Russian Federation (2010–2014);
17. Karl-Heinz Brunner, Member of Parliament, Spokesman on the Sub-Committee on Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation of the German Bundestag, Berlin;
18. Corentin Brustlein, Director of the Center for Security Studies, France 19. Philip Breedlove*, USAF General retired. Distinguished Professor, Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at Georgia Tech, former US European Command Commander and Supreme Allied Commander Europe;
20. Des Browne, Chair of the European Leadership Network (ELN), Vice-Chairman of the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), Convener of the TLG and former UK Defence Secretary
21. Denis Bukonkin*, Director of Foreign Policy and Security Research Center, Minsk; Belorussia;
22. William J. Burns, President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, former Deputy Secretary of State, former Ambassador to Russia;
23. Evgeniy Buzhinsky*, Lieutenant General (ret.), Vice President of the Russian International Affairs Council; Chairman, Executive Board, PIR Center;
24. Vincenzo Camporini, former Chief of the Joint Defence Staff , Former Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Italy;
25. Samuel Charap*, former Senior Advisor to the Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, 2011–2012;
26. Pierce Corden*, former head of the department of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, research fellow at the Center for science, technologies and security policy;
27. Thomas Countryman*, former Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation, Chairman of the Arms Control Association;
28. Dmitry Danilov*, Head of Department at the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IERAS);
29. Christopher Davis*, Professorial Research Fellow, University of Oxford;
30. Lewis Dunn*, former U.S. Ambassador to the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;
31. Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, Former Danish Foreign Minister (1982–1993);
32. Victor Esin*, Colonel General (ret.), Former Head of the Main Staff of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces, Leading Research Fellow, Department for Military-Political Research, Institute for the US and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (ISKRAN);
33. Marc Finaud*, Head of Arms Proliferation and Diplomatic Tradecraft, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy;
34. Ute Finckh-Kraemer, former Member of Parliament, Foreign Affairs Committee, Sub-Committee on Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-proliferation; Alumna of Parliamentarians for Nuclear Disarmament and Non-proliferation (PNND);
35. Cornelius Friesendorf, Head, Centre for OSCE Research, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, at the University of Hamburg (IFSH);
36. Helmut W. Ganser, Brigadier-General (ret), Defence Advisor to the German NATO Delegation 2004–2008, Brussels;
37. Rainer L. Glatz, Lieutenant-General (ret), former Commander German Armed Forces Joint Force Command, Potsdam;
38. Valery Garbuzov, Director, Institute for the US and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (ISKRAN);
39. Francois Le Goff, General Secretary of the Franco-German-British Club of Three;
40. Thomas Gomart, Director, Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI);
41. Alexander Graef, Research Fellow, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH);
42. Charles Grant, Director of the Centre for European Reform (CER), UK;
43. Philippe Gréciano, Professor at Grenoble Alpes University, Jean Monnet Chair, Member of the Center for International Security and EU Cooperation, France;
44. Alexey Gromyko**, Director of the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IERAS), Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences;
45. Wolfgang Guensche, LtColonel (ret), former Head of Arms Control Unit, German Armed Forces Verification Centre, Geilenkirchen; former military advisor to the German Foreign Office on security, arms control and disarmament;
46. David Hannay, Former Ambassador to the EU and to the UN; current Chair of UK All Party Parliamentary Group on Global Security and Non-Proliferation in the UK Parliament;
47. Ruediger Hartmann, Ambassador (ret), former Commissioner of the German Federal Government for Disarmament and Arms Control;
48. Benjamin Hautecouverture, Senior Research Fellow at Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS);
49. François Heisbourg, Chairman and Special Advisor, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) / Foundation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS), France;
50. Kurt Herrmann, Lieutenant-General (ret), former Head NATO Military Liaison Mission (MLM), Moscow, and former Director NATO Communication and Information Systems Services Agency (NCSA);
51. Sven Hirdman, Ambassador to Russia 1994–2004, State Secretary Ministry of Defence of Sweden (1979–1982);
52. Matthias Hoehn, Member of Parliament, Chairman, Sub-Committee on Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation of the German Bundestag, Berlin;
53. Hellmut Hoffmann, Ambassador (ret), former Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Conference on Disarmament (2009–2013);
54. Heiner Horsten, Ambassador (ret), Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany to the OSCE in Vienna 2008–2012;
55. Hans Huebner, Brigadier-General (ret), former Director, German Arms Control Verification Centre, Geilenkirchen;
56. Hans-Dieter Heumann, Ambassador (ret.), former President of Federal College for Security Policy, Berlin;
57. Jon Huntsman, former Governor of Utah, former Ambassador of the United States to Russia, to China and to Singapore;
58. Igor Istomin, Senior Lecturer at the Department of Applied International Political Analysis, MGIMO University;
59. Igor Ivanov, Minister of Foreign Affairs (1998–2004), former Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation (2004–2007), President of Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC);
60. Juhani Kaskeala, Senior Finnish Admiral and former Chief of Defence of the Finnish Defence Forces (2001–2009);
61. Daryl G. Kimball, Executive Director, Arms Control Association;
62. Michael Kofman*, Director of the Russia Studies Program at CNA, Fellow at the Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center;
63. Bert Koenders, Former Foreign Minister of the Netherlands;
64. Lawrence Korb*, US Navy Captain (ret.), former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reagan Administration, Senior Research Fellow, Center for American Progress, and Senior Advisor, Defense Information Center;
65. Andrey Kortunov*, Director General, Russian International Affairs Council;
66. Oleg Krivolapov*, Research Fellow, Department for Military-Political Research, Institute for the US and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (ISKRAN);
67. Evgeniy Kozhokin, Dean of School of International Relations and Regional Studies of the State University for Humanitarian Studies;
68. Ulrich Kuehn, Head, Arms Control and Emerging Technologies, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH);
69. Valentin Kuznetsov*, Vice Admiral (ret.), former Chief Military Representative of the RF at NATO, Senior Research Fellow, Department for Military-Political Research, Institute for the US and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (ISKRAN);
70. Henrik Larsen, Senior Researcher, Center for Security Studies, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH Zürich);
71. Robert Legvold, Marshall D. Shulman Professor, Columbia University;
72. Imants Liegis, Latvian Ambassador to France and to Hungary, Latvia’s Defense Minister (2009–2010) and the Acting Minister of Justice (2009–2010);
73. Osman Faruk Logoglu, former Turkish Ambassador to the United States and former Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
74. Mogens Lykketof, former Minister for Finance and Foreign Affairs and Speaker of Parliament, Denmark. Former President of the United Nations General Assembly (2015–2016), Denmark;
75. Roderic Lyne, former British ambassador to the Russian Federation;
76. Ruediger Luedeking, Ambassador (ret), former Deputy Commissioner of the German Federal Government for Disarmament and Arms Control;
77. Vladimir Lukin, Russian Ambassador to the United States (1992-1994),
director on the board of the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), Deputy Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Federation Council of the RF;
78. Douglas Lute*, Lieutenant General (rt.), US Ambassador to NATO,
2013–2017, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center, Harvard University;
79. Emmanuelle Maitre, Research Fellow at FRS;
80. Michael Maclay, Chairman of the Franco-German-British Club of Three;
81. János Martonyi, Former Foreign Affairs Minister of Hungary;
82. John McColl, former NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) and Lieutenant-Governor of Jersey, UK;
83. Oliver Meier, Senior Researcher, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH);
84. Giles Merritt, Founder and Chairman, Friends of Europe;
85. Mira Milosevich-Juaristi, Senior Analyst for Russia and Eurasia, Elcano Royal Institute for International and Strategic Studies, Spain;
86. Victor Mizin*, Leading Research Fellow, Center for International Security, Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO);
87. Thierry de Montbrial, founder and Executive chairman of Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI);
88. Klaus Naumann, General (ret), former Chief of Staff of the Bundeswehr (German Armed Forces); Former Chairman of the NATO Military Committee (1996-1999);
89. Alexander Nikitin*, Director of the Center for Euro-Atlantic Security, of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (MGIMO), Honorary President of the Russian Association of Political Science;
90. Bernard Norlain, General (ret), former Air Defense Commander and Air Combat Commander of the French Air Force;
91. Joseph Nye, Harvard University Distinguished Professor Emeritus, Under-Secretary of State, former Assistant Secretary of Defense, former Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government;
92. Olga Oliker*, Director for Europe and Central Asia, International Crisis Group;
93. Sergey Oznobishev*, Head, Department of Military and Political Analysis and Research Projects, Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO);
94. William Perry, former US Secretary of Defense, Director of the Preventive Defense Project at CISAC, FSI Senior Fellow;
95. Thomas R Pickering, former US Under Secretary of State, former Ambassador to Jordan, Nigeria, El Salvador, Israel, the United Nations, India and Russia;
96. Steven Pifer*, former US Ambassador to Ukraine, William Perry research fellow at Stanford University and nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution;
97. William Potter, Director, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar Professor of Nonproliferation Studies Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, Foreign Member to the Russian Academy of Sciences;
98. Pavel Palazhchenko*, Head of the International Relations, the Gorbachev Foundation;
99. Giampaolo Di Paola, former Minister of Defence of Italy; Former Chairman of NATO Military Committee;
100. Solomon Passy, former Chairman of the United Nations Security Council, former Bulgarian Foreign Minister;
101. Friedrich W. Ploeger, Lieutenant-General (ret), German Airforce, former Deputy Commander AIRCOM Ramstein (2010–2013);
102. Ruprecht Polenz, President German Association for East European Studies, former Chairman Committee on Foreign Affairs of the German Bundestag
103. Paul Quilès, President of the Initiatives for Nuclear Disarmament (IDN). Former Defence Minister and former President of the Defence and Armed Forces Committee of the National Assembly of France;
104. Alain Richard, French Senator; Defence Minister of France (1997–2002);
105. David Richards, General (ret), former Chief of the Defence Staff, member of the UK House of Lords;
106. Wolfgang Richter*, Colonel (ret.), Senior Military Advisor of the Permanent Representation of Germany to the OSCE, Vienna (2005–2009); Senior
Associate, International Security Division, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin (SWP)
107. Malcolm Rifkind, Former Conservative MP in the UK Parliament, former chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee and former British Defence Secretary and former Foreign Secretary;
108. Cynthia Roberts*, Professor of Political Science, Hunter College, City University of New York, Senior Research Scholar, Columbia University, policy adviser, Joint Staff , US Department of Defense, 2019;
109. George Robertson, Former NATO Secretary General; Former UK Secretary of State for Defence;
110. Sergey Rogov**, Academic Director, Institute for the US and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (ISKRAN), Chairman of the International Security Advisory Board of the Scientific Council at the Security Council of the Russian Federation; Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences;
111. Kevin Ryan*, Associate at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Member of the US-Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism, former Defense Attache at the US embassy in Russia, Brigadier General;
112. Laëtitia Saint-Paul, French Politician and Vice President of the National Assembly;
113. Pavel Sharikov*, Leading Research Fellow, Department for Military-Political Research, Institute for the US and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (ISKRAN);
114. Igor Sherbak, former First Deputy of the Permanent Representative of the RF at the United Nations, Research Fellow Chief the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences;
115. Robby Schlund, Head of German-Russian Parliament Group, Deutscher Bundestag;
116. Hans-Joachim Schmidt, Senior Associate Research Fellow, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF);
117. Reiner Schwalb, Brigadier-General (ret), National German Representative at NATO Allied Command Transformation, Norfolk/VA, 2007–2010; German Senior Defense Official and Attaché to the Russian Federation, Moscow, 2011–2018;
118. Vladimir Senko, former Foreign Minister of Belarus; Former Ambassador of Belarus to the United Kingdom.;
119. Stefano Silvestri, Senior Scientific Advisor at Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), former Under Secretary of State for Defence, former President of IAI (2001–2013);
120. Hartwig Spitzer, Professor, Centre for Science and Peace Research, University of Hamburg;
121. Michael Staack, Professor, Helmut-Schmidt-University/University of the Armed Forces in Germany, Hamburg;
122. Armin Staigis, Brigadier-General (ret), former Vice President of the Federal Academy for Security Policy in Berlin;
123. Stefano Stefanini, former Permanent Representative to NATO, Former Diplomatic Advisor to the President of Italy;
124. Angela Stent, professor, Georgetown University;
125. Nataliya Stepanova* Research Fellow, Department for Military-Political Studies, Institute for the US and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (ISKRAN);
126. Goran Svilanović, Former Secretary General, Regional Cooperation Council, Serbia;
127. Strobe Talbott, Distinguished fellow in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, Deputy Secretary of State (1994–2001), President of the Brookings Institution (2002–2017);
128. John Tefft, former US Ambassador to Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, and Lithuania
129. Greg Thielmann*, Board member of the Arms Control Association, Commissioner of the U.S.-Russian-German “Deep Cuts” Project;
130. Adam Thomson*, Director of the European Leadership Network, Permanent UK Representative to NATO (2014–2016);
131. Alexander Tikhansky, military-political analyst (Belarus), professor of the Academy of Military Science of Russia;
132. Nathalie Tocci, Director of Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Italy, Special Adviser to EU High Representative/Vice President Josep Borrell;
133. Vyacheslav Trubnikov, Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service (1996–2000), Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation (2000–2004), Member of the Directorate, Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO);
134. Vygaudas Ušackas*, former Foreign Minister of Lithuania, Lithuanian ambassador to USA, Mexico and UK as well as EU ambassador to Russia and Afghanistan, Member of the Board of Directors of Avia Solutions Group;
135. Alexander Vershbow*, former Assistant Secretary of Defense, former NATO Deputy Secretary General; former US Ambassador to South Korea, NATO, Russia; Distinguished Visiting Fellow at University of Pennsylvania’s Perry World House; Distinguished Fellow at the Atlantic Council;
136. Karsten D. Voigt, former Member of Parliament and President of the NATO-Parliamentary Assembly, former German-American Coordinator in the German Federal Foreign Office;
137. Fedor Voytolovsky, Director, Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences;
138. Andrew Weber, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, and Senior Fellow, Council on Strategic Risks.
139. Igor Yurgens*, President of the All-Russian Insurance Association, Member of the Board of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs;
140. Andrey Zagorskiy*, Head, Department for Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Studies, Primakov National Research Institute for World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO);
141. Dr Wolfgang Zellner, Senior Research Fellow and former Deputy Director, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH)
142. Valery Zhuravel, Colonel (ret), chief adviser of the Department of International Security of the Staff of the Security Council of the Russian Federation (2009–2014), head of the Center for Arctic Studies of the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences;
143. Vitaliy Zhurkin, Director Emeritus, Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IERAS), Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences;
144. Pavel Zolotarev*, Major General (ret.), Leading Research Fellow, Department of Military-Political Studies, Institute for the US and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (ISKRAN);
145. Vladislav Zubok, professor, London School of Economics.
146. Per Carlsen, former Assistant Secretary of Defence (Denmark), Former Ambassador to Vilnius, Moscow and Riga
* – Members of the expert group.
** – Co-chairs of the expert group.
‘This is going to be quite a show’: Biden’s arms control team eyes nuclear policy overhaul
President Joe Biden is assembling a national security team with an unusually ambitious agenda to negotiate new arms control treaties, scale back the nuclear arsenal, and review decades of military doctrine.
But veterans of the last administration fear this newly empowered group of progressives may be naive about what can be achieved without undermining U.S. security, and are already warning them to prepare for a shock when they read the latest intelligence.
Taking up posts at the Pentagon, State Department and National Security Council are a cadre of experts who collectively have their sights on a renaissance in nuclear restraint, after President Donald Trump withdrew from three arms control pacts, threatened a nuclear war with North Korea and expanded the role of nuclear weapons in war planning.
Biden has already agreed to extend the last remaining nuclear agreement with Russia, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, and called for further negotiations with Moscow to place new limits on their arsenals, the world’s largest. And the group of arms control experts he is enlisting to carry out his agenda represents the vanguard of a decades-long progressive push to pull back from the nuclear brink and seek the elimination of atomic weapons.
“The stars are aligned,” said Joe Cirincione, a veteran nonproliferation advocate who mentored a number of Biden’s picks. “Extending New START for five years is just the opening gambit. This is going to be quite a show.”
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“I think a lot of these guys who are going into government are going to finally start getting classified briefings about what China has been up to,” said Tim Morrison, who oversaw the arms control portfolio on the National Security Council under Trump and is now at the Hudson Institute. “I want to be a fly in the room. The color is going to drain out of their faces, they are going to sit back in their chairs, and they are going to say ‘oh s—.'”
Under Trump, the United States significantly increased spending on nuclear weapons and also fielded a new submarine-launched warhead, citing Russian and Chinese nuclear buildups and more aggressive efforts by North Korea to increase its arsenal and develop more advanced long-range missiles.
