Author: Metta Spencer
Even before our primate ancestors began to walk upright, there were wars—times when whole human communities or groups within a community tried to kill each other. Scholars have reached this conclusion partly on the basis of Jane Goodall’s discovery that our closest primate relative, the chimpanzee, engages in war,(1) and partly on the basis of archaeological evidence. One site of skeletons was found in Kenya dating back 9,500 to 10,500 years showing that a group of 27 people had been massacred together.(2) Indeed, there is strong evidence that levels of violence were higher in prehistoric times than today.(3) One example is a cemetery about 14,000 years old where about 45 percent of the skeletons showed signs of violent death.(4) An estimated 15 percent of deaths in primitive societies were caused by warfare.
But life did not consistently become friendlier as our species spread and developed. By one estimate, there were 14,500 wars between 3500 BC and the late twentieth century. These took around 3.5 billion lives.(5)
Can we conclude, then, that war is simply an intrinsic part of “human nature,” so that one cannot reasonably hope to overcome it? No, for there is more variation in the frequency and extent of warfare than can be attributed to genetic differences. In some societies, war is completely absent. Douglas Fry, checking the ethnographic records, identified 74 societies that have clearly been non-warring; some even lacked a word for “war.” The Semai of Malaysia and the Mardu of Australia are examples.(6)
We may gain insights about solutions to warfare by exploring the variations in its distribution, type, and intensity. We begin with the best news: We are probably living in the most peaceful period in human history!
Historical Changes in Rates of War
Steven Pinker is the scholar who most convincingly argues that violence has declined, both recently and over the millennia. Pinker’s book Enlightenment Now, contains a graph showing the numbers of battle deaths by year from 1945 to 2015. A huge spike represents World War II, of course, for that was most lethal war in human history, causing at least 55 million deaths. How can we reconcile that ghastly number with any claim that the modern era is a peaceful epoch?
Pinker’s proof is based on distinguishing sharply between absolute numbers and rates. To be sure, 55 million is a huge number, but the Mongol Conquests killed 40 million people back in the thirteenth century, out of a world population only about one-seventh the size of the world’s 1950 population. Pinker says that if World War II had matched the Mongols’ stupendous rate of killing, about 278 million people would have been killed.
Read moreAnd there was an even worse war than the Mongol Conquest: the An Lushan Revolt of eighth century China, an eight-year rebellion that resulted in the loss of 36 million people — two-thirds of the empire’s population, and a sixth of the world’s population at the time. Had it matched that level of atrocity, considering the size of the world’s population in the 1940s, World War II would have killed 419 million people! Pinker calls An Lushan the worst war in human history. By his calculations, based on rates or percentages, World War II was only the ninth worst in history and World War I was the 16th worst.(7)
Moreover, Pinker shows that the two world wars were huge spikes in a graph of war deaths that has declined remarkably since 1950. There has been a slight upward bump since 2010, representing the civil war in Syria, but even that increase is minuscule in comparison to the rates of battle deaths over the preceding centuries.(8)
Pinker admits that there is no guarantee that this civilizing trend will continue, but he marshals much empirical evidence to explain it in terms of several historical changes. One was the transition to agriculture from hunting and gathering. This brought about a fivefold decrease in rates of violent death from chronic raiding and feuding.(9)
A second factor occurred in Europe between the Middle Ages and the 20th century when feudal territories were consolidated into large kingdoms with centralized authority and an infrastructure of commerce. This led to a tenfold-to-fiftyfold decline in homicide rates. There have been numerous other changes since then, including the abolition of such practices as slavery, dueling, sadistic punishment, and cruelty to animals. Since the end of World War II the downward trend has been remarkable.(10)
Nature
Unlike Steven Pinker, who attributes the current relatively wonderful degree of peacefulness to cultural and social changes in history, Dave Grossman attributes it to nature itself. In contrast to those who claim that human nature destines us to be killers, Grossman argues that people are “naturally” reluctant to kill members of their own species. In this respect we resemble other animals, for it is normal for animals to avoid killing their own species. When, for example, two male moose bash each other with their horns, they rarely do much real damage.
In fact, the human reluctance to kill their own kind poses a real problem for military leaders, who must induce their soldiers to fight wars. Lt. Col. Grossman himself had been responsible for training US Army Rangers, and he seems to have taken considerable pride in overcoming nature’s inhibitions.
Grossman cites Brigadier General S. L. A. Marshall’s book Men Against Fire, which showed that only 15 to 20 percent of the individual riflemen in World War II fired their weapons at an exposed enemy soldier.(11) Similar results can be shown in earlier wars as well, including for example the battlefield of Gettysburg, where of the discarded muskets later found there, 90 percent were still loaded.(12)
On the other hand, soldiers who work together as crews (e.g. in launching cannon-fire or flamethrowers together) do not show the same hesitation, nor do soldiers whose officers stand nearby, ordering them to fire. And distance matters too; stabbing an enemy is harder to do than shooting one a few meters away, and the farther away the enemy is, the easier it is to shoot him. Bombardiers rarely hesitate to drop shells on the people below, nor do drone operators sitting at controls in a different continent. Distance, team spirit and authority can apparently overcome nature’s misgivings.
In response to Marshall’s discovery, the U.S. military developed new training measures to break down this resistance. For example, instead of having soldiers fire at bulls-eye targets, the army now provides realistic human-shaped silhouettes that pop up suddenly and must be shot quickly. The training also relies on repetition; soldiers are required to shoot many, many times so they stop thinking about the possible implications of each shot.(13)
The best technological innovation for inuring fighters for battle is the video training simulator. As a result of using the equivalent to violent videogames, the military successfully raised soldiers’ firing rates to over 90 percent during the Vietnam War. Because of this “superior training,” Grossman claims that today “non-firers” are almost non-existent among U.S. troops.
While lauding the military for developing such excellent training systems, Grossman is scathing in criticizing the use of video games as entertainment. He maintains that the very methods that turn soldiers into superb killers will, and do, influence the players to become violent in real life. He blames the epidemic of school shootings, for example, largely on the exposure of teen-aged boys to violent films and especially violent video games.(14)
Moreover, the training of soldiers for battle does not protect them from the psychological consequences of fighting. In a study of World War II soldiers, after sixty days of continuous combat, 98 percent of all those surviving had become psychiatric casualties. One-tenth of all American military men were hospitalized for mental disturbances between 1942 and 1945.[14] Moreover, upon their return to civilian life, the incidence of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder remains high, and more veterans commit suicide than had been killed during the war. Also, the U.S. Army dismissed more than 22,000 soldiers for misconduct between 2009- 2016 after they returned from war with mental health problems or brain injuries.(15)
These facts clearly disprove the assertion that human nature itself destines us all to be killers; indeed, one might argue that, on the contrary, nature intends for us all to be peaceful. However, even that assertion is hard to sustain when we look at the evidence showing how widespread is the cultural pattern of glorifying war and warriors.
The Hero Warrior
Not everyone is reluctant to kill. On the contrary. For example, consider Mr. L, an Asian friend of ours whose brother was found decapitated on a forest trail. Mr. L knew who had done it — the army of Burma — so he went to the jungle and joined the resistance army. For seventeen years he was a sniper. Now living in Canada, he finds the memory hard to explain:
“Actually, I loved it. I probably killed about thirty men in all, and it was the greatest feeling! I was always so elated after killing an enemy soldier that I couldn’t sleep that night. That’s what I went to there to do, after all. But now? Well…”
No one in Canada glorifies Mr. L’s achievements, but in another time or place he might be considered a war hero. Brave, effective warriors have been honored by their own societies at least as far back as the ancient Assyrians and Greeks.
There were good reasons for it. When our ancestors still lived in caves, presumably some strong fellow volunteered to stand guard at night to keep out the saber-toothed tigers. His mother must have felt proud of him, and perhaps also praised him and his brave buddies for raiding the neighbors’ cave and bringing home valuable loot.
The Iliad is one long bloodcurdling story about heroes seeking to outdo each other in courage and brutality. Militarism is the belief or the desire of a government or a people that a state should maintain a strong military capability and use it aggressively to expand national interests and/or values.(16) Among the most intelligent militarists who glorified war was the philosopher Georg Hegel,(17) whose views were perfectly ordinary in the Prussian society of his day.
A century later in America militarism was not quite as popular, but the great American psychologist William James, who was a pacifist, could nevertheless understand and even respect it as a moral stance. He pointed out that young males need a thrilling opportunity to test their capacity for enduring physical hardship and surmounting obstacles. That is what sports are for, but James wanted this experience to involve sacrifice and a sense of service as well. He was seeking to innovate a rigorous substitute for military discipline whereby youths could instead contribute positively to society. James understood the emotional value and even romance of militarism, as shown in his sardonic depiction of war from the militarists’ point of view:
“Its ‘horrors’ are a cheap price to pay for rescue from the only alternative supposed, of a world of clerks and teachers, of co-education and zoophily, of ‘consumer’s leagues’ and ‘associated charities,’ of industrialism unlimited, and feminism unabashed. No scorn, no hardness, no valor any more! Fie upon such a cattleyard of a planet!”(18)
James believed that this “manly” yearning for hard challenges ought to be fulfilled. He proposed a system of national service whereby all young males would be conscripted to serve in a challenging role. (He called it a “war against nature,” which is a shocking notion today; we’d prefer to call it a “war for nature.”) He thought that privileged youths should have to experience at least once the hardships that poor people endure throughout their lives. And indeed, since James’s day, the United States and many other prosperous societies have developed programs such as the Peace Corps to fill that need. It is unlikely, however, that the challenges they offer overseas are comparable to the emotions of killing or stepping onto a landmine.
If Pinker’s fond hopes (and our own) could be fulfilled, the planet might indeed resemble what James’s militarists consider a boring “cattleyard” — but that seems unlikely to occur. Our war heroes are still celebrities. And many of them still commit suicide.
The Evolution or the Death of Warfare?
Pinker’s statistics are correct, but it is far too early to celebrate the impending death of war. Weaponry continues to become ever more deadly, and the history of warfare is best described in terms of the evolutionary improvement of weapons. We present in Table 1 the summary of those developments provided by Dave Grossman and Loren Christensen— who, oddly, have omitted today’s worst weapons of mass destruction, as well as the future of autonomous weapons and cyber weapons. These innovations require our utmost concern.
Table 1. Landmarks in the Evolution of Combat
Dates generally represent century or decade of first major, large-scale introduction
c. 1700BC Chariots provide key form of mobility advantage in ancient warfare
c. 400BC: Greek phalanx
c. 100BC: Roman system (pilum, swords, training, professional leadership)
c. 900AD: Mounted knight (stirrup greatly enhances utility of mounted warfare)
c. 1300: Gunpowder (cannon) in warfare
c. 1300: Wide scale application of long bow defeats mounted knights
c. 1600: Gunpowder (small arms) in warfare, defeats all body armor
c. 1800: Shrapnel (exploding artillery shells), ultimately creates renewed need for helmets, c. 1915
c. 1850: Percussion caps permit all-weather use of small arms *
c. 1870: Breech-loading, cartridge firing rifles and pistols
c. 1915: Machine gun
c. 1915: Gas warfare
c. 1915: Tanks
c. 1915: Aircraft *
c. 1915: Self-loading (automatic) rifles and pistols
c. 1940: Strategic bombing of population centers
c. 1945: Nuclear weapons
c. 1960: Large scale introduction of operant conditioning in training to enable killing *
c. 1960: Large scale introduction of media violence begins to enable domestic violent crime
c. 1965: Large scale introduction of helicopters in battle
c. 1970: Introduction of precision-guided munitions in warfare
c. 1980: Kevlar body armor provides first individual armor to defeat state-of-the-art small arms in over 300 years *
c. 1990: Large scale introduction of operant conditioning through violent video games begins to enable mass murders in domestic violent crime
c. 1990: First extensive use of precision guided munitions in warfare (approximately 10 percent of all bombs dropped), by Unites States forces in the Gulf War
c. 1990: Large scale use of combat stress inoculation in law enforcement, with the introduction of paint bullet training
c. 2000: Approximately 70 percent of all bombs used by United States forces in conquest of Afghanistan and Iraq are precision-guided munitions
c. 2000: Large scale use of combat stress inoculation in United States military forces, with the introduction of paint bullet combat simulation training *
* Represents developments influencing domestic violent crime.
Source: Grossman and Christensen, Evolution of Weaponry. Loc. 2058 in Kindle version
In a nutshell, weapons keep get more and more effective at killing, and the population keeps increasing (especially during the past century), so this might suggest a gloomy prediction: that we must expect a world war vastly larger than either of the two previous ones.
But neither Pinker nor Grossman have concluded that the magnitude of a war will inevitably be determined by either the population or the effectiveness of weapons. Pinker believes that the records of history show that war is rather randomly distributed over time and space, not following any discernable pattern.
Scholars know quite a lot about warfare in early civilizations, for we have epic stories such as Gilgamesh in Mesopotamia (about 2500 BCE) and Achilles versus Hector in Homer’s Greece (supposedly 1184 BCE).
The Hittites invented the chariot, and the Egyptians adopted it from them, though there were long intervals when chariots were not used in any Middle Eastern wars. Though the Greeks often used chariots, they would sometimes stop and dismount for hand-to-hand combat. The Greeks invented the phalanx, or row of middle-class citizen-soldiers(19) fighting side by side with their shields overlapping, with long pikes against an enemy’s phalanx.
But the elite warriors worked differently. Achilles, for example, would individually single out the enemy he considered a worthy match. Such a noble warrior might stroll across the battlefield to the enemy’s side, and call out their best fighter by name to come and fight him to the death. This kind of semi-organized warfare also has been practiced until recently in some paleolithic societies, such as in Papua New Guinea.(20)
We need not trace the complete evolution of weaponry from ancient times to now, except to mention a few dramatic innovations. One was the invention of gunpowder, which of course made it easy to kill large numbers of opponents. It was discovered in China during the late ninth century, but was not used in that country except for fireworks. It was adopted in the West, and ironically, much later, the Chinese were defeated by Westerners with firearms.
Historians debate why the Chinese did not use gunpowder(21) for military purposes, but the more interesting point is simply the fact that they did not. We can take this as evidence that technological innovation does not take an inevitable course, for sometimes a society opts not to perfect a weapon that offers the every prospect of improved effectiveness.
Much later, there were other extraordinary military discoveries that have been prohibited almost everywhere. Chemical weapons (notably chlorine, phosgene, and mustard gas.) were used in World War I. Although the Germans soon developed powerful nerve agents such as sarin, no chemical weapons were used in World War II. Some say that Hitler ruled out using them against troops because he had experienced gas poisoning during World War I. However, he did not hesitate to use them in his death camps. In the Geneva Protocol of 1925 the international community banned the use of chemical and biological weapons. In 1973 and 1993 the prohibition was even strengthened by the Chemical Weapons Convention, which bans the development, production, stockpiling and transfer of these weapons. By now 193 states have ratified that treaty and the whole world expresses shock whenever it is violated, as in the Syrian civil war in 2017.(22)
Likewise, biological agents could be, and have sometimes been, used effectively in warfare. For example, in 1763 the British forces defending Fort Pitt, near Philadelphia, gave blankets from smallpox patients to Indian chiefs who had come to negotiate an end to their conflict.(23)
Epidemics of disease have been a regular feature of warfare throughout the ages. Indeed, more people died of “Spanish flu” during World War I — between 20 million and 50 million(24) — than were killed by military action. When troops move around, they may be exposed to pathogens and carry them with them. However, such epidemics are not spread intentionally, and there is not only a norm against the use of biological agents to kill enemies, but it is also prohibited by the same treaty that bans the use of chemical weapons.
Thus it is evident that at times even the most horrible technological means of killing — gunpowder, chemical, and biological weapons — have been banned and the prohibitions against them have generally been obeyed. People sometimes opt not to use weapons that are available to them. Take heart, for this proves that war is not inexorable.
Yet not all of the worst weapons have been banned, and until they are abolished, one cannot be as optimistic as Steven Pinker in expecting the end of warfare. There are four crucial initiatives going on now to ban weapons. If all are fulfilled, such optimism will be wholly justified. These propose to (a) regulate the trade in conventional arms among nations to prevent the violation of human rights; (b) ban the existence of nuclear weapons, and (c) prohibit the development of lethal autonomous weapons — those sometimes called “killer robots” — and (d) regulate the potential for cyberattacks. Our Platform for Survival promotes each of these bans in specific planks.
