Episode 778 Liberalism

Notes

In this episode, Metta, Anne Kornhauser, and Doug Saunders discuss Kornhauser's academic work on the evolution of 'statist liberalism' in the USA and the contemporary challenges facing the modern administrative state.

https://projectsavetheworld.substack.com/p/episode-778-liberalism

Guests

  • Metta
  • Anne Kornhauser
  • Doug Saunders

Video

Podcast

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SUMMARY and TRANSCRIPT

SUMMARY KEYWORDS

state, government, liberalism, administrative, political, states, power, big, Trump, bureaucratic, administration, book, certainly, federal, party, democratic, law, became, call, Congress

SPEAKERS

Anne Kornhauser, Doug Saunders, Metta Spencer.

SUMMARY

This episode of Project Save the World features host Metta Spencer, guest Anne Kornhauser, and Doug Saunders, discussing liberalism in the United States and how it has changed since Kornhauser's book appeared about eleven years ago. Spencer said she had reconnected with Kornhauser after an online search and wanted to hear what she thought of recent events. Kornhauser summarized her book, which examines what she calls statist liberalism, forged during the New Deal. She identified three tensions: unelected bureaucracy versus majoritarian democracy, the place of the rule of law in administrative government, and threats to individual autonomy from a powerful state. She said she traced these through American social scientists, German émigrés, and the philosopher John Rawls.

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Kornhauser explained that the New Deal distinguished itself from earlier progressivism by dropping that movement's moralism, pointing to prohibition and its repeal as an example. She argued that the expansion of the state was largely a response to the Depression and the war, and that debate over how far government should reach was always present. Spencer said Kornhauser had shown her own ambivalence about big government, and she was unsure whether she wanted more government or smaller government with openings for citizens to intervene. Kornhauser replied that her book had found no strong normative justification for the bureaucratic growth of that period, which is why the dilemma persists in everyday life.

Doug asked how the second Trump administration relates to the administrative state. Kornhauser said she had not anticipated this outcome, and drew a distinction between shutting down government agencies and politicizing them from within. Doug described a counter-administration emerging among Democratic-governed states, citing vaccine policy and medicine procurement networks, and a panelist noted these are called interstate compacts. Spencer then linked the changes to Max Weber's cycle of charismatic authority becoming bureaucratic routine. Doug questioned whether the real issue is the size of government or what it is used for, citing climate and AI.

Kornhauser argued that Congress has weakened since the New Deal, and that its over-delegation of power to agencies, a point made by Theodore Lowi, is central. She also said the Supreme Court has enhanced presidential power in ways she did not foresee. Spencer observed that American parties are weak in terms of membership control, while partisanship has grown. Doug stressed money's role in channeling candidates. Kornhauser then discussed independent agencies, the Administrative Procedure Act, and rulemaking, and the group ended by planning a follow-up on global populism and Brexit.

Transcript made by speech recognition from the episode as published; names and unusual words may be wrong. The speakers are told apart by number, not by name.

Metta Spencer 0:00

[music]

Speaker 2 0:05

Hi, I'm Metta Spencer. Today I have a real thrill. I'll tell you a secret. 60-ish years ago, I was a graduate student in sociology in Berkeley, and I had a summer job working as a research assistant for Professor William Kornhauser. And we spent a lot of time talking. I did a lot more Just visiting and chatting and theorizing with him than I did actual work. I don't even remember what my work was. But I had a good summer. And about then, his wife had a baby. And and.

Speaker 3 0:49

Meta, you just dated me, but that's OK.

Speaker 2 0:53

So I wondered if. A few months ago, I started thinking, whatever happened to that baby? I never saw that baby. So I thought, I'm going to look it up. So I tagged Kornhauser in my Google. And here came up a woman named Ann Kornhauser, who turns out to be the chairman of the Department of History at the City College of New York. So I gave her a note and said, you know, you want to chat and get acquainted with? She did. So we said hi to each other a couple of times. And I found out that she'd written an extremely interesting book about liberalism in America. And well, I guess the U.S. almost exclusively, I don't know.