Others see Biden’s willingness to accept Russia’s offer to extend New START a full five years without preconditions as a worrying sign the new team won’t be tough enough on the Russians.
“I think that is a bad signal and suggests that Biden may be a pushover when it comes to this sort of thing because even those who still see value in New START agree there are some things the United States should be pushing for,” former Republican Sen. Jon Kyl, a leading skeptic of arms control agreements, said in an interview.
Trump’ chief arms control negotiator, former Ambassador Marshall Billingslea, is also critical about Biden’s first move.
“They gave away all of the leverage that they had in order to get additional arms control done,” he said. “It’s not at all clear to me what further interest the Russians have in negotiating anything with the Biden administration.”
But the team advising Biden has big ambitions. One leading player is Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins, a veteran of the Obama State Department who coordinated efforts to combat the spread of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. She has been nominated to be undersecretary of State for arms control and international security.
Jenkins has recently argued for declaring a “no first-use” policy when it comes to nuclear weapons, which arms control advocates consider a major step toward reducing nuclear tensions.
“We are trying to say, ‘we are not going to attack you with a nuclear weapon unless you attack us with a nuclear weapon,” she explained in a podcast this month. “That’s kind of the direction it was going. However, in 2018 we kind of took some steps back on that. We have added all these conditions where we can actually use a nuclear weapon. We have gone backwards.”
She is joined by a growing roster of progressive-minded national security experts who have advocated for some of the most drastic changes in U.S. nuclear policy in recent years.
For example, several key players in the new administration have ties with the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, the research arm of the liberal Council for a Livable World, which aims to “reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons.”
Alexandra Bell, a former State Department official who most recently was the center’s policy director, has been appointed as deputy assistant secretary of State in the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance. Leonor Tomero, former chief counsel for the House Armed Services Committee who was the think tank’s director, will oversee nuclear and missile defense programs for the undersecretary of Defense for policy.
Meanwhile, Mallory Stewart, the new senior director for arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation on the National Security Council, is a longtime national security official and think tank scholar who was a member of the center’s board. And others with ties to the organization include Colin Kahl, Biden’s nominee to be Pentagon policy chief, who is an adviser.
“They want to lower the risk of having any nuclear catastrophe,” said former Rep. John Tierney, executive director of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, calling their new influence “a tremendous win for the State Department, the United States, and indeed, every person on the planet who believes a world free from nuclear threats is possible.”
“They want have have as much reasonable, verifiable arms control as they can to lower the risk of a nuclear catastrophe,” he added.
Other players on the arms control front include the NSC’s head of strategic planning, Sasha Baker. She’s a former national security adviser to Sen. Elizabeth Warren, a leading advocate in the chamber for reducing the size of the American arsenal.
“She is probably the person who’s going to rewrite the national security strategy,” Darryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, one of the leading disarmament groups, said of Baker.
Many of Biden’s arms control advisers believe deeply that the United States’ plan to modernize all three legs of the nuclear triad — bombers, submarines and land-based missiles — is more comprehensive and expensive than needed to deter nuclear adversaries.
They are expected to review the nuclear modernization portfolio, which is expected to cost upwards of half a trillion dollars over the next decade alone, and much more after that. They are almost certain to try to kill a new, “low-yield” nuclear warhead that the Trump administration outfitted on submarines.
They are also likely to find more allies in a Democratically-controlled Congress.
“I think [Biden] is in a position where he can change our nuclear weapons doctrine,” Sen. Ed Markey (D-Mass.), a member of the Foreign Relations Committee and leading advocate for curtaining nuclear weapons spending, said in an interview.
He also believes the need for arms control has only grown “because of these past four years with Donald Trump.”
“We can see how quickly our relationship with other nuclear weapon powers can become much more tense and dangerous,” Markey said. “We can’t afford nuclear weapons overkill.”
Meanwhile, Tomero’s former boss, Rep. Adam Smith, is chair of the Armed Services Committee. Smith, a leading national security progressive in Congress, has been among the most vocal proponents for cutting the nuclear budget.
“There is a good opportunity when you add in the fact that Adam Smith clearly sees that this whole modernization plan, as it’s currently projected, is going to be way too expensive,” Tierney said.
“We don’t need any of the new weapons that Trump put in,” he added. “And [Biden] was clear on that when he was running. There is no reason why we should be developing new classes of weapons and nuclear warheads. That is destabilizing and it just leads to an arms race and makes everybody less safe.”
But the political and diplomatic obstacles to Biden’s agenda are also enormous, whether Washington tries to revive arms control agreements or pursue new ones with Russia, Iran, North Korea or China, or curtail U.S. plans to upgrade its own arsenal and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in American strategy.
“Some of the aspirations, some of the idealized goals of some of his base, they may not get what they want,” said Morrison, the former Trump administration NSC official.
Peter Huessy, director of strategic deterrent studies at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, which is supported by the defense industry, also worries that the United States lacks enough experienced negotiators to replicate some of the arms control successes of the Cold War.
“By not having a professional cadre of arms negotiators, we lose institutional memory as well as full understanding of the gambits used by the Russians and the tricks they play in negotiations,” he said.
Follow along as we track the administration’s first 100 days. »
Others rebutted the idea that Biden’s team doesn’t have what it takes, or that they are naive about what can be achieved.
“They are believers, as has every president from Eisenhower to Obama, that arms control is a key tool to national security that reduces both existential and lesser risks to the United States,” said Ambassador Tom Countryman, who served as acting undersecretary of State for arms control and international security in the Obama administration.
“There is no greater risk to the existence of the United States than the increasing risk of the use of nuclear weapons,” he added. “It is a national security mandate to reduce that risk and the vehicle to do that is arms control. They are a dream team, not of ideologues, not of boastful dealmakers, but of people who are willing to do the hard work that is necessary.”
But he also acknowledged how hard it will be to make their visions reality. “It won’t be easy to get it done,” Countryman said. “I’m reluctant to predict any specific achievement besides the extension of New START.”
‘This is going to be quite a show’: Biden’s arms control team eyes nuclear policy overhaul
President Joe Biden is assembling a national security team with an unusually ambitious agenda to negotiate new arms control treaties, scale back the nuclear arsenal, and review decades of military doctrine.
But veterans of the last administration fear this newly empowered group of progressives may be naive about what can be achieved without undermining U.S. security, and are already warning them to prepare for a shock when they read the latest intelligence.
Taking up posts at the Pentagon, State Department and National Security Council are a cadre of experts who collectively have their sights on a renaissance in nuclear restraint, after President Donald Trump withdrew from three arms control pacts, threatened a nuclear war with North Korea and expanded the role of nuclear weapons in war planning.
Biden has already agreed to extend the last remaining nuclear agreement with Russia, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, and called for further negotiations with Moscow to place new limits on their arsenals, the world’s largest. And the group of arms control experts he is enlisting to carry out his agenda represents the vanguard of a decades-long progressive push to pull back from the nuclear brink and seek the elimination of atomic weapons.
“The stars are aligned,” said Joe Cirincione, a veteran nonproliferation advocate who mentored a number of Biden’s picks. “Extending New START for five years is just the opening gambit. This is going to be quite a show.”
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“I think a lot of these guys who are going into government are going to finally start getting classified briefings about what China has been up to,” said Tim Morrison, who oversaw the arms control portfolio on the National Security Council under Trump and is now at the Hudson Institute. “I want to be a fly in the room. The color is going to drain out of their faces, they are going to sit back in their chairs, and they are going to say ‘oh s—.'”
Under Trump, the United States significantly increased spending on nuclear weapons and also fielded a new submarine-launched warhead, citing Russian and Chinese nuclear buildups and more aggressive efforts by North Korea to increase its arsenal and develop more advanced long-range missiles.
Others see Biden’s willingness to accept Russia’s offer to extend New START a full five years without preconditions as a worrying sign the new team won’t be tough enough on the Russians.
“I think that is a bad signal and suggests that Biden may be a pushover when it comes to this sort of thing because even those who still see value in New START agree there are some things the United States should be pushing for,” former Republican Sen. Jon Kyl, a leading skeptic of arms control agreements, said in an interview.
Trump’ chief arms control negotiator, former Ambassador Marshall Billingslea, is also critical about Biden’s first move.
“They gave away all of the leverage that they had in order to get additional arms control done,” he said. “It’s not at all clear to me what further interest the Russians have in negotiating anything with the Biden administration.”
But the team advising Biden has big ambitions. One leading player is Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins, a veteran of the Obama State Department who coordinated efforts to combat the spread of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. She has been nominated to be undersecretary of State for arms control and international security.
Jenkins has recently argued for declaring a “no first-use” policy when it comes to nuclear weapons, which arms control advocates consider a major step toward reducing nuclear tensions.
“We are trying to say, ‘we are not going to attack you with a nuclear weapon unless you attack us with a nuclear weapon,” she explained in a podcast this month. “That’s kind of the direction it was going. However, in 2018 we kind of took some steps back on that. We have added all these conditions where we can actually use a nuclear weapon. We have gone backwards.”
She is joined by a growing roster of progressive-minded national security experts who have advocated for some of the most drastic changes in U.S. nuclear policy in recent years.
For example, several key players in the new administration have ties with the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, the research arm of the liberal Council for a Livable World, which aims to “reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons.”
Alexandra Bell, a former State Department official who most recently was the center’s policy director, has been appointed as deputy assistant secretary of State in the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance. Leonor Tomero, former chief counsel for the House Armed Services Committee who was the think tank’s director, will oversee nuclear and missile defense programs for the undersecretary of Defense for policy.
Meanwhile, Mallory Stewart, the new senior director for arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation on the National Security Council, is a longtime national security official and think tank scholar who was a member of the center’s board. And others with ties to the organization include Colin Kahl, Biden’s nominee to be Pentagon policy chief, who is an adviser.
“They want to lower the risk of having any nuclear catastrophe,” said former Rep. John Tierney, executive director of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, calling their new influence “a tremendous win for the State Department, the United States, and indeed, every person on the planet who believes a world free from nuclear threats is possible.”
“They want have have as much reasonable, verifiable arms control as they can to lower the risk of a nuclear catastrophe,” he added.
Other players on the arms control front include the NSC’s head of strategic planning, Sasha Baker. She’s a former national security adviser to Sen. Elizabeth Warren, a leading advocate in the chamber for reducing the size of the American arsenal.
“She is probably the person who’s going to rewrite the national security strategy,” Darryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, one of the leading disarmament groups, said of Baker.
Many of Biden’s arms control advisers believe deeply that the United States’ plan to modernize all three legs of the nuclear triad — bombers, submarines and land-based missiles — is more comprehensive and expensive than needed to deter nuclear adversaries.
They are expected to review the nuclear modernization portfolio, which is expected to cost upwards of half a trillion dollars over the next decade alone, and much more after that. They are almost certain to try to kill a new, “low-yield” nuclear warhead that the Trump administration outfitted on submarines.
They are also likely to find more allies in a Democratically-controlled Congress.
“I think [Biden] is in a position where he can change our nuclear weapons doctrine,” Sen. Ed Markey (D-Mass.), a member of the Foreign Relations Committee and leading advocate for curtaining nuclear weapons spending, said in an interview.
He also believes the need for arms control has only grown “because of these past four years with Donald Trump.”
“We can see how quickly our relationship with other nuclear weapon powers can become much more tense and dangerous,” Markey said. “We can’t afford nuclear weapons overkill.”
Meanwhile, Tomero’s former boss, Rep. Adam Smith, is chair of the Armed Services Committee. Smith, a leading national security progressive in Congress, has been among the most vocal proponents for cutting the nuclear budget.
“There is a good opportunity when you add in the fact that Adam Smith clearly sees that this whole modernization plan, as it’s currently projected, is going to be way too expensive,” Tierney said.
“We don’t need any of the new weapons that Trump put in,” he added. “And [Biden] was clear on that when he was running. There is no reason why we should be developing new classes of weapons and nuclear warheads. That is destabilizing and it just leads to an arms race and makes everybody less safe.”
But the political and diplomatic obstacles to Biden’s agenda are also enormous, whether Washington tries to revive arms control agreements or pursue new ones with Russia, Iran, North Korea or China, or curtail U.S. plans to upgrade its own arsenal and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in American strategy.
“Some of the aspirations, some of the idealized goals of some of his base, they may not get what they want,” said Morrison, the former Trump administration NSC official.
Peter Huessy, director of strategic deterrent studies at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, which is supported by the defense industry, also worries that the United States lacks enough experienced negotiators to replicate some of the arms control successes of the Cold War.
“By not having a professional cadre of arms negotiators, we lose institutional memory as well as full understanding of the gambits used by the Russians and the tricks they play in negotiations,” he said.
Follow along as we track the administration’s first 100 days. »
Others rebutted the idea that Biden’s team doesn’t have what it takes, or that they are naive about what can be achieved.
“They are believers, as has every president from Eisenhower to Obama, that arms control is a key tool to national security that reduces both existential and lesser risks to the United States,” said Ambassador Tom Countryman, who served as acting undersecretary of State for arms control and international security in the Obama administration.
“There is no greater risk to the existence of the United States than the increasing risk of the use of nuclear weapons,” he added. “It is a national security mandate to reduce that risk and the vehicle to do that is arms control. They are a dream team, not of ideologues, not of boastful dealmakers, but of people who are willing to do the hard work that is necessary.”
But he also acknowledged how hard it will be to make their visions reality. “It won’t be easy to get it done,” Countryman said. “I’m reluctant to predict any specific achievement besides the extension of New START.”
Suggestion Box: Compulsory Dispute Resolution to Abolish Nuclear Weapons
James Ranney has posted this proposal in the suggestion box:
“The missing link? Compulsory international dispute resolution. Check out my new book, World Peace Through Law.”
Great idea, James. Would you care to elaborate on it with another comment here? You may need to propose ways of making it happen!
Sure. The argument is as follows: 1) We must abolish war (or war will abolish us, JFK); 2) we therefore need ALTERNATIVES TO WAR; 3) this means we need INTERNATIONAL ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION; and 4) this means, in order to be workable, we need COMPULSORY INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION (compulsory negotiation, which would probably have prevented WWI, according to two historians); compulsory mediation (which would probably prevent 95% of all int’l conflict); compulsory arbitration (as argued by President Theodore Roosevelt, but was rejected by the Republicans in the Senate); and compulsory adjudication in the World Court (proposed by Mikhail Gorbachev in 1987 & discussed for a couple years before being forgotten). This proposal was accepted by representatives of the U.S. and the USSR in the famous McCloy-Zorin Agreement in 1961, but has been totally forgotten since then.
Suggestion Box: Compulsory Dispute Resolution to Abolish Nuclear Weapons
James Ranney has posted this proposal in the suggestion box:
“The missing link? Compulsory international dispute resolution. Check out my new book, World Peace Through Law.”
Great idea, James. Would you care to elaborate on it with another comment here? You may need to propose ways of making it happen!
Sure. The argument is as follows: 1) We must abolish war (or war will abolish us, JFK); 2) we therefore need ALTERNATIVES TO WAR; 3) this means we need INTERNATIONAL ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION; and 4) this means, in order to be workable, we need COMPULSORY INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION (compulsory negotiation, which would probably have prevented WWI, according to two historians); compulsory mediation (which would probably prevent 95% of all int’l conflict); compulsory arbitration (as argued by President Theodore Roosevelt, but was rejected by the Republicans in the Senate); and compulsory adjudication in the World Court (proposed by Mikhail Gorbachev in 1987 & discussed for a couple years before being forgotten). This proposal was accepted by representatives of the U.S. and the USSR in the famous McCloy-Zorin Agreement in 1961, but has been totally forgotten since then.
Suggestion Box: Petition Canada to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons!
Nancy Covington has posted this suggestion:
“Until closing Feb 6, 2021 petition to call on the Canadian Government to sign the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is open. Sign here:https://petitions.ourcommons.ca/en/Petition/Sign/e-3028”
Yes! This is important, folks. Let’s get behind this campaign!
Suggestion Box: Petition Canada to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons!
Nancy Covington has posted this suggestion:
“Until closing Feb 6, 2021 petition to call on the Canadian Government to sign the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is open. Sign here:https://petitions.ourcommons.ca/en/Petition/Sign/e-3028”
Yes! This is important, folks. Let’s get behind this campaign!