The Arms Trade Treaty
It is not now realistic to ban all firearms or other conventional weapons, if only because we depend on states to authorize the use of weapons by police to protect citizens whenever necessary. Nevertheless, it is possible to reduce the incidence and violence of contemporary wars by preventing the transfer of conventional weapons (e.g. assault rifles and other military hardware such as armored personnel carriers) to insurgent groups or lawless states.
Most of the real wars in today’s world differ from what we previously thought of as war. Mary Kaldor calls them “new wars.”(25) For centuries, war had meant conflicts between states with the maximum use of violence. But these “new wars” combine war, organized crime, and human rights violations. They are sometimes fought by global organizations, sometimes local ones; they are funded and organized sometimes by public agencies, sometimes private ones. They resort to such tactics as terrorism and destabilizing the enemy with false information on the Internet.
What is a suitable response to such wars, given our historical assumption that, according to Max Weber’s definitions, a sovereign state is any organization that succeeds in holding the exclusive right to use, threaten, or authorize physical force against residents of its territory.(26) In a time of globalization, Kaldor insists that the monopoly of legitimate organized violence must be shifted from a national to a transnational level and that international peacekeeping must be redefined as law enforcement of global norms. Kaldor’s proposal is consistent with our Platform for Survival’s plank 25, which promotes the cosmopolitan notion of “sustainable common security.”
This approach can begin with the development of a treaty regulating (though not completely banning) the international trade in conventional weapons. Such an international law — the Arms Trade Treaty — was adopted in 2013, when 155 UN member states voted in favor of it and three against, with 23 abstentions. It entered into force on 24 December 2014 after the fiftieth state ratified it.
The treaty, if well enforced, can reduce the incidence and violence of wars. Although one might suppose that the main source of weaponry for “new wars” is the black market trade in illegal arms, that is not the case. Until now, most violent movements have obtained their weapons by purchasing them openly from states that are indifferent as to whether or not the “end users” are responsible. The Arms Trade Treaty prohibits countries from permitting the transfer of weapons to any group or state that violates human rights or international humanitarian law. However, the treaty is only a regulation between states, having no bearing on nations’ internal gun laws.
The Nuclear Bomb: The “Perfect Weapon”?
If there is such a thing as a “perfect sword,” or a “perfect storm,” then what would be a “perfect weapon”? Probably it would be a thermonuclear bomb. A nuclear bomb manifests precisely every attribute of an ideal killing machine; it is the consummate device for destroying enemies on an unlimited scale.
The largest hydrogen bomb that was ever exploded was the Soviet invention, Tsar Bomba, which was exploded by the Soviet Union on 30 October 1961 over Novaya Zemlya Island in the Russian Arctic Sea. It was equivalent to 58.6 megatons of TNT, and its fireball was five miles wide and could be seen from 630 miles away. It was ten times more powerful than all of the munitions expended during World War II combined. The blast wave orbited the earth three times. And even so, Tsar Bomba was only half the size that the inventors had originally planned to build. They had realized that exploding that a full-sized version might have been self-destructive. Indeed, such a weapon is too big ever to be used in a war. It is the “perfect weapon” — so good that it can kill everything, including its creators. No war with such weapons can ever be won. And, as Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan agreed, no nuclear war must ever be fought.
Tsar Bomba was only one bomb, and logically a single such perfect weapon ought to be enough — indeed, it should be “one too many.” You would want to dismantle it as soon as possible. But suppose your crazy enemy has such a bomb too. You might reasonably fear that, seeing you without one, he would take the opportunity to use his. To prevent that, you might want to keep some of these “perfect weapons” and declare that you will retaliate if he starts a fight.
That is what happened. The owners of nuclear weapons each kept a growing stockpile of them. Each side knew that any nuclear war would involve “mutual assured destruction” or “MAD” — the total annihilation of them all. Each side also knew that to explode one them in war would be an act of suicide, yet by 1986 there were 64,449 nuclear bombs on the planet.(27) Madness! But once such a situation of mutual deterrence is established, how can you end it?
The creators of “mutual assured destruction” proposed that the situation be reversed gradually by a process of “arm control.” The adversaries would meet, discuss their predicament, and agree to reduce their stockpiles in equal amounts, one step at a time. But this was tricky, for each side considered every weapon to be, not only a terrible threat, but also a necessity for “security.” It would be used only to deter the other side, keep the adversary from using his bomb.
But when your arsenals contain bombs of different sizes, in different types of delivery systems, it is hard to decide which combination of weapons to offer as your package, or what combination your adversary should offer to match yours. You could go on haggling over this kind of thing for decades.
As indeed the arms controllers have done. Negotiations for nuclear disarmament are supposed to take place by 55 states in Geneva — an organization called the Conference on Disarmament — “CD.” However, all decisions there require the unanimous consent of all parties— which never happens. No progress has been made at the “CD” since the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was negotiated in August 1996. In fact, the nuclear weapons states make it clear that they do not intend to relinquish their bombs within the foreseeable future, since they claim that their “security” depends upon retaining them.
In a strange sense, they are right. However weak a country may be, if it acquires a nuclear arsenal, any unfriendly country will think twice before threatening it. On the other hand, that is obviously an insane notion of “security.” The existence of a “perfect weapon” creates a logical paradox as well as a practical dilemma that no military leaders have solved.
The most humane solution to the paradox is one that the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev recognized and adopted in dealing with President Ronald Reagan during the Cold War. In this he was influenced by the German politician Egon Bahr, who explained in a 1994 interview:
“I came to a very astonishing result at that time. I thought, based on the mutual assured destruction, it’s quite obvious that neither side in a major nuclear exchange can win a war. So if this is true, then the result is in the political sphere — that the potential enemy becomes the partner of your own security and the other way around. In other words, despite the fact of the East-West conflict, both sides can live together or can die together. If this is true, we live in a period de facto of common security.
“And when I reached this result, I was surprised because this was against the experience of history. In history, when you fought, you had to beat the enemy. To become secure, you had to win a war. So, I wrote this down and I thought, better think it over.”(28)
This notion of common security became the guiding principle in the Palme Commission, which was then seeking solutions to the Cold War. The Russian participant in the Palme Commission, Georgy Arbatov, conveyed Bahr’s ideas to Mikhail Gorbachev, who was then the Soviet Minister of Agriculture. Evidently Gorbachev fully assimilated the notion to his own thinking. Shortly after he came to power, Egon Bahr met him and Gorbachev began explaining to him the idea of common security as if he had thought of it himself.(29)
Actually, however, Gorbachev’s notion of common security seems to have differed from that of Bahr, who believed that the situation of common security was created by, and even depended on, the existence of the relationship of mutual assured destruction. Gorbachev cannot have believed that, for it was he, more than anyone else, who sought to abolish all nuclear weapons for the sake of common security. And for about one day, October 11, 1986, in Reykjavik, Iceland he almost got his wish.
President Ronald Reagan shared Gorbachev’s recognition that nuclear war could never be won, and when the two men met in Iceland’s capital, Gorbachev offered to disarm every one of his nuclear weapons if the Americans would do the same with theirs. Since between them the two countries owned the vast majority of the world’s nuclear weapons, such a deal would have ended the arms race and moved humankind back closer to a state of genuine security.
Unfortunately, Ronald Reagan wanted to have both nuclear disarmament and a defence against nuclear weapons, lest any be kept and used to bomb the United States. He had developing a project called “Strategic Defense Initiative,” (then popularly called “Star Wars”) that he hoped would be able to intercept and destroy incoming nuclear missiles before they could reach their targets. If it worked, such a system would only be defensive; it could not attack an enemy but only defend against an enemy’s bombs. However, any country with such a “shield” would enjoy vast superiority over an enemy if it retained even a few nuclear weapons secretly, for its enemy would be helpless. Mutual Assured Destruction would no longer exist to confer its perverse version of “security” on both sides. Gorbachev realized that he could not trade away MAD for such partial progress. Thus the deal collapsed — much to the relief of Reagan’s advisers who had never wanted to give up their country’s nuclear arsenal at all. The subject was never officially broached again in the United States.
However, the conversation between the two superpower leaders did have benign effects. A year later the Soviet Union and the United States agreed to a new treaty, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of 1987. Both sides agreed to ban ground-launched missiles with a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. This removed the most frightening danger of that era, when both the Soviet side and the NATO side had been toe-to-toe, nearly installing weapons in Europe that would almost inevitably have led to a real nuclear war.
Indeed, Gorbachev went even further, removing Soviet troops from Eastern Europe and no longer promising to support any of the Communist regimes in that region, should their citizens wish to leave the Soviet sphere of influence — as indeed they did. In 1989, protests swept through those states and forced the Communist regimes, now lacking the support of Soviet military intervention, to relinquish power to formerly dissident political activists.
Nor was the Soviet Union itself exempt from opposition movements. In 1991 Gorbachev had to lower the Soviet flag from the Kremlin, for nationalism and the economic strains of transitioning to capitalism were fragmenting the union that he had led.
But the Cold War was over, and nuclear disarmament continued for several years, though relations between East and West never quite became cordial. Their last arms reduction agreement, the “New START” Treaty, was signed by Presidents Dmitri Medvedev and Barack Obama in 2010. Today there are still about 15,000 nuclear weapons on the planet, 90 percent of which belong to the US or Russia.(30) Moreover, to win approval of that treaty by the U.S. Senate, Obama had found it necessary to consent to modernizing the American nuclear arsenal, which is expected to cost about $1.5 trillion over the next thirty years—unless the Democrats now controlling the House of Representatives reverse that plan.
Tensions are still increasing, with Russia complaining that the US broke the promise it made to Gorbachev not to move NATO “one inch to the east” when he was so readily dismantling the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Indeed, he should probably have insisted that such a promise be recorded in a treaty, for most of the formerly Soviet bloc countries now hope to join NATO and several already have been admitted.
Moreover, although “Star Wars” never lived up to its promoters’ hopes, there is a continuing interest in defensive systems that can intercept incoming missiles in flight. NATO (read “the US”) is installing such a system called Aegis on ships in the Mediterranean, as well as ashore in Romania and Poland. Russia objects that these are not merely defensive, and in a recent paper Theodore A. Postol has shown that their objections are well founded. The canisters from which missiles can be launched in the Aegis Ashore system can easily have software installed that can launch cruise missiles, in violation of the INF Treaty.(31)
For its part, the US has accused Russia of violating the INF Treaty too by preparing to install a new missile that count hit Western European cities. Indeed, President Trump has announced his intention of withdrawing from the INF Treaty in six months and President Putin says he will develop new nuclear weaponry in response. We are in a new arms race.
Thus we see that the long experiment with arms control has failed to abolish nuclear weapons. What other options might succeed instead?
Though there is no prospect of speedy progress, the best alternative initiative is the “Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons” (TPNW), which was adopted (by a vote of 122 States in favour (with one vote against and one abstention) at the United Nations on 7 July 2017. It will enter into force 90 days after the fiftieth ratification has been deposited.(32)
The TPNW was the result, not of official arms control negotiations, but of action by civil society—notably an organization called the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN). According to all international public opinion polls, the majority of citizens of virtually every country have always wanted nuclear weapons to be abolished, but they have lacked any means of forcing the nuclear weapons states to comply. But the governments of Norway, Mexico, and Austria convened several conferences that flatly denied that nuclear weapons can ever make the world safer. The participants reminded everyone of the catastrophic humanitarian effects of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and showed that on numerous occasions nuclear missiles have nearly been exploded, sometimes by intention, sometimes by mistake. ICAN’s argument has been convincing, and nations are ratifying the TPNW more quickly than with most previous treaties.
So far, the nuclear weapons states just ignore the treaty. Nevertheless, ICAN was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2018 and continues pressing the nuclear states to comply, invoking shame to motivate them. To be sure, the leaders of all nuclear weapons states are shameless and are unmoved by humanitarian appeals to any ethical principles. On the other hand, they can no longer pretend to be progressing toward disarmament with the methods that they have used so far.
So the greatest threat lies ahead, when states are no longer inhibited by the INF treaty or, possibly, even by the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which may also be terminated if the nuclear arms race heats up. The US is making a new nuclear weapon only one-third the size of the Hiroshima bomb. One might consider such smaller bombs less dangerous than large ones, but that is not so. A small nuclear weapon is designed to be used in battle, not merely rattled ominously to intimidate or deter an enemy. We are in a post-MAD world now, and something new must be done to counter the threat.
Killer Robots and Cyberattacks
Gunpowder and nuclear weapons were “breakthroughs” in the development of weaponry. Now we must act quickly to prevent the development of other innovations with shocking potential: the application of artificial intelligence, robotics, and cyber-hacking to the development of weapons. Fortunately, we may still have enough time to stop lethal autonomous weapons, for the Pentagon is not yet working on producing them.(33) It is much harder to stop a weapons program after investors have sunk their savings into it and workers’ jobs would be lost by banning the weapon. Stopping cyberattacks will be harder to achieve, for there are already huge institutions using such systems.
In a way, it is entertaining to imagine two shiny robots fighting a duel — a nicer replay of the Iliad, when Achilles and Hector went mano-a-mano at Troy. If the two machines would merely kill each other we might even enjoy cheering for our side’s tin soldier, since no real blood would be shed. Unfortunately, lethal autonomous weapons will not be so restrained. Instead, they will be programmed to hunt down you or me–human adversaries. And if they have artificial intelligence, they may even learn to plan how to take over the world. Or at least such is the warning of some widely respected persons, including Elon Musk and Stephen Hawking.
But the Chinese rejected gunpowder, and we can reject killer robots and cyber war. The mechanism for opposing lethal autonomous weapons is a UN body that reviews and enforces a treaty called the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. Of course, killer robots are not plausibly considered “conventional,” but they are officially categorized as such because they are not chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. The common trait shared by all the banned so-called “conventional” weapons is that they are deemed “inhumane.” (Some of us do not consider any weapons humane except perhaps the darts that are used to tranquilize wild animals for medical treatment.) We must expect that lethal autonomous weapons, if allowed to select their own targets, would not be gentle, so there is an urgent need for such innovations to be prohibited.(34)
Cyberattacks are already a familiar experience for most of us, since we receive fraudulent phishing attacks or fake news in our social media all the time. Banks experience large losses through cyber theft, but prefer not to publicize that fact. There are even ransom attacks on civilians and hospitals, whereby the hacker promises to restore one’s computer to proper functioning only after receiving a large payoff. But these are mere annoyances when compared to an organized cyber war.
Indeed, a malevolent adversary can wreak terrible effects on any society today without firing any weapon. Already you are probably receiving “likes” on your Facebook account from foreign “bots” — fake accounts purporting to belong to someone who shares your values. The purpose is to lure you into reading posts that influence you to accept more extremist ideas or even to participate in extremist street demonstrations. We lack any easy means of identifying and intercepting these messages, though the political effects can indeed be significant in a democracy.
Still the effects of a violent cyber war can surpass these problems. It would be easy for the anti-ballistic missile defence system of any country or alliance to knock out the satellites belonging to its enemy. Already our electric grid and municipal water purification systems are vulnerable to attack, and we are entering the era of the “Internet of Things.” All our digital equipment— e.g. cars, door locks, kitchen stoves, phones — will be managed through remote systems that are vulnerable to hacking. If ten million electric cars stall at the same time on our streets, we will be helpless.
The plans to manage these threats are almost exclusively military: deter your enemy by proving that you can retaliate powerfully to any cyberattack. In 2010 the Obama Administration established a military Cyber Command in the military, and the US is not unique. Out of 114 states with some form of national cyber security programs, 47 assign some role to their armed forces.(35) Russia has already used cyberattacks against Estonia and Georgia; Israel has used them against Syria in conjunction with its bombing of a covert nuclear facility; and the US has used them (a cyber “worm” called “Stuxnet”) against Iran’s nuclear enrichment plant. None of these advanced countries seem genuinely interested in reaching an international agreement to regulate or ban any of their cyber activities.
On the other hand, there have been ostensible efforts to create limits. Obama’s administration called for some action and In 2011 China and Russia submitted a Code of Conduct for Information Security to the UN General Assembly. Most of the proposals in it were innocuous, but one clause asserted all states’ sovereign right to protect their ”information space”. The vagueness of this principle left others wondering whether the whole code of conduct was meant as a serious proposal or as only a cover for problematic intentions. There is an urgent need for international law to prevent cyber war.
Is Militarism the Main Problem?
