01. All states owning or hosting nuclear weapons shall immediately de-alert them and commit to no-first-use

Rapporteur: Barbara Birkett

Where We Are: “Two Minutes to Midnight”!

–see The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (The Bulletin of The Atomic Scientists Doomsday Clock, 2019.)

According to the Federation of American Scientists(1), the world has 14,485 nuclear weapons, about 9335 of them in military stockpiles, ready for use, the rest awaiting dismantlement. Some 93% are owned by the US and Russia, with each having about 4,000 warheads in their stockpiles. Many of these are thirty or fifty or more times as lethal as the weapons that fell on Hiroshima and Nagasaki!

About 3,750 are with operational forces; 1,940 US, Russian, British, and French warheads are on high alert.

No-First-Use (NFU) has been declared as a policy by China and India; in 1993 the latter country stated that it would respond massively to any size of nuclear attack and changed the wording to “no first use against non-nuclear armed weapons states” in 2010.

France, Pakistan, Russia, the UK, and the USA say they will use nuclear weapons against nuclear or non-nuclear states only in the case of invasion or other attack against their territories or against one of their allies. In 2017 the UK stated it would use nuclear weapons in a pre-emptive strike “in the most extreme circumstances.”

[read more]

Pakistan, although it has a no-first-attack policy, refuses to have a NFU doctrine. The USA does not have a NFU policy, although attempts have been made to require congressional approval for a pre-emptive strike or to adopt a NFU rule. NATO has refused to adopt a no-first-use policy. Israel has not stated its stance. North Korea has stated different policies at various times.(2)

The Problems

Major concerns are the rising tensions between the US and Russia, nuclear developments in North Korea, climate change, other international conflicts, and possible cyber attacks leading to release or loss of control of nuclear weapons. Current US threats of withdrawal from the INF treaty (and previous leaving of the ABM treaty) with subsequent loss of contact and verification abilities, may further risk accidental, mistaken, or deliberate launches.

Given that US and Russian Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) can reach the other’s countries within about 30 minutes, a US President or Russian leader might have only about 12 minutes to decide whether to order an attack or respond to an attack. Is it a comfort that any single human being should have to make such decision, and so quickly? Or should such a decision ever be made at all?

Maintaining nuclear weapons as deterrents, either on alert or off, is the prime excuse for their possession, but this makes other countries feel they must have their own deterrent weapons. Hence we now have nine nuclear weapons states. The world once reached nearly 70,000 weapons. Although the numbers are much reduced, all nine nuclear states are either making new weapons, or modernizing them, and some are even thinking of making the weapons “more usable.” As noted above, at least four nuclear weapon states have weapons on high alert and feel they should be so maintained. The deterrence doctrine is coupled with plans to use nuclear weapons if deterrence fails. In some cases it is even contemplated using nuclear weapons in response to a conventional weapons attack. Even a limited nuclear war such as might occur between India and Pakistan, using Hiroshima-sized nuclear weapons, could cause two billion deaths.(3)

Other arguments note, in spite of persistent efforts in the command and control systems, the many near misses or actual accidents that actually have occurred over the years, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Able Archer close call in 1983, the near-launch when a practice tape was played in the US in error, the research flight from Norway in 1995, which the Russians thought was a nuclear weapons attack and their proposed response was only prevented by a brave Russian officer. Other numerous near calamities are recorded in the book of about 500 pages, ”Command and Control,” by Eric Schlosser.(4)

The NPT recognized the dangers of nuclear arms, and the nuclear weapons states are supposed to be committed to disarming their nuclear weapons as quickly as possible, not just preventing proliferation to other states. Last year’s Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), adopted by 122 states and already ratified by 23, arose from the frustration of many states (particularly those who had been the victims of nuclear tests), at the nuclear states’ lack of action or very slow pace on nuclear disarmament and abolition.

The Red Cross/Red Crescent has declared that there can be no possible humanitarian response in a nuclear conflict.

Those holding the view that abolition of nuclear weapons is the correct move, believe that, whether or not nuclear weapons can act as a deterrent to aggression, like any medications with serious and lethal side effects, they should be withdrawn from the market. The risks of both accidental and deliberate use are too high.