Suggestion Box: Build New Global Peace Movement by Women for Children
Andre Sheldon has posted this idea in the suggestion box:
” I have networked with women leaders from around the world, planting seeds, in preparation for this moment….Global Strategy of Nonviolence, For the Children Facilitator, CALL to WOMEN, a World-Wide Unity Campaign +1-617-964-5267 Email: Andre@GlobalStrategyofNonviolence.org Website: http://www.GlobalStrategyofNonviolence.org Facebook: Global Movement of Nonviolence”
Suggestion Box: Build New Global Peace Movement by Women for Children
Andre Sheldon has posted this idea in the suggestion box:
” I have networked with women leaders from around the world, planting seeds, in preparation for this moment….Global Strategy of Nonviolence, For the Children Facilitator, CALL to WOMEN, a World-Wide Unity Campaign +1-617-964-5267 Email: Andre@GlobalStrategyofNonviolence.org Website: http://www.GlobalStrategyofNonviolence.org Facebook: Global Movement of Nonviolence”
Suggestion Box: Conventional Wars Count Too!
Alberto Portugheis posted this idea in the suggestion box: “It should be the other way round: “Weapons & War” and NEVER “especially nuclear.” 1,000s die daily from conventional warfare. Alberto, President HUFUD.”
Of course it’s true. The people being killed in wars now are all hit by regular bullets and bombs, not nuclear ones. Would you like to come back to this comments column and elaborate on this idea, Alberto? You can also tell us about HUFUD, or post events if you have anything planned. Thanks for your sensible comment.
Suggestion Box: Conventional Wars Count Too!
Alberto Portugheis posted this idea in the suggestion box: “It should be the other way round: “Weapons & War” and NEVER “especially nuclear.” 1,000s die daily from conventional warfare. Alberto, President HUFUD.”
Of course it’s true. The people being killed in wars now are all hit by regular bullets and bombs, not nuclear ones. Would you like to come back to this comments column and elaborate on this idea, Alberto? You can also tell us about HUFUD, or post events if you have anything planned. Thanks for your sensible comment.
Will America Help Britain Build A New Nuclear Warhead?
Matthew Harries | War on the Rocks | 22 October 2020
“The future of the United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent depends, in part, on decisions being made right now in the U.S. Congress. At stake are Britain’s plans to build a replacement for its current nuclear warhead. According to the U.K. defense secretary and senior U.S. officials, the United Kingdom’s program is reliant on the United States pursuing its own new warhead program of record, the W93. But the Donald Trump administration’s Fiscal Year 2021 request for funds for the W93 was first nixed by House appropriators and then excluded from the stopgap continuing resolution. It is neither clear whether the W93 program will eventually make it into the budget proper, nor whether it would be taken up immediately by a potential incoming Joe Biden administration.”
Read more
The United Kingdom’s new warhead will be housed in the U.S. Navy’s proposed new Mk7 aeroshell, and is intended to be developed in parallel with the W93 warhead, sharing key design parameters and using some common non-nuclear components. In April, U.K. Defence Secretary Ben Wallace wrote to members of Congress on relevant committees, claiming that their “support to the W93 program in this budget cycle is critical to the success of our replacement warhead program and to the long-term viability of the U.K.’s nuclear deterrent.” Senior Trump administration officials have also repeatedly told Congress that a failure to fund the W93 will prevent the United States from supporting the British program. The future of a nuclear deterrent that the United Kingdom calls its “ultimate insurance policy as a nation” and a contribution to the “ultimate guarantee of collective Euro-Atlantic security” is being called into question.
Most media discussion of Wallace’s letter focused on the propriety of the defense secretary lobbying Congress. But Wallace’s letter was remarkable on grounds of substance, not just process. At face value, his letter made very serious claims, suggesting that the fate of the United Kingdom as a nuclear power is in the hands not of members of Parliament, but of congressional appropriators. These claims deserve close interrogation — not least by Parliament, which has so far failed in its duty of scrutiny. British legislators should be asking why, exactly, a new warhead is needed; what the backup plan in case U.S. assistance is disrupted; what military and technical requirements are being set for the new warhead; whether the United Kingdom’s fraying infrastructure can deliver what is asked of it; and how much this endeavor will cost. Buried in these questions are significant risks and long-term strategic choices for the United Kingdom, the future of its nuclear deterrent, and Anglo-American defense ties.
Dependent Deterrent
The United Kingdom’s nuclear force is strongly dependent, in material and programmatic terms, on the United States. The Royal Navy deploys four nuclear-armed submarines equipped with the U.S.-built and maintained Trident II D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missile, drawing from a common missile pool at King’s Bay, Georgia. The essence of this cooperative relationship on delivery systems has been in place since the conclusion of the Polaris Sales Agreement in 1963, signed after Prime Minister Harold Macmillan persuaded President John F. Kennedy to sell the United Kingdom the Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missile. Bilateral cooperation on warhead-relevant matters, including the transfer to the United Kingdom of special nuclear material and non-nuclear weapon components, is authorized under the 1958 U.K.-U.S. Mutual Defense Agreement, which freed London from Washington’s postwar prohibition on nuclear cooperation under the 1946 McMahon Act.
The United Kingdom is currently working on a successor submarine, the Dreadnought class, which will replace the currently deployed Vanguard class in the 2030s, and which will share a common missile compartment with America’s own successor class, the Columbia. In 2006, Prime Minister Tony Blair secured from President George W. Bush an agreement that the United Kingdom would participate in a missile life extension program so that the Dreadnought class could continue to carry the Trident II D-5. In addition, London would be invited to participate in any program to replace or further life extend the D-5. A program is now underway to develop a successor missile once the D-5 leaves service in 2042, currently designated the D-5 Life Extension 2.
The basic parameters of the British warhead are thus set by the need for it to be certified for use with an American missile system and housed in an American aeroshell. The United Kingdom’s current nuclear warhead, the Holbrook, is sometimes referred to as an “Anglicized” version of the U.S. W76. It is certainly a similar design, and is referred to as such by U.S. national laboratories, although the degree of similarity is not publicly known. Several non-nuclear components of the warhead are known to be procured from the United States, including the arming, fusing, and firing system; neutron initiator; and the gas transfer system. The United Kingdom has made some updates to the Holbrook while the United States has conducted a life extension of the W76, now designated the W76-1, including at least the incorporation of the Mk4a arming, fusing, and firing system. However, it has not been publicly disclosed whether the United Kingdom has conducted an equally extensive life extension program of its own.
There is little reason to believe that the United Kingdom wishes to depart significantly from this model when it comes to building the next warhead. The structural incentives to hew closely to U.S. plans are strong. Procurement of non-nuclear components from the United States is seen as an obvious cost-saving measure, and reliance on U.S. facilities and information-sharing gives Britain a hedge against technological risks in design and certification. An explicit goal of the United Kingdom’s program to modernize its nuclear infrastructure has in recent years been to “increase engagement with the United States to align capabilities and requirements for any future warhead decision.”
Unless the United Kingdom wants to diverge significantly from the United States, then its new warhead program needs a parallel U.S. program against which to align. Enter the W93. The announcement of a new program of record was good news for the U.K. nuclear establishment, which had been in a holding pattern during several years of U.S. deliberations and interservice wrangling. But the United Kingdom fields only one warhead in its nuclear arsenal, and so has considerably less margin for error than the United States, which already has two warhead types delivered by submarine-launched ballistic missiles (the W76-1 and W88, plus a lower-yield W76-2 variant), as well as the redundancy of two alternative delivery vehicles (land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles and strategic bombers), each with their own warhead types. The United Kingdom also appears to be working toward a rather pressing deadline. According to official U.K. statements, a replacement warhead could be needed as early as the late 2030s, and it has previously been estimated to take 17 years from a procurement decision to the eventual production of the warhead.
This sense of urgency leaves Britain in an uncomfortable position, because many in Congress do not appear convinced that the United States truly needs the W93 program to start right away. Funding for the W93 program was not anticipated to be required for two more years, and the timing of the administration’s request has provoked pushback from Democratic legislators. One possible theory is that Trump administration officials want the W93 on the books before a potential Biden administration enters office. Another more concrete explanation is that U.S. defense officials might not trust the National Nuclear Security Administration — the semi-autonomous agency within the Department of Energy which manufactures the United States’ nuclear warheads — to deliver the W93 on schedule, and would like a more generous margin of error. The National Nuclear Security Administration request is only for the first of seven phases of warhead development, and calls for the relatively modest sum of $53 million, alongside a Pentagon request for $32 million for the Navy Mk7 program. The latter request, unlike that of the National Nuclear Security Administration, was originally approved by House appropriators.
Even if a potential incoming Biden administration agreed with the requirement for a new warhead for its submarine-launched ballistic missiles, it might still choose to delay the program. This could be a symbolic gesture toward reducing emphasis on nuclear weapons, or a practical recognition both that National Nuclear Security Administration already has four life extension or modification programs to execute and a new sea-launched cruise missile warhead to produce, and that the U.S. nuclear modernization program is shaping up to be spectacularly expensive at a time of COVID-19 induced budget pressure. Even without a conscious decision to delay the program, it might still be pushed back if a Biden administration wished to consider the W93 in the context of a Nuclear Posture Review, which would take time to complete.
Unanswered Questions
The United Kingdom, in other words, is in quite a bind. The defense secretary has stated, in writing, that the viability of the British deterrent depends on a program which the U.S. Congress might be about to stymie. It could be the case that, if work on the Mk7 aeroshell can start even in the absence of National Nuclear Security Administration funding for the W93, the United Kingdom could begin work on its own program. But the longer that Britain proceeds without a parallel U.S. warhead program in place, the greater the risks it would be incurring. Vanishingly little is publicly known about the decision-making process which has led to this point, which makes the precise degree of risk facing the United Kingdom very difficult to judge.
Congress has now had four public hearings at which the W93 was discussed, including several references to the program’s importance to the United Kingdom, and the administration has given briefings on the rationale behind the program. Yet in the United Kingdom, where the stakes are allegedly much higher, the sum total of the government’s public output on the warhead is a vaguely written statement to Parliament, and confirmation that the warhead will use the Mk7 aeroshell. This leaves open several key questions.
Why Has the United Kingdom Decided to Build a New Warhead, Rather Than Seeking to Further Refurbish or to Remanufacture Holbrook?
The fact that the United Kingdom has decided to build a new warhead at all, rather than seeking to further prolong the life of the Holbrook, is something that needs justifying. Has the United Kingdom made an independent judgment that a replacement warhead is essential, or is this decision simply the combination of a U.S. decision to proceed with W93 and the United Kingdom’s preference for alignment? Ever since the 2006 White Paper in which the decision to renew the ballistic missile submarine force was taken, the U.K. government has repeatedly told Parliament that at some point a decision on whether to build a new warhead would be need to be made. That decision has now been made, and Parliament and the public do not know why.
It is not clear that the United States sees a critical need to replace the W76-1, which has recently been life-extended, providing for additional decades of use. Some discussions of the W93’s role suggest that it could exist in parallel with both the W76-1 and the W88 as one of America’s three submarine-launched ballistic missile warheads. Were the United States to decide that the W76-1 could be further life-extended, or remanufactured from scratch, the U.K. government has not yet provided any public reasoning why the same could not be done for the Holbrook. Such reasons can certainly be imagined: there might be materials used in the original U.K. design that have now aged, and cannot for technical, legal, or safety reasons be remanufactured other than at disproportionate cost. There is also a case to be made that further life-extending old warheads introduces a degree of risk of technical failure that is unacceptably high for a country that depends on a single design, and that changes in the security environment, such as developments in missile defenses, could set future military requirements that the current warhead cannot meet. These arguments, however, have not yet been publicly made by the U.K. government.
What Are the Critical U.S. Activities on Which the U.K. Replacement Warhead Will Depend in the Next Few Years, and What Is the United Kingdom’s Backup Plan if These Activities Are Not Funded?
The U.K. government has emphasized the need for its warhead to be “compatible” with America’s Trident system. What this probably means in practice is that the United Kingdom needs to know key parameters of the Mk7 aeroshell which will define the size, shape, mass distribution, and other aspects of the British warhead which will fit inside it. Beyond that, in order for the United Kingdom to be able to cooperate closely with the United States on key scientific and engineering aspects of the warhead’s design, manufacturing, and certification, the United Kingdom will need to know U.S. intentions for various design choices. Until the United States starts work on the W93 program, the United Kingdom will either have to delay its own choices or make assumptions about likely U.S. decisions in order to begin necessary work. Either path could involve increased costs and technical risk.
Beyond a small delay, more serious disruption to the W93 program raises very challenging questions: would the United Kingdom pursue indigenous production of components that would otherwise have been procured from the United States, and if so, at what risk and cost? If the United Kingdom still wishes to remain aligned with the United States, are there alternatives to a replacement warhead based on the W93/Mk7? More broadly, Parliament might ask whether such close alignment to the United States is truly worth the accompanying loss of sovereignty. It is often assumed that the United Kingdom has simply no other option, and a more independent program would certainly involve taking a greater share of technical risk and would very likely incur greater financial costs. Nevertheless, close alignment with the United States has downsides as well as upsides, including greater vulnerability to disruption or delayed supply of materials, components, and expertise, and less discretion in setting military and other requirements for the warhead. This is a strategically important choice which has not yet been fully debated in public.
What Are the Likely Requirements for the W93, and How Do These Relate to the U.K. Program?
Assuming that the W93 program does go ahead, the first phases of its development will involve, among other things, the drafting of military characteristics and a stockpile-to-target sequence. Taken together, these will define the performance requirements and physical characteristics of the weapon, as well as the environments and threats it will be exposed to that must be taken into account in its design. This will require deciding, for example, what explosive yield the warhead will have, what defenses it must defeat — including nuclear, hit-to-kill, and (potentially) directed energy weapons — and what kind of hardening and countermeasures will be necessary. Choices will also be made regarding surety requirements, such as whether to use insensitive high explosives, which could mean a relative increase in mass and volume.
Requirements set in the United States during this process are likely to determine or strongly influence several characteristics of the British warhead. Embedded in those requirements are important implications for U.K. policy and strategy, and although London is likely to have a voice in U.S. discussions over such questions, it will not have a deciding vote. Briefings by U.S. officials suggest, for example, that the W93 is intended to be of higher yield than the W76-1. If the United Kingdom were to follow this path, the overall explosive yield of its operational stockpile could increase for the first time since it began deploying Trident in 1994. The emphasis placed by U.S. officials on the W93’s “flexibility” implies variable yield, which would be somewhat consistent with the existing lower-yield warhead variant the U.K. reportedly deploys at present, but would leave the United Kingdom vulnerable to accusations that it was reinforcing a global trend toward the development of supposedly more “usable” nuclear options. Any potential improvement to the warhead’s ability to strike hard targets might also draw criticism from those opposed to enhancements in nuclear weapon capabilities, as was the case when the U.K. began introducing the Mk4a arming, fusing and firing system. Lastly, U.K. defense planners might be thinking about future deterrence requirements for countries other than Russia, the traditional driver of U.K. warhead needs. This might have an impact on the requirements for a new warhead, such as on the question of the new warhead’s weight, which helps determine the maximum range that missiles can reach. This is a potentially relevant factor when considering the risk that future developments in anti-submarine warfare might complicate U.K. operations.
Can the United Kingdom Successfully Execute a Warhead Replacement Program?
The state of the United Kingdom’s nuclear weapons infrastructure suggests that the country will face significant challenges in producing its next warhead, even if cooperation with the United States runs entirely smoothly. By now, at least three key U.K. facilities should have been up and running: Pegasus (to handle enriched uranium components), Mensa (to assemble and disassemble warheads), and Hydrus (to conduct hydrodynamic tests). None is fully operational. Pegasus has been suspended after initial designs were judged too expensive and unwieldy, Mensa is now being built at least six years late and at more than twice the original cost, and Hydrus has been replaced by a joint U.K.-French hydrodynamic facility in France not scheduled to be fully operational for the United Kingdom at least until 2022.
More fundamentally, this will be the first warhead the United Kingdom has designed for some thirty years, and the first ever without explosive nuclear testing. It will also be designed just as the last generation of Atomic Weapons Establishment employees with firsthand experience designing new warheads are retiring. With civil nuclear projects also planned for the coming decades, the Atomic Weapons Establishment will be facing considerable workforce recruitment, training, and retention challenges.
How Much Will the United Kingdom’s New Warhead Cost?
In the context of the COVID-19 crisis, the forecast hit to the U.K. economy caused by Brexit, and an ongoing strategic review, there is likely to be financial pressure on the warhead program even if it is shielded from immediate cuts. Yet the government is staying remarkably coy about the projected costs of the new warhead. The 2006 White Paper estimated the cost to be 2 to 3 billion pounds ($2.6 to $3.9 billion). This estimate was confirmed in government documents as late as 2013. Since then, however, no official estimate has been provided, although the 2013 Trident Alternatives Review, a government-published document — though not a statement of policy — estimated the cost of a new submarine-launched ballistic missile warhead to be 4 billion pounds in 2012 prices.