War and weapons constitute only one of the six global threats that we must urgently address, since any one of them could destroy civilization within a short interval. If we are to strategize and decide how to solve the six threats together, it may be useful to identify which option may have the largest payoff. Probably the answer is this: reduce militarism.
You may ask: Why militarism? Answer: Because war and weapons cause or exacerbate all five of the other global threats. By reducing the national armed forces (we probably cannot eliminate them entirely) we will reduce all the other risks.
Global warming is a danger on the same scale as war. To solve it we must urgently halt the emissions of greenhouse gas from every expendable human activity. And war is not only expendable, but abolishing it would benefit every person involved.
Moreover, it harms all the rest of us by emitting vast amounts of carbon. Manufacturing each gun, each airplane, each tank, each bomb, each bomb or bullet emits greenhouse gas. Flying the planes, shooting the bullets emits it too. The Pentagon is the largest consumer of fuel in the world. When it conducts a military operation overseas, such as in Afghanistan or Iraq, forty percent of the cost goes for transporting the fuel for use there. Then that fuel is used for injuring people and destroying buildings that later must be reconstructed, emitting even more carbon.
Suppose every country reduces its military by, say, 80 percent by the year 2030. No one can say with certainty how much this would reduce the CO2 in the planet’s atmosphere. However, one of the strongest arguments for cutting military expenditures is to limit climate change.
But militarism imposes huge opportunity costs. Diverting the money from militarism could enable other essential innovations, including limiting climate change. Global military expenditures between 1995 and 2016 hovered at about 2.3% of the world’s total Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The Sustainable Development Goals could be met with about half of that amount. In other words, such a shift in expenditures would enable humanity’s unmet needs to be provided, for health, education, agriculture and food security, access to modern energy, water supply and sanitation, telecommunications and transport infrastructure, ecosystems, and emergency response, humanitarian work, plus climate change mitigation and adaptation.(36)
The most grave threat besides the risk of nuclear war is climate change, and the most promising way of reducing CO2 in the air is by planting about a trillion trees. But that will cost vast sums. The only likely source of such funds is by diverting budgets from military activities to afforestation. Reducing militarism is the best — maybe the only realistic — way to reduce climate change. Unfortunately, in Kyoto and Paris accords, no country is even obliged to report /em> its military activities as part of its commitment to reduce CO2 emissions.
The other global threats are also all connected to militarism. For example, the only famines in the world today are not the result of food shortages. They are all created deliberately as acts of war or to subdue a population. For example, Saudi Arabia has blockaded food shipments into Yemen precisely to starve the Yemeni population into submission. And the people of Venezuela are starving because of their government’s deliberate policies to suppress protests against a military-backed regime. Famines are designed to violate human rights. Ending militarism would be a decisive step toward ending famine.
Likewise, ending militarism would reduce the incidence of epidemics. Historically, soldiers on the move carry diseases with them and spread them wherever they go. Germ warfare is prohibited by international law now but, as usual, more of the famine victims in Yemen are dying from diseases such as cholera than are actually starving to death or dying in battle. When people are weakened by stress and deprivation, they succumb to diseases. War is a cause.
Furthermore, ending militarism would reduce the risks of massive exposure to radioactivity. The original reason for creating reactors was to produce plutonium for nuclear bombs. Only later did anyone think of using the heat from these reactors as a means of generating electricity. Today large swathes of land are poisoned by radioactive waste, as for example around Hanford, Washington, where the Manhattan Project produced the radioactive ingredients for America’s nuclear arsenal. Seventy years later, the Hanford area is still poisonous and, as Ronan Farrow has reported, “Clean up of the toxic material at the Hanford Nuclear Site is expected to take 50 years.”(37) Numerous other contaminated military sites exist around the world, including battlefields in Syria and Iraq littered with depleted uranium(38) and a leaking dome-shaped dump in the Marshall Islands.(39)
There are countless ways of using radioactivity as a weapon of war. Crashing a plane into an enemy’s reactor may create a plume that would circle the planet, falling everywhere or polluting the oceans. Terrorist organizations are known to be seeking access to radioactive materials, probably for “dirty bombs” that will not explode but will contaminate large areas. The more radioactive waste there is in the world, the more opportunities will inevitably exist for these to become weapons. A solution to the problem requires two approaches: (a) managing the radioactive waste itself for many thousands of years, and (b) reducing the militarism that misuses these wastes as weapons. The technological challenge of burying the waste is probably easier than the social challenge of changing militaristic thinking.
Finally, reducing militarism obviously will reduce the risk of cyberattacks. Indeed, when we speak of cyberattacks, most people assume that we are speaking of a military attack, though there are probably more such attacks waged every day by civilian criminals stealing from businesses and individuals than are sponsored by foreign governments.
All six threats tend to interact causally, so that we need to address them together as a system. Nevertheless, there may be more “leverage” available by quickly demanding a reduction of militarism than through any other direct policy changes.
Still, this will not be easy. People have their jobs and their live savings tied up in the military-industrial complex and will not readily change to projects that can actually save the world. And they will argue that their security depends on having a robust military to defend their country from attack. Their concerns cannot properly be disregarded. If militarism is to be reduced, some other form of armed protection is necessary. We would not, for example, abolish the police in a country or city, for doing so always results in more crime and violence. A few countries (notably Costa Rica) have abolished their armed forces, but they still have police. Something similar must be provided at the international level. Two planks in the Platform for Survival call for the development of “sustainable common security” and a United Nations Emergency Peace Service, which would quickly rush to protect people anywhere in the world who are in danger of attack.
But how many people would trust the United Nations to protect them? There are surely good reasons for skepticism, since the Security Council is controlled ultimately by the veto power of five major states. Only a more democratically accountable body in the United Nations can be trusted to protect people equally, without regard to alliances and enmities between states. Hence, in the Enabling Measures section of the Platform for Survival, we consider some reforms of the United Nations that will make the United Nations a more reliable source of security.
All of these reforms, if introduced together, can reduce militarism and the risks that flow from war and weapons. This argues for a policy assigning top priority to the drastic, worldwide reduction of armed forces as the best means of saving the world from all six global threats.
Footnotes for this article can be seen at the Footnotes 1 page on this website (link will open in a new page).
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Canada, NATO, & The Nuclear Ban Treaty
Paul Meyer | CDA Institute | 19 January 2021
“Does the TPNW complement existing treaties? What are its aims and what gaps could it fill?
Supporters of the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) characterized it as filling a “legal gap”. This refers to the fact that of the three categories of WMDs—chemical, biological, and nuclear, only the first two categories are subject to comprehensive prohibition treaties. Nuclear weapons are only constrained by the 1968 (Nuclear) Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT has a far lower standard of restriction on nuclear weapons. The treaty commits its state parties to work towards nuclear disarmament and oppose any proliferation, but the NPT is actually silent on the possession and use of nuclear weapons. Article VI of the NPT outlines an obligation to engage in good faith negotiations to bring the arms race to a cessation at an early date, and for nuclear disarmament. But the NPT lacks the comprehensive prohibition of the other treaties. What’s especially significant is that the TPNW also prohibits the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.”
Read More Here: https://cdainstitute.ca/paul-meyer-canada-nato-the-nuclear-treaty-ban/
That’s an interesting point, but it sure seems contradictory to say that you are negotiating in good faith while actually continuing to possess nuclear weapons. In fact, I don’t think any NW state even pretends to be negotiating for nuclear disarmament.
Well, they did disarm somewhat when Russia and the US were negotiating various treaties. Quite a bit, in fact. They are just not planning to get rid of them all.
Canada, NATO, & The Nuclear Ban Treaty
Paul Meyer | CDI Institute | 19 January 2021
“Does the TPNW complement existing treaties? What are its aims and what gaps could it fill?
Supporters of the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) characterized it as filling a “legal gap”. This refers to the fact that of the three categories of WMDs—chemical, biological, and nuclear, only the first two categories are subject to comprehensive prohibition treaties. Nuclear weapons are only constrained by the 1968 (Nuclear) Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT has a far lower standard of restriction on nuclear weapons. The treaty commits its state parties to work towards nuclear disarmament and oppose any proliferation, but the NPT is actually silent on the possession and use of nuclear weapons. Article VI of the NPT outlines an obligation to engage in good faith negotiations to bring the arms race to a cessation at an early date, and for nuclear disarmament. But the NPT lacks the comprehensive prohibition of the other treaties. What’s especially significant is that the TPNW also prohibits the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.”
Read More Here: https://cdainstitute.ca/paul-meyer-canada-nato-the-nuclear-treaty-ban/
If you’re in Canada, please take action to say No to the War on Yemen,
Yemen is now the world’s worst humanitarian disaster – and 15 billion in Canadian-made weapons are going to the Saudis. Take action and call on Trudeau to stop sending munitions that fuel the war in Yemen.
Social Media Post to use:
Please kindly sign & widely share this Canadian Government petition. With enough signatures we can tell the Trudeau Govt to stop the sale of arms to Saudi & to bring them to The Hague for war crimes in #Yemen > https://petitions.ourcommons.ca/en/Petition/Sign/e-3075 #YemenCantWait #Yemen #StopArmingSaudi
Thank you
Excellent suggestion, Ali. Is there any proof that the Saudis are using Canadian weapons against the Yemen people? I am not saying that they AREN’T — I really just don’t know.
I don’t know either. But does it matter? I mean, we know what they are doing to the Yemen people, regardless of the national origin of their weapons, so we should not be providing them with tools that they MIGHT use to oppress people. Sell weapons only to legitimate police forces, and only certain kinds of non-military weapons at that.
On Tuesday, February 9, 2021 at 12:30 p.m. Eastern Standard Time, I will be joining a conversation with Metta Spencer on her To Save The World YouTube channel. We will be speaking about my work on the McIntyre Powder Project, which is a justice project that I founded to seek answers about the health effects on miners and factory workers who were historically required by their employers to inhale finely ground aluminum dust known as McIntyre Powder – a non-consensual prophylactic medical treatment against the lung disease silicosis. My father, Jim Hobbs, was one of the affected underground miners, who ended up with Parkinson’s. After years of advocacy, researchers found a link between Parkinson’s and McIntyre Powder exposure in a groundbreaking study released in 2020.
What does this have to do with PEACE? Metta’s invitation to engage in this conversation gave me pause to think about the notion of peace and how it relates to the fight that I am engaged in to seek justice and reparation for what was at its core an industrial human health experiment. Where there is wrongdoing, human rights violations, or similar offences, the pathway to peace begins with acknowledgement of the wrongdoing, the violations, the offences. It is fundamental for healing to acknowledge the wound. I very much look forward to speaking with Metta and her guest co-host Dr. Richard Denton.
For anyone seeking background on this subject, please watch The Fifth Estate’s 2016 documentary “The Miner’s Daughter”, or read the Toronto Star’s April 15, 2017 article “In human experiment, Ontario miners say they paid a devastating price” – both of which are available under the “Media Reports” tab of the McIntyre Powder Project website. Thanks!
https://youtu.be/pv2rrwf_wx8
The following document was produced by a movement initiated by Sergey Rogov, former director of the USA/Canada Institute in Moscow. It has been endorsed by 146 experts; see their names at the end. We hope to produce a talk show on our Youtube channel with arms control experts in Moscow, Canada, and other NATO countries. Watch for it on our channel, https://youtube.com/c/ToSaveTheWorld .
— Metta Spencer
Recommendations of the Participants of the Expert Dialogue on NATO-Russia Military Risk Reduction in Europe
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This group of experts from Russia, the United States and Europe held 15 online-seminars on NATO–Russia Risk Reduction in summer and fall of 2020 and offer the following ideas:
To maintain strategic stability, we look forward to immediate action to extend the New START Treaty for 5 years.
At the same time, we are concerned by the deterioration of the European security situation in recent years. The nuclear and conventional arms control system that took decades to build is rapidly unraveling, with nothing to take its place. Incidents in the course of military activities which bring Russian and NATO forces into close proximity are worrisome in their own right and run the risk of escalation. While members of our group diff er over the root causes of the crisis, we are concerned that as tension builds between Russia and NATO, a real military confrontation becomes an increasing danger.
Given this situation, we call upon our countries’ leaders to demonstrate the political will necessary to take a number of urgent actions in order to reduce the risks of military conflict. These military and security actions should be pursued whether or not we make progress in reducing the serious political disputes among our countries. Indeed, these steps can contribute to an atmosphere, in which resolution of those difficult political issues becomes more achievable.
We propose a set of measures, recognizing that not all of these steps will be immediately feasible. The detailed recommendations below address the following areas:
1. Re-establishing practical dialogue between Russia and NATO, including direct contacts between the military commanders and experts of Russia and NATO member states.
2. Developing common rules that will reduce the risk of unintended incidents on land, air and sea.
3. Enhancing stability by increasing transparency, avoiding dangerous military activities, and providing dedicated communication channels that would avoid escalation of incidents that might occur.
4. Utilizing (and possibly supplementing) the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act to codify restraint, transparency and confidence-building measures.
5. Exploring possible limitations on NATO and Russian conventional force deployments in Europe to enhance transparency and stability.
6. Establishing consultations between Russia and US/NATO on the topics of intermediate-range missiles and ballistic missile defense, in order to prevent a new nuclear missile race in Europe.
7. Preserving the Open Skies Treaty.
SPECIFIC PROPOSALS
1.The need for dialogue
1.1. Political dialogue should be revitalized at the ambassadorial level in the NATO-Russia Council and include briefi ngs by military experts as appropriate.
1.2. As part of the NATO 2030 refl ection process, Russia and NATO member states should analyze relations between NATO and Russia with a view to developing the military-to-military dialogue. At a time when most NATO-Russia cooperation remains suspended, such a dialogue should not be viewed as a departure from NATO’s “no business as usual” policy, but as a step that is necessary to increase predictability and reduce the risk of military incidents at sea, in the air and on land escalating to the level of military conflict.
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1.3 Once Russia and NATO member states reach a formal or informal understanding or agreement, they could take initial steps in the form of parallel unilateral measures that do not necessarily require conclusion of a formal agreement between NATO, or NATO member states, and Russia, which could prove politically difficult to achieve in the present environment.
1.4. Regular meetings should be held between the Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff , the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, reinforced by military experts, to address issues of current concern.
1.5. In addition, NATO member states and Russia should resume contacts at the level of military representatives in the NATO Military Committee and restore the Russian military liaison mission at SACEUR Headquarters.
1.6. Furthermore, NATO member states and Russia should enhance military contacts in OSCE forums to provide a more effi cient and inclusive format for discussion and quick decision-making on current issues relating to military activities.
1.7. NATO and Russia should consider the possibility of establishing special NATO-Russia communication channels or hotlines in sensitive regions such as the Baltic, and Black sea regions and the High North area.
1.8. While the recommendations off ered in this paper would be developed primarily in NATO-Russia channels, a number of them could be opened to discussion with and participation by other countries, such as Sweden and Finland in the Baltic and High North regions, and Ukraine and Georgia in the Black Sea region.
2.Preventing incidents
2.1. Prevention of incidents and de-escalation once they have occurred is the most urgent issue related to military interaction. NATO member states and Russia, as well as other European states, need to together formulate a minimum set of realistic measures that could be adopted as formal agreements, informal understandings or parallel, coordinated steps. While they do not have to be in the form of a legal treaty, they should have real force so as to effectively reduce the level of mutual tension.
2.2. NATO and Russia should develop a single set of common rules that would define minimum distances between military aircraft and ships as well as procedures for interaction of crews. To this end, they could resume joint work within the framework of the Cooperative Airspace Initiative (CAI), which had as one of its tasks the strengthening of confidence-building measures along the NATO-Russia line of contact. To address this task, sides should resume a navigational data exchange on the air situation along Russia’s Western border with NATO member states that was already established in the past.
2.3 As one of the options for managing incidents, the 1972 U.S.-Soviet Agreement on Prevention of Incidents at Sea and in the Airspace Above the Sea, as well as 11 similar agreements between certain NATO member states and Russia, could be taken as the basis for additional bilateral or multilateral agreements. Another source of ideas and approaches can be found in the Sino-American agreement of 2014 and Protocol of 2015 on prevention of incidents, which combines principles of prevention of incidents at sea and prevention of incidents during military activities in general.
2.4. Russia and the United States should reach agreement on notifi cation of heavy bomber patrols and fl ights near the borders of the other side, similar to the notifi cations they exchange of ICBM and SLBM launches.