Suggested Solutions: De-Alerting, No First Use, End Sole Authority for Launch, Stop Enhancing Weapons, Pursue Nuclear Disarmament, Sign the TPNW.

Some are calling for an intermediate stance, a deterrence-only policy.

Others see such actions as urgent steps towards total nuclear disarmament.

Others call for maintenance of alert status.

De-Alerting

Intermediate stance de-alerting policy:

Phillips and Starr [2006] noted that changing from a Launch-on-Warning policy to Retaliatory-Launch-Only–After-Detonation would eliminate the risk of accidental war from false alarms. It would not require de-alerting or verification and might be more acceptable to the US and Russia militaries. Deterrence could be maintained.(5)

A deterrence-only policy option is to proceed with fewer stockpiled nuclear weapons and an end of the current modernization plans. It would rely mainly on submarine-based missiles, would not require a time-sensitive retaliatory nuclear attack, and could be supplemented by conventional and cyber forces. It would be decoupled from the idea of immediately destroying the enemy’s nuclear forces. It would be less expensive and allow funding of other endeavours. It would require much up-grading of Command, Control, and Communication networks. It still retains the deterrence doctrine, but not, according to its proponents, deterrence + war-fighting.(6) (7)

The arguments for maintaining alert status state that cyberattacks could still occur after de-alerting, and that even with a longer decision-making delay, a president could not make a better decision in the event of a threatened or actual nuclear strike after de-alerting. This is because rapid re-altering would cause even more risk. They argue that foes would be emboldened rather than deterred under such conditions and that de-alerting would lead to de facto No-First-Use. They call for better cyber security, especially with modernization. They are willing to discuss eliminating ICBMs.(8)

Others state that under alert status, deliberate or accidental launches or attacks are too grave a risk. De-Alerting should therefore be the first step in avoiding these. The Union of Concerned Scientists suggests simple methods for accomplishing this.(9)

NO FIRST USE- Statements by the Red Cross and Red Crescent that there is no possible humanitarian response to any use of nuclear weapons and its call for assurance that such weapons “are never again used” reinforce arguments against First Use (and any use, ever.) The ICJ opinion in 1996 stated that use of nuclear weapons would be illegal in almost all conceivable situations. This is consistent with a policy of No-First-Use. Such arguments were also made at the Humanitarian (disarmament) conferences in Oslo, Nayarit, and Austria.

De-alerting would help promote the adoption of a doctrine of No-First-Use.

Also essential would be confidence-building and communication with foes (eg between US and Russia) to make sure disarmament and de-alert agreements were being followed. As Phillips and Starr have noted, however, even an unverified no launch on warning policy held by one party is safer than the current situation.

At the UN General Assembly First Committee vote on the Humanitarian Pledge in 2015 the nuclear weapons states and their umbrella allies asserted their “recognition of the grave humanitarian consequences of a nuclear weapons detonation” and at the same time stated that “security and humanitarian principles co-exist.” They suggested that the proponents of a TPNW’s resolutions “do not reflect these realities and imperatives” and contribute to “increasing international divisions regarding nuclear disarmament”.

Their remarks reflect the dilemma of trying to relate NATO’s supposed support for the NPT obligations towards disarmament and NATO’s policy that nuclear weapons are an “essential” component of its deterrence. NATO will not, to date, accept a No-First-Use approach, and several European states have US tactical nuclear weapons on their territory.(10)

Others deny the dichotomy between humanitarian and security goals. They point out that the risks of having nuclear weapons far outweigh any perceived benefits, particularly in times of heightened tension, such as now. An Immediate shift towards de-alerting, and adoption of No-First-Use policy would lessen danger of use, allow for further rational discussion and reduction of numbers of weapons, re- enforce the NPT, encourage more nations to sign the TPNW, and eliminate many nuclear weapons.(11) (12) (13)

In June 2018 the Canadian House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence called upon the Government ”to take a leadership role within NATO in beginning the work necessary for achieving the NATO goal of creating the conditions for a world free of nuclear weapons.” Canada can press NATO, with like-minded allies, to help achieve these goals, help change some of NATO’s nuclear doctrines and promote removal of tactical weapons from its members’ territories.(14)

Footnotes for this article can be seen at the Footnotes 1 page on this website (link will open in a new page).