The Nuclear Warhead Capability Sustainment Program, under which much of the supporting infrastructure for building a new warhead was supposed to be built, has an overall budget of 21 billion pounds spread out from 2005 to 2025, and is subject to the scrutiny requirements applied to major projects. The government has said that the program to build the new warhead will also be subject to those requirements, but is not giving a specific cost estimate, citing national security concerns. Likewise, it has not said which parts of the Nuclear Warhead Capability Sustainment Program will be subsumed under the new warhead program. It is certainly tricky to separate the costs of the new warhead from the overall costs of having nuclear infrastructure capable of maintaining the existing warhead. And yet not only has the U.K. government done so in the past — making it difficult to imagine national security grounds for withholding the information now — the U.S. government has also provided estimates of how much the W93 might cost: $14.4 billion, according to the Nuclear Security Administration’s last published assessment.
Take Back Control
The United Kingdom’s replacement nuclear warhead program is a long-term, complex, and expensive endeavor. It deserves proper scrutiny. And while many of the technical details of the U.K. warhead must remain classified, the broad parameters of the decision the government has made — and the risks the program faces — are fair game for public debate. The British public learned of the decision to replace the Holbrook warhead not because the government decided to announce it, but because U.S. officials told Congress and reporters in February. In several respects, the transparency of the U.S. government, and the persistence of Congress in extracting answers, is throwing the opacity of the United Kingdom’s nuclear warhead program into stark relief. It is time for Parliament to take back control.
Read More: https://warontherocks.com/2020/10/will-america-help-britain-build-a-new-nuclear-warhead/
Will America Help Britain Build A New Nuclear Warhead?
Matthew Harries | War on the Rocks | 22 October 2020
“The future of the United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent depends, in part, on decisions being made right now in the U.S. Congress. At stake are Britain’s plans to build a replacement for its current nuclear warhead. According to the U.K. defense secretary and senior U.S. officials, the United Kingdom’s program is reliant on the United States pursuing its own new warhead program of record, the W93. But the Donald Trump administration’s Fiscal Year 2021 request for funds for the W93 was first nixed by House appropriators and then excluded from the stopgap continuing resolution. It is neither clear whether the W93 program will eventually make it into the budget proper, nor whether it would be taken up immediately by a potential incoming Joe Biden administration.”
Read more
The United Kingdom’s new warhead will be housed in the U.S. Navy’s proposed new Mk7 aeroshell, and is intended to be developed in parallel with the W93 warhead, sharing key design parameters and using some common non-nuclear components. In April, U.K. Defence Secretary Ben Wallace wrote to members of Congress on relevant committees, claiming that their “support to the W93 program in this budget cycle is critical to the success of our replacement warhead program and to the long-term viability of the U.K.’s nuclear deterrent.” Senior Trump administration officials have also repeatedly told Congress that a failure to fund the W93 will prevent the United States from supporting the British program. The future of a nuclear deterrent that the United Kingdom calls its “ultimate insurance policy as a nation” and a contribution to the “ultimate guarantee of collective Euro-Atlantic security” is being called into question.
Most media discussion of Wallace’s letter focused on the propriety of the defense secretary lobbying Congress. But Wallace’s letter was remarkable on grounds of substance, not just process. At face value, his letter made very serious claims, suggesting that the fate of the United Kingdom as a nuclear power is in the hands not of members of Parliament, but of congressional appropriators. These claims deserve close interrogation — not least by Parliament, which has so far failed in its duty of scrutiny. British legislators should be asking why, exactly, a new warhead is needed; what the backup plan in case U.S. assistance is disrupted; what military and technical requirements are being set for the new warhead; whether the United Kingdom’s fraying infrastructure can deliver what is asked of it; and how much this endeavor will cost. Buried in these questions are significant risks and long-term strategic choices for the United Kingdom, the future of its nuclear deterrent, and Anglo-American defense ties.
Dependent Deterrent
The United Kingdom’s nuclear force is strongly dependent, in material and programmatic terms, on the United States. The Royal Navy deploys four nuclear-armed submarines equipped with the U.S.-built and maintained Trident II D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missile, drawing from a common missile pool at King’s Bay, Georgia. The essence of this cooperative relationship on delivery systems has been in place since the conclusion of the Polaris Sales Agreement in 1963, signed after Prime Minister Harold Macmillan persuaded President John F. Kennedy to sell the United Kingdom the Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missile. Bilateral cooperation on warhead-relevant matters, including the transfer to the United Kingdom of special nuclear material and non-nuclear weapon components, is authorized under the 1958 U.K.-U.S. Mutual Defense Agreement, which freed London from Washington’s postwar prohibition on nuclear cooperation under the 1946 McMahon Act.
The United Kingdom is currently working on a successor submarine, the Dreadnought class, which will replace the currently deployed Vanguard class in the 2030s, and which will share a common missile compartment with America’s own successor class, the Columbia. In 2006, Prime Minister Tony Blair secured from President George W. Bush an agreement that the United Kingdom would participate in a missile life extension program so that the Dreadnought class could continue to carry the Trident II D-5. In addition, London would be invited to participate in any program to replace or further life extend the D-5. A program is now underway to develop a successor missile once the D-5 leaves service in 2042, currently designated the D-5 Life Extension 2.
The basic parameters of the British warhead are thus set by the need for it to be certified for use with an American missile system and housed in an American aeroshell. The United Kingdom’s current nuclear warhead, the Holbrook, is sometimes referred to as an “Anglicized” version of the U.S. W76. It is certainly a similar design, and is referred to as such by U.S. national laboratories, although the degree of similarity is not publicly known. Several non-nuclear components of the warhead are known to be procured from the United States, including the arming, fusing, and firing system; neutron initiator; and the gas transfer system. The United Kingdom has made some updates to the Holbrook while the United States has conducted a life extension of the W76, now designated the W76-1, including at least the incorporation of the Mk4a arming, fusing, and firing system. However, it has not been publicly disclosed whether the United Kingdom has conducted an equally extensive life extension program of its own.
There is little reason to believe that the United Kingdom wishes to depart significantly from this model when it comes to building the next warhead. The structural incentives to hew closely to U.S. plans are strong. Procurement of non-nuclear components from the United States is seen as an obvious cost-saving measure, and reliance on U.S. facilities and information-sharing gives Britain a hedge against technological risks in design and certification. An explicit goal of the United Kingdom’s program to modernize its nuclear infrastructure has in recent years been to “increase engagement with the United States to align capabilities and requirements for any future warhead decision.”
Unless the United Kingdom wants to diverge significantly from the United States, then its new warhead program needs a parallel U.S. program against which to align. Enter the W93. The announcement of a new program of record was good news for the U.K. nuclear establishment, which had been in a holding pattern during several years of U.S. deliberations and interservice wrangling. But the United Kingdom fields only one warhead in its nuclear arsenal, and so has considerably less margin for error than the United States, which already has two warhead types delivered by submarine-launched ballistic missiles (the W76-1 and W88, plus a lower-yield W76-2 variant), as well as the redundancy of two alternative delivery vehicles (land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles and strategic bombers), each with their own warhead types. The United Kingdom also appears to be working toward a rather pressing deadline. According to official U.K. statements, a replacement warhead could be needed as early as the late 2030s, and it has previously been estimated to take 17 years from a procurement decision to the eventual production of the warhead.
This sense of urgency leaves Britain in an uncomfortable position, because many in Congress do not appear convinced that the United States truly needs the W93 program to start right away. Funding for the W93 program was not anticipated to be required for two more years, and the timing of the administration’s request has provoked pushback from Democratic legislators. One possible theory is that Trump administration officials want the W93 on the books before a potential Biden administration enters office. Another more concrete explanation is that U.S. defense officials might not trust the National Nuclear Security Administration — the semi-autonomous agency within the Department of Energy which manufactures the United States’ nuclear warheads — to deliver the W93 on schedule, and would like a more generous margin of error. The National Nuclear Security Administration request is only for the first of seven phases of warhead development, and calls for the relatively modest sum of $53 million, alongside a Pentagon request for $32 million for the Navy Mk7 program. The latter request, unlike that of the National Nuclear Security Administration, was originally approved by House appropriators.
Even if a potential incoming Biden administration agreed with the requirement for a new warhead for its submarine-launched ballistic missiles, it might still choose to delay the program. This could be a symbolic gesture toward reducing emphasis on nuclear weapons, or a practical recognition both that National Nuclear Security Administration already has four life extension or modification programs to execute and a new sea-launched cruise missile warhead to produce, and that the U.S. nuclear modernization program is shaping up to be spectacularly expensive at a time of COVID-19 induced budget pressure. Even without a conscious decision to delay the program, it might still be pushed back if a Biden administration wished to consider the W93 in the context of a Nuclear Posture Review, which would take time to complete.
Unanswered Questions
The United Kingdom, in other words, is in quite a bind. The defense secretary has stated, in writing, that the viability of the British deterrent depends on a program which the U.S. Congress might be about to stymie. It could be the case that, if work on the Mk7 aeroshell can start even in the absence of National Nuclear Security Administration funding for the W93, the United Kingdom could begin work on its own program. But the longer that Britain proceeds without a parallel U.S. warhead program in place, the greater the risks it would be incurring. Vanishingly little is publicly known about the decision-making process which has led to this point, which makes the precise degree of risk facing the United Kingdom very difficult to judge.
Congress has now had four public hearings at which the W93 was discussed, including several references to the program’s importance to the United Kingdom, and the administration has given briefings on the rationale behind the program. Yet in the United Kingdom, where the stakes are allegedly much higher, the sum total of the government’s public output on the warhead is a vaguely written statement to Parliament, and confirmation that the warhead will use the Mk7 aeroshell. This leaves open several key questions.
Why Has the United Kingdom Decided to Build a New Warhead, Rather Than Seeking to Further Refurbish or to Remanufacture Holbrook?
The fact that the United Kingdom has decided to build a new warhead at all, rather than seeking to further prolong the life of the Holbrook, is something that needs justifying. Has the United Kingdom made an independent judgment that a replacement warhead is essential, or is this decision simply the combination of a U.S. decision to proceed with W93 and the United Kingdom’s preference for alignment? Ever since the 2006 White Paper in which the decision to renew the ballistic missile submarine force was taken, the U.K. government has repeatedly told Parliament that at some point a decision on whether to build a new warhead would be need to be made. That decision has now been made, and Parliament and the public do not know why.
It is not clear that the United States sees a critical need to replace the W76-1, which has recently been life-extended, providing for additional decades of use. Some discussions of the W93’s role suggest that it could exist in parallel with both the W76-1 and the W88 as one of America’s three submarine-launched ballistic missile warheads. Were the United States to decide that the W76-1 could be further life-extended, or remanufactured from scratch, the U.K. government has not yet provided any public reasoning why the same could not be done for the Holbrook. Such reasons can certainly be imagined: there might be materials used in the original U.K. design that have now aged, and cannot for technical, legal, or safety reasons be remanufactured other than at disproportionate cost. There is also a case to be made that further life-extending old warheads introduces a degree of risk of technical failure that is unacceptably high for a country that depends on a single design, and that changes in the security environment, such as developments in missile defenses, could set future military requirements that the current warhead cannot meet. These arguments, however, have not yet been publicly made by the U.K. government.
What Are the Critical U.S. Activities on Which the U.K. Replacement Warhead Will Depend in the Next Few Years, and What Is the United Kingdom’s Backup Plan if These Activities Are Not Funded?
The U.K. government has emphasized the need for its warhead to be “compatible” with America’s Trident system. What this probably means in practice is that the United Kingdom needs to know key parameters of the Mk7 aeroshell which will define the size, shape, mass distribution, and other aspects of the British warhead which will fit inside it. Beyond that, in order for the United Kingdom to be able to cooperate closely with the United States on key scientific and engineering aspects of the warhead’s design, manufacturing, and certification, the United Kingdom will need to know U.S. intentions for various design choices. Until the United States starts work on the W93 program, the United Kingdom will either have to delay its own choices or make assumptions about likely U.S. decisions in order to begin necessary work. Either path could involve increased costs and technical risk.
Beyond a small delay, more serious disruption to the W93 program raises very challenging questions: would the United Kingdom pursue indigenous production of components that would otherwise have been procured from the United States, and if so, at what risk and cost? If the United Kingdom still wishes to remain aligned with the United States, are there alternatives to a replacement warhead based on the W93/Mk7? More broadly, Parliament might ask whether such close alignment to the United States is truly worth the accompanying loss of sovereignty. It is often assumed that the United Kingdom has simply no other option, and a more independent program would certainly involve taking a greater share of technical risk and would very likely incur greater financial costs. Nevertheless, close alignment with the United States has downsides as well as upsides, including greater vulnerability to disruption or delayed supply of materials, components, and expertise, and less discretion in setting military and other requirements for the warhead. This is a strategically important choice which has not yet been fully debated in public.
What Are the Likely Requirements for the W93, and How Do These Relate to the U.K. Program?
Assuming that the W93 program does go ahead, the first phases of its development will involve, among other things, the drafting of military characteristics and a stockpile-to-target sequence. Taken together, these will define the performance requirements and physical characteristics of the weapon, as well as the environments and threats it will be exposed to that must be taken into account in its design. This will require deciding, for example, what explosive yield the warhead will have, what defenses it must defeat — including nuclear, hit-to-kill, and (potentially) directed energy weapons — and what kind of hardening and countermeasures will be necessary. Choices will also be made regarding surety requirements, such as whether to use insensitive high explosives, which could mean a relative increase in mass and volume.
Requirements set in the United States during this process are likely to determine or strongly influence several characteristics of the British warhead. Embedded in those requirements are important implications for U.K. policy and strategy, and although London is likely to have a voice in U.S. discussions over such questions, it will not have a deciding vote. Briefings by U.S. officials suggest, for example, that the W93 is intended to be of higher yield than the W76-1. If the United Kingdom were to follow this path, the overall explosive yield of its operational stockpile could increase for the first time since it began deploying Trident in 1994. The emphasis placed by U.S. officials on the W93’s “flexibility” implies variable yield, which would be somewhat consistent with the existing lower-yield warhead variant the U.K. reportedly deploys at present, but would leave the United Kingdom vulnerable to accusations that it was reinforcing a global trend toward the development of supposedly more “usable” nuclear options. Any potential improvement to the warhead’s ability to strike hard targets might also draw criticism from those opposed to enhancements in nuclear weapon capabilities, as was the case when the U.K. began introducing the Mk4a arming, fusing and firing system. Lastly, U.K. defense planners might be thinking about future deterrence requirements for countries other than Russia, the traditional driver of U.K. warhead needs. This might have an impact on the requirements for a new warhead, such as on the question of the new warhead’s weight, which helps determine the maximum range that missiles can reach. This is a potentially relevant factor when considering the risk that future developments in anti-submarine warfare might complicate U.K. operations.
Can the United Kingdom Successfully Execute a Warhead Replacement Program?
The state of the United Kingdom’s nuclear weapons infrastructure suggests that the country will face significant challenges in producing its next warhead, even if cooperation with the United States runs entirely smoothly. By now, at least three key U.K. facilities should have been up and running: Pegasus (to handle enriched uranium components), Mensa (to assemble and disassemble warheads), and Hydrus (to conduct hydrodynamic tests). None is fully operational. Pegasus has been suspended after initial designs were judged too expensive and unwieldy, Mensa is now being built at least six years late and at more than twice the original cost, and Hydrus has been replaced by a joint U.K.-French hydrodynamic facility in France not scheduled to be fully operational for the United Kingdom at least until 2022.
More fundamentally, this will be the first warhead the United Kingdom has designed for some thirty years, and the first ever without explosive nuclear testing. It will also be designed just as the last generation of Atomic Weapons Establishment employees with firsthand experience designing new warheads are retiring. With civil nuclear projects also planned for the coming decades, the Atomic Weapons Establishment will be facing considerable workforce recruitment, training, and retention challenges.
How Much Will the United Kingdom’s New Warhead Cost?
In the context of the COVID-19 crisis, the forecast hit to the U.K. economy caused by Brexit, and an ongoing strategic review, there is likely to be financial pressure on the warhead program even if it is shielded from immediate cuts. Yet the government is staying remarkably coy about the projected costs of the new warhead. The 2006 White Paper estimated the cost to be 2 to 3 billion pounds ($2.6 to $3.9 billion). This estimate was confirmed in government documents as late as 2013. Since then, however, no official estimate has been provided, although the 2013 Trident Alternatives Review, a government-published document — though not a statement of policy — estimated the cost of a new submarine-launched ballistic missile warhead to be 4 billion pounds in 2012 prices.