But it turned out, you know, really an interesting argument that I hadn't ever heard before. So I thought we ought to do a show about this. And the book was actually published About 11 years ago. So I think things have changed a lot in the United States with Trump and all the other folks. And I want to see not only what she thought then, but what she thinks is going on now. And so I invited her. And then I thought, oh, I also have another friend who'd love to meet Ann Kornhauser, I bet. And that's Doug Saunders. He is a I call him the head honcho in international affairs at the Globe and Mail.

I don't know what your official title is, but he's a big shot. And he travels a lot, and he knows stuff. So I thought he'd be a really good conversationalist today, and I invited him to join us. So hello, both of you, Anne and Doug.

Speaker 3 2:49

And I'm…

Speaker 2 2:53

You look a little bit like your dad. So I'd like you to give us a kind of a summary of your book, I don't know, 10 minutes or so, however long it takes, what your argument was then, and then let's dive into considering what has been going on in the United States ever since then. Is that okay?

Speaker 3 3:17

Yes, it's fine. I don't know if I can talk for 10 minutes about the book, but I'll I'll make it… I'll do what I can. I mean, I think… Anyway. So let me start by saying that when I went to Columbia University, which is where I did my doctoral work under Eric Foner, actually, who's more of a 19th century historian, but I had a lot of great resources there from political science as well. I've always been a bit of a… I'm a cross-disciplinary type. I did not follow my parents' footsteps in sociology. But I was really interested in liberalism. I didn't know exactly how I was going to write about it when I went into graduate school, which would probably be a no-no today.

I mean, I really didn't know. I just knew that I wanted to write about it. Why? Because I grew up in Berkeley, as you have said, Metta. Where liberalism as a concept is a word. Let me just say from the start, I'm interested in political liberalism. It is applied to other domains, but this is my interest. Broadly speaking, I don't just mean in government or whatever, but the political conceptualization and programs of liberalism.

In Berkeley in the 70s, when I was growing up, even into the early 80s, it was kind of a dirty word from the left, and I was involved in left-wing politics, anti-war stuff, and local politics, very involved, too involved probably for my academic work, but So I became really, you know, so that was one sort of experience. And then I went to college, sort of continued my lefty proclivities, by which at that point, I mean, well, Berkeley to Marxist, actually studying it at that point. I then became the editor of the newspaper, though, and that I did not do as the Columbia Daily Spectre. I did not do that as a Marxist per se.

And I was also slowly sort of At least in my practical politics, I guess I would have called myself then and do today a left liberal or in European terms, a social democrat. So that I don't really think matters that much, actually, but I just put it out there. So then I became, I worked as a journalist in Washington, D.C. for about four or five years before going back to Columbia to graduate school. And there, so that would have been Late 80s, early 90s. So under Republican, for the most part, Republican leadership. And then liberalism again was anathema. This time though, more from the right.

And I just thought, why is this phenomenon or idea However much truth there was to the imagery of liberalism, why was it so much of a lightning rod? And particularly considering it hasn't been, isn't still, and whether it's in the context of the Democratic Party or more generally, it's not that well defined or grasped, and I'm not sure it can be because I'm not sure it represents a single thing. Anyway, so that's the background to why I decided to write about liberalism. But, or and, I also became increasingly interested in state power. Part of that goes back to that was an influence of my father, the political sociologist, whose main claim to fame was writing about totalitarianism as one did the Cold War years. What?

Mass society was here. So the big moment for liberalism when it was called by its name in connection to the Democratic Party was under Franklin Delano Roosevelt during the New Deal in the 1930s. That was very self-conscious. And here I'm going to probably disagree a bit with my brilliant colleague, Helena Rosenblatt wrote an exceptional book on a much broader history of liberalism in European and the United States context. I think that there was a big effort to distinguish liberalism in political rhetoric from progressivism, which was the kind of liberal-ish A precursor, right, in the early part of the 20th century among politicians, journalists, you know, and there was a capital P progressive moment, right? Movement, rather.