[/read]

06. UN Convention on CCW and all states shall prohibit developing or deploying lethal autonomous weapons.

Rapporteurs: Erin Hunt and Gerardo Lebron Laboy, Mines Action Canada

I. THE PROBLEM

Lethal Autonomous Weapons (LAWs) refers to future weapons that would select their targets and engage (kill) based on their programming. They will be “autonomous” in the sense that they would not require human intervention to actuate (act or operate according to its programming).(1) Being solely algorithmic driven, LAWs will be able to kill without any human interference or oversight.

The following arguments have been offered in support of the development of LAWs:

LAWs technology could offer better military performance and thus enhance mission effectiveness
  • LAWs, being a product of robotics, could be faster, stronger, and have better endurance than human soldiers in every perspective, not being subject to fatigue.
  • Better environmental awareness; robotic sensors could provide better battlefield observation.
  • Higher and longer range precision: Also, given advanced sensor technology, LAWs could have better target precision and a longer range.
  • Better responsiveness: LAWs will not be subject to the uncertainty in situational awareness that participants in military operations may go through because of communication problems or sight or vision obstructions (fog of war). Through an interconnected system of multiple sensors and intelligence sources, LAWs could have the capacity to update instantly more information than humans and faster, which would enable better awareness of their surroundings.
  • Emotionless advantage: LAWs would not have emotions that cloud their judgement.
  • Self sacrificing nature: LAWs would not have a self-preservation tendency and thus could be used in self sacrificing manners if needed and appropriate.

[read more]

Ethical superiority
  • Because LAWs could be programmed to follow the Laws of Armed Conflict, and given their robotic nature, they would not be subject to human failings, which will permit them to comply more rigorously with International Humanitarian Law (IHL), specifically following in a highly precise matter the principles of distinction, proportionality, and military necessity.
Casualty reduction
  • LAWs will substitute for human soldiers and as consequence reduce own-soldier casualties.
  • LAWs’ better target precision capabilities could reduce collateral damage, such as civilian casualties or civilian property damage. LAWs, being a product of robotics, could be faster, stronger, and have better endurance than human soldiers in every perspective, not being subject to fatigue.

The following arguments have been offered against the development of LAWs:

Immorality
  • Delegating the decision to kill to machines crosses a fundamental moral line.
Martens Clause violation
  • LAWs could not fulfill the principles of humanity and therefore will be contrary to the dictates of public conscience, thus violating the Martens Clause as stated in the Additional Protocol I of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions.
Laws of Armed Conflict violation
  • The complexity of the interrelation of the principles of distinction, proportionality, and military necessity, and their required value judgements, makes the Laws of Armed Conflict unprogrammable. Thus, LAWs would not be able to comply with IHL.
Unpredictability
  • Because LAWs could be designed with machine learning algorithms, their actuation will be unpredictable and thus commanders would lose control of outcomes.
Algorithmic bias
  • LAWs programs could be subject to human bias inserted in the algorithmic design process which would open the possibility of unethical discrimination and inhumane treatment.
Accountability
  • It is uncertain how accountability could be addressed with LAWs because of the number of humans associated with the use or production of these weapons (operators, commanders, programmers, manufacturers, etc.). Neither criminal law nor civil law guarantees adequate accountability for individuals directly or indirectly involved in the use of autonomous weapons systems.
Totalitarian possibilities
  • LAWs will lack the human capacity of acting against orders that seemed unethical or immoral to them and thus could more easily serve totalitarian purposes on the hands of commanders.
Lack of constraints
  • LAWs will not be subject to human constraints given by emotions, empathy, and compassion, which work as an important check for humans in the killing of civilians.
Force Multiplier
  • Because LAWs will distance humans from the risks and tragedies of war by enabling remotely driven tactics, they will make the political decision of going to war easier and thus function as a force multiplier, promoting more conflict rather than less. This will lead to a war paradigm shift where remoteness plays the central role.
Arms Race
  • The development of LAWs would initiate a global arms race that will lead to increased international instability.

II. SOLUTION

The solution is an international preemptive ban on the development of lethal autonomous weapons adopted by the High Contracting Parties of the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.This ban would build on other humanitarian disarmament treaties and the preemptive ban of blinding laser weapons by the The Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons, Protocol IV of the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.