2.5. NATO and Russia should develop and adopt standardized procedures for de-escalation of military incidents and confl icts. They should also conduct joint staff training exercises to prepare for de-escalation, create de-confliction mechanisms in the Baltic, High North and Black Sea regions, and establish a joint mechanism similar to the one built up by Russia and the United States in Syria.
3. Ensuring stability
3.1. NATO member states and Russia should reaffirm the reciprocal political commitments contained in the NATO-Russia Founding Act (1997) and the CFE Final Act (1999) whereby NATO and Russia agree to refrain from additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces in areas close to the territory of the other side in Europe.
3.2. They should explore the possibility of reciprocal constraints or further parallel unilateral commitments on the size and scope of military activities in contiguous areas, or on the level of armed forces permanently located in such areas, with scope wider and thresholds for advance notification and mandatory observation much lower than those required under the 2011 Vienna Document. A focus for such measures could be the Baltic Region (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, Poland and Germany), including Kaliningrad and Russia’s Western military district.
3.3. NATO member states and Russia should consider including in transparency measures land-based and sea-launched conventional intermediate (medium-range) strike systems, such as cruise missiles that may be located outside the contact zones if they can support exercises and military operations in the contact zones.
3.4. They could also draw on the experience with the provisions relating to the inner-German border area contained in the 1989 U.S.-Soviet agreement on preventing dangerous military activities. That agreement required troops to behave with caution in the border area. The sides could consider the establishment of reciprocal zones in which exercises should not be conducted, e.g. within 5 to 10 kilometers of specified borders, while also limiting personnel and certain kinds of military equipment in such zones.
3.5. Russia and NATO member states could agree that both sides will conduct large-scale military exercises, as a rule, at a militarily meaningful distance from their borders taking into account the specificity of contact zones. They should consider reducing the scale and frequency of military activities with respect to numbers and geography, in particular exercises in near borders. Generally, military exercises should be executed responsibly, not provocatively.
3.6. As for “snap exercises”, which continue to be a source of tension and are not subject to prior notification, we recommend the establishment of a regime of mutual transparency at a high military level between Russia and NATO. To that end, a “quiet notification” mode should be developed, e.g. providing confidential advance high-level notice to the other side, but with no advance warning to troops participating in the exercises. “Quiet notification” could also be applied to short-notice transit of multinational forces. An appropriate level for this sort of mutual information exchange would be the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the NATO Supreme Allied Commander.
4. NATO-Russia Founding Act
4.1. If agreements can be reached between NATO and Russia on additional confidence-building, transparency and restraint measures, these could be incorporated as additional protocols or annexes to the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act.
4.2. NATO and Russia could also agree to defi nitions of the parameters of the reciprocal measures of restraint mentioned in the Founding Act, such as “additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces.” This could be established as the equivalent of one army brigade and one air wing/regiment per country or Russian military district.
4.3. With the implementation of these additional risk-reduction measures and significant progress in the resolution of broader political differences between NATO and Russia, the sides could agree to draw up a new Code of Conduct for European security, which could also engage other European states beyond NATO and Russia.
5. Possible agreements on conventional armed forces in Europe
5.1. Confidence-building measures and possible measures of restraint should provide for eff ective collective and individual defense for all states in the region, big and small, with a view to enhancing stability and transparency, avoiding surprises, and minimizing risks of escalation. Given that a new conventional arms control treaty does not seem possible or practicable at this time, agreements may take the form of political commitments.
5.2. NATO and Russia should start negotiations to adopt certain measures to limit the arms race in the European region based on the assumption that currently deployed force levels are sufficient. Agreement should be aimed primarily at limiting destabilizing concentrations of forces and military training activities.
5.3. Both sides should consider and discuss the potentially destabilizing capabilities of some precision and long-range conventional weapons with a view to exercising restraint and ensuring transparency in this sphere. They could adopt transparency measures also with respect to conventional strike forces located outside the zone of direct contact of Russia and NATO. This refers to naval forces, long-range aviation and ground-based weapons, not covered by New START, with the range capability to reach this region.
5.4. The measures proposed in this paper should be significantly more far-reaching than the provisions of the Vienna Document 2011. They should take into account the experience of the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty and its adapted version and extend their scope.
5.5. Therefore, we recommend conducting an analysis of the Vienna Document 2011 with a view to extending the scope of its transparency and verification measures and its provisions on large-scale military exercises and other deployments to include naval forces, all large air force and air defense formations, conventional ground-, air- or sea-launched ballistic or cruise missiles, as well as logistic and communication units.
5.6. NATO member states and Russia should practice parallel unilateral arms control measures, coordinating them in advance, where practicable, and reciprocating as appropriate.
6. Missile Defenses and Intermediate Range Missiles in Europe
6.1. Russia and the United States/NATO should hold consultations on missile defense in Europe, both strategic and non-strategic, nuclear and non-nuclear, with a view to increasing transparency and overcoming existing differences.
6.2. They should consider ways to bridge the differences between NATO’s declared intention not to deploy any nuclear-armed ground-based missiles in Europe and Russia’s proposal for a moratorium on nuclear- and conventionally-armed medium-range and intermediate-range missiles in Europe. A first step could be to agree upon reciprocal transparency measures with regard to existing capabilities.
6.3. Russia, the United States and other NATO member states should enhance transparency beyond current capabilities through an annual exchange of ten-year plans for the development of missile defense in Europe, the creation of a data exchange center, and notification of new missile defense elements that have reached operational readiness.
7. Open Skies Treaty
7.1. Participants in the dialogue support preserving the Open Skies Treaty as it is one of the few remaining transparency instruments geared to promote confidence-building between states parties in Europe.
7.2. We should focus on the consequences of the U.S. withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty for the remaining 33 states parties and on preserving the treaty. All states parties, including Russia, should remain in the Treaty for a sufficient time to assess how it would function in these conditions and to allow time for possible re-entry by the United States. Russia and the United States, as well as other states parties, should discuss their concerns about the treaty and try to find agreed solutions.
7.3. Remaining states parties should consider the possibility of joint diplomatic initiatives aimed at returning the United States to the Open Skies Treaty.
Americans, Europeans and Russians, who signed the statement
Note: Each of the signers of these recommendations agrees with most but not necessarily all of them.
Affiliations are for purposes of identification only.
1. Benoît d’Aboville, Former Ambassador and Permanent Representative to NATO, Vice President of the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS), France.
2. James Acton, co-director, Nuclear policy Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace;
3. Graham Allison, Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, “Founding Dean” of Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, until 2017 Director of its Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, former Assistant Secretary of Defense;
4. Roy Allison*, Professor of Russian and Eurasian International Relations, Director, Russian and Eurasian Studies Centre, St. Antony’s College, Oxford;
5. Alexey Arbatov, Head, Center for International Security, Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences;
6. Nadezhda Arbatova, Head, Department for European Political Studies, Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO);
7. Valeriy Baranov, Colonel General (ret.), Inspector general of the Ministry of Defense.
8. Vladimir Baranovsky*, Member of the Directorate, Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International relations (IMEMO), Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences;
9. Alexandra Bell*, former Director for Strategic Outreach in the Office of the US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, Senior Policy Director at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation;
10. Robert Bell*, former assistant to the US President, former counselor to the Secretary General of NATO, distinguished Professor of the Practice, Georgia Tech;
11. John Beyrle, former Ambassador of the United States to the Russian Federation (2008–2012), former Ambassador to Bulgaria (2005–2008), Chairman of the U.S. Russia Foundation
12. James Bindenagel*, Ambassador (ret.), Henry Kissinger Professor, em.Center for Advanced Security, Strategy and Integration Studies, Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn;
13. Hans Blix, former Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, former IAEA Director General, Executive Chairman of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC);
14. Dieter Boden, Ambassador (ret), Potsdam;
15. Michael Boyce, Former Chief of the Defence Staff and First Sea Lord of the Royal Navy; a cross bench member of the the British House of Lords;
16. Ulrich J. Brandenburg, German Ambassador to NATO (2007–2010), German Ambassador to the Russian Federation (2010–2014);
17. Karl-Heinz Brunner, Member of Parliament, Spokesman on the Sub-Committee on Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation of the German Bundestag, Berlin;
18. Corentin Brustlein, Director of the Center for Security Studies, France 19. Philip Breedlove*, USAF General retired. Distinguished Professor, Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at Georgia Tech, former US European Command Commander and Supreme Allied Commander Europe;
20. Des Browne, Chair of the European Leadership Network (ELN), Vice-Chairman of the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), Convener of the TLG and former UK Defence Secretary
21. Denis Bukonkin*, Director of Foreign Policy and Security Research Center, Minsk; Belorussia;
22. William J. Burns, President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, former Deputy Secretary of State, former Ambassador to Russia;
23. Evgeniy Buzhinsky*, Lieutenant General (ret.), Vice President of the Russian International Affairs Council; Chairman, Executive Board, PIR Center;
24. Vincenzo Camporini, former Chief of the Joint Defence Staff , Former Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Italy;
25. Samuel Charap*, former Senior Advisor to the Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, 2011–2012;
26. Pierce Corden*, former head of the department of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, research fellow at the Center for science, technologies and security policy;
27. Thomas Countryman*, former Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation, Chairman of the Arms Control Association;
28. Dmitry Danilov*, Head of Department at the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IERAS);
29. Christopher Davis*, Professorial Research Fellow, University of Oxford;
30. Lewis Dunn*, former U.S. Ambassador to the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;
31. Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, Former Danish Foreign Minister (1982–1993);
32. Victor Esin*, Colonel General (ret.), Former Head of the Main Staff of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces, Leading Research Fellow, Department for Military-Political Research, Institute for the US and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (ISKRAN);
33. Marc Finaud*, Head of Arms Proliferation and Diplomatic Tradecraft, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy;
34. Ute Finckh-Kraemer, former Member of Parliament, Foreign Affairs Committee, Sub-Committee on Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-proliferation; Alumna of Parliamentarians for Nuclear Disarmament and Non-proliferation (PNND);
35. Cornelius Friesendorf, Head, Centre for OSCE Research, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, at the University of Hamburg (IFSH);
36. Helmut W. Ganser, Brigadier-General (ret), Defence Advisor to the German NATO Delegation 2004–2008, Brussels;
37. Rainer L. Glatz, Lieutenant-General (ret), former Commander German Armed Forces Joint Force Command, Potsdam;
38. Valery Garbuzov, Director, Institute for the US and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (ISKRAN);
39. Francois Le Goff, General Secretary of the Franco-German-British Club of Three;
40. Thomas Gomart, Director, Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI);
41. Alexander Graef, Research Fellow, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH);
42. Charles Grant, Director of the Centre for European Reform (CER), UK;
43. Philippe Gréciano, Professor at Grenoble Alpes University, Jean Monnet Chair, Member of the Center for International Security and EU Cooperation, France;
44. Alexey Gromyko**, Director of the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IERAS), Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences;
45. Wolfgang Guensche, LtColonel (ret), former Head of Arms Control Unit, German Armed Forces Verification Centre, Geilenkirchen; former military advisor to the German Foreign Office on security, arms control and disarmament;
46. David Hannay, Former Ambassador to the EU and to the UN; current Chair of UK All Party Parliamentary Group on Global Security and Non-Proliferation in the UK Parliament;
47. Ruediger Hartmann, Ambassador (ret), former Commissioner of the German Federal Government for Disarmament and Arms Control;
48. Benjamin Hautecouverture, Senior Research Fellow at Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS);
49. François Heisbourg, Chairman and Special Advisor, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) / Foundation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS), France;
50. Kurt Herrmann, Lieutenant-General (ret), former Head NATO Military Liaison Mission (MLM), Moscow, and former Director NATO Communication and Information Systems Services Agency (NCSA);
51. Sven Hirdman, Ambassador to Russia 1994–2004, State Secretary Ministry of Defence of Sweden (1979–1982);
52. Matthias Hoehn, Member of Parliament, Chairman, Sub-Committee on Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation of the German Bundestag, Berlin;
53. Hellmut Hoffmann, Ambassador (ret), former Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Conference on Disarmament (2009–2013);
54. Heiner Horsten, Ambassador (ret), Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany to the OSCE in Vienna 2008–2012;
55. Hans Huebner, Brigadier-General (ret), former Director, German Arms Control Verification Centre, Geilenkirchen;
56. Hans-Dieter Heumann, Ambassador (ret.), former President of Federal College for Security Policy, Berlin;
57. Jon Huntsman, former Governor of Utah, former Ambassador of the United States to Russia, to China and to Singapore;
58. Igor Istomin, Senior Lecturer at the Department of Applied International Political Analysis, MGIMO University;
59. Igor Ivanov, Minister of Foreign Affairs (1998–2004), former Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation (2004–2007), President of Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC);
60. Juhani Kaskeala, Senior Finnish Admiral and former Chief of Defence of the Finnish Defence Forces (2001–2009);
61. Daryl G. Kimball, Executive Director, Arms Control Association;
62. Michael Kofman*, Director of the Russia Studies Program at CNA, Fellow at the Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center;
63. Bert Koenders, Former Foreign Minister of the Netherlands;
64. Lawrence Korb*, US Navy Captain (ret.), former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reagan Administration, Senior Research Fellow, Center for American Progress, and Senior Advisor, Defense Information Center;
65. Andrey Kortunov*, Director General, Russian International Affairs Council;
66. Oleg Krivolapov*, Research Fellow, Department for Military-Political Research, Institute for the US and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (ISKRAN);
67. Evgeniy Kozhokin, Dean of School of International Relations and Regional Studies of the State University for Humanitarian Studies;
68. Ulrich Kuehn, Head, Arms Control and Emerging Technologies, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH);
69. Valentin Kuznetsov*, Vice Admiral (ret.), former Chief Military Representative of the RF at NATO, Senior Research Fellow, Department for Military-Political Research, Institute for the US and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (ISKRAN);
70. Henrik Larsen, Senior Researcher, Center for Security Studies, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH Zürich);
71. Robert Legvold, Marshall D. Shulman Professor, Columbia University;
72. Imants Liegis, Latvian Ambassador to France and to Hungary, Latvia’s Defense Minister (2009–2010) and the Acting Minister of Justice (2009–2010);
73. Osman Faruk Logoglu, former Turkish Ambassador to the United States and former Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
74. Mogens Lykketof, former Minister for Finance and Foreign Affairs and Speaker of Parliament, Denmark. Former President of the United Nations General Assembly (2015–2016), Denmark;
75. Roderic Lyne, former British ambassador to the Russian Federation;
76. Ruediger Luedeking, Ambassador (ret), former Deputy Commissioner of the German Federal Government for Disarmament and Arms Control;
77. Vladimir Lukin, Russian Ambassador to the United States (1992-1994),
director on the board of the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), Deputy Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Federation Council of the RF;
78. Douglas Lute*, Lieutenant General (rt.), US Ambassador to NATO,
2013–2017, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center, Harvard University;
79. Emmanuelle Maitre, Research Fellow at FRS;
80. Michael Maclay, Chairman of the Franco-German-British Club of Three;
81. János Martonyi, Former Foreign Affairs Minister of Hungary;
82. John McColl, former NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) and Lieutenant-Governor of Jersey, UK;
83. Oliver Meier, Senior Researcher, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH);
84. Giles Merritt, Founder and Chairman, Friends of Europe;
85. Mira Milosevich-Juaristi, Senior Analyst for Russia and Eurasia, Elcano Royal Institute for International and Strategic Studies, Spain;
86. Victor Mizin*, Leading Research Fellow, Center for International Security, Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO);
87. Thierry de Montbrial, founder and Executive chairman of Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI);
88. Klaus Naumann, General (ret), former Chief of Staff of the Bundeswehr (German Armed Forces); Former Chairman of the NATO Military Committee (1996-1999);
89. Alexander Nikitin*, Director of the Center for Euro-Atlantic Security, of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (MGIMO), Honorary President of the Russian Association of Political Science;
90. Bernard Norlain, General (ret), former Air Defense Commander and Air Combat Commander of the French Air Force;
91. Joseph Nye, Harvard University Distinguished Professor Emeritus, Under-Secretary of State, former Assistant Secretary of Defense, former Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government;
92. Olga Oliker*, Director for Europe and Central Asia, International Crisis Group;
93. Sergey Oznobishev*, Head, Department of Military and Political Analysis and Research Projects, Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO);