The Nuclear Warhead Capability Sustainment Program, under which much of the supporting infrastructure for building a new warhead was supposed to be built, has an overall budget of 21 billion pounds spread out from 2005 to 2025, and is subject to the scrutiny requirements applied to major projects. The government has said that the program to build the new warhead will also be subject to those requirements, but is not giving a specific cost estimate, citing national security concerns. Likewise, it has not said which parts of the Nuclear Warhead Capability Sustainment Program will be subsumed under the new warhead program. It is certainly tricky to separate the costs of the new warhead from the overall costs of having nuclear infrastructure capable of maintaining the existing warhead. And yet not only has the U.K. government done so in the past — making it difficult to imagine national security grounds for withholding the information now — the U.S. government has also provided estimates of how much the W93 might cost: $14.4 billion, according to the Nuclear Security Administration’s last published assessment.
Take Back Control
The United Kingdom’s replacement nuclear warhead program is a long-term, complex, and expensive endeavor. It deserves proper scrutiny. And while many of the technical details of the U.K. warhead must remain classified, the broad parameters of the decision the government has made — and the risks the program faces — are fair game for public debate. The British public learned of the decision to replace the Holbrook warhead not because the government decided to announce it, but because U.S. officials told Congress and reporters in February. In several respects, the transparency of the U.S. government, and the persistence of Congress in extracting answers, is throwing the opacity of the United Kingdom’s nuclear warhead program into stark relief. It is time for Parliament to take back control.
Read More: https://warontherocks.com/2020/10/will-america-help-britain-build-a-new-nuclear-warhead/
Until closing Feb 6, 2021 petition to call on the Canadian Government to sign the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is open.
Sign here: https://petitions.ourcommons.ca/en/Petition/Sign/e-3028
Until closing Feb 6, 2021 petition to call on the Canadian Government to sign the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is open.
Sign here: https://petitions.ourcommons.ca/en/Petition/Sign/e-3028
Vatican’s Foreign Minister Reaffirms Church’s Shift Away From Accepting Nuclear Deterrence
Joshua J. McElwee | National Catholic Reporter | 16 December 2020
ROME — The Vatican’s foreign minister reaffirmed the Catholic Church’s recent shift away from accepting the Cold War-era global system of nuclear deterrence Dec. 16, telling a webinar featuring arms control activists that nuclear weapons only give “a false sense of security.”
“International peace and security cannot be founded on the threat of mutual destruction or total annihilation, or maintaining a balance of power,” Archbishop Paul Gallagher told the webinar, which was co-hosted by the Vatican and several institutes at Georgetown University and the University of Notre Dame.
“Peace and security must be built on justice, integral human development, [and] respect for fundamental human rights,” said Gallagher. “From this perspective, it is necessary to go beyond nuclear deterrence.”
Read more
The webinar, livestreamed on the Vatican’s YouTube channel, was meant to mark the third anniversary of a landmark November 2017 Vatican symposium at which Pope Francis changed the Catholic Church’s position on nuclear deterrence.
Developing the teaching of previous pontiffs, who had granted conditional moral acceptance to the system of deterrence as a way of preventing any world power from using nuclear arms, Francis told the 2017 event that even the possession of nuclear weapons is to be “firmly condemned.”
Francis’ changing of the church’s teaching on deterrence came shortly after the Vatican joined the U.N.’s 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. The treaty, which prevents signatories from developing, producing, stockpiling or testing nuclear arms, is set to go into force on Jan. 22.
The United States has not taken part in the treaty, which has been signed by 86 countries and ratified by 51 of those.
Cardinal Peter Turkson, whose Dicastery for Promoting Integral Human Development had coordinated the 2017 Vatican event, told the Dec. 16 webinar that maintaining nuclear stockpiles “wastes precious resources” that could be used to feed the world’s population or towards social welfare campaigns.
Turkson quoted U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower’s 1953 speech highlighting the cost of the Soviet-U.S. arms race: “Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed.”
Among others joining the webinar was Beatrice Fihn, the executive director of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, the organization that helped bring about the new nuclear ban treaty and was the recipient of the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize.
Fihn said that nuclear deterrence is “becoming increasingly stigmatized as a security policy.”
“Any state that supports nuclear weapons … lends credibility to this dangerous notion that it is acceptable and legal to mass-murder civilians,” she said.
Also taking part in the event was Rose Gottemoeller, a former deputy secretary general of NATO and former State Department official who is now a lecturer at Stanford University.
Gottemoeller starkly disagreed with Fihn and Gallagher, saying that the nuclear ban treaty places “irreconcilable burdens” on countries that maintain nuclear weapons.
“While nuclear weapons continue to exist, we must ensure that they remain safe and secure, lest they fall into the wrong hands and become the tools of nuclear terrorists or madmen,” said Gottemoeller.
“The nuclear weapons states also care about ensuring that the weapons are effective, for if the dreadful day ever arrives when they had to be used, they must be ready,” she added.
Gallagher was asked during the event if the Vatican planned to give direction to national bishops’ conferences about how to speak about the “moral unacceptability of nuclear weapons” following the entry into force of the nuclear ban treaty.
“There’s no formal intention at this stage of so doing,” said the archbishop. “I think that the bishops’ conferences are very aware of the position of the Holy See and what the Holy Father has said about this.”
“We, generally speaking … like to leave such initiatives up to the discretion of local bishops’ conferences because the response is different, obviously, in almost every country depending on policies of governments,” said Gallagher.
“I don’t think a decree will go out from Caesar Augustus in this respect,” the archbishop quipped.
Link: https://www.ncronline.org/news/vatican/vaticans-foreign-minister-reaffirms-churchs-shift-away-accepting-nuclear-deterrence
Vatican’s Foreign Minister Reaffirms Church’s Shift Away From Accepting Nuclear Deterrence
Joshua J. McElwee | National Catholic Reporter | 16 December 2020
ROME — The Vatican’s foreign minister reaffirmed the Catholic Church’s recent shift away from accepting the Cold War-era global system of nuclear deterrence Dec. 16, telling a webinar featuring arms control activists that nuclear weapons only give “a false sense of security.”
“International peace and security cannot be founded on the threat of mutual destruction or total annihilation, or maintaining a balance of power,” Archbishop Paul Gallagher told the webinar, which was co-hosted by the Vatican and several institutes at Georgetown University and the University of Notre Dame.
“Peace and security must be built on justice, integral human development, [and] respect for fundamental human rights,” said Gallagher. “From this perspective, it is necessary to go beyond nuclear deterrence.”
Read more
The webinar, livestreamed on the Vatican’s YouTube channel, was meant to mark the third anniversary of a landmark November 2017 Vatican symposium at which Pope Francis changed the Catholic Church’s position on nuclear deterrence.
Developing the teaching of previous pontiffs, who had granted conditional moral acceptance to the system of deterrence as a way of preventing any world power from using nuclear arms, Francis told the 2017 event that even the possession of nuclear weapons is to be “firmly condemned.”
Francis’ changing of the church’s teaching on deterrence came shortly after the Vatican joined the U.N.’s 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. The treaty, which prevents signatories from developing, producing, stockpiling or testing nuclear arms, is set to go into force on Jan. 22.
The United States has not taken part in the treaty, which has been signed by 86 countries and ratified by 51 of those.
Cardinal Peter Turkson, whose Dicastery for Promoting Integral Human Development had coordinated the 2017 Vatican event, told the Dec. 16 webinar that maintaining nuclear stockpiles “wastes precious resources” that could be used to feed the world’s population or towards social welfare campaigns.
Turkson quoted U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower’s 1953 speech highlighting the cost of the Soviet-U.S. arms race: “Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed.”
Among others joining the webinar was Beatrice Fihn, the executive director of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, the organization that helped bring about the new nuclear ban treaty and was the recipient of the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize.
Fihn said that nuclear deterrence is “becoming increasingly stigmatized as a security policy.”
“Any state that supports nuclear weapons … lends credibility to this dangerous notion that it is acceptable and legal to mass-murder civilians,” she said.
Also taking part in the event was Rose Gottemoeller, a former deputy secretary general of NATO and former State Department official who is now a lecturer at Stanford University.
Gottemoeller starkly disagreed with Fihn and Gallagher, saying that the nuclear ban treaty places “irreconcilable burdens” on countries that maintain nuclear weapons.
“While nuclear weapons continue to exist, we must ensure that they remain safe and secure, lest they fall into the wrong hands and become the tools of nuclear terrorists or madmen,” said Gottemoeller.
“The nuclear weapons states also care about ensuring that the weapons are effective, for if the dreadful day ever arrives when they had to be used, they must be ready,” she added.
Gallagher was asked during the event if the Vatican planned to give direction to national bishops’ conferences about how to speak about the “moral unacceptability of nuclear weapons” following the entry into force of the nuclear ban treaty.
“There’s no formal intention at this stage of so doing,” said the archbishop. “I think that the bishops’ conferences are very aware of the position of the Holy See and what the Holy Father has said about this.”
“We, generally speaking … like to leave such initiatives up to the discretion of local bishops’ conferences because the response is different, obviously, in almost every country depending on policies of governments,” said Gallagher.
“I don’t think a decree will go out from Caesar Augustus in this respect,” the archbishop quipped.
Link: https://www.ncronline.org/news/vatican/vaticans-foreign-minister-reaffirms-churchs-shift-away-accepting-nuclear-deterrence
Google Earth Reveals Suspected Nuclear Weapons Facility in Pakistan
Adam Vaughan | NewScientist | 27 November 2020
Sleuthing with satellite images on Google Earth has revealed a substantial and undocumented expansion to a suspected nuclear processing plant in Pakistan. Researchers say it is a possible sign of the country boosting the capacity of its nuclear weapons programme.
Pakistan has possessed nuclear weapons since 1998, but isn’t a signatory to key international treaties on nuclear proliferation and tests. The country’s secretive nuclear weapons programme is closely watched due to tensions with neighbouring India, which also has a nuclear arsenal.
Full article available here: https://www.newscientist.com/article/2261031-google-earth-reveals-suspected-nuclear-weapons-facility-in-pakistan
Google Earth Reveals Suspected Nuclear Weapons Facility in Pakistan
Adam Vaughan | NewScientist | 27 November 2020
Sleuthing with satellite images on Google Earth has revealed a substantial and undocumented expansion to a suspected nuclear processing plant in Pakistan. Researchers say it is a possible sign of the country boosting the capacity of its nuclear weapons programme.
Pakistan has possessed nuclear weapons since 1998, but isn’t a signatory to key international treaties on nuclear proliferation and tests. The country’s secretive nuclear weapons programme is closely watched due to tensions with neighbouring India, which also has a nuclear arsenal.
Full article available here: https://www.newscientist.com/article/2261031-google-earth-reveals-suspected-nuclear-weapons-facility-in-pakistan
Time to Ban the Bomb: A Path Forward:
The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
Beatrice Fihn | Ploughshares Fund | 2020
“The risk of use of nuclear weapons is higher today than it has been for years. With developments in cyber warfare, autonomous weapons and an increasingly uncertain global security situation, that risk will only increase over time. A security policy based on plans to fight — and “win” — a nuclear war is morally bankrupt and unsustainable. The United States must begin developing a policy for a non-nuclear future, or risk becoming an outlier without moral authority.
The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), a global coalition of over 530 organizations, is leading a movement to achieve this non-nuclear future. Over 10 years, together with countless partners in governments, international organizations and civil society groups around the world, we helped incubate and amplify a previously-ignored conversation about nuclear weapons. We placed civilians and the harm caused to them by nuclear weapons at the center of debate. This movement ultimately led to the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) and to ICAN being awarded the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize for its work in promoting nuclear disarmament.
The Treaty emerged through something new and different in the disarmament debate within the nuclear community — the Humanitarian Initiative. This initiative reframed the discourse around nuclear weapons to make the horrific humanitarian consequences caused by their use the center of discussion, rather than a secondary issue. In seeking the negotiation and adoption of the treaty, we followed the path set by other global weapons prohibitions, including conventions related to biological weapons, chemical weapons, antipersonnel landmines and cluster munitions. The premise, based in international law, is founded on the total abnegation of possession and use of weapons with unspeakable consequences.”
Read more
No sustainable, smart or effective national security strategy can be based on weapons that cause the level of harm to civilians that nuclear weapons do. This reflects a shift in security and development policies toward a more pre-eminent role for humanitarian concerns, humanitarian law and the protection of civilians. Therefore, such weapons cannot remain legal or be considered legitimate options for states in warfare.
On July 7, 2017, the TPNW was adopted by 122 states at the United Nations (UN). It will enter into force once 50 states have deposited their instruments of ratification, which2 we expect will happen by 2020. This moment represents an opportunity for the international community to make real progress toward a world free of nuclear weapons. With this in mind, the United States — and all states possessing nuclear weapons — must engage the majority of the world’s countries working toward true global peace and security.
The United States’ path forward is clear: 1) end nuclear saber-rattling and place humanitarian consequences at the center of nuclear policy; 2) commit in good faith to multilateralism with a view to ending the new nuclear arms race, putting legal and diplomatic options above military expansionism; and 3) cease denigrating the TPNW and instead support the treaty and its signatories.
Humanitarian Consequences at the Center of Nuclear Policy
By their nature, nuclear weapons are indiscriminate and inhumane. Any use of nuclear weapons would have catastrophic humanitarian consequences that would quickly ripple across the world, even if a nuclear conflict was localized. The use of a nuclear weapon over a populated area would immediately kill tens of thousands — if not hundreds of thousands — of men, women and children, and injure countless more.3 We continue to pay the price of atmospheric nuclear testing in many countries around the world with hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of people dying early from cancers.
We also must not forget that the effects of nuclear detonations have disproportionately affected women. Though the immediate effects of nuclear weapons use are indiscriminate — no matter your sex or gender identity — the impact on survivors is not. Women in Hiroshima and Nagasaki have nearly double the risk that men do of developing and dying from solid cancer due to ionizing radiation exposure.5 Robust findings from the Chernobyl disaster indicate that girls are considerably more likely than boys to develop thyroid cancer from nuclear fallout.6 Pregnant women exposed to nuclear radiation face a greater likelihood of delivering children with physical malformations and stillbirths, leading to increased maternal mortality.7 And these effects last generations.8 Women’s rights, human rights, cannot be fully realized when we are threatened by, or threaten others, with such consequences.
A national security framework that respects human rights must work to eliminate and legally ban any weapon that causes these consequences. The TPNW codifies the stigma against the infliction of such barbarity and can be used as an example of how to incorporate humanitarian consequences at the center of policy. A congressional inquiry is needed on the short- and long-term environmental and human cost of past nuclear programs. Members must ask: Who has died early as a result of these programs and who will die in the future as a result of past misdeeds? And to be credible, such an inquiry must include women and other survivors as an integral part of the process.
The full article is available here: https://ploughshares.org/issues-analysis/article/time-ban-bomb
Time to Ban the Bomb: A Path Forward:
The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
Beatrice Fihn | Ploughshares Fund | 2020
“The risk of use of nuclear weapons is higher today than it has been for years. With developments in cyber warfare, autonomous weapons and an increasingly uncertain global security situation, that risk will only increase over time. A security policy based on plans to fight — and “win” — a nuclear war is morally bankrupt and unsustainable. The United States must begin developing a policy for a non-nuclear future, or risk becoming an outlier without moral authority.
The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), a global coalition of over 530 organizations, is leading a movement to achieve this non-nuclear future. Over 10 years, together with countless partners in governments, international organizations and civil society groups around the world, we helped incubate and amplify a previously-ignored conversation about nuclear weapons. We placed civilians and the harm caused to them by nuclear weapons at the center of debate. This movement ultimately led to the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) and to ICAN being awarded the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize for its work in promoting nuclear disarmament.
The Treaty emerged through something new and different in the disarmament debate within the nuclear community — the Humanitarian Initiative. This initiative reframed the discourse around nuclear weapons to make the horrific humanitarian consequences caused by their use the center of discussion, rather than a secondary issue. In seeking the negotiation and adoption of the treaty, we followed the path set by other global weapons prohibitions, including conventions related to biological weapons, chemical weapons, antipersonnel landmines and cluster munitions. The premise, based in international law, is founded on the total abnegation of possession and use of weapons with unspeakable consequences.”
Read more
No sustainable, smart or effective national security strategy can be based on weapons that cause the level of harm to civilians that nuclear weapons do. This reflects a shift in security and development policies toward a more pre-eminent role for humanitarian concerns, humanitarian law and the protection of civilians. Therefore, such weapons cannot remain legal or be considered legitimate options for states in warfare.