So I thought, let me look at liberalism in a particular period, in a particular place, right? The one that we've inherited, really, you know, the one that connected itself to a very activist central state, central government, yeah? That claimed a lot of problem-solving attributes, but that also, and this is Roosevelt, but it caught on, that also distinguished itself, as I said, from progressivism in demoralizing its picking out the moralistic content that often went along with progressive ideas, things, you know. So under progressivism, you get prohibition. Under New Deal, Roosevelt, you get the repeal of it. I mean, there are many reasons for that, you know, economic and otherwise.

But one of them was certainly the moralism that attended the nation, the people, you know, that we needed to make it harder for Americans

Speaker 2 9:55

to drink.

Speaker 3 9:56

But, you know, just in general, the idea that government would be put to the, would be used for sort of moral reasons. Guidance and education and stuff. It's not that they rejected it so much as they downplayed it. Well, there was some rejection of it, actually, as well. So what do you have instead? What is liberalism under the New Deal? Well, I already said a little bit about it, but let me say a little bit more. So just to say, again, I call it in my book, statist liberalism.

To try to define this emergent political liberalism that self-consciously, right, through the Democratic Party and others, forged, you know, not a radically new path, but one that was supposed to be somewhat new and different, much more activist. I mean, look, the conditions under which it was forged, and that's very important, were You know, catastrophic, right? A global depression, unlike anything anybody in our lifetime has lived through as an adult anyway. And then not long after that, you

Speaker 2 11:17

know, of course, a global war,

Speaker 3 11:19

total war. So, you know, I'm not saying that liberalism created emergency conditions, but it had to any whatever the ideology, the governing Ideology was anywhere had to respond to these conditions. Well, not anywhere, but most places. And the state was the only, the most powerful institution, set of institutions. Really the only thing that could address this level of crisis. And I think…

That was accepted, but the degree to which the state would get involved in the economy, in society, in other non-state institutions was always up for debate, and the ends to which that involvement would be But there really was in this country, including during the 1930s, though somewhat tempered then because of the conditions, you know, a longstanding debate about how powerful the central government should be. Not so common in a place like Canada, maybe some of that because you have the, well, you have the federal structure there too. Sorry, I won't talk about Canada.

Speaker 4 12:39

Let's say- There's a little bit of that, but it hasn't created quite as many- Right. Quite as dramatic interruptions.

Speaker 3 12:47

Yes. But Western European countries are probably a better example. But the federalist system that we have in which states have their own governments and constitutionally a fair amount of power also adds to this. The growth of the centralized state, the bureaucratic state, which is what was already going on in the progressive period, but really, as I say in my book, increased dramatically in this period. Again, a lot of that was of necessity. They had to just do a lot more, create jobs, try to stabilize the economy, try to create more opportunity, frankly, and less inequality. Protect people and give them better security and old age and sickness.

And, you know, these kinds of things became much more pressing when, you know, the economic circumstances were so dire. So in this context, I looked at liberalism as it was articulated by Mostly intellectuals, because that's my area of interest, but also the interface of that articulation with government, as I've been mentioning Roosevelt, government actors. And I came up with three, what I call, dilemmas or tensions that I thought kind of described the growing pains and overall sort of uncertainties about this effort to Have a statist liberalism at this moment.

And I have to remind myself here, the unelected bureaucracy, right, and hierarchical bureaucracy with a lot of power in the executive, but also in administrative government, which grew hugely through agencies at this time, versus more democratic participatory and representative, so Congress. Majoritarian usually, but a more majoritarian, a commitment to majoritarian democracy in various guises. Second, where was the place of the rule of law? This is also familiar in the administrative, in a liberal administrative state. Why? Because administration isn't the same thing as law and discretion, which comes with Appointed officials and bureaucratic organizations is much more prevalent in this kind of state. So that is not the same thing as the rule of law.

I'm not saying as law, although there's some of that too, but I'm interested in the rule of law. That is the norm that says there should be legal constraints on government power, but also legal protections, right? For citizens, and in some cases non-citizens, but also for, in some ways, particularly for minorities in a majoritarian democracy. So two things, how the government itself operates is subject to law. That's always been the case, but I'm saying, I mean, constitutionally always been the case, right? But I'm saying that it became a much more salient issue under these conditions of administrative policy. Growth and Emergency.