The adoption of this solution depends in its entirety on the willingness of the parties to agree and adopt the ban.As of today, the call for the lethal autonomous weapons ban is being supported by the following 25 states:Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Colombia, Cuba, Djibouti Ecuador, Egypt, Ghana, Guatemala, Holy See, Iraq, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, State of Palestine, Uganda, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. China has expressed support on a ban on the use of LAWs, not on their development.

There have been numerous citizen expressions from the technology industry in favor of the ban on the development of LAWs. Over 1,000 experts in robotics and artificial intelligence have signed two letters from the Future of Life Institute supporting the ban (Autonomous Weapons: An Open Letter) from AI & robotics Researchers; Lethal Autonomous Weapons Pledge. Signatories of these letters include Stephen Hawking, Elon Musk, Steve Wozniak, Noam Chomsky, Skype co-founder Jaan Tallinn, Google DeepMind co-founder Demis Hassabis, and others.

Seventy religious leaders, representatives and faith based organisations have signed an interreligious declaration, initiative of PAX in cooperation with Pax Christi International, calling on states to work towards a global ban on fully autonomous weapons.

More than 20 Nobel Peace Prize Laureates have endorsed a joint statement calling for a ban on weapons that would be able to select and attack targets without meaningful human control.

The United States and Russia have expressed the view that an international ban on lethal autonomous weapons would be premature. Instead, they encourage further analysis of the possible benefits this new technology could offer. The Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence of the United Kingdom expressed its opposition to the international ban since it states that international humanitarian law already addresses the issue.

LAWs have not been fully developed yet. In fact, much of its proposed technology still does not exist. This positions the international community in an advantageous point where we can actually prevent, as we did with laser blinding weapons, a humanitarian catastrophe and its consequences altogether.

Footnotes for this article can be seen at the Footnotes 1 page on this website (link will open in a new page).

[/read]

05. All states shall ratify and fully implement the Arms Trade Treaty

Rapporteur: César Jaramillo

The Arms Trade Treaty

The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) is a multilateral, legally binding agreement, aimed at regulating the global trade in conventional weapons. Illicit and irresponsible transfers of conventional weapons are widely recognized to be a significant factor in human suffering worldwide, fueling armed violence in all its forms. The ATT intends to develop a universal framework for responsible decision-making at the national level on the transfer of conventional weapons.

The two primary objectives of the ATT are to “Establish the highest possible common international standards for regulating or improving the regulation of the international trade in conventional arms” and to “Prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and prevent their diversion”.

Three purposes are identified under these objectives:

  1. Contributing to international and regional peace, security and stability;
  2. Reducing human suffering;
  3. Promoting cooperation, transparency and responsible action by States Parties in the international trade in conventional arms, thereby building confidence among States Parties.

The ATT is strongly founded on humanitarian principles. A proportion of the global arms trade, which is estimated to be worth up to $100-billion annually, is known to enable the violation of human rights and international humanitarian law, to sustain autocratic regimes, to exacerbate armed conflict, and to be a factor for regional instability.

[read more]

Rather than proscribe transfers of any one category of conventional weapons, the ATT delineates the circumstances under which arms exports would be prohibited, for example, in violation of UN Security Council sanctions or arms embargoes. Central to the rationale for the ATT is the nexus between the end-use or end-user of arms exports and the risk of their misuse.

In simple terms, exporting states ought not to authorize arms exports when there is a risk that they may be misused.

While the ATT specifically prohibits certain arms transfers when a risk of misuse is identified, it is understood to be an arms control regime, not a disarmament one. In fact, the Treaty explicitly recognizes the licit trade in conventional weapons as a legitimate pursuit for arms exporting states and focuses its restrictions on illicit, irresponsible and/or unscrupulous arms transfers.

Treaty adoption and entry into force

The UN General Assembly adopted the ATT on April 2nd, 2013, and the treaty opened for state signatures on June 3rd, 2013. Following ratification by 50 states, as required by Article 22 of the treaty, it entered into force on December 24th, 2014.

In 1997 a group of Nobel Laureates led by Oscar Arias had met in New York to develop a code of conduct around the global arms trade. Discussions continued involving a greater number of stakeholders from in and out of government and, in 2001, the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects was adopted as a non-legally binding policy instrument.