On July 7, 2017, the TPNW was adopted by 122 states at the United Nations (UN). It will enter into force once 50 states have deposited their instruments of ratification, which2 we expect will happen by 2020. This moment represents an opportunity for the international community to make real progress toward a world free of nuclear weapons. With this in mind, the United States — and all states possessing nuclear weapons — must engage the majority of the world’s countries working toward true global peace and security.
The United States’ path forward is clear: 1) end nuclear saber-rattling and place humanitarian consequences at the center of nuclear policy; 2) commit in good faith to multilateralism with a view to ending the new nuclear arms race, putting legal and diplomatic options above military expansionism; and 3) cease denigrating the TPNW and instead support the treaty and its signatories.
Humanitarian Consequences at the Center of Nuclear Policy
By their nature, nuclear weapons are indiscriminate and inhumane. Any use of nuclear weapons would have catastrophic humanitarian consequences that would quickly ripple across the world, even if a nuclear conflict was localized. The use of a nuclear weapon over a populated area would immediately kill tens of thousands — if not hundreds of thousands — of men, women and children, and injure countless more.3 We continue to pay the price of atmospheric nuclear testing in many countries around the world with hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of people dying early from cancers.
We also must not forget that the effects of nuclear detonations have disproportionately affected women. Though the immediate effects of nuclear weapons use are indiscriminate — no matter your sex or gender identity — the impact on survivors is not. Women in Hiroshima and Nagasaki have nearly double the risk that men do of developing and dying from solid cancer due to ionizing radiation exposure.5 Robust findings from the Chernobyl disaster indicate that girls are considerably more likely than boys to develop thyroid cancer from nuclear fallout.6 Pregnant women exposed to nuclear radiation face a greater likelihood of delivering children with physical malformations and stillbirths, leading to increased maternal mortality.7 And these effects last generations.8 Women’s rights, human rights, cannot be fully realized when we are threatened by, or threaten others, with such consequences.
A national security framework that respects human rights must work to eliminate and legally ban any weapon that causes these consequences. The TPNW codifies the stigma against the infliction of such barbarity and can be used as an example of how to incorporate humanitarian consequences at the center of policy. A congressional inquiry is needed on the short- and long-term environmental and human cost of past nuclear programs. Members must ask: Who has died early as a result of these programs and who will die in the future as a result of past misdeeds? And to be credible, such an inquiry must include women and other survivors as an integral part of the process.
The full article is available here: https://ploughshares.org/issues-analysis/article/time-ban-bomb
Talking Tough and Carrying a Radioactive Stick:
The Nuclearization of American Diplomacy
Michael T. Klare | Moyers on Democracy | 20 October 2020
“States have long engaged in military operations to intimidate other powers. Once upon a distant time, this would have been called “gunboat diplomacy” and naval vessels would have been the instruments of choice for such missions. The arrival of nuclear arms made such operations far more dangerous. This didn’t, however, stop the US from using weaponry of this sort as tools of intimidation throughout the Cold War. In time, however, even nuclear strategists began condemning acts of “nuclear coercion,” arguing that such weaponry was inappropriate for any purpose other than “deterrence” — that is, using the threat of “massive retaliation” to prevent another country from attacking you. In fact, a deterrence-only posture eventually became Washington’s official policy, even if the temptation to employ nukes as political cudgels never entirely disappeared from its strategic thinking.”
Read the full article here: https://billmoyers.com/story/talking-tough-and-carrying-a-radioactive-stick
Talking Tough and Carrying a Radioactive Stick:
The Nuclearization of American Diplomacy
Michael T. Klare | Moyers on Democracy | 20 October 2020
“States have long engaged in military operations to intimidate other powers. Once upon a distant time, this would have been called “gunboat diplomacy” and naval vessels would have been the instruments of choice for such missions. The arrival of nuclear arms made such operations far more dangerous. This didn’t, however, stop the US from using weaponry of this sort as tools of intimidation throughout the Cold War. In time, however, even nuclear strategists began condemning acts of “nuclear coercion,” arguing that such weaponry was inappropriate for any purpose other than “deterrence” — that is, using the threat of “massive retaliation” to prevent another country from attacking you. In fact, a deterrence-only posture eventually became Washington’s official policy, even if the temptation to employ nukes as political cudgels never entirely disappeared from its strategic thinking.”
Read the full article here: https://billmoyers.com/story/talking-tough-and-carrying-a-radioactive-stick
US urges countries to withdraw from UN nuke ban treaty
Edith M. Lederer | The Associated Press | 21 October 2020
Link: https://apnews.com/article/nuclear-weapons-disarmament-latin-america-united-nations-gun-politics-4f109626a1cdd6db10560550aa1bb491
UNITED NATIONS (AP) — The United States is urging countries that have ratified a U.N. treaty to ban nuclear weapons to withdraw their support as the pact nears the 50 ratifications needed to trigger its entry into force, which supporters say could happen this week.
The U.S. letter to signatories, obtained by The Associated Press, says the five original nuclear powers — the U.S., Russia, China, Britain and France — and America’s NATO allies “stand unified in our opposition to the potential repercussions” of the treaty.
It says the treaty “turns back the clock on verification and disarmament and is dangerous” to the half-century-old Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, considered the cornerstone of global nonproliferation efforts.
“Although we recognize your sovereign right to ratify or accede to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), we believe that you have made a strategic error and should withdraw your instrument of ratification or accession,” the letter says.
The treaty requires that all ratifying countries “never under any circumstances … develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” It also bans any transfer or use of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices — and the threat to use such weapons — and requires parties to promote the treaty to other countries.
Read more
Beatrice Fihn, executive director of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize-winning coalition whose work helped spearhead the nuclear ban treaty, told The Associated Press Tuesday that several diplomatic sources confirmed that they and other states that ratified the TPNW had been sent letters by the U.S. requesting their withdrawal.
She said the “increasing nervousness, and maybe straightforward panic, with some of the nuclear-armed states and particularly the Trump administration” shows that they “really seem to understand that this is a reality: Nuclear weapons are going to be banned under international law soon.”
Fihn dismissed the nuclear powers’ claim that the treaty interferes with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as “straightforward lies, to be frank.”
“They have no actual argument to back that up,” she said. “The Nonproliferation Treaty is about preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and eliminating nuclear weapons, and this treaty implements that. There’s no way you can undermine the Nonproliferation Treaty by banning nuclear weapons. It’s the end goal of the Nonproliferation Treaty.”
The NPT sought to prevent the spread of nuclear arms beyond the five original weapons powers. It requires non-nuclear signatory nations to not pursue atomic weapons in exchange for a commitment by the five powers to move toward nuclear disarmament and to guarantee non-nuclear states’ access to peaceful nuclear technology for producing energy.
U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres called the nuclear weapons ban treaty “a very welcome initiative.”
“It is clear for me that we will only be entirely safe in relation to nuclear weapons the day where nuclear weapons no longer exist,” he said in an interview Wednesday with AP. “We know that it’s not easy. We know that there are many obstacles.”
He expressed hope that a number of important initiatives, including U.S.-Russia talks on renewing the New Start Treaty limiting deployed nuclear warheads, missiles and bombers and next year’s review conference of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, “will all converge in the same direction, and the final objective must be to have a world with no nuclear weapons.”
“That the Trump administration is pressuring countries to withdraw from a United Nations-backed disarmament treaty is an unprecedented action in international relations,” Fihn said. “That the U.S. goes so far as insisting countries violate their treaty obligations by not promoting the TPNW to other states shows how fearful they are of the treaty’s impact and growing support.”
The treaty was approved by the 193-member U.N. General Assembly on July 7, 2017 by a vote of 122 in favor, the Netherlands opposed, and Singapore abstaining. Among countries voting in favor was Iran. The five nuclear powers and four other countries known or believed to possess nuclear weapons — India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel — boycotted negotiations and the vote on the treaty, along with many of their allies.
The treaty currently has 47 ratifications and needs 50 ratifications to trigger its entry into force in 90 days.
Fihn said there are about 10 countries that are trying very hard to ratify to get to 50, “and we know that there are a few governments that are working towards Friday as the date. … We’re not 100 percent it will happen, but hopefully it will.”
Friday has been an unofficial target because it is the eve of United Nations Day on Oct. 24 which marks the anniversary of the entry into force in 1945 of the U.N. Charter. The day has been observed since 1948 and this year is the 75th anniversary of the founding of the U.N.
Fihn stressed that the entry into force of the treaty will be “a really big deal” because it will become part of international law and will be raised in discussions on disarmament, war crimes and weapons.
“And I think that over time pressure will grow on the nuclear-armed states to join the treaty,” she said.
US urges countries to withdraw from UN nuke ban treaty
Edith M. Lederer | The Associated Press | 21 October 2020
Link: https://apnews.com/article/nuclear-weapons-disarmament-latin-america-united-nations-gun-politics-4f109626a1cdd6db10560550aa1bb491
UNITED NATIONS (AP) — The United States is urging countries that have ratified a U.N. treaty to ban nuclear weapons to withdraw their support as the pact nears the 50 ratifications needed to trigger its entry into force, which supporters say could happen this week.
The U.S. letter to signatories, obtained by The Associated Press, says the five original nuclear powers — the U.S., Russia, China, Britain and France — and America’s NATO allies “stand unified in our opposition to the potential repercussions” of the treaty.
It says the treaty “turns back the clock on verification and disarmament and is dangerous” to the half-century-old Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, considered the cornerstone of global nonproliferation efforts.
“Although we recognize your sovereign right to ratify or accede to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), we believe that you have made a strategic error and should withdraw your instrument of ratification or accession,” the letter says.
The treaty requires that all ratifying countries “never under any circumstances … develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” It also bans any transfer or use of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices — and the threat to use such weapons — and requires parties to promote the treaty to other countries.
Read more
Beatrice Fihn, executive director of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize-winning coalition whose work helped spearhead the nuclear ban treaty, told The Associated Press Tuesday that several diplomatic sources confirmed that they and other states that ratified the TPNW had been sent letters by the U.S. requesting their withdrawal.
She said the “increasing nervousness, and maybe straightforward panic, with some of the nuclear-armed states and particularly the Trump administration” shows that they “really seem to understand that this is a reality: Nuclear weapons are going to be banned under international law soon.”
Fihn dismissed the nuclear powers’ claim that the treaty interferes with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as “straightforward lies, to be frank.”
“They have no actual argument to back that up,” she said. “The Nonproliferation Treaty is about preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and eliminating nuclear weapons, and this treaty implements that. There’s no way you can undermine the Nonproliferation Treaty by banning nuclear weapons. It’s the end goal of the Nonproliferation Treaty.”
The NPT sought to prevent the spread of nuclear arms beyond the five original weapons powers. It requires non-nuclear signatory nations to not pursue atomic weapons in exchange for a commitment by the five powers to move toward nuclear disarmament and to guarantee non-nuclear states’ access to peaceful nuclear technology for producing energy.
U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres called the nuclear weapons ban treaty “a very welcome initiative.”
“It is clear for me that we will only be entirely safe in relation to nuclear weapons the day where nuclear weapons no longer exist,” he said in an interview Wednesday with AP. “We know that it’s not easy. We know that there are many obstacles.”
He expressed hope that a number of important initiatives, including U.S.-Russia talks on renewing the New Start Treaty limiting deployed nuclear warheads, missiles and bombers and next year’s review conference of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, “will all converge in the same direction, and the final objective must be to have a world with no nuclear weapons.”
“That the Trump administration is pressuring countries to withdraw from a United Nations-backed disarmament treaty is an unprecedented action in international relations,” Fihn said. “That the U.S. goes so far as insisting countries violate their treaty obligations by not promoting the TPNW to other states shows how fearful they are of the treaty’s impact and growing support.”
The treaty was approved by the 193-member U.N. General Assembly on July 7, 2017 by a vote of 122 in favor, the Netherlands opposed, and Singapore abstaining. Among countries voting in favor was Iran. The five nuclear powers and four other countries known or believed to possess nuclear weapons — India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel — boycotted negotiations and the vote on the treaty, along with many of their allies.
The treaty currently has 47 ratifications and needs 50 ratifications to trigger its entry into force in 90 days.
Fihn said there are about 10 countries that are trying very hard to ratify to get to 50, “and we know that there are a few governments that are working towards Friday as the date. … We’re not 100 percent it will happen, but hopefully it will.”
Friday has been an unofficial target because it is the eve of United Nations Day on Oct. 24 which marks the anniversary of the entry into force in 1945 of the U.N. Charter. The day has been observed since 1948 and this year is the 75th anniversary of the founding of the U.N.
Fihn stressed that the entry into force of the treaty will be “a really big deal” because it will become part of international law and will be raised in discussions on disarmament, war crimes and weapons.
“And I think that over time pressure will grow on the nuclear-armed states to join the treaty,” she said.
In subtle diplomatic move, Canada ceases its opposition to nuclear weapons prohibition treaty
The Hill Times | Douglas Roche | October 30, 2020
In a renewed political atmosphere, the paralysis that has plagued nuclear disarmament for so long may be broken. With a becoming modesty, Canada has nudged this process forward.
EDMONTON—In a subtle diplomatic move, the Government of Canada has ceased its opposition and now “acknowledges” the reason for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which will enter into force on Jan. 22, 2021.
The new treaty, which has been ratified by 50 states, has been denounced by the Trump administration and also rejected by NATO. Canada is betting that the expected election, on Nov. 3, of Joe Biden as president will bring the United States back into more cooperative multilateral work, and that NATO will gradually recognize that the global norm against the possession of nuclear weapons is rising.
Only the states that join the treaty will be bound by it, but its central provision—the prohibition of the possession of nuclear weapons—is a direct attack on the military doctrine of nuclear deterrence.
Canada is not joining the treaty—at least at this moment in history. But its policy is shifting. In 2017, when negotiations for the treaty were under way, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau called the exercise “useless.” Then, when 122 states adopted the treaty at the UN, government spokespeople dismissed it as “premature.” Now Global Affairs Canada says: “We acknowledge the widespread frustration with the pace of global efforts toward nuclear disarmament, which clearly motivated the negotiation of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.”
Some might argue that this is not a clear-cut endorsement of the treaty, but given that Global Affairs Canada did not want to directly contradict the prime minister or directly challenge NATO, which still claims that nuclear weapons are the “supreme guarantee” of security, the statement is a diplomatic expression of a shift in policy. Doubtless, the recent rebuke to NATO’s nuclear policies by two former Canadian prime ministers (Jean Chrétien, the now later John Turner), three former foreign ministers (Lloyd Axworthy, Bill Graham, John Manley) and two former defence ministers (Jean-Jacques Blais, John McCallum)—all of them Liberals—made an impression on the Pearson Building. The prohibition treaty is now treated with respect in Canada. The logical next step is for Canada to open a dialogue with NATO to bring the organization’s nuclear weapons policies into conformity with the Prohibition Treaty.
The government statement adds that, for 50 years, Canada has pursued a “pragmatic, inclusive approach to nuclear disarmament,” which is “anchored” in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. But, with nine states still holding 13,865 nuclear weapons, the NPT has clearly not produced a nuclear weapons-free world.
Reacting to this failure to eliminate nuclear weapons, a new movement, composed of activist governments and civil society leaders, began to warn of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. The Prohibition Treaty resulted.
The treaty, driven by the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, which won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2017 for its efforts, does not pretend to eliminate nuclear weapons. Nor does it seek to replace the NPT, which the treaty hails as the “cornerstone” of nuclear disarmament. What it does is stigmatize nuclear weapons as standing outside international humanitarian law and prepare the ground for comprehensive negotiations by all states for the elimination of nuclear weapons as called for by the NPT.
At the same time, the treaty is more than an exercise in public education. It is an international legal reality, binding on all those who join it. The combined educational, political, and legal value of the treaty, taking the world a step closer to the end of nuclear weapons, is what the U.S. fears most.
In a letter to supporters of the treaty urging they recant, the U.S. claims that the treaty is divisive and “will detract from realistic and practical efforts to advance the cause of nuclear disarmament.” It is quite hard to see how the U.S. is advancing nuclear disarmament when it plans to spend $1.7-trillion over the next quarter-century modernizing its fleet of nuclear missiles.
Whether Joe Biden, if elected president, will butt heads with the military-industrial complex, driving such outrageous expenditures, remains to be seen. But he did say in his campaign, “I will work to bring us closer to a world without nuclear weapons.” And he emphasized his respect for treaties: “For decades, American leaders of both parties have understood that the United States has a national security imperative and a moral responsibility to reduce nuclear threats, including by negotiating treaties and agreements to control and eventually eliminate these weapons.”
It will take a lot of pressure on a Biden presidency to “acknowledge” the Prohibition Treaty, but even if he only stops the U.S. attack on it, the treaty may come to be seen as a reinforcement of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In a renewed political atmosphere, the paralysis that has plagued nuclear disarmament for so long may be broken.