94. William Perry, former US Secretary of Defense, Director of the Preventive Defense Project at CISAC, FSI Senior Fellow;
95. Thomas R Pickering, former US Under Secretary of State, former Ambassador to Jordan, Nigeria, El Salvador, Israel, the United Nations, India and Russia;
96. Steven Pifer*, former US Ambassador to Ukraine, William Perry research fellow at Stanford University and nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution;
97. William Potter, Director, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar Professor of Nonproliferation Studies Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, Foreign Member to the Russian Academy of Sciences;
98. Pavel Palazhchenko*, Head of the International Relations, the Gorbachev Foundation;
99. Giampaolo Di Paola, former Minister of Defence of Italy; Former Chairman of NATO Military Committee;
100. Solomon Passy, former Chairman of the United Nations Security Council, former Bulgarian Foreign Minister;
101. Friedrich W. Ploeger, Lieutenant-General (ret), German Airforce, former Deputy Commander AIRCOM Ramstein (2010–2013);
102. Ruprecht Polenz, President German Association for East European Studies, former Chairman Committee on Foreign Affairs of the German Bundestag
103. Paul Quilès, President of the Initiatives for Nuclear Disarmament (IDN). Former Defence Minister and former President of the Defence and Armed Forces Committee of the National Assembly of France;
104. Alain Richard, French Senator; Defence Minister of France (1997–2002);
105. David Richards, General (ret), former Chief of the Defence Staff, member of the UK House of Lords;
106. Wolfgang Richter*, Colonel (ret.), Senior Military Advisor of the Permanent Representation of Germany to the OSCE, Vienna (2005–2009); Senior
Associate, International Security Division, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin (SWP)
107. Malcolm Rifkind, Former Conservative MP in the UK Parliament, former chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee and former British Defence Secretary and former Foreign Secretary;
108. Cynthia Roberts*, Professor of Political Science, Hunter College, City University of New York, Senior Research Scholar, Columbia University, policy adviser, Joint Staff , US Department of Defense, 2019;
109. George Robertson, Former NATO Secretary General; Former UK Secretary of State for Defence;
110. Sergey Rogov**, Academic Director, Institute for the US and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (ISKRAN), Chairman of the International Security Advisory Board of the Scientific Council at the Security Council of the Russian Federation; Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences;
111. Kevin Ryan*, Associate at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Member of the US-Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism, former Defense Attache at the US embassy in Russia, Brigadier General;
112. Laëtitia Saint-Paul, French Politician and Vice President of the National Assembly;
113. Pavel Sharikov*, Leading Research Fellow, Department for Military-Political Research, Institute for the US and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (ISKRAN);
114. Igor Sherbak, former First Deputy of the Permanent Representative of the RF at the United Nations, Research Fellow Chief the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences;
115. Robby Schlund, Head of German-Russian Parliament Group, Deutscher Bundestag;
116. Hans-Joachim Schmidt, Senior Associate Research Fellow, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF);
117. Reiner Schwalb, Brigadier-General (ret), National German Representative at NATO Allied Command Transformation, Norfolk/VA, 2007–2010; German Senior Defense Official and Attaché to the Russian Federation, Moscow, 2011–2018;
118. Vladimir Senko, former Foreign Minister of Belarus; Former Ambassador of Belarus to the United Kingdom.;
119. Stefano Silvestri, Senior Scientific Advisor at Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), former Under Secretary of State for Defence, former President of IAI (2001–2013);
120. Hartwig Spitzer, Professor, Centre for Science and Peace Research, University of Hamburg;
121. Michael Staack, Professor, Helmut-Schmidt-University/University of the Armed Forces in Germany, Hamburg;
122. Armin Staigis, Brigadier-General (ret), former Vice President of the Federal Academy for Security Policy in Berlin;
123. Stefano Stefanini, former Permanent Representative to NATO, Former Diplomatic Advisor to the President of Italy;
124. Angela Stent, professor, Georgetown University;
125. Nataliya Stepanova* Research Fellow, Department for Military-Political Studies, Institute for the US and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (ISKRAN);
126. Goran Svilanović, Former Secretary General, Regional Cooperation Council, Serbia;
127. Strobe Talbott, Distinguished fellow in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, Deputy Secretary of State (1994–2001), President of the Brookings Institution (2002–2017);
128. John Tefft, former US Ambassador to Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, and Lithuania
129. Greg Thielmann*, Board member of the Arms Control Association, Commissioner of the U.S.-Russian-German “Deep Cuts” Project;
130. Adam Thomson*, Director of the European Leadership Network, Permanent UK Representative to NATO (2014–2016);
131. Alexander Tikhansky, military-political analyst (Belarus), professor of the Academy of Military Science of Russia;
132. Nathalie Tocci, Director of Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Italy, Special Adviser to EU High Representative/Vice President Josep Borrell;
133. Vyacheslav Trubnikov, Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service (1996–2000), Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation (2000–2004), Member of the Directorate, Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO);
134. Vygaudas Ušackas*, former Foreign Minister of Lithuania, Lithuanian ambassador to USA, Mexico and UK as well as EU ambassador to Russia and Afghanistan, Member of the Board of Directors of Avia Solutions Group;
135. Alexander Vershbow*, former Assistant Secretary of Defense, former NATO Deputy Secretary General; former US Ambassador to South Korea, NATO, Russia; Distinguished Visiting Fellow at University of Pennsylvania’s Perry World House; Distinguished Fellow at the Atlantic Council;
136. Karsten D. Voigt, former Member of Parliament and President of the NATO-Parliamentary Assembly, former German-American Coordinator in the German Federal Foreign Office;
137. Fedor Voytolovsky, Director, Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences;
138. Andrew Weber, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, and Senior Fellow, Council on Strategic Risks.
139. Igor Yurgens*, President of the All-Russian Insurance Association, Member of the Board of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs;
140. Andrey Zagorskiy*, Head, Department for Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Studies, Primakov National Research Institute for World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO);
141. Dr Wolfgang Zellner, Senior Research Fellow and former Deputy Director, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH)
142. Valery Zhuravel, Colonel (ret), chief adviser of the Department of International Security of the Staff of the Security Council of the Russian Federation (2009–2014), head of the Center for Arctic Studies of the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences;
143. Vitaliy Zhurkin, Director Emeritus, Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IERAS), Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences;
144. Pavel Zolotarev*, Major General (ret.), Leading Research Fellow, Department of Military-Political Studies, Institute for the US and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (ISKRAN);
145. Vladislav Zubok, professor, London School of Economics.
146. Per Carlsen, former Assistant Secretary of Defence (Denmark), Former Ambassador to Vilnius, Moscow and Riga
* – Members of the expert group.
** – Co-chairs of the expert group.
‘This is going to be quite a show’: Biden’s arms control team eyes nuclear policy overhaul
President Joe Biden is assembling a national security team with an unusually ambitious agenda to negotiate new arms control treaties, scale back the nuclear arsenal, and review decades of military doctrine.
But veterans of the last administration fear this newly empowered group of progressives may be naive about what can be achieved without undermining U.S. security, and are already warning them to prepare for a shock when they read the latest intelligence.
Taking up posts at the Pentagon, State Department and National Security Council are a cadre of experts who collectively have their sights on a renaissance in nuclear restraint, after President Donald Trump withdrew from three arms control pacts, threatened a nuclear war with North Korea and expanded the role of nuclear weapons in war planning.
Biden has already agreed to extend the last remaining nuclear agreement with Russia, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, and called for further negotiations with Moscow to place new limits on their arsenals, the world’s largest. And the group of arms control experts he is enlisting to carry out his agenda represents the vanguard of a decades-long progressive push to pull back from the nuclear brink and seek the elimination of atomic weapons.
“The stars are aligned,” said Joe Cirincione, a veteran nonproliferation advocate who mentored a number of Biden’s picks. “Extending New START for five years is just the opening gambit. This is going to be quite a show.”
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“I think a lot of these guys who are going into government are going to finally start getting classified briefings about what China has been up to,” said Tim Morrison, who oversaw the arms control portfolio on the National Security Council under Trump and is now at the Hudson Institute. “I want to be a fly in the room. The color is going to drain out of their faces, they are going to sit back in their chairs, and they are going to say ‘oh s—.'”
Under Trump, the United States significantly increased spending on nuclear weapons and also fielded a new submarine-launched warhead, citing Russian and Chinese nuclear buildups and more aggressive efforts by North Korea to increase its arsenal and develop more advanced long-range missiles.
Others see Biden’s willingness to accept Russia’s offer to extend New START a full five years without preconditions as a worrying sign the new team won’t be tough enough on the Russians.
“I think that is a bad signal and suggests that Biden may be a pushover when it comes to this sort of thing because even those who still see value in New START agree there are some things the United States should be pushing for,” former Republican Sen. Jon Kyl, a leading skeptic of arms control agreements, said in an interview.
Trump’ chief arms control negotiator, former Ambassador Marshall Billingslea, is also critical about Biden’s first move.
“They gave away all of the leverage that they had in order to get additional arms control done,” he said. “It’s not at all clear to me what further interest the Russians have in negotiating anything with the Biden administration.”
But the team advising Biden has big ambitions. One leading player is Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins, a veteran of the Obama State Department who coordinated efforts to combat the spread of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. She has been nominated to be undersecretary of State for arms control and international security.
Jenkins has recently argued for declaring a “no first-use” policy when it comes to nuclear weapons, which arms control advocates consider a major step toward reducing nuclear tensions.
“We are trying to say, ‘we are not going to attack you with a nuclear weapon unless you attack us with a nuclear weapon,” she explained in a podcast this month. “That’s kind of the direction it was going. However, in 2018 we kind of took some steps back on that. We have added all these conditions where we can actually use a nuclear weapon. We have gone backwards.”
She is joined by a growing roster of progressive-minded national security experts who have advocated for some of the most drastic changes in U.S. nuclear policy in recent years.
For example, several key players in the new administration have ties with the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, the research arm of the liberal Council for a Livable World, which aims to “reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons.”
Alexandra Bell, a former State Department official who most recently was the center’s policy director, has been appointed as deputy assistant secretary of State in the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance. Leonor Tomero, former chief counsel for the House Armed Services Committee who was the think tank’s director, will oversee nuclear and missile defense programs for the undersecretary of Defense for policy.
Meanwhile, Mallory Stewart, the new senior director for arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation on the National Security Council, is a longtime national security official and think tank scholar who was a member of the center’s board. And others with ties to the organization include Colin Kahl, Biden’s nominee to be Pentagon policy chief, who is an adviser.
“They want to lower the risk of having any nuclear catastrophe,” said former Rep. John Tierney, executive director of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, calling their new influence “a tremendous win for the State Department, the United States, and indeed, every person on the planet who believes a world free from nuclear threats is possible.”
“They want have have as much reasonable, verifiable arms control as they can to lower the risk of a nuclear catastrophe,” he added.
Other players on the arms control front include the NSC’s head of strategic planning, Sasha Baker. She’s a former national security adviser to Sen. Elizabeth Warren, a leading advocate in the chamber for reducing the size of the American arsenal.
“She is probably the person who’s going to rewrite the national security strategy,” Darryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, one of the leading disarmament groups, said of Baker.
Many of Biden’s arms control advisers believe deeply that the United States’ plan to modernize all three legs of the nuclear triad — bombers, submarines and land-based missiles — is more comprehensive and expensive than needed to deter nuclear adversaries.
They are expected to review the nuclear modernization portfolio, which is expected to cost upwards of half a trillion dollars over the next decade alone, and much more after that. They are almost certain to try to kill a new, “low-yield” nuclear warhead that the Trump administration outfitted on submarines.
They are also likely to find more allies in a Democratically-controlled Congress.
“I think [Biden] is in a position where he can change our nuclear weapons doctrine,” Sen. Ed Markey (D-Mass.), a member of the Foreign Relations Committee and leading advocate for curtaining nuclear weapons spending, said in an interview.
He also believes the need for arms control has only grown “because of these past four years with Donald Trump.”
“We can see how quickly our relationship with other nuclear weapon powers can become much more tense and dangerous,” Markey said. “We can’t afford nuclear weapons overkill.”
Meanwhile, Tomero’s former boss, Rep. Adam Smith, is chair of the Armed Services Committee. Smith, a leading national security progressive in Congress, has been among the most vocal proponents for cutting the nuclear budget.
“There is a good opportunity when you add in the fact that Adam Smith clearly sees that this whole modernization plan, as it’s currently projected, is going to be way too expensive,” Tierney said.
“We don’t need any of the new weapons that Trump put in,” he added. “And [Biden] was clear on that when he was running. There is no reason why we should be developing new classes of weapons and nuclear warheads. That is destabilizing and it just leads to an arms race and makes everybody less safe.”
But the political and diplomatic obstacles to Biden’s agenda are also enormous, whether Washington tries to revive arms control agreements or pursue new ones with Russia, Iran, North Korea or China, or curtail U.S. plans to upgrade its own arsenal and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in American strategy.
“Some of the aspirations, some of the idealized goals of some of his base, they may not get what they want,” said Morrison, the former Trump administration NSC official.
Peter Huessy, director of strategic deterrent studies at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, which is supported by the defense industry, also worries that the United States lacks enough experienced negotiators to replicate some of the arms control successes of the Cold War.
“By not having a professional cadre of arms negotiators, we lose institutional memory as well as full understanding of the gambits used by the Russians and the tricks they play in negotiations,” he said.
Follow along as we track the administration’s first 100 days. »
Others rebutted the idea that Biden’s team doesn’t have what it takes, or that they are naive about what can be achieved.
“They are believers, as has every president from Eisenhower to Obama, that arms control is a key tool to national security that reduces both existential and lesser risks to the United States,” said Ambassador Tom Countryman, who served as acting undersecretary of State for arms control and international security in the Obama administration.
“There is no greater risk to the existence of the United States than the increasing risk of the use of nuclear weapons,” he added. “It is a national security mandate to reduce that risk and the vehicle to do that is arms control. They are a dream team, not of ideologues, not of boastful dealmakers, but of people who are willing to do the hard work that is necessary.”
But he also acknowledged how hard it will be to make their visions reality. “It won’t be easy to get it done,” Countryman said. “I’m reluctant to predict any specific achievement besides the extension of New START.”
Suggestion Box: Compulsory Dispute Resolution to Abolish Nuclear Weapons
James Ranney has posted this proposal in the suggestion box:
“The missing link? Compulsory international dispute resolution. Check out my new book, World Peace Through Law.”
Great idea, James. Would you care to elaborate on it with another comment here? You may need to propose ways of making it happen!
Sure. The argument is as follows: 1) We must abolish war (or war will abolish us, JFK); 2) we therefore need ALTERNATIVES TO WAR; 3) this means we need INTERNATIONAL ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION; and 4) this means, in order to be workable, we need COMPULSORY INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION (compulsory negotiation, which would probably have prevented WWI, according to two historians); compulsory mediation (which would probably prevent 95% of all int’l conflict); compulsory arbitration (as argued by President Theodore Roosevelt, but was rejected by the Republicans in the Senate); and compulsory adjudication in the World Court (proposed by Mikhail Gorbachev in 1987 & discussed for a couple years before being forgotten). This proposal was accepted by representatives of the U.S. and the USSR in the famous McCloy-Zorin Agreement in 1961, but has been totally forgotten since then.
Suggestion Box: Petition Canada to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons!
Nancy Covington has posted this suggestion:
“Until closing Feb 6, 2021 petition to call on the Canadian Government to sign the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is open. Sign here:https://petitions.ourcommons.ca/en/Petition/Sign/e-3028”
Yes! This is important, folks. Let’s get behind this campaign!
Suggestion Box: Build New Global Peace Movement by Women for Children
Andre Sheldon has posted this idea in the suggestion box:
” I have networked with women leaders from around the world, planting seeds, in preparation for this moment….Global Strategy of Nonviolence, For the Children Facilitator, CALL to WOMEN, a World-Wide Unity Campaign +1-617-964-5267 Email: Andre@GlobalStrategyofNonviolence.org Website: http://www.GlobalStrategyofNonviolence.org Facebook: Global Movement of Nonviolence”
Suggestion Box: Conventional Wars Count Too!
Alberto Portugheis posted this idea in the suggestion box: “It should be the other way round: “Weapons & War” and NEVER “especially nuclear.” 1,000s die daily from conventional warfare. Alberto, President HUFUD.”
Of course it’s true. The people being killed in wars now are all hit by regular bullets and bombs, not nuclear ones. Would you like to come back to this comments column and elaborate on this idea, Alberto? You can also tell us about HUFUD, or post events if you have anything planned. Thanks for your sensible comment.
Will America Help Britain Build A New Nuclear Warhead?