And then the third one was, you know, threats, probably the most obvious to individual autonomy and liberty posed by a much bigger, more powerful government state. So I'll just say a couple last things. So I looked at, as I said, mostly thinkers. Some American, obviously, I mean, they're all American, but some native-born American social scientists. I have a couple chapters on them and how they often worked in or with the New Deal state and what concerns were they raising by this very rapid growth in this particular way. Second, I looked at some German émigrés who had mostly been social democrats in China. In Germany and had come up in Weimar.

Again, I know this is all weirdly familiar, but they also often worked in government and advised government, especially during World War II, as you can imagine. And what were they saying, given their experience of watching a democratic republic dissolve into a totalitarian world? Nazi state. And then, you know, the structure of the book's a little weird this way, and the sort of apotheosis of all this, or the way that I decided to trace this lineage that I was exploring was by looking at the political philosopher John Rawls, who at the time had not been studied that much. I could have and maybe should have written a whole book on him, but then someone else did it anyway, so it's okay.

But he, I thought, could be read. So did this person, actually. Or, you know, maybe independently or maybe thought I'd made a good argument. I don't know. I thought he could be seen as someone grappling with all three of these dilemmas and trying to resolve them in theory or at least begin to resolve them. So, you know, try to find ways to have to preserve democratic The democratic dimensions of government to to focus on the rule of law and most importantly for him to look at the role of individuals in this new, you know, very bureaucratized and sort of just alien, you know, form of democracy. By alien, I mean that the people are more alienated from highly bureaucratic structures generally.

As you know, we all know this from experience. This applies in the private sector as well. I happen to be talking about public bureaucracy, right? But the layers and layers of, you know, things you have to go through.

Speaker 2 19:25

Well, you know, the thing I enjoy is you pointed out ambivalences in my own thinking that I was not aware of, you know? And I had not identified the extent to which my anxieties about bureaucratic… I don't want to say the deep state, but by God… Okay. And I hadn't really thought through how mixed my own feelings are about whether or not I'm liking big government And I want more of it, or whether I want to chop it up and make sure that there are little cracks where human beings can intervene and say, hey, here I am, pay attention to me.

Speaker 3 20:14

Sorry, on that note, may I just interject quickly? I won't do this again, I promise. Well, I shouldn't promise. There was one other aspect to my argument that I didn't mention that goes to this, which is that Given the conditions that I already described, under which this public philosophy, for lack of a better word, or political program that supported a greater bureaucratic presence was forged, there wasn't a, and I don't know if there can be, but there wasn't any kind of normative, much of a normative justification or principled justification for this.

So I think, Mehta, you and all of us partly are Part of the dilemma in our own head has to do with a, you know, I mean, Rawls tried at a very high philosophical level, but that's not going to really resonate in everyday life.

Speaker 2 21:14

I'm going to ask Doug's reaction to this. Yesterday, he and I had a debate, not a debate, but a discussion about what is liberalism, what is neoliberalism, and what is neoconism. Let's not try to draw those lines today because, I mean, Anne, why I'm really grateful to have you here talking

Speaker 4 21:46

At this moment in 2026, is because you wrote about, in Debating the American State, about an inflection point in the creation of the modern American bureaucratic state, the liberal state, as it has existed since the interwar years in the United States and the overarching and unresolved question of its legitimacy as a de facto branch of government. And in the decade and a bit since you published it, There's been another inflection point caused by what I think was just emerging at that time from some corners of the American right and the right in other countries, which was to use the phrase the administrative state to describe… Everything that was wrong with the liberal state from their perspective.

And then, of course, in the last two years, the rise of the second Trump administration A very direct and violent challenge to the administrative state as an enemy. And it's organized overthrow. I mean, the first couple months of Trump II with Elon Musk's organization were 100% devoted explicitly to shutting down The bureaucratic institutions of the modern state. And I have to say, it's a form of politics. You mentioned the deep state as a concept meta. I first heard that from people who we would maybe call on the right in Turkey in the 1990s.