In December 2006, the United Kingdom introduced Resolution 61/89, which asked the UN Secretary-General to seek the views of member states on the feasibility of a “comprehensive, legally binding instrument establishing common international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms” and to report on those views back to the General Assembly.

In late 2009, a decision was made by the UN General Assembly, through resolution A/RES/64/48, to hold a multilateral conference in 2012 “to elaborate a legally binding instrument on the highest possible common international standards for the transfer of conventional arms”.

Types of conventional weapons covered

Per Article 2 of the ATT, the regulations established by the treaty are applicable to eight categories of conventional weapons, namely:

  • Battle tanks;
  • Armoured combat vehicles;
  • Large-calibre artillery systems;
  • Combat aircraft;
  • Attack helicopters;
  • Warships;
  • Missiles and missile launchers; and
  • Small arms and light weapons.

In addition, Article 3 extends the treaty’s applicability to ammunition “fired, launched or delivered by the conventional arms” under the eight categories specified under Article 2. Likewise, Article 4 includes parts and components “where the export is in a form that provides the capability to assemble the conventional arms” covered by the treaty.

Treaty universalization

Achieving universal membership is an explicit objective of the treaty, on the understanding that the regime’s effectiveness will be enhanced as more states agree to abide by the common set of standards it establishes. As of July 1st, 2009, there are 103 states parties, 33 signatories that are not state parties, and 57 states that have not joined the treaty.

On June 19, 2019, Canada deposited its instrument of accession to the ATT at the United Nations, set to become the 104th state party to the treaty when accession takes effect after 90 days.

Treaty text

The ATT text consists of a preamble outlining the primary issues underpinning the treaty, a statement of principles to guide the actions of state parties and 28 articles.

Among other considerations, the preamble recognizes both “the need to prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and to prevent their diversion to the illicit market, or for unauthorized end use and end users, including in the commission of terrorist acts”, and “the legitimate political, security, economic and commercial interests of States in the international trade in conventional arms.”

The preamble also points to the “security, social, economic and humanitarian consequences of the illicit and unregulated trade in conventional arms” and draws attention to the fact that “civilians, particularly women and children, account for the vast majority of those adversely affected by armed conflict and armed violence.”

The ATT is also explicit in acknowledging the legitimate possession of certain types of conventional weapons “for recreational, cultural, historical, and sporting activities.”

Treaty principles include states’ individual and collective right to self-defense, as well as the legitimate interest of states in acquiring conventional weapons to exercise said right; the principle of non-intervention “in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State”; and the consistent, objective and non-discriminatory implementation of the ATT by all states parties.

Key Provisions

The ATT lists five criteria by which proposed exports must be evaluated: peace and security, human suffering (according to the standards of International Humanitarian Law), respect for human rights (according to the standards of International Human Rights Law), terrorism, and transnational organized crime.

Moreover, the ATT is the first international agreement to recognize and address the link between conventional arms transfers and gender-based violence. Exporting states must take into account the risk of the arms or munitions “being used to commit or facilitate serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women and children.”

Article 2 of the ATT, which defines the scope of the treaty, is explicit about its applicability to all military exports under the eight categories of conventional weapons it recognizes. Furthermore, article 5 calls for the ATT to be implemented in a consistent, objective, and non-discriminatory manner.

The ATT, under Article 12, obligates exporting countries to maintain national records of the authorization or the export of weapons for at least 10 years. In addition, in Article 11, the ATT requires exporters to assess the risk of diversion of arms exports, understood as a change in the intended end use or end user.

The ATT also includes the obligation, under Article 10, to regulate the brokering or arms transfers, as well as the transit or transshipment of conventional weapons in territories or waters under its jurisdiction.

Articles 6 and 7, which deal, respectively, with prohibitions and risk assessments, are at the core of actual authorizations or denials of arms exports by states parties.