Matthew Harries | War on the Rocks | 22 October 2020
“The future of the United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent depends, in part, on decisions being made right now in the U.S. Congress. At stake are Britain’s plans to build a replacement for its current nuclear warhead. According to the U.K. defense secretary and senior U.S. officials, the United Kingdom’s program is reliant on the United States pursuing its own new warhead program of record, the W93. But the Donald Trump administration’s Fiscal Year 2021 request for funds for the W93 was first nixed by House appropriators and then excluded from the stopgap continuing resolution. It is neither clear whether the W93 program will eventually make it into the budget proper, nor whether it would be taken up immediately by a potential incoming Joe Biden administration.”
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The United Kingdom’s new warhead will be housed in the U.S. Navy’s proposed new Mk7 aeroshell, and is intended to be developed in parallel with the W93 warhead, sharing key design parameters and using some common non-nuclear components. In April, U.K. Defence Secretary Ben Wallace wrote to members of Congress on relevant committees, claiming that their “support to the W93 program in this budget cycle is critical to the success of our replacement warhead program and to the long-term viability of the U.K.’s nuclear deterrent.” Senior Trump administration officials have also repeatedly told Congress that a failure to fund the W93 will prevent the United States from supporting the British program. The future of a nuclear deterrent that the United Kingdom calls its “ultimate insurance policy as a nation” and a contribution to the “ultimate guarantee of collective Euro-Atlantic security” is being called into question.
Most media discussion of Wallace’s letter focused on the propriety of the defense secretary lobbying Congress. But Wallace’s letter was remarkable on grounds of substance, not just process. At face value, his letter made very serious claims, suggesting that the fate of the United Kingdom as a nuclear power is in the hands not of members of Parliament, but of congressional appropriators. These claims deserve close interrogation — not least by Parliament, which has so far failed in its duty of scrutiny. British legislators should be asking why, exactly, a new warhead is needed; what the backup plan in case U.S. assistance is disrupted; what military and technical requirements are being set for the new warhead; whether the United Kingdom’s fraying infrastructure can deliver what is asked of it; and how much this endeavor will cost. Buried in these questions are significant risks and long-term strategic choices for the United Kingdom, the future of its nuclear deterrent, and Anglo-American defense ties.
Dependent Deterrent
The United Kingdom’s nuclear force is strongly dependent, in material and programmatic terms, on the United States. The Royal Navy deploys four nuclear-armed submarines equipped with the U.S.-built and maintained Trident II D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missile, drawing from a common missile pool at King’s Bay, Georgia. The essence of this cooperative relationship on delivery systems has been in place since the conclusion of the Polaris Sales Agreement in 1963, signed after Prime Minister Harold Macmillan persuaded President John F. Kennedy to sell the United Kingdom the Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missile. Bilateral cooperation on warhead-relevant matters, including the transfer to the United Kingdom of special nuclear material and non-nuclear weapon components, is authorized under the 1958 U.K.-U.S. Mutual Defense Agreement, which freed London from Washington’s postwar prohibition on nuclear cooperation under the 1946 McMahon Act.
The United Kingdom is currently working on a successor submarine, the Dreadnought class, which will replace the currently deployed Vanguard class in the 2030s, and which will share a common missile compartment with America’s own successor class, the Columbia. In 2006, Prime Minister Tony Blair secured from President George W. Bush an agreement that the United Kingdom would participate in a missile life extension program so that the Dreadnought class could continue to carry the Trident II D-5. In addition, London would be invited to participate in any program to replace or further life extend the D-5. A program is now underway to develop a successor missile once the D-5 leaves service in 2042, currently designated the D-5 Life Extension 2.
The basic parameters of the British warhead are thus set by the need for it to be certified for use with an American missile system and housed in an American aeroshell. The United Kingdom’s current nuclear warhead, the Holbrook, is sometimes referred to as an “Anglicized” version of the U.S. W76. It is certainly a similar design, and is referred to as such by U.S. national laboratories, although the degree of similarity is not publicly known. Several non-nuclear components of the warhead are known to be procured from the United States, including the arming, fusing, and firing system; neutron initiator; and the gas transfer system. The United Kingdom has made some updates to the Holbrook while the United States has conducted a life extension of the W76, now designated the W76-1, including at least the incorporation of the Mk4a arming, fusing, and firing system. However, it has not been publicly disclosed whether the United Kingdom has conducted an equally extensive life extension program of its own.
There is little reason to believe that the United Kingdom wishes to depart significantly from this model when it comes to building the next warhead. The structural incentives to hew closely to U.S. plans are strong. Procurement of non-nuclear components from the United States is seen as an obvious cost-saving measure, and reliance on U.S. facilities and information-sharing gives Britain a hedge against technological risks in design and certification. An explicit goal of the United Kingdom’s program to modernize its nuclear infrastructure has in recent years been to “increase engagement with the United States to align capabilities and requirements for any future warhead decision.”
Unless the United Kingdom wants to diverge significantly from the United States, then its new warhead program needs a parallel U.S. program against which to align. Enter the W93. The announcement of a new program of record was good news for the U.K. nuclear establishment, which had been in a holding pattern during several years of U.S. deliberations and interservice wrangling. But the United Kingdom fields only one warhead in its nuclear arsenal, and so has considerably less margin for error than the United States, which already has two warhead types delivered by submarine-launched ballistic missiles (the W76-1 and W88, plus a lower-yield W76-2 variant), as well as the redundancy of two alternative delivery vehicles (land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles and strategic bombers), each with their own warhead types. The United Kingdom also appears to be working toward a rather pressing deadline. According to official U.K. statements, a replacement warhead could be needed as early as the late 2030s, and it has previously been estimated to take 17 years from a procurement decision to the eventual production of the warhead.
This sense of urgency leaves Britain in an uncomfortable position, because many in Congress do not appear convinced that the United States truly needs the W93 program to start right away. Funding for the W93 program was not anticipated to be required for two more years, and the timing of the administration’s request has provoked pushback from Democratic legislators. One possible theory is that Trump administration officials want the W93 on the books before a potential Biden administration enters office. Another more concrete explanation is that U.S. defense officials might not trust the National Nuclear Security Administration — the semi-autonomous agency within the Department of Energy which manufactures the United States’ nuclear warheads — to deliver the W93 on schedule, and would like a more generous margin of error. The National Nuclear Security Administration request is only for the first of seven phases of warhead development, and calls for the relatively modest sum of $53 million, alongside a Pentagon request for $32 million for the Navy Mk7 program. The latter request, unlike that of the National Nuclear Security Administration, was originally approved by House appropriators.
Even if a potential incoming Biden administration agreed with the requirement for a new warhead for its submarine-launched ballistic missiles, it might still choose to delay the program. This could be a symbolic gesture toward reducing emphasis on nuclear weapons, or a practical recognition both that National Nuclear Security Administration already has four life extension or modification programs to execute and a new sea-launched cruise missile warhead to produce, and that the U.S. nuclear modernization program is shaping up to be spectacularly expensive at a time of COVID-19 induced budget pressure. Even without a conscious decision to delay the program, it might still be pushed back if a Biden administration wished to consider the W93 in the context of a Nuclear Posture Review, which would take time to complete.
Unanswered Questions
The United Kingdom, in other words, is in quite a bind. The defense secretary has stated, in writing, that the viability of the British deterrent depends on a program which the U.S. Congress might be about to stymie. It could be the case that, if work on the Mk7 aeroshell can start even in the absence of National Nuclear Security Administration funding for the W93, the United Kingdom could begin work on its own program. But the longer that Britain proceeds without a parallel U.S. warhead program in place, the greater the risks it would be incurring. Vanishingly little is publicly known about the decision-making process which has led to this point, which makes the precise degree of risk facing the United Kingdom very difficult to judge.
Congress has now had four public hearings at which the W93 was discussed, including several references to the program’s importance to the United Kingdom, and the administration has given briefings on the rationale behind the program. Yet in the United Kingdom, where the stakes are allegedly much higher, the sum total of the government’s public output on the warhead is a vaguely written statement to Parliament, and confirmation that the warhead will use the Mk7 aeroshell. This leaves open several key questions.
Why Has the United Kingdom Decided to Build a New Warhead, Rather Than Seeking to Further Refurbish or to Remanufacture Holbrook?
The fact that the United Kingdom has decided to build a new warhead at all, rather than seeking to further prolong the life of the Holbrook, is something that needs justifying. Has the United Kingdom made an independent judgment that a replacement warhead is essential, or is this decision simply the combination of a U.S. decision to proceed with W93 and the United Kingdom’s preference for alignment? Ever since the 2006 White Paper in which the decision to renew the ballistic missile submarine force was taken, the U.K. government has repeatedly told Parliament that at some point a decision on whether to build a new warhead would be need to be made. That decision has now been made, and Parliament and the public do not know why.
It is not clear that the United States sees a critical need to replace the W76-1, which has recently been life-extended, providing for additional decades of use. Some discussions of the W93’s role suggest that it could exist in parallel with both the W76-1 and the W88 as one of America’s three submarine-launched ballistic missile warheads. Were the United States to decide that the W76-1 could be further life-extended, or remanufactured from scratch, the U.K. government has not yet provided any public reasoning why the same could not be done for the Holbrook. Such reasons can certainly be imagined: there might be materials used in the original U.K. design that have now aged, and cannot for technical, legal, or safety reasons be remanufactured other than at disproportionate cost. There is also a case to be made that further life-extending old warheads introduces a degree of risk of technical failure that is unacceptably high for a country that depends on a single design, and that changes in the security environment, such as developments in missile defenses, could set future military requirements that the current warhead cannot meet. These arguments, however, have not yet been publicly made by the U.K. government.
What Are the Critical U.S. Activities on Which the U.K. Replacement Warhead Will Depend in the Next Few Years, and What Is the United Kingdom’s Backup Plan if These Activities Are Not Funded?
The U.K. government has emphasized the need for its warhead to be “compatible” with America’s Trident system. What this probably means in practice is that the United Kingdom needs to know key parameters of the Mk7 aeroshell which will define the size, shape, mass distribution, and other aspects of the British warhead which will fit inside it. Beyond that, in order for the United Kingdom to be able to cooperate closely with the United States on key scientific and engineering aspects of the warhead’s design, manufacturing, and certification, the United Kingdom will need to know U.S. intentions for various design choices. Until the United States starts work on the W93 program, the United Kingdom will either have to delay its own choices or make assumptions about likely U.S. decisions in order to begin necessary work. Either path could involve increased costs and technical risk.
Beyond a small delay, more serious disruption to the W93 program raises very challenging questions: would the United Kingdom pursue indigenous production of components that would otherwise have been procured from the United States, and if so, at what risk and cost? If the United Kingdom still wishes to remain aligned with the United States, are there alternatives to a replacement warhead based on the W93/Mk7? More broadly, Parliament might ask whether such close alignment to the United States is truly worth the accompanying loss of sovereignty. It is often assumed that the United Kingdom has simply no other option, and a more independent program would certainly involve taking a greater share of technical risk and would very likely incur greater financial costs. Nevertheless, close alignment with the United States has downsides as well as upsides, including greater vulnerability to disruption or delayed supply of materials, components, and expertise, and less discretion in setting military and other requirements for the warhead. This is a strategically important choice which has not yet been fully debated in public.
What Are the Likely Requirements for the W93, and How Do These Relate to the U.K. Program?
Assuming that the W93 program does go ahead, the first phases of its development will involve, among other things, the drafting of military characteristics and a stockpile-to-target sequence. Taken together, these will define the performance requirements and physical characteristics of the weapon, as well as the environments and threats it will be exposed to that must be taken into account in its design. This will require deciding, for example, what explosive yield the warhead will have, what defenses it must defeat — including nuclear, hit-to-kill, and (potentially) directed energy weapons — and what kind of hardening and countermeasures will be necessary. Choices will also be made regarding surety requirements, such as whether to use insensitive high explosives, which could mean a relative increase in mass and volume.
Requirements set in the United States during this process are likely to determine or strongly influence several characteristics of the British warhead. Embedded in those requirements are important implications for U.K. policy and strategy, and although London is likely to have a voice in U.S. discussions over such questions, it will not have a deciding vote. Briefings by U.S. officials suggest, for example, that the W93 is intended to be of higher yield than the W76-1. If the United Kingdom were to follow this path, the overall explosive yield of its operational stockpile could increase for the first time since it began deploying Trident in 1994. The emphasis placed by U.S. officials on the W93’s “flexibility” implies variable yield, which would be somewhat consistent with the existing lower-yield warhead variant the U.K. reportedly deploys at present, but would leave the United Kingdom vulnerable to accusations that it was reinforcing a global trend toward the development of supposedly more “usable” nuclear options. Any potential improvement to the warhead’s ability to strike hard targets might also draw criticism from those opposed to enhancements in nuclear weapon capabilities, as was the case when the U.K. began introducing the Mk4a arming, fusing and firing system. Lastly, U.K. defense planners might be thinking about future deterrence requirements for countries other than Russia, the traditional driver of U.K. warhead needs. This might have an impact on the requirements for a new warhead, such as on the question of the new warhead’s weight, which helps determine the maximum range that missiles can reach. This is a potentially relevant factor when considering the risk that future developments in anti-submarine warfare might complicate U.K. operations.
Can the United Kingdom Successfully Execute a Warhead Replacement Program?
The state of the United Kingdom’s nuclear weapons infrastructure suggests that the country will face significant challenges in producing its next warhead, even if cooperation with the United States runs entirely smoothly. By now, at least three key U.K. facilities should have been up and running: Pegasus (to handle enriched uranium components), Mensa (to assemble and disassemble warheads), and Hydrus (to conduct hydrodynamic tests). None is fully operational. Pegasus has been suspended after initial designs were judged too expensive and unwieldy, Mensa is now being built at least six years late and at more than twice the original cost, and Hydrus has been replaced by a joint U.K.-French hydrodynamic facility in France not scheduled to be fully operational for the United Kingdom at least until 2022.
More fundamentally, this will be the first warhead the United Kingdom has designed for some thirty years, and the first ever without explosive nuclear testing. It will also be designed just as the last generation of Atomic Weapons Establishment employees with firsthand experience designing new warheads are retiring. With civil nuclear projects also planned for the coming decades, the Atomic Weapons Establishment will be facing considerable workforce recruitment, training, and retention challenges.
How Much Will the United Kingdom’s New Warhead Cost?
In the context of the COVID-19 crisis, the forecast hit to the U.K. economy caused by Brexit, and an ongoing strategic review, there is likely to be financial pressure on the warhead program even if it is shielded from immediate cuts. Yet the government is staying remarkably coy about the projected costs of the new warhead. The 2006 White Paper estimated the cost to be 2 to 3 billion pounds ($2.6 to $3.9 billion). This estimate was confirmed in government documents as late as 2013. Since then, however, no official estimate has been provided, although the 2013 Trident Alternatives Review, a government-published document — though not a statement of policy — estimated the cost of a new submarine-launched ballistic missile warhead to be 4 billion pounds in 2012 prices.
The Nuclear Warhead Capability Sustainment Program, under which much of the supporting infrastructure for building a new warhead was supposed to be built, has an overall budget of 21 billion pounds spread out from 2005 to 2025, and is subject to the scrutiny requirements applied to major projects. The government has said that the program to build the new warhead will also be subject to those requirements, but is not giving a specific cost estimate, citing national security concerns. Likewise, it has not said which parts of the Nuclear Warhead Capability Sustainment Program will be subsumed under the new warhead program. It is certainly tricky to separate the costs of the new warhead from the overall costs of having nuclear infrastructure capable of maintaining the existing warhead. And yet not only has the U.K. government done so in the past — making it difficult to imagine national security grounds for withholding the information now — the U.S. government has also provided estimates of how much the W93 might cost: $14.4 billion, according to the Nuclear Security Administration’s last published assessment.
Take Back Control
The United Kingdom’s replacement nuclear warhead program is a long-term, complex, and expensive endeavor. It deserves proper scrutiny. And while many of the technical details of the U.K. warhead must remain classified, the broad parameters of the decision the government has made — and the risks the program faces — are fair game for public debate. The British public learned of the decision to replace the Holbrook warhead not because the government decided to announce it, but because U.S. officials told Congress and reporters in February. In several respects, the transparency of the U.S. government, and the persistence of Congress in extracting answers, is throwing the opacity of the United Kingdom’s nuclear warhead program into stark relief. It is time for Parliament to take back control.