With a becoming modesty, Canada has nudged this process forward.
Statement issued to Doug Roche from Global Affairs Canada Oct. 26, 2020:
Former Senator Douglas Roche is a former Canadian ambassador for disarmament.
Lloyd Axworthy, Jean Chrétien, Bill Graham, John McCallum, John Manley, and the now-late John Turner all signed an open letter.
In subtle diplomatic move, Canada ceases its opposition to nuclear weapons prohibition treaty
The Hill Times | Douglas Roche | October 30, 2020
In a renewed political atmosphere, the paralysis that has plagued nuclear disarmament for so long may be broken. With a becoming modesty, Canada has nudged this process forward.
EDMONTON—In a subtle diplomatic move, the Government of Canada has ceased its opposition and now “acknowledges” the reason for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which will enter into force on Jan. 22, 2021.
The new treaty, which has been ratified by 50 states, has been denounced by the Trump administration and also rejected by NATO. Canada is betting that the expected election, on Nov. 3, of Joe Biden as president will bring the United States back into more cooperative multilateral work, and that NATO will gradually recognize that the global norm against the possession of nuclear weapons is rising.
Only the states that join the treaty will be bound by it, but its central provision—the prohibition of the possession of nuclear weapons—is a direct attack on the military doctrine of nuclear deterrence.
Canada is not joining the treaty—at least at this moment in history. But its policy is shifting. In 2017, when negotiations for the treaty were under way, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau called the exercise “useless.” Then, when 122 states adopted the treaty at the UN, government spokespeople dismissed it as “premature.” Now Global Affairs Canada says: “We acknowledge the widespread frustration with the pace of global efforts toward nuclear disarmament, which clearly motivated the negotiation of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.”
Some might argue that this is not a clear-cut endorsement of the treaty, but given that Global Affairs Canada did not want to directly contradict the prime minister or directly challenge NATO, which still claims that nuclear weapons are the “supreme guarantee” of security, the statement is a diplomatic expression of a shift in policy. Doubtless, the recent rebuke to NATO’s nuclear policies by two former Canadian prime ministers (Jean Chrétien, the now later John Turner), three former foreign ministers (Lloyd Axworthy, Bill Graham, John Manley) and two former defence ministers (Jean-Jacques Blais, John McCallum)—all of them Liberals—made an impression on the Pearson Building. The prohibition treaty is now treated with respect in Canada. The logical next step is for Canada to open a dialogue with NATO to bring the organization’s nuclear weapons policies into conformity with the Prohibition Treaty.
The government statement adds that, for 50 years, Canada has pursued a “pragmatic, inclusive approach to nuclear disarmament,” which is “anchored” in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. But, with nine states still holding 13,865 nuclear weapons, the NPT has clearly not produced a nuclear weapons-free world.
Reacting to this failure to eliminate nuclear weapons, a new movement, composed of activist governments and civil society leaders, began to warn of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. The Prohibition Treaty resulted.
The treaty, driven by the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, which won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2017 for its efforts, does not pretend to eliminate nuclear weapons. Nor does it seek to replace the NPT, which the treaty hails as the “cornerstone” of nuclear disarmament. What it does is stigmatize nuclear weapons as standing outside international humanitarian law and prepare the ground for comprehensive negotiations by all states for the elimination of nuclear weapons as called for by the NPT.
At the same time, the treaty is more than an exercise in public education. It is an international legal reality, binding on all those who join it. The combined educational, political, and legal value of the treaty, taking the world a step closer to the end of nuclear weapons, is what the U.S. fears most.
In a letter to supporters of the treaty urging they recant, the U.S. claims that the treaty is divisive and “will detract from realistic and practical efforts to advance the cause of nuclear disarmament.” It is quite hard to see how the U.S. is advancing nuclear disarmament when it plans to spend $1.7-trillion over the next quarter-century modernizing its fleet of nuclear missiles.
Whether Joe Biden, if elected president, will butt heads with the military-industrial complex, driving such outrageous expenditures, remains to be seen. But he did say in his campaign, “I will work to bring us closer to a world without nuclear weapons.” And he emphasized his respect for treaties: “For decades, American leaders of both parties have understood that the United States has a national security imperative and a moral responsibility to reduce nuclear threats, including by negotiating treaties and agreements to control and eventually eliminate these weapons.”
It will take a lot of pressure on a Biden presidency to “acknowledge” the Prohibition Treaty, but even if he only stops the U.S. attack on it, the treaty may come to be seen as a reinforcement of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In a renewed political atmosphere, the paralysis that has plagued nuclear disarmament for so long may be broken.
With a becoming modesty, Canada has nudged this process forward.
Statement issued to Doug Roche from Global Affairs Canada Oct. 26, 2020:
Former Senator Douglas Roche is a former Canadian ambassador for disarmament.
Lloyd Axworthy, Jean Chrétien, Bill Graham, John McCallum, John Manley, and the now-late John Turner all signed an open letter.
Historic Milestone: UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Reaches 50 Ratifications Needed for Entry Into Force
ICAN | 24 October 2020
On October 24, 2020, the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons reached the required 50 states parties for its entry into force, after Honduras ratified just one day after Jamaica and Nauru submitted their ratifications. In 90 days, the treaty will enter into force, cementing a categorical ban on nuclear weapons, 75 years after their first use.
This is a historic milestone for this landmark treaty. Prior to the TPNW’s adoption, nuclear weapons were the only weapons of mass destruction not banned under international law, despite their catastrophic humanitarian consequences. Now, with the treaty’s entry into force, we can call nuclear weapons what they are: prohibited weapons of mass destruction, just like chemical weapons and biological weapons.
ICAN’s Executive Director Beatrice Fihn welcomed the historic moment. “This is a new chapter for nuclear disarmament. Decades of activism have achieved what many said was impossible: nuclear weapons are banned,” she said.
Setsuko Thurlow, survivor of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, said “I have committed my life to the abolition of nuclear weapons. I have nothing but gratitude for all who have worked for the success of our treaty.” As a long-time and iconic ICAN activist who has spent decades sharing the story of the horrors she faced to raise awareness on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons this moment held particular significance: “This is the first time in international law that we have been so recognized. We share this recognition with other hibakusha across the world, those who have suffered radioactive harm from nuclear testing, from uranium mining, from secret experimentation.” Survivors of atomic use and testing all over the world have joined Setsuko in celebrating this milestone.
The three latest states to ratify were proud to be part of such a historic moment. All 50 states have shown true leadership to achieve a world without nuclear weapons, all while facing unprecedented levels of pressure from the nuclear armed states not to do so. A recent letter, obtained by AP only days before the ceremony, demonstrates that the Trump administration has been directly pressuring states that have ratified the treaty to withdraw from it and abstain from encouraging others to join it, in direct contradiction to their obligations under the treaty. Beatrice Fihn said: “Real leadership has been shown by the countries that have joined this historical instrument to bring it to full legal effect. Desperate attempts to weaken these leaders’ commitment to nuclear disarmament demonstrate only the fear of nuclear armed states of the change this treaty will bring.”
This is just the beginning. Once the treaty is in force, all states parties will need to implement all of their positive obligations under the treaty and abide by its prohibitions. States that haven’t joined the treaty will feel its power too – we can expect companies to stop producing nuclear weapons and financial institutions to stop investing in nuclear weapon producing companies.
How do we know? Because we have nearly 600 partner organisations in over 100 countries committed to advancing this treaty and the norm against nuclear weapons. People, companies, universities and governments everywhere will know this weapon has been prohibited and that now is the moment for them to stand on the right side of history.”
https://www.icanw.org/historic_milestone_un_treaty_on_the_prohibition_of_nuclear_weapons_reaches_50_ratifications_needed_for_entry_into_force
Historic Milestone: UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Reaches 50 Ratifications Needed for Entry Into Force
ICAN | 24 October 2020
On October 24, 2020, the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons reached the required 50 states parties for its entry into force, after Honduras ratified just one day after Jamaica and Nauru submitted their ratifications. In 90 days, the treaty will enter into force, cementing a categorical ban on nuclear weapons, 75 years after their first use.
This is a historic milestone for this landmark treaty. Prior to the TPNW’s adoption, nuclear weapons were the only weapons of mass destruction not banned under international law, despite their catastrophic humanitarian consequences. Now, with the treaty’s entry into force, we can call nuclear weapons what they are: prohibited weapons of mass destruction, just like chemical weapons and biological weapons.
ICAN’s Executive Director Beatrice Fihn welcomed the historic moment. “This is a new chapter for nuclear disarmament. Decades of activism have achieved what many said was impossible: nuclear weapons are banned,” she said.
Setsuko Thurlow, survivor of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, said “I have committed my life to the abolition of nuclear weapons. I have nothing but gratitude for all who have worked for the success of our treaty.” As a long-time and iconic ICAN activist who has spent decades sharing the story of the horrors she faced to raise awareness on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons this moment held particular significance: “This is the first time in international law that we have been so recognized. We share this recognition with other hibakusha across the world, those who have suffered radioactive harm from nuclear testing, from uranium mining, from secret experimentation.” Survivors of atomic use and testing all over the world have joined Setsuko in celebrating this milestone.
The three latest states to ratify were proud to be part of such a historic moment. All 50 states have shown true leadership to achieve a world without nuclear weapons, all while facing unprecedented levels of pressure from the nuclear armed states not to do so. A recent letter, obtained by AP only days before the ceremony, demonstrates that the Trump administration has been directly pressuring states that have ratified the treaty to withdraw from it and abstain from encouraging others to join it, in direct contradiction to their obligations under the treaty. Beatrice Fihn said: “Real leadership has been shown by the countries that have joined this historical instrument to bring it to full legal effect. Desperate attempts to weaken these leaders’ commitment to nuclear disarmament demonstrate only the fear of nuclear armed states of the change this treaty will bring.”
This is just the beginning. Once the treaty is in force, all states parties will need to implement all of their positive obligations under the treaty and abide by its prohibitions. States that haven’t joined the treaty will feel its power too – we can expect companies to stop producing nuclear weapons and financial institutions to stop investing in nuclear weapon producing companies.
How do we know? Because we have nearly 600 partner organisations in over 100 countries committed to advancing this treaty and the norm against nuclear weapons. People, companies, universities and governments everywhere will know this weapon has been prohibited and that now is the moment for them to stand on the right side of history.”
https://www.icanw.org/historic_milestone_un_treaty_on_the_prohibition_of_nuclear_weapons_reaches_50_ratifications_needed_for_entry_into_force
Canada can’t hide behind NATO in refusal to sign treaty on nuclear weapons prohibition
Here is Senator Douglas Roche’s article in The Hill Times, regarding the extraordinary new list of eminent persons urging all states to join the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.
EDMONTON—Sept 21.
Lloyd Axworthy, Jean-Jacques Blais, Jean Chrétien, Bill Graham, John McCallum, John Manley, and John Turner.These seven names hardly need an introduction to readers of The Hill Times and certainly not to the Government of Canada. Two of them are former prime ministers, three are former foreign ministers, and two are former defence ministers, who ran and served Liberal governments. All of them signed an open letter, released on Sept. 21, that features 53 former high officials of NATO countries expressing support for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. It is an astonishing rebuke of NATO’s moribund policies on nuclear weapons, and the most serious challenge to NATO’s nuclear orthodoxy in the organization’s 71-year history. Even two former NATO secretaries-general, Javier Solana and Willy Claes, as well as former U.N. secretary-general Ban Ki-moon, joined in this protest.< The treaty, which bans the possession of nuclear weapons, was adopted by 122 states at the UN in 2017 and must be ratified by 50 states before it enters into force. To date, 44 states have ratified it, so it won’t be long before the treaty becomes binding law for those who have signed it. The Canadian government, under Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, pictured Sept. 16, 2020, has said it cannot make such a commitment to sign the treaty because of its membership in NATO. But NATO, following the lead of the U.S., the U.K., and France, has vigorously rejected the treaty because it “risks undermining” the Non-Proliferation Treaty and supposedly creates divisions in the international community. It would be harder to find a more pungent example of nuclear hypocrisy. First, the treaty explicitly recognizes the NPT as the “cornerstone” of nuclear disarmament efforts. Second, it is the refusal by the nuclear weapons states to negotiate the elimination of nuclear weapons, as ordered by the NPT, that led to the development of the Prohibition Treaty.
Read more
NATO doesn’t have a leg to stand on in maintaining that nuclear weapons are the “supreme guarantee” of security. It has now been called out by its own strongest supporters—former high officials in 20 NATO countries, Germany, Norway, Belgium, Italy, Denmark, and others, as well as the Canadians—who have signed the letter organized by the Nobel Peace Prize winning-International Campaign for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons.
The letter accuses the U.S., Russia, the U.K., France, and China—permanent members of the Security Council that all possess nuclear weapons—of viewing the NPT “as a license to retain their nuclear forces in perpetuity.” They are all flouting the NPT by modernizing their arsenals.
The letter adds: “With close to 14,000 nuclear weapons located at dozens of sites across the globe and on submarines patrolling the oceans at all times, the capacity for destruction is beyond our imagination. … Without doubt, a new nuclear arms race is under way.”
The prohibition treaty is explicit in its condemnation of nuclear weapons, stating: “Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”
The Canadian government has said it cannot make such a commitment because of its membership in NATO. But the letter contests this stand, arguing that nothing in the new treaty precludes a NATO state joining, as long as it never assists the use of nuclear weapons. This was the stand taken by Canadian Pugwash, a prominent civil society group, which said that Canada should sign the treaty and argue within NATO councils to get the nuclear policies changed. Indeed, Lloyd Axworthy, one of the signatories of the letter, went to NATO when he was foreign affairs minister to get the policy changed, but was rebuffed.
Pierre Trudeau, the father of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, once told me that NATO’s obsolete policies were one of the biggest thorns he had to endure as prime minister. Justin Trudeau has not yet learned how NATO contravenes the basic idea of nuclear disarmament, for he called the negotiations that led to the adoption of the Prohibition Treaty “useless.” And his government has continued to use NATO membership as a block to the new treaty.
COVID-19 has upended the world order. It has dramatically shown the uselessness of piling up military hardwire to provide human security. Many steps need to be taken to boost cooperative security. One of the most important would be to renounce nuclear weapons. That is what the Prohibition Treaty does. The nuclear weapons states’ plan to spend $1-trillion this decade on nuclear weapons is an outrage to a humanity crying out for resources to survive against the coronavirus.
The seven former Canadian high officials—all of them Liberals—have pulled the rug out from under the Liberal government’s pathetic excuse for not signing the Prohibition Treaty. These seven are not alone among prominent Canadians calling for this action.
Other signatories include: John Polanyi, Ed Broadbent, John English, Gerry Barr, Bruce Kidd, Margaret MacMillan, Stephen Lewis, Ernie Regehr, Jennifer Simons, Clayton Ruby, Jane Urquhart, and many other distinguished recipients of the Order of Canada who have signed a letter to Prime Minister Trudeau by Canadians for a Nuclear Weapons Convention, calling for Canada to make nuclear disarmament “a national priority.”
Another civil society organization, the Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, representing 16 national organizations, wants Canada “to take a leadership role within NATO” to create the conditions for a nuclear weapons-free world. This was exactly what the House of Commons Committee on National Defence unanimously recommended in 2018.
Justin Trudeau and his deputy, Chrystia Freeland, should now look around and see what important people in the country are saying to them. Not least their own former colleagues.
Former Senator Douglas Roche was also Canadian ambassador for disarmament. | The Hill Times
Canada can’t hide behind NATO in refusal to sign treaty on nuclear weapons prohibition
Here is Senator Douglas Roche’s article in The Hill Times, regarding the extraordinary new list of eminent persons urging all states to join the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.
EDMONTON—Sept 21.
Lloyd Axworthy, Jean-Jacques Blais, Jean Chrétien, Bill Graham, John McCallum, John Manley, and John Turner.These seven names hardly need an introduction to readers of The Hill Times and certainly not to the Government of Canada. Two of them are former prime ministers, three are former foreign ministers, and two are former defence ministers, who ran and served Liberal governments. All of them signed an open letter, released on Sept. 21, that features 53 former high officials of NATO countries expressing support for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. It is an astonishing rebuke of NATO’s moribund policies on nuclear weapons, and the most serious challenge to NATO’s nuclear orthodoxy in the organization’s 71-year history. Even two former NATO secretaries-general, Javier Solana and Willy Claes, as well as former U.N. secretary-general Ban Ki-moon, joined in this protest.< The treaty, which bans the possession of nuclear weapons, was adopted by 122 states at the UN in 2017 and must be ratified by 50 states before it enters into force. To date, 44 states have ratified it, so it won’t be long before the treaty becomes binding law for those who have signed it. The Canadian government, under Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, pictured Sept. 16, 2020, has said it cannot make such a commitment to sign the treaty because of its membership in NATO. But NATO, following the lead of the U.S., the U.K., and France, has vigorously rejected the treaty because it “risks undermining” the Non-Proliferation Treaty and supposedly creates divisions in the international community. It would be harder to find a more pungent example of nuclear hypocrisy. First, the treaty explicitly recognizes the NPT as the “cornerstone” of nuclear disarmament efforts. Second, it is the refusal by the nuclear weapons states to negotiate the elimination of nuclear weapons, as ordered by the NPT, that led to the development of the Prohibition Treaty.