Under Article 6, a State Party is not to authorize any transfer of conventional arms covered, ammunition or parts and components covered by the treaty, if:

  1. The transfer 5 would violate its obligations under measures adopted by the United Nations Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, in particular arms embargoes.
  2. The transfer would violate its relevant international obligations under international agreements to which it is a Party, in particular those relating to the transfer of, or illicit trafficking in, conventional arms.
  3. It has knowledge at the time of authorization that the arms or items would be used in the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, attacks directed against civilian objects or civilians protected as such, or other war crimes as defined by international agreements to which it is a Party.

Article 7 defines the risk assessment process that each exporting state must undertake prior to authorizing an arms export. Specifically, exporting states must assess “the potential” that the conventional arms being considered for export:

  1. Would contribute to or undermine peace and security.
  2. Could be used to:
    1. commit or facilitate a serious violation of international humanitarian law;
    2. commit or facilitate a serious violation of international human rights law;
    3. commit or facilitate an act constituting an offence under international conventions or protocols relating to terrorism to which the exporting State is a Party;
    4. commit or facilitate an act constituting an offence under international conventions or protocols relating to transnational organized crime to which the exporting State is a Party.

In this context, exporting states must also consider whether measures can be taken to mitigate these risks. If the exporting state determines that the negative consequences of said risks remain after considering possible mitigating measures, the export shall not be authorized. If, after the export has taken place, the exporting state becomes aware of “new relevant information” it is “encouraged” to reassess the authorization of the export.

Criticism

The Arms Trade Treaty has been the subject of criticism from various sectors, including during the negotiation stage and since its entry into force. Two types of criticism have stood out:

Gun groups, such as the US-based National Rifle Association, as well as sports shooting associations in other countries, have long contended that the treaty infringes upon the rights of lawful, domestic gun owners. While these concerns are unfounded as the treaty deals with international commerce, not domestic ownership, this line of criticism has been persistent at Conferences of States Parties and other ATT meetings, which are routinely attended not only by NGOs supportive of the objectives and spirit of the treaty but also by those who oppose it.

The treaty’s effectiveness has also been the subject of criticism. An article published by The Economist at the time of the 4th Conference of States Parties in August 2018, argued that the ATT had had “little impact”. The military intervention in Yemen by a regional coalition led by Saudi Arabia has been the cause of heavy criticisms about compliance with the ATT by states parties, such as the United Kingdom and France, which have continued exporting weapons to Saudi Arabia and other coalition partners despite vast evidence that they are being used against civilian targets and despite vocal domestic and international opposition.

[/read]

04. All states shall develop a UN Emergency Peace Service to protect civilians and respond to crises

Rapporteur: Dr. H. Peter Langille (hpl@globalcommonsecurity.org )

The objective of the proposed United Nations Emergency Peace Service (UNEPS) is to develop a standing UN capacity that can respond rapidly and reliably to address four of the UN’s long-standing challenges. A UNEPS is designed to help prevent armed conflict and genocide/atrocity crimes; to protect civilians at risk; to ensure prompt start-up of demanding peace operations; and to address human needs in areas where others either cannot or will not.

In addition to the four primary roles identified, a UNEPS has emancipatory potential to help in the following areas: facilitating disarmament; freeing up enormous resources wasted on war; saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war; and as a step toward a more legitimate, effective, universal peace system.

A key lesson of previous experience is that favorable conditions for such a development tend to arise in the aftermath of tragic wars and genocides. Then, when the urgent need was evident, the prior preparation of a viable plan and a core constituency of support was not. This effort endeavors to ensure both are ready and sufficiently compelling to encourage development of a UNEPS before emergencies overwhelm.

A UNEPS will be a new UN formation. Thus, the UNEPS initiative is both a proposal and an advocacy campaign, coupled to an ongoing research project. Each aspect is a work in progress. To succeed, each aspect needs wider support.

Ten Core Principles of the proposed UNEPS:

  1. a permanent standing, integrated UN formation;
  2. highly trained and well-equipped;
  3. ready for immediate deployment upon authorization of the UN Security Council;
  4. multidimensional (civilians, police and military);
  5. multifunctional (capable of diverse assignments with specialized skills for security, humanitarian, health and environmental crises);
  6. composed of 13,500 dedicated personnel (recruited professionals who volunteer for service and are then screened, selected, trained and employed by the UN);
  7. developed to ensure regional and gender equitable representation;
  8. co-located at a designated UN base under an operational headquarters and two mobile mission headquarters