And from people on the far left, actually, who would talk about the deep state as being in the wake of the military coup, that it was really this bureaucracy that ran everything, that ran all the actual elected people. And I was surprised to hear… That concept leaping after 2016 out of its Middle Eastern origins to become a popular term uttered by the President of the United States to describe his own public service as an enemy. So let me ask you this second inflection point. Did you anticipate as a way that those tensions that you Outline that tension of legitimacy in the bureaucratic state of being, it would be resolved.

Speaker 3 24:51

Did I anticipate it would be resolved? Oh, God.

Speaker 4 24:54

In this particular way.

Speaker 3 24:55

Oh, in this way, absolutely not.

Speaker 4 24:58

Because a lot of what you talk about in this history is the left's Or scholars who are to the left of the center of gravity of the American liberal state, critiquing its tensions and contradictions and crises of legitimacy. It's interesting, though, I mean, the Trump administration just released this, you know, 2000 page or something outline of the… Reforms it wants to make to a lot of bureaucratic things, and a lot of it is introducing new subsidies for favored industries and that sort of thing, which is stuff that requires bureaucratic apparatus and so on. Yeah.

Speaker 3 25:53

I'll wait till you finish. I'm really sorry. I had to. Sorry.

Speaker 4 25:57

The Trump administration just recently released this voluminous outline of the reforms it wants to make to all sorts of things, which includes a lot of subsidies to favored industries. I think the New York Times focused on the chicken farming subsidies and these sorts of things, which will require You know, its own bureaucratic infrastructure to be implemented and so on. Please continue, but I do want to ask you about what point we're seeing in a certain cycle of power and institutionalization as a result of that. But just continue that thought, please.

Speaker 3 26:48

Okay. Well, thank you so much for that comment. Actually, it's very well taken. And I was generalizing in a way that I don't even agree with, but one tries to do these things sometimes in these contexts, but let's get it a little more granular. So it wouldn't, to be more precise, right? It's not simply the relationship that the Trump administration is trying to forge with the With capitalism, capitalist institutions, is not simply anti-government interference, let's say that. The regulatory stuff, I think, well, even it's not even just anti-regulatory, because as you point out, there are other, you know, there are different kinds of regulation.

And I did say in my book, something that I think is very important that still holds, which is this, this, Landscape of politics in this country, and certainly not now, but even until recently, has not best described as big government versus small government. It's really always been about to what end, as I said, do you want to use government, right? And who decides? So those are the two things that are up for contest, not so much should there be, you know, government power. Now, there is some Through line that I think has been pretty much destroyed by the second Trump administration of, you know, concern about centralized government versus, right, the federal government versus states.

But if you take it in totality, I think there's a general appreciation, as there is for people all over the world, that, you know, collective action in the form of public power needs to take place. So, yeah, sorry, go ahead.

Speaker 4 28:42

What's an interesting development that I think hasn't really fully played out yet is that because power is distributed in the United States, it's a federal state, and states have a lot of powers. In the last two years, we've started to see the seeds of what you might call an emerging counter-administration. At the pseudo-federal level. Okay, this is what I mean. The best example of this is when the Department of Health and Human Services began to get rid of vaccination and funding for vaccination. And also the Supreme Court and other institutions started to roll back reproductive freedom and abortion rights and so on. We have seen coalitions of states, democratic-governed states, that aren't into that. Forming their networks of support. There's a medicine procurement network.

There was a West Coast one that had the West Coast states in it. And I think late last year, it joined up with an East Coast one to create what sort of I thought looked like the seeds of And there's a couple other fields, including reproductive issues, where you're starting to see this, that the states that aren't into it, the Trump agenda, are forming their own counter-administration. I guess you wouldn't call it federal, but at the trans-state level or interstate level.

Speaker 3 30:44

Interstate Compacts, they're called.

Speaker 4 30:47

Okay, there is a name for this then.

Speaker 3 30:50

Well, in one context, I was doing a little research before this program to see how people who are trying to think about counteracting the Trump administration in this context, what were they thinking about? And I came across that.

Speaker 4 31:07

I think that's a unique thing. I mean, I have to say, I'm very glad to be here with both of you because I've increasingly come to be thinking of the change that's happened in the United States and in other countries as sort of illustrations of a shift in power that I associate in my naive and under-informed way with the ideas of Max Weber. And I think it's fair to say you both come from traditions that at least are Weberian in their initial thinking.