Read more
NATO doesn’t have a leg to stand on in maintaining that nuclear weapons are the “supreme guarantee” of security. It has now been called out by its own strongest supporters—former high officials in 20 NATO countries, Germany, Norway, Belgium, Italy, Denmark, and others, as well as the Canadians—who have signed the letter organized by the Nobel Peace Prize winning-International Campaign for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons.
The letter accuses the U.S., Russia, the U.K., France, and China—permanent members of the Security Council that all possess nuclear weapons—of viewing the NPT “as a license to retain their nuclear forces in perpetuity.” They are all flouting the NPT by modernizing their arsenals.
The letter adds: “With close to 14,000 nuclear weapons located at dozens of sites across the globe and on submarines patrolling the oceans at all times, the capacity for destruction is beyond our imagination. … Without doubt, a new nuclear arms race is under way.”
The prohibition treaty is explicit in its condemnation of nuclear weapons, stating: “Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”
The Canadian government has said it cannot make such a commitment because of its membership in NATO. But the letter contests this stand, arguing that nothing in the new treaty precludes a NATO state joining, as long as it never assists the use of nuclear weapons. This was the stand taken by Canadian Pugwash, a prominent civil society group, which said that Canada should sign the treaty and argue within NATO councils to get the nuclear policies changed. Indeed, Lloyd Axworthy, one of the signatories of the letter, went to NATO when he was foreign affairs minister to get the policy changed, but was rebuffed.
Pierre Trudeau, the father of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, once told me that NATO’s obsolete policies were one of the biggest thorns he had to endure as prime minister. Justin Trudeau has not yet learned how NATO contravenes the basic idea of nuclear disarmament, for he called the negotiations that led to the adoption of the Prohibition Treaty “useless.” And his government has continued to use NATO membership as a block to the new treaty.
COVID-19 has upended the world order. It has dramatically shown the uselessness of piling up military hardwire to provide human security. Many steps need to be taken to boost cooperative security. One of the most important would be to renounce nuclear weapons. That is what the Prohibition Treaty does. The nuclear weapons states’ plan to spend $1-trillion this decade on nuclear weapons is an outrage to a humanity crying out for resources to survive against the coronavirus.
The seven former Canadian high officials—all of them Liberals—have pulled the rug out from under the Liberal government’s pathetic excuse for not signing the Prohibition Treaty. These seven are not alone among prominent Canadians calling for this action.
Other signatories include: John Polanyi, Ed Broadbent, John English, Gerry Barr, Bruce Kidd, Margaret MacMillan, Stephen Lewis, Ernie Regehr, Jennifer Simons, Clayton Ruby, Jane Urquhart, and many other distinguished recipients of the Order of Canada who have signed a letter to Prime Minister Trudeau by Canadians for a Nuclear Weapons Convention, calling for Canada to make nuclear disarmament “a national priority.”
Another civil society organization, the Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, representing 16 national organizations, wants Canada “to take a leadership role within NATO” to create the conditions for a nuclear weapons-free world. This was exactly what the House of Commons Committee on National Defence unanimously recommended in 2018.
Justin Trudeau and his deputy, Chrystia Freeland, should now look around and see what important people in the country are saying to them. Not least their own former colleagues.
Former Senator Douglas Roche was also Canadian ambassador for disarmament. | The Hill Times
Program ABM systems to shoot down intrusions, without regard to their source
Unlike Ronald Reagan’s 1980s Strategic defence initiative, a.k.a. Star Wars, the anti-missile defence shield, into which Canada currently seems to be placing some serious stock, is quite realistic and technologically sound. In fact, over two decades ago the tech had impressively (at least to me) proved itself to be on solid ground, though I feel that it could’ve already been by now solidly established as a fully functional defense shield.
Though there still are skeptics, I can recall the successful interceptions by Patriot missiles launched from batteries stationed around Israel during Desert Storm.
If I recall correctly, the Patriot missiles had been barely developed with no practical testing, thus they had to be field tested during actual warfare. Only one scud made it through the defence shield intact and another after being severely damaged, though both did not result in death, injury nor even notable damage. Had the system been shy of competent, let alone a failure, there’s no reason to believe that the nuclear-armed nation of Israel was bluffing when it promised to retaliate against Iraq if the Patriots failed to deliver and Israeli casualties were incurred.
Unfortunately, whatever small degree to which the U.S. has thus far developed its shield technology in actual hardware would only serve to intercept ballistic missiles targeting nations that are U.S. friendly or their protection is in U.S. interests.
Read more
A good means of avoiding such dreary anti-productive measures-thus-counter-measures would be to ensure all interested ‘sides’ that the anti-missile defence shield would be independently programmed to intercept all airborne projectiles regardless of their origin.
Admittedly, a notable sticking point could be the neutrality of the parties or national interests, etcetera, that would program such a system’s computer.
The system would monitor the planet’s air space and launch anti-missile defensive measures, equipped with latest computer-systems-hacking fail-safe technology.
The naysayers of such a universal defence shield should suggest other plausible ways through which to avoid nuclear-exchange devastation anywhere, let alone everywhere. As for those who say such a shield would be too expensive—just how much is Earth and humanity worth?
Program ABM systems to shoot down intrusions, without regard to their source
Unlike Ronald Reagan’s 1980s Strategic defence initiative, a.k.a. Star Wars, the anti-missile defence shield, into which Canada currently seems to be placing some serious stock, is quite realistic and technologically sound. In fact, over two decades ago the tech had impressively (at least to me) proved itself to be on solid ground, though I feel that it could’ve already been by now solidly established as a fully functional defense shield.
Though there still are skeptics, I can recall the successful interceptions by Patriot missiles launched from batteries stationed around Israel during Desert Storm.
If I recall correctly, the Patriot missiles had been barely developed with no practical testing, thus they had to be field tested during actual warfare. Only one scud made it through the defence shield intact and another after being severely damaged, though both did not result in death, injury nor even notable damage. Had the system been shy of competent, let alone a failure, there’s no reason to believe that the nuclear-armed nation of Israel was bluffing when it promised to retaliate against Iraq if the Patriots failed to deliver and Israeli casualties were incurred.
Unfortunately, whatever small degree to which the U.S. has thus far developed its shield technology in actual hardware would only serve to intercept ballistic missiles targeting nations that are U.S. friendly or their protection is in U.S. interests.
Read more
A good means of avoiding such dreary anti-productive measures-thus-counter-measures would be to ensure all interested ‘sides’ that the anti-missile defence shield would be independently programmed to intercept all airborne projectiles regardless of their origin.
Admittedly, a notable sticking point could be the neutrality of the parties or national interests, etcetera, that would program such a system’s computer.
The system would monitor the planet’s air space and launch anti-missile defensive measures, equipped with latest computer-systems-hacking fail-safe technology.
The naysayers of such a universal defence shield should suggest other plausible ways through which to avoid nuclear-exchange devastation anywhere, let alone everywhere. As for those who say such a shield would be too expensive—just how much is Earth and humanity worth?
Does the Soviet “Dead Hand” system count as a Lethal Autonomous Weapon? Has this system carried over into modern day Russia?
Does the Soviet “Dead Hand” system count as a Lethal Autonomous Weapon? Has this system carried over into modern day Russia?
Arctic Peace and Security Policy Issues
In this context, it is very important to recall the 1983 Declaration of the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) on a Nuclear Free Arctic. Re-Issue of an updated Declaration by the ICC could have a powerful impact on the international community and influence progress toward a nuclear-weapon-free Arctic. Canadian Pugwash, together with its international contacts, has significant expertise in current political status of nuclear weapons and would gladly offer assistance in producing updated wording of the Declaration.
Read more
When and if the circumpolar non-nuclear-weapon states agree on the nuclear-weapon-free goal, they could approach the United Nations, which would readily offer assistance in forming a Treaty. Russia and the United States, over time, could have reason to withdraw nuclear weapons from this very limited geographic region. Alternatively, true militarization of the Arctic is a possibility, in which case the nuclear weapons of China, Britain and France might also be deployed in the Arctic. Without changing the security strategy presently employed by NW states and their allies, a nuclear-weapon-free Arctic offers a model situation for working out methodology for reduction of NW, verification and eventual nuclear disarmament.
China, in its new Arctic Policy, has announced its intention to be a key player, to expend major resources to that effect, and, in particular, to facilitate a ‘Polar Silk Road’ . The newly issued policy is aspirational, rather than specific. The policy states ‘Peace and stability in the Arctic provides a significant guarantee for all activities in the region,and serves the fundamental interest of all countries including China’. Every nation involved in the Arctic at present or in the future should and could adopt this stance, but if there is conflict, military activity, including deployment of weapons, could result. China and others would possibly be prompted to send nuclear-weapon equipped submarines; probably forever closing the opportunity for a nuclear-weapon free Arctic. This is the reason why the Government of Canada should act now.
By: Adele Buckley, Canadian Pugwash Group
Proposals for a Nuclear Weapon Free Arctic
To read more, click- http://arcticnwfz.ca/
Arctic Peace and Security Policy Issues
In this context, it is very important to recall the 1983 Declaration of the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) on a Nuclear Free Arctic. Re-Issue of an updated Declaration by the ICC could have a powerful impact on the international community and influence progress toward a nuclear-weapon-free Arctic. Canadian Pugwash, together with its international contacts, has significant expertise in current political status of nuclear weapons and would gladly offer assistance in producing updated wording of the Declaration.
Read more
When and if the circumpolar non-nuclear-weapon states agree on the nuclear-weapon-free goal, they could approach the United Nations, which would readily offer assistance in forming a Treaty. Russia and the United States, over time, could have reason to withdraw nuclear weapons from this very limited geographic region. Alternatively, true militarization of the Arctic is a possibility, in which case the nuclear weapons of China, Britain and France might also be deployed in the Arctic. Without changing the security strategy presently employed by NW states and their allies, a nuclear-weapon-free Arctic offers a model situation for working out methodology for reduction of NW, verification and eventual nuclear disarmament.
China, in its new Arctic Policy, has announced its intention to be a key player, to expend major resources to that effect, and, in particular, to facilitate a ‘Polar Silk Road’ . The newly issued policy is aspirational, rather than specific. The policy states ‘Peace and stability in the Arctic provides a significant guarantee for all activities in the region,and serves the fundamental interest of all countries including China’. Every nation involved in the Arctic at present or in the future should and could adopt this stance, but if there is conflict, military activity, including deployment of weapons, could result. China and others would possibly be prompted to send nuclear-weapon equipped submarines; probably forever closing the opportunity for a nuclear-weapon free Arctic. This is the reason why the Government of Canada should act now.
By: Adele Buckley, Canadian Pugwash Group
Proposals for a Nuclear Weapon Free Arctic
To read more, click- http://arcticnwfz.ca/
Japan Council’s Statement on Trump’s Nuclear Tests
President Trump’s Message on the Occasion of the 75th Anniversary of the Trinity Nuclear Test Shows No Sign of Remorse and Blatantly Declaring Further Nuclear Arms Buildup
On July 16, U.S. President Trump released a Presidential Message on the 75th Anniversary of the Trinity Nuclear Test held in New Mexico. Referring to the Manhattan Project which produced the atomic bombs, the Message says that it “helped end World War II and launch an unprecedented era of global stability” and “Our nuclear deterrent has also greatly benefitted our Nation and our allies”. This is a laudatory statement trying to justify the current nuclear buildup and modernization program promoted by the Trump Administration.
We strongly protest against his attempt to justify the production of the atomic bombs, rather than shifting to the elimination of nuclear weapons in the 75th year of the atomic bombing, which blatantly betrays the aspiration of the Hibakusha and challenges the world public opinion in support of the elimination of nuclear weapons. The atomic bomb attack was made on Hiroshima and Nagasaki when both Germany and Italy had surrendered and Japan had lost its war potential completely though it had yet to make a decision to surrender. It was the attack against undefended cities, where most of the victims were non-combatants. It was an unprecedented scale of mass destruction, which cannot be justified even in the light of international law in those days.
Read more
Under the direction of President Trump, the U.S. has abandoned some existing treaties for nuclear arms control and is now stepping out for a new nuclear arms race with Russia. However, the deepening crisis over COVID-19, by which the U.S. people have suffered the greatest sacrifice, shows that what is most needed now is global cooperation and efforts for peace based on the U.N. Charter, disarmament and elimination of nuclear weapons, not inciting further confrontation or division.
In the present world, whether over the question of nuclear weapons prohibition, climate change, pandemic, poverty and social gap or gender equality, overwhelming majority of countries are working hand in hand with the civil society in creating a major trend toward solving these problems, focusing on the “human security”. We strongly call on the United States to reflect on its own history of having caused the crisis of annihilation of humankind, and change its course towards prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons and achieving a peaceful and just world.
Published: July 17, 2020
YASUI Masakazu, Secretary General
Japan Council against A and H Bombs (Gensuikyo)
Well, yes, in a way you are right. But can programmers foresee all possible circumstances that may arise and the exceptions that should be made? Not in my experience. Just remember those telephone messages that tell you to press 2 for this and 3 for that and 4 for the other thing. Invariably, the issue I am dealing with will not fit into any of the categories they had anticipated, so there is no number established for me to press. So imagine saying “if this,” immediately shoot. “If that,” wait and while and think it over. Etc.
Hey, look: It’s not nuclear “balance” that we need! It’s disarmament, stupid!
Japan Council’s Statement on Trump’s Nuclear Tests
President Trump’s Message on the Occasion of the 75th Anniversary of the Trinity Nuclear Test Shows No Sign of Remorse and Blatantly Declaring Further Nuclear Arms Buildup
On July 16, U.S. President Trump released a Presidential Message on the 75th Anniversary of the Trinity Nuclear Test held in New Mexico. Referring to the Manhattan Project which produced the atomic bombs, the Message says that it “helped end World War II and launch an unprecedented era of global stability” and “Our nuclear deterrent has also greatly benefitted our Nation and our allies”. This is a laudatory statement trying to justify the current nuclear buildup and modernization program promoted by the Trump Administration.
We strongly protest against his attempt to justify the production of the atomic bombs, rather than shifting to the elimination of nuclear weapons in the 75th year of the atomic bombing, which blatantly betrays the aspiration of the Hibakusha and challenges the world public opinion in support of the elimination of nuclear weapons. The atomic bomb attack was made on Hiroshima and Nagasaki when both Germany and Italy had surrendered and Japan had lost its war potential completely though it had yet to make a decision to surrender. It was the attack against undefended cities, where most of the victims were non-combatants. It was an unprecedented scale of mass destruction, which cannot be justified even in the light of international law in those days.
Read more
Under the direction of President Trump, the U.S. has abandoned some existing treaties for nuclear arms control and is now stepping out for a new nuclear arms race with Russia. However, the deepening crisis over COVID-19, by which the U.S. people have suffered the greatest sacrifice, shows that what is most needed now is global cooperation and efforts for peace based on the U.N. Charter, disarmament and elimination of nuclear weapons, not inciting further confrontation or division.
In the present world, whether over the question of nuclear weapons prohibition, climate change, pandemic, poverty and social gap or gender equality, overwhelming majority of countries are working hand in hand with the civil society in creating a major trend toward solving these problems, focusing on the “human security”. We strongly call on the United States to reflect on its own history of having caused the crisis of annihilation of humankind, and change its course towards prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons and achieving a peaceful and just world.
Published: July 17, 2020
YASUI Masakazu, Secretary General
Japan Council against A and H Bombs (Gensuikyo)
Well, yes, in a way you are right. But can programmers foresee all possible circumstances that may arise and the exceptions that should be made? Not in my experience. Just remember those telephone messages that tell you to press 2 for this and 3 for that and 4 for the other thing. Invariably, the issue I am dealing with will not fit into any of the categories they had anticipated, so there is no number established for me to press. So imagine saying “if this,” immediately shoot. “If that,” wait and while and think it over. Etc.
Hey, look: It’s not nuclear “balance” that we need! It’s disarmament, stupid!