Read More: https://warontherocks.com/2020/10/will-america-help-britain-build-a-new-nuclear-warhead/
Until closing Feb 6, 2021 petition to call on the Canadian Government to sign the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is open.
Sign here: https://petitions.ourcommons.ca/en/Petition/Sign/e-3028
Vatican’s Foreign Minister Reaffirms Church’s Shift Away From Accepting Nuclear Deterrence
Joshua J. McElwee | National Catholic Reporter | 16 December 2020
ROME — The Vatican’s foreign minister reaffirmed the Catholic Church’s recent shift away from accepting the Cold War-era global system of nuclear deterrence Dec. 16, telling a webinar featuring arms control activists that nuclear weapons only give “a false sense of security.”
“International peace and security cannot be founded on the threat of mutual destruction or total annihilation, or maintaining a balance of power,” Archbishop Paul Gallagher told the webinar, which was co-hosted by the Vatican and several institutes at Georgetown University and the University of Notre Dame.
“Peace and security must be built on justice, integral human development, [and] respect for fundamental human rights,” said Gallagher. “From this perspective, it is necessary to go beyond nuclear deterrence.”
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The webinar, livestreamed on the Vatican’s YouTube channel, was meant to mark the third anniversary of a landmark November 2017 Vatican symposium at which Pope Francis changed the Catholic Church’s position on nuclear deterrence.
Developing the teaching of previous pontiffs, who had granted conditional moral acceptance to the system of deterrence as a way of preventing any world power from using nuclear arms, Francis told the 2017 event that even the possession of nuclear weapons is to be “firmly condemned.”
Francis’ changing of the church’s teaching on deterrence came shortly after the Vatican joined the U.N.’s 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. The treaty, which prevents signatories from developing, producing, stockpiling or testing nuclear arms, is set to go into force on Jan. 22.
The United States has not taken part in the treaty, which has been signed by 86 countries and ratified by 51 of those.
Cardinal Peter Turkson, whose Dicastery for Promoting Integral Human Development had coordinated the 2017 Vatican event, told the Dec. 16 webinar that maintaining nuclear stockpiles “wastes precious resources” that could be used to feed the world’s population or towards social welfare campaigns.
Turkson quoted U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower’s 1953 speech highlighting the cost of the Soviet-U.S. arms race: “Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed.”
Among others joining the webinar was Beatrice Fihn, the executive director of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, the organization that helped bring about the new nuclear ban treaty and was the recipient of the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize.
Fihn said that nuclear deterrence is “becoming increasingly stigmatized as a security policy.”
“Any state that supports nuclear weapons … lends credibility to this dangerous notion that it is acceptable and legal to mass-murder civilians,” she said.
Also taking part in the event was Rose Gottemoeller, a former deputy secretary general of NATO and former State Department official who is now a lecturer at Stanford University.
Gottemoeller starkly disagreed with Fihn and Gallagher, saying that the nuclear ban treaty places “irreconcilable burdens” on countries that maintain nuclear weapons.
“While nuclear weapons continue to exist, we must ensure that they remain safe and secure, lest they fall into the wrong hands and become the tools of nuclear terrorists or madmen,” said Gottemoeller.
“The nuclear weapons states also care about ensuring that the weapons are effective, for if the dreadful day ever arrives when they had to be used, they must be ready,” she added.
Gallagher was asked during the event if the Vatican planned to give direction to national bishops’ conferences about how to speak about the “moral unacceptability of nuclear weapons” following the entry into force of the nuclear ban treaty.
“There’s no formal intention at this stage of so doing,” said the archbishop. “I think that the bishops’ conferences are very aware of the position of the Holy See and what the Holy Father has said about this.”
“We, generally speaking … like to leave such initiatives up to the discretion of local bishops’ conferences because the response is different, obviously, in almost every country depending on policies of governments,” said Gallagher.
“I don’t think a decree will go out from Caesar Augustus in this respect,” the archbishop quipped.
Link: https://www.ncronline.org/news/vatican/vaticans-foreign-minister-reaffirms-churchs-shift-away-accepting-nuclear-deterrence
Google Earth Reveals Suspected Nuclear Weapons Facility in Pakistan
Adam Vaughan | NewScientist | 27 November 2020
Sleuthing with satellite images on Google Earth has revealed a substantial and undocumented expansion to a suspected nuclear processing plant in Pakistan. Researchers say it is a possible sign of the country boosting the capacity of its nuclear weapons programme.
Pakistan has possessed nuclear weapons since 1998, but isn’t a signatory to key international treaties on nuclear proliferation and tests. The country’s secretive nuclear weapons programme is closely watched due to tensions with neighbouring India, which also has a nuclear arsenal.
Full article available here: https://www.newscientist.com/article/2261031-google-earth-reveals-suspected-nuclear-weapons-facility-in-pakistan
Time to Ban the Bomb: A Path Forward:
The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
Beatrice Fihn | Ploughshares Fund | 2020
“The risk of use of nuclear weapons is higher today than it has been for years. With developments in cyber warfare, autonomous weapons and an increasingly uncertain global security situation, that risk will only increase over time. A security policy based on plans to fight — and “win” — a nuclear war is morally bankrupt and unsustainable. The United States must begin developing a policy for a non-nuclear future, or risk becoming an outlier without moral authority.
The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), a global coalition of over 530 organizations, is leading a movement to achieve this non-nuclear future. Over 10 years, together with countless partners in governments, international organizations and civil society groups around the world, we helped incubate and amplify a previously-ignored conversation about nuclear weapons. We placed civilians and the harm caused to them by nuclear weapons at the center of debate. This movement ultimately led to the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) and to ICAN being awarded the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize for its work in promoting nuclear disarmament.
The Treaty emerged through something new and different in the disarmament debate within the nuclear community — the Humanitarian Initiative. This initiative reframed the discourse around nuclear weapons to make the horrific humanitarian consequences caused by their use the center of discussion, rather than a secondary issue. In seeking the negotiation and adoption of the treaty, we followed the path set by other global weapons prohibitions, including conventions related to biological weapons, chemical weapons, antipersonnel landmines and cluster munitions. The premise, based in international law, is founded on the total abnegation of possession and use of weapons with unspeakable consequences.”
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No sustainable, smart or effective national security strategy can be based on weapons that cause the level of harm to civilians that nuclear weapons do. This reflects a shift in security and development policies toward a more pre-eminent role for humanitarian concerns, humanitarian law and the protection of civilians. Therefore, such weapons cannot remain legal or be considered legitimate options for states in warfare.
On July 7, 2017, the TPNW was adopted by 122 states at the United Nations (UN). It will enter into force once 50 states have deposited their instruments of ratification, which2 we expect will happen by 2020. This moment represents an opportunity for the international community to make real progress toward a world free of nuclear weapons. With this in mind, the United States — and all states possessing nuclear weapons — must engage the majority of the world’s countries working toward true global peace and security.
The United States’ path forward is clear: 1) end nuclear saber-rattling and place humanitarian consequences at the center of nuclear policy; 2) commit in good faith to multilateralism with a view to ending the new nuclear arms race, putting legal and diplomatic options above military expansionism; and 3) cease denigrating the TPNW and instead support the treaty and its signatories.
Humanitarian Consequences at the Center of Nuclear Policy
By their nature, nuclear weapons are indiscriminate and inhumane. Any use of nuclear weapons would have catastrophic humanitarian consequences that would quickly ripple across the world, even if a nuclear conflict was localized. The use of a nuclear weapon over a populated area would immediately kill tens of thousands — if not hundreds of thousands — of men, women and children, and injure countless more.3 We continue to pay the price of atmospheric nuclear testing in many countries around the world with hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of people dying early from cancers.
We also must not forget that the effects of nuclear detonations have disproportionately affected women. Though the immediate effects of nuclear weapons use are indiscriminate — no matter your sex or gender identity — the impact on survivors is not. Women in Hiroshima and Nagasaki have nearly double the risk that men do of developing and dying from solid cancer due to ionizing radiation exposure.5 Robust findings from the Chernobyl disaster indicate that girls are considerably more likely than boys to develop thyroid cancer from nuclear fallout.6 Pregnant women exposed to nuclear radiation face a greater likelihood of delivering children with physical malformations and stillbirths, leading to increased maternal mortality.7 And these effects last generations.8 Women’s rights, human rights, cannot be fully realized when we are threatened by, or threaten others, with such consequences.
A national security framework that respects human rights must work to eliminate and legally ban any weapon that causes these consequences. The TPNW codifies the stigma against the infliction of such barbarity and can be used as an example of how to incorporate humanitarian consequences at the center of policy. A congressional inquiry is needed on the short- and long-term environmental and human cost of past nuclear programs. Members must ask: Who has died early as a result of these programs and who will die in the future as a result of past misdeeds? And to be credible, such an inquiry must include women and other survivors as an integral part of the process.
The full article is available here: https://ploughshares.org/issues-analysis/article/time-ban-bomb
Talking Tough and Carrying a Radioactive Stick:
The Nuclearization of American Diplomacy
Michael T. Klare | Moyers on Democracy | 20 October 2020
“States have long engaged in military operations to intimidate other powers. Once upon a distant time, this would have been called “gunboat diplomacy” and naval vessels would have been the instruments of choice for such missions. The arrival of nuclear arms made such operations far more dangerous. This didn’t, however, stop the US from using weaponry of this sort as tools of intimidation throughout the Cold War. In time, however, even nuclear strategists began condemning acts of “nuclear coercion,” arguing that such weaponry was inappropriate for any purpose other than “deterrence” — that is, using the threat of “massive retaliation” to prevent another country from attacking you. In fact, a deterrence-only posture eventually became Washington’s official policy, even if the temptation to employ nukes as political cudgels never entirely disappeared from its strategic thinking.”
Read the full article here: https://billmoyers.com/story/talking-tough-and-carrying-a-radioactive-stick
US urges countries to withdraw from UN nuke ban treaty
Edith M. Lederer | The Associated Press | 21 October 2020
Link: https://apnews.com/article/nuclear-weapons-disarmament-latin-america-united-nations-gun-politics-4f109626a1cdd6db10560550aa1bb491
UNITED NATIONS (AP) — The United States is urging countries that have ratified a U.N. treaty to ban nuclear weapons to withdraw their support as the pact nears the 50 ratifications needed to trigger its entry into force, which supporters say could happen this week.
The U.S. letter to signatories, obtained by The Associated Press, says the five original nuclear powers — the U.S., Russia, China, Britain and France — and America’s NATO allies “stand unified in our opposition to the potential repercussions” of the treaty.
It says the treaty “turns back the clock on verification and disarmament and is dangerous” to the half-century-old Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, considered the cornerstone of global nonproliferation efforts.
“Although we recognize your sovereign right to ratify or accede to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), we believe that you have made a strategic error and should withdraw your instrument of ratification or accession,” the letter says.
The treaty requires that all ratifying countries “never under any circumstances … develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” It also bans any transfer or use of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices — and the threat to use such weapons — and requires parties to promote the treaty to other countries.
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Beatrice Fihn, executive director of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize-winning coalition whose work helped spearhead the nuclear ban treaty, told The Associated Press Tuesday that several diplomatic sources confirmed that they and other states that ratified the TPNW had been sent letters by the U.S. requesting their withdrawal.
She said the “increasing nervousness, and maybe straightforward panic, with some of the nuclear-armed states and particularly the Trump administration” shows that they “really seem to understand that this is a reality: Nuclear weapons are going to be banned under international law soon.”
Fihn dismissed the nuclear powers’ claim that the treaty interferes with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as “straightforward lies, to be frank.”
“They have no actual argument to back that up,” she said. “The Nonproliferation Treaty is about preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and eliminating nuclear weapons, and this treaty implements that. There’s no way you can undermine the Nonproliferation Treaty by banning nuclear weapons. It’s the end goal of the Nonproliferation Treaty.”
The NPT sought to prevent the spread of nuclear arms beyond the five original weapons powers. It requires non-nuclear signatory nations to not pursue atomic weapons in exchange for a commitment by the five powers to move toward nuclear disarmament and to guarantee non-nuclear states’ access to peaceful nuclear technology for producing energy.
U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres called the nuclear weapons ban treaty “a very welcome initiative.”
“It is clear for me that we will only be entirely safe in relation to nuclear weapons the day where nuclear weapons no longer exist,” he said in an interview Wednesday with AP. “We know that it’s not easy. We know that there are many obstacles.”
He expressed hope that a number of important initiatives, including U.S.-Russia talks on renewing the New Start Treaty limiting deployed nuclear warheads, missiles and bombers and next year’s review conference of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, “will all converge in the same direction, and the final objective must be to have a world with no nuclear weapons.”
“That the Trump administration is pressuring countries to withdraw from a United Nations-backed disarmament treaty is an unprecedented action in international relations,” Fihn said. “That the U.S. goes so far as insisting countries violate their treaty obligations by not promoting the TPNW to other states shows how fearful they are of the treaty’s impact and growing support.”
The treaty was approved by the 193-member U.N. General Assembly on July 7, 2017 by a vote of 122 in favor, the Netherlands opposed, and Singapore abstaining. Among countries voting in favor was Iran. The five nuclear powers and four other countries known or believed to possess nuclear weapons — India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel — boycotted negotiations and the vote on the treaty, along with many of their allies.
The treaty currently has 47 ratifications and needs 50 ratifications to trigger its entry into force in 90 days.
Fihn said there are about 10 countries that are trying very hard to ratify to get to 50, “and we know that there are a few governments that are working towards Friday as the date. … We’re not 100 percent it will happen, but hopefully it will.”
Friday has been an unofficial target because it is the eve of United Nations Day on Oct. 24 which marks the anniversary of the entry into force in 1945 of the U.N. Charter. The day has been observed since 1948 and this year is the 75th anniversary of the founding of the U.N.
Fihn stressed that the entry into force of the treaty will be “a really big deal” because it will become part of international law and will be raised in discussions on disarmament, war crimes and weapons.
“And I think that over time pressure will grow on the nuclear-armed states to join the treaty,” she said.
In subtle diplomatic move, Canada ceases its opposition to nuclear weapons prohibition treaty
The Hill Times | Douglas Roche | October 30, 2020
In a renewed political atmosphere, the paralysis that has plagued nuclear disarmament for so long may be broken. With a becoming modesty, Canada has nudged this process forward.
EDMONTON—In a subtle diplomatic move, the Government of Canada has ceased its opposition and now “acknowledges” the reason for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which will enter into force on Jan. 22, 2021.
The new treaty, which has been ratified by 50 states, has been denounced by the Trump administration and also rejected by NATO. Canada is betting that the expected election, on Nov. 3, of Joe Biden as president will bring the United States back into more cooperative multilateral work, and that NATO will gradually recognize that the global norm against the possession of nuclear weapons is rising.
Only the states that join the treaty will be bound by it, but its central provision—the prohibition of the possession of nuclear weapons—is a direct attack on the military doctrine of nuclear deterrence.
Canada is not joining the treaty—at least at this moment in history. But its policy is shifting. In 2017, when negotiations for the treaty were under way, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau called the exercise “useless.” Then, when 122 states adopted the treaty at the UN, government spokespeople dismissed it as “premature.” Now Global Affairs Canada says: “We acknowledge the widespread frustration with the pace of global efforts toward nuclear disarmament, which clearly motivated the negotiation of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.”
Some might argue that this is not a clear-cut endorsement of the treaty, but given that Global Affairs Canada did not want to directly contradict the prime minister or directly challenge NATO, which still claims that nuclear weapons are the “supreme guarantee” of security, the statement is a diplomatic expression of a shift in policy. Doubtless, the recent rebuke to NATO’s nuclear policies by two former Canadian prime ministers (Jean Chrétien, the now later John Turner), three former foreign ministers (Lloyd Axworthy, Bill Graham, John Manley) and two former defence ministers (Jean-Jacques Blais, John McCallum)—all of them Liberals—made an impression on the Pearson Building. The prohibition treaty is now treated with respect in Canada. The logical next step is for Canada to open a dialogue with NATO to bring the organization’s nuclear weapons policies into conformity with the Prohibition Treaty.
The government statement adds that, for 50 years, Canada has pursued a “pragmatic, inclusive approach to nuclear disarmament,” which is “anchored” in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. But, with nine states still holding 13,865 nuclear weapons, the NPT has clearly not produced a nuclear weapons-free world.
Reacting to this failure to eliminate nuclear weapons, a new movement, composed of activist governments and civil society leaders, began to warn of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. The Prohibition Treaty resulted.