And my cartoonish Picture of Max Weber's cycle of politics and power is that you have these eruptions of charismatic authority of various sorts, where it's the rule of the movement or the figure or the person that holds legitimacy, which then gets institutionalized or routinized, I think, into bureaucratic authority, That then becomes removed from its connection to the initial source of legitimacy or authority and becomes a thing unto its own until the cycle begins again. I'm sure that's a gross oversimplification, but I couldn't help thinking this last decade that we're seeing an explosion of this cycle. And in some of the things we're talking about now, it sounds like we're starting to see sort of the institutionalization of the Trump movement's charismatic authority into its own…

Routinization and bureaucratization.

Speaker 2 33:03

Let me react to because I think what you're putting out is two different dimensions, not necessarily the same. I mean, Anne has pointed out that this isn't now just about big government or the administration of government or not. Although it is, I mean, the part about Max Weber, he certainly pointed out all the downside of living in a bureaucracy, and I feel that, you know, that's one of my I do feel that. I think we need to do more to turn power back to ordinary citizens, and it might even involve challenging the rule of law sometimes, or certainly the administrative structures.

But on the other hand, you do have this other side too, where It is a question not of how much power the government will have, as much as what you're going to use it for. And clearly the big fight, as you're pointing out, between certain states and certainly political parties is whether you're going to use it for certain emerging issues that have not been even on the table before. A climate which requires major intervention and is now being curtailed. And also, I think AI is going to be a big drama. And let's not even talk about nuclear weapons because that's been around so long. That's not new. But what are you going to use your power for?

And for Trump, it's a matter of Of taking and giving all the goodies to his buddies, frankly, to coal miners and whatever, or chicken farmers, I don't know. And for, I don't even know who the Democrats are, but they would have much more, certainly the California guy, Newsom, would have more time for supporting climate Climate issues and AI issues, I think. And so we're having a distinction between, is it big government itself that's a problem or the issue, or is it what you're going to do with big government, given the fact that you know damn well you're going to have to have it?

Speaker 3 35:45

Yeah. You're going to have to have it is a very important point too, right? That distinguished the people I wrote about in my own view, right, from Well, you know, Steve Bannon calling for the deconstruction of the administration. That's partly rhetoric, but it's all over the Heritage Foundation report as well. And, you know, certain strains on the left certainly want to see, you know, a much… Diminished state in order, as you say, Mehta, for a greater democratic element.

But it is, I would say, actually, I would just tweak what you said, Mehta, because I think that, I mean, I myself did make that distinction and said that, you know, it's really not been, well, There's an effort right now to get rid of large swaths of government, but not, as we know, the macro picture is deficits are going up, spending is going up, and military activity at home and abroad is increasing. Certain sectors are ramping up. It is this notion of the administrative state as the bogeyman and as a problem in and of itself. And my argument in the book is that formation really defines the whole of federal government.

I mean, the thing itself is sort of subservient to an administrative structure at this point. That was not always the case, right? Headed by the president. And that's another thing we haven't talked about, which is, you know, we have this… Separation of powers and mixed government. And the other thing that's going on, has been going on since the New Deal, frankly, with some blips, is a weakening Congress, the representative part of our democracy. The most important part, that's what we are, first and foremost. And then meanwhile, at the state level, yeah, go ahead.

Speaker 2 38:05

You pointed out something I think very important about Weakening of Congress, which I don't really understand why that's happening. And I think that's very important because the Congress now can't stand up to Trump no matter what. And I don't understand why. And I, you know, I'm so much into things like promoting citizens' assemblies and Other democratic methods of giving people some say-so.

Speaker 3 38:45

Participation.

Speaker 2 38:47

Yeah, I think my fear is about the political parties. The political parties are just too powerful, and even

Speaker 4 38:59

they are not powerful.

Speaker 3 39:01

They're very weak, actually.

Speaker 4 39:02

In the United States, they're weaker than any other country for the simple fact that there's no other country in the world where a political party has no control over who's a member of the party or even who's a candidate for the party. I think that first became apparent when David Duke became a figure in the Republican Party in the early 90s. And there were some Republicans who said, why don't we just kick them out of the party? And I think the courts ruled that under the way things are set up in the States, there's no them who has control over who's in a party, which is a form of weakness, I would say.

Speaker 3 39:42

I think, Matt, what is true, and maybe this is what you're getting at, is partisanship has grown dramatically, and this is documentable. Right. And so it didn't used to be that people in parties would vote so much along. Right. But that's not because the parties are strong. That's what's weird.

Speaker 2 40:09

OK, I take that point. But I do I think that the problem is money has to be channeled through, you know, money to money has to be given to candidates and candidates have to be Party candidates. And so, you know, independence, you know, you got Bernie Sanders. And who else have you got?

Speaker 3 40:34

There's someone else. There's someone, the other senator in Maine, I think. Anyway, not the other. I know Bernie. I mean, the other one, not the one we've been talking, not the seat we've been talking about. The weakness of Congress, you know, One other thing, sorry, about candidates and all of that is that the court, the Supreme, one thing I didn't foresee, and I don't really try to foresee all that much because I'm a historian, I tend to look backward rather than forward or whatever that's worth, but I didn't see a court that was so captured by such a right-wing ideological, so much of it. That's very unusual in our history that it would be that lopsided in either direction.

The Conservatives would say, oh, the Warren Court, but even that didn't have that. It had a somewhat narrow agenda that they all agreed on and implemented, and it was very important. But the role of the Supreme Court in actually enhancing the power of the president, and in some ways the administrative state writ large, is… A new development that I didn't see. But Congress, so that brings in the third branch, right? Congress, the other big, another big scholarly influence on me is Ted Lowy, a political scientist. Cornell, he's retired. I hope he's still alive. I'm not sure. Who wrote in 1969, I think, a book called The End of Liberalism.

And his big concern then, as I said, there's a moment in the 60s, right, was the, to my over-delegation by Congress of decision-making and power to the executive branch and the administrative agencies. It's really complicated and there's not all that much time. I mean, why this has happened and what other. So I won't get into it too much, except to say they could do better, absolutely could do better. And it's really important because, yes, the president is elected also, but that gets highly attenuated very quickly. And we have the Electoral College and and and.

Speaker 4 42:57

It's going to be hard to rebuild. It is. The liberal administrative state. Aside from the question that hangs over your work, which is should you in this way, Because I think the two things that we've learned these last two years are that there's two ways that, I mean, look, even a lot of quite right-wing conservatives now call this fascism, but that a very right-wing government can challenge the administrative state. One is to shut it down entirely, and certainly the federal role in education and USAID and many other organizations Bodies of the state have just been eliminated.

But the other one is to is to make it a direct executive instrument and to politicize it in not just in its source of control, but in its very organic structure and so on, which certainly is the case of the Commerce Department, the Pentagon in many ways. And that's interesting because, of course, that was the critique of the administrative state that some of the scholars you mentioned in the 60s were concerned with, that in Vietnam, you know, you had McNamara's turning the Pentagon into a General Motors of war for the president, however it was phrased and so on. So is it time to think about ways to organize Institutional power that aren't so easily hijacked.

Speaker 3 44:39

Yes, I think it is. And I think that, you know, again, I did a little research because I'm not as up on, you know, what the thinking is now about how to counteract this. Actually, before COVID, I was invited to a conference in Washington where we were going to discuss this, but then it didn't happen. Part of it was in the context of the Supreme Court, actually. And does that need reforming? But That's kind of an external force that's reinforcing much of what the Trump administration is doing. I was interested to see on Reddit, of all places, and of course among academics, there is some very recent new thinking on this.

I don't think we want to, we, those who don't like what's happening in the Trump administration, I don't think we want to just turn the table entirely and say, let's reconstruct the, I mean, you know, let's not deconstruct the state, let's make it more powerful. But I think that, well, one thing I've changed my mind on is independent agencies. There's a little Concerned because they're so purely bureaucratic. They were supposed to not be so… The Federal Reserve is the best example, right? You don't want direct political control over that. And even the Supreme Court seems to be saying that's different. Why it's different principally than the principal legal…

Speaker 4 46:16

You'd think there were a few more that there shouldn't be… Political control over.