The treaty, driven by the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, which won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2017 for its efforts, does not pretend to eliminate nuclear weapons. Nor does it seek to replace the NPT, which the treaty hails as the “cornerstone” of nuclear disarmament. What it does is stigmatize nuclear weapons as standing outside international humanitarian law and prepare the ground for comprehensive negotiations by all states for the elimination of nuclear weapons as called for by the NPT.
At the same time, the treaty is more than an exercise in public education. It is an international legal reality, binding on all those who join it. The combined educational, political, and legal value of the treaty, taking the world a step closer to the end of nuclear weapons, is what the U.S. fears most.
In a letter to supporters of the treaty urging they recant, the U.S. claims that the treaty is divisive and “will detract from realistic and practical efforts to advance the cause of nuclear disarmament.” It is quite hard to see how the U.S. is advancing nuclear disarmament when it plans to spend $1.7-trillion over the next quarter-century modernizing its fleet of nuclear missiles.
Whether Joe Biden, if elected president, will butt heads with the military-industrial complex, driving such outrageous expenditures, remains to be seen. But he did say in his campaign, “I will work to bring us closer to a world without nuclear weapons.” And he emphasized his respect for treaties: “For decades, American leaders of both parties have understood that the United States has a national security imperative and a moral responsibility to reduce nuclear threats, including by negotiating treaties and agreements to control and eventually eliminate these weapons.”
It will take a lot of pressure on a Biden presidency to “acknowledge” the Prohibition Treaty, but even if he only stops the U.S. attack on it, the treaty may come to be seen as a reinforcement of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In a renewed political atmosphere, the paralysis that has plagued nuclear disarmament for so long may be broken.
With a becoming modesty, Canada has nudged this process forward.
Statement issued to Doug Roche from Global Affairs Canada Oct. 26, 2020:
Former Senator Douglas Roche is a former Canadian ambassador for disarmament.
Lloyd Axworthy, Jean Chrétien, Bill Graham, John McCallum, John Manley, and the now-late John Turner all signed an open letter.
Historic Milestone: UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Reaches 50 Ratifications Needed for Entry Into Force
ICAN | 24 October 2020
On October 24, 2020, the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons reached the required 50 states parties for its entry into force, after Honduras ratified just one day after Jamaica and Nauru submitted their ratifications. In 90 days, the treaty will enter into force, cementing a categorical ban on nuclear weapons, 75 years after their first use.
This is a historic milestone for this landmark treaty. Prior to the TPNW’s adoption, nuclear weapons were the only weapons of mass destruction not banned under international law, despite their catastrophic humanitarian consequences. Now, with the treaty’s entry into force, we can call nuclear weapons what they are: prohibited weapons of mass destruction, just like chemical weapons and biological weapons.
ICAN’s Executive Director Beatrice Fihn welcomed the historic moment. “This is a new chapter for nuclear disarmament. Decades of activism have achieved what many said was impossible: nuclear weapons are banned,” she said.
Setsuko Thurlow, survivor of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, said “I have committed my life to the abolition of nuclear weapons. I have nothing but gratitude for all who have worked for the success of our treaty.” As a long-time and iconic ICAN activist who has spent decades sharing the story of the horrors she faced to raise awareness on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons this moment held particular significance: “This is the first time in international law that we have been so recognized. We share this recognition with other hibakusha across the world, those who have suffered radioactive harm from nuclear testing, from uranium mining, from secret experimentation.” Survivors of atomic use and testing all over the world have joined Setsuko in celebrating this milestone.
The three latest states to ratify were proud to be part of such a historic moment. All 50 states have shown true leadership to achieve a world without nuclear weapons, all while facing unprecedented levels of pressure from the nuclear armed states not to do so. A recent letter, obtained by AP only days before the ceremony, demonstrates that the Trump administration has been directly pressuring states that have ratified the treaty to withdraw from it and abstain from encouraging others to join it, in direct contradiction to their obligations under the treaty. Beatrice Fihn said: “Real leadership has been shown by the countries that have joined this historical instrument to bring it to full legal effect. Desperate attempts to weaken these leaders’ commitment to nuclear disarmament demonstrate only the fear of nuclear armed states of the change this treaty will bring.”
This is just the beginning. Once the treaty is in force, all states parties will need to implement all of their positive obligations under the treaty and abide by its prohibitions. States that haven’t joined the treaty will feel its power too – we can expect companies to stop producing nuclear weapons and financial institutions to stop investing in nuclear weapon producing companies.
How do we know? Because we have nearly 600 partner organisations in over 100 countries committed to advancing this treaty and the norm against nuclear weapons. People, companies, universities and governments everywhere will know this weapon has been prohibited and that now is the moment for them to stand on the right side of history.”
https://www.icanw.org/historic_milestone_un_treaty_on_the_prohibition_of_nuclear_weapons_reaches_50_ratifications_needed_for_entry_into_force
Canada can’t hide behind NATO in refusal to sign treaty on nuclear weapons prohibition
Here is Senator Douglas Roche’s article in The Hill Times, regarding the extraordinary new list of eminent persons urging all states to join the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.
EDMONTON—Sept 21.
Lloyd Axworthy, Jean-Jacques Blais, Jean Chrétien, Bill Graham, John McCallum, John Manley, and John Turner.These seven names hardly need an introduction to readers of The Hill Times and certainly not to the Government of Canada. Two of them are former prime ministers, three are former foreign ministers, and two are former defence ministers, who ran and served Liberal governments. All of them signed an open letter, released on Sept. 21, that features 53 former high officials of NATO countries expressing support for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. It is an astonishing rebuke of NATO’s moribund policies on nuclear weapons, and the most serious challenge to NATO’s nuclear orthodoxy in the organization’s 71-year history. Even two former NATO secretaries-general, Javier Solana and Willy Claes, as well as former U.N. secretary-general Ban Ki-moon, joined in this protest.< The treaty, which bans the possession of nuclear weapons, was adopted by 122 states at the UN in 2017 and must be ratified by 50 states before it enters into force. To date, 44 states have ratified it, so it won’t be long before the treaty becomes binding law for those who have signed it. The Canadian government, under Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, pictured Sept. 16, 2020, has said it cannot make such a commitment to sign the treaty because of its membership in NATO. But NATO, following the lead of the U.S., the U.K., and France, has vigorously rejected the treaty because it “risks undermining” the Non-Proliferation Treaty and supposedly creates divisions in the international community. It would be harder to find a more pungent example of nuclear hypocrisy. First, the treaty explicitly recognizes the NPT as the “cornerstone” of nuclear disarmament efforts. Second, it is the refusal by the nuclear weapons states to negotiate the elimination of nuclear weapons, as ordered by the NPT, that led to the development of the Prohibition Treaty.
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NATO doesn’t have a leg to stand on in maintaining that nuclear weapons are the “supreme guarantee” of security. It has now been called out by its own strongest supporters—former high officials in 20 NATO countries, Germany, Norway, Belgium, Italy, Denmark, and others, as well as the Canadians—who have signed the letter organized by the Nobel Peace Prize winning-International Campaign for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons.
The letter accuses the U.S., Russia, the U.K., France, and China—permanent members of the Security Council that all possess nuclear weapons—of viewing the NPT “as a license to retain their nuclear forces in perpetuity.” They are all flouting the NPT by modernizing their arsenals.
The letter adds: “With close to 14,000 nuclear weapons located at dozens of sites across the globe and on submarines patrolling the oceans at all times, the capacity for destruction is beyond our imagination. … Without doubt, a new nuclear arms race is under way.”
The prohibition treaty is explicit in its condemnation of nuclear weapons, stating: “Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”
The Canadian government has said it cannot make such a commitment because of its membership in NATO. But the letter contests this stand, arguing that nothing in the new treaty precludes a NATO state joining, as long as it never assists the use of nuclear weapons. This was the stand taken by Canadian Pugwash, a prominent civil society group, which said that Canada should sign the treaty and argue within NATO councils to get the nuclear policies changed. Indeed, Lloyd Axworthy, one of the signatories of the letter, went to NATO when he was foreign affairs minister to get the policy changed, but was rebuffed.
Pierre Trudeau, the father of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, once told me that NATO’s obsolete policies were one of the biggest thorns he had to endure as prime minister. Justin Trudeau has not yet learned how NATO contravenes the basic idea of nuclear disarmament, for he called the negotiations that led to the adoption of the Prohibition Treaty “useless.” And his government has continued to use NATO membership as a block to the new treaty.
COVID-19 has upended the world order. It has dramatically shown the uselessness of piling up military hardwire to provide human security. Many steps need to be taken to boost cooperative security. One of the most important would be to renounce nuclear weapons. That is what the Prohibition Treaty does. The nuclear weapons states’ plan to spend $1-trillion this decade on nuclear weapons is an outrage to a humanity crying out for resources to survive against the coronavirus.
The seven former Canadian high officials—all of them Liberals—have pulled the rug out from under the Liberal government’s pathetic excuse for not signing the Prohibition Treaty. These seven are not alone among prominent Canadians calling for this action.
Other signatories include: John Polanyi, Ed Broadbent, John English, Gerry Barr, Bruce Kidd, Margaret MacMillan, Stephen Lewis, Ernie Regehr, Jennifer Simons, Clayton Ruby, Jane Urquhart, and many other distinguished recipients of the Order of Canada who have signed a letter to Prime Minister Trudeau by Canadians for a Nuclear Weapons Convention, calling for Canada to make nuclear disarmament “a national priority.”
Another civil society organization, the Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, representing 16 national organizations, wants Canada “to take a leadership role within NATO” to create the conditions for a nuclear weapons-free world. This was exactly what the House of Commons Committee on National Defence unanimously recommended in 2018.
Justin Trudeau and his deputy, Chrystia Freeland, should now look around and see what important people in the country are saying to them. Not least their own former colleagues.
Former Senator Douglas Roche was also Canadian ambassador for disarmament. | The Hill Times
Program ABM systems to shoot down intrusions, without regard to their source
Unlike Ronald Reagan’s 1980s Strategic defence initiative, a.k.a. Star Wars, the anti-missile defence shield, into which Canada currently seems to be placing some serious stock, is quite realistic and technologically sound. In fact, over two decades ago the tech had impressively (at least to me) proved itself to be on solid ground, though I feel that it could’ve already been by now solidly established as a fully functional defense shield.
Though there still are skeptics, I can recall the successful interceptions by Patriot missiles launched from batteries stationed around Israel during Desert Storm.
If I recall correctly, the Patriot missiles had been barely developed with no practical testing, thus they had to be field tested during actual warfare. Only one scud made it through the defence shield intact and another after being severely damaged, though both did not result in death, injury nor even notable damage. Had the system been shy of competent, let alone a failure, there’s no reason to believe that the nuclear-armed nation of Israel was bluffing when it promised to retaliate against Iraq if the Patriots failed to deliver and Israeli casualties were incurred.
Unfortunately, whatever small degree to which the U.S. has thus far developed its shield technology in actual hardware would only serve to intercept ballistic missiles targeting nations that are U.S. friendly or their protection is in U.S. interests.
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A good means of avoiding such dreary anti-productive measures-thus-counter-measures would be to ensure all interested ‘sides’ that the anti-missile defence shield would be independently programmed to intercept all airborne projectiles regardless of their origin.
Admittedly, a notable sticking point could be the neutrality of the parties or national interests, etcetera, that would program such a system’s computer.
The system would monitor the planet’s air space and launch anti-missile defensive measures, equipped with latest computer-systems-hacking fail-safe technology.
The naysayers of such a universal defence shield should suggest other plausible ways through which to avoid nuclear-exchange devastation anywhere, let alone everywhere. As for those who say such a shield would be too expensive—just how much is Earth and humanity worth?
Does the Soviet “Dead Hand” system count as a Lethal Autonomous Weapon? Has this system carried over into modern day Russia?
Arctic Peace and Security Policy Issues
In this context, it is very important to recall the 1983 Declaration of the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) on a Nuclear Free Arctic. Re-Issue of an updated Declaration by the ICC could have a powerful impact on the international community and influence progress toward a nuclear-weapon-free Arctic. Canadian Pugwash, together with its international contacts, has significant expertise in current political status of nuclear weapons and would gladly offer assistance in producing updated wording of the Declaration.
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When and if the circumpolar non-nuclear-weapon states agree on the nuclear-weapon-free goal, they could approach the United Nations, which would readily offer assistance in forming a Treaty. Russia and the United States, over time, could have reason to withdraw nuclear weapons from this very limited geographic region. Alternatively, true militarization of the Arctic is a possibility, in which case the nuclear weapons of China, Britain and France might also be deployed in the Arctic. Without changing the security strategy presently employed by NW states and their allies, a nuclear-weapon-free Arctic offers a model situation for working out methodology for reduction of NW, verification and eventual nuclear disarmament.
China, in its new Arctic Policy, has announced its intention to be a key player, to expend major resources to that effect, and, in particular, to facilitate a ‘Polar Silk Road’ . The newly issued policy is aspirational, rather than specific. The policy states ‘Peace and stability in the Arctic provides a significant guarantee for all activities in the region,and serves the fundamental interest of all countries including China’. Every nation involved in the Arctic at present or in the future should and could adopt this stance, but if there is conflict, military activity, including deployment of weapons, could result. China and others would possibly be prompted to send nuclear-weapon equipped submarines; probably forever closing the opportunity for a nuclear-weapon free Arctic. This is the reason why the Government of Canada should act now.
By: Adele Buckley, Canadian Pugwash Group
Proposals for a Nuclear Weapon Free Arctic
To read more, click- http://arcticnwfz.ca/
And/or the government of some other country in the circumpolar community. The Arctic should be nuclear-weapon free. It was Gorbachev who first proposed that notion, decades ago. Hurry up! The opportunity is closing.
I doubt that the opportunity closing or really changing much at all. They could probably have come up withe an Arctic NWFZ a long time ago if it weren’t for the Russian nuclear submarines. They pretty much have to keep their subs in the far north, mostly on the Kola Peninsula, and they have to go through the Arctic to get in and out.
Japan Council’s Statement on Trump’s Nuclear Tests
President Trump’s Message on the Occasion of the 75th Anniversary of the Trinity Nuclear Test Shows No Sign of Remorse and Blatantly Declaring Further Nuclear Arms Buildup
On July 16, U.S. President Trump released a Presidential Message on the 75th Anniversary of the Trinity Nuclear Test held in New Mexico. Referring to the Manhattan Project which produced the atomic bombs, the Message says that it “helped end World War II and launch an unprecedented era of global stability” and “Our nuclear deterrent has also greatly benefitted our Nation and our allies”. This is a laudatory statement trying to justify the current nuclear buildup and modernization program promoted by the Trump Administration.
We strongly protest against his attempt to justify the production of the atomic bombs, rather than shifting to the elimination of nuclear weapons in the 75th year of the atomic bombing, which blatantly betrays the aspiration of the Hibakusha and challenges the world public opinion in support of the elimination of nuclear weapons. The atomic bomb attack was made on Hiroshima and Nagasaki when both Germany and Italy had surrendered and Japan had lost its war potential completely though it had yet to make a decision to surrender. It was the attack against undefended cities, where most of the victims were non-combatants. It was an unprecedented scale of mass destruction, which cannot be justified even in the light of international law in those days.
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Under the direction of President Trump, the U.S. has abandoned some existing treaties for nuclear arms control and is now stepping out for a new nuclear arms race with Russia. However, the deepening crisis over COVID-19, by which the U.S. people have suffered the greatest sacrifice, shows that what is most needed now is global cooperation and efforts for peace based on the U.N. Charter, disarmament and elimination of nuclear weapons, not inciting further confrontation or division.
In the present world, whether over the question of nuclear weapons prohibition, climate change, pandemic, poverty and social gap or gender equality, overwhelming majority of countries are working hand in hand with the civil society in creating a major trend toward solving these problems, focusing on the “human security”. We strongly call on the United States to reflect on its own history of having caused the crisis of annihilation of humankind, and change its course towards prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons and achieving a peaceful and just world.
Published: July 17, 2020
YASUI Masakazu, Secretary General
Japan Council against A and H Bombs (Gensuikyo)
There is something strange about the laws of war. There are treaties that outlaw certain types of conventional weapons for being too “inhumane.” If I recall correctly, there are “dumdum” bullets that explode upon impact and cause lacerations and these are forbidden. But nuclear weapons? Nah! That’s fine. Go right ahead with them!