Speaker 3 46:21

I mean, yes. And that was the case in the 30s when these agencies really ballooned. Most of the people supporting them, liberals, thought they needed more independence. I, you know, from my academic perch was. But now I see, you know, with a much stronger presidency, the advantages of that. And unfortunately, recently, the Supreme Court decided, no, the president should be able to remove, for any reason, the heads of these agencies. It just happened that the FTC, they're looking at members now, too, and overturned a precedent from the 30s when they were trying to limit Roosevelt. Again, that liberal conservative axis just doesn't line up. So what is to be done?

There is, okay, one thing we've already mentioned, which is, you know, coalitions among states to not to, you know, to do their own sort of administrative work where it's been dismantled. Depoliticizing, as you said, some of the, I don't, you know, presidentially appointed positions. That's an agenda item that I'll have to wait. It's not going to happen now.

Speaker 4 47:41

And just resisting the temptation to re-politicize in the other direction. Exactly.

Speaker 3 47:45

Exactly. Because frankly, very, very complicated, but I'm someone who does like to see nuances and it's just what I do. I'm really upset that the one area where this politicization versus expertise is Another discussion is happening that you didn't mention, Doug, is in the OMB and an area close to my heart, grant making, just in general academic oversight, right? Because there's certain federal laws that give the federal government, regardless of what the Department of Education may be doing otherwise, you know, a great deal of say because the universities and researchers get a lot of federal money or used to. So there's this big fight going on. And it's very much an administrative state fight.

One of the things they passed in the 40s was the Administrative Procedure Act. Which was supposed to bring some light of day to rulemaking, which is instead of lawmaking, the way for the most part that agencies do their stuff. Rulemaking is not a public process for the most part. Doesn't involve jurors or any kind of citizen participation, except in these limited way through this law. These rules have to be published in the Federal Register now, and there are comment periods in which citizens can weigh in.

And so the academic trade organizations, unions, others are urging, well, the period is closed as of yesterday, but people to say that these new OMB rules, which are going to give more power to senior political authorities, you know, should not happen. Yeah.

Speaker 2 49:40

I think we need to play with that a lot more because I'd like to have a whole show about the rulemaking and the democratization of rulemaking. Yes. That's close to my heart. But we've used our time up and so we need to come back another day and pick up this conversation and carry it forward because We're right now at, let's call it what Doug has called an inflection point. I think we're at a point where things are certainly happening, and we have to pay attention. So this is great fun, and I'm really grateful to you, Anne, and we'll be back in touch soon. Either of you want a quick parting word before I say goodbye?

Speaker 3 50:33

Doug, I'd be really interested in your thoughts on this in the context of a more global context, because certain parts of it are, you know, the populist, the charismatic stuff is certainly…

Speaker 4 50:48

It's another conversation to have, but… I've just been spending some time looking at the political effects of the post-Brexit years in the UK, when of course you had… I mean, another level of administrative authority that had inspired a revolt against it, which was the pooled sovereignty and anti-nationalist creation of economic administration in Brussels. And The political debates around the creation of that, and then of course the challenge of that, and a whole other interesting set of topics. And you probably can cite Jurgen Habermas in both the US and the European cases in terms of arguing for the creation of these entities. But anyway, There are other forms of this tension going on, which have, of course, inspired their own challenges from the right.

And this is a whole other interesting conversation to have.

Speaker 3 52:16

Great. Yeah, I just wanted to get that in there for this particular podcast. And also, I'm interested.

Speaker 2 52:22

Okay, we'll come back together with probably some new players as well. But I can say goodbye to Anne for the moment.

Speaker 3 52:29

Thank you so much for having me. It was a really great conversation. Thank you, Doug. And I wish all journalists were as well-informed as you.

Speaker 4 52:42

I'm better informed now. Let's put it that way.

Speaker 3 52:45

Okay. Thanks, everybody. Bye-bye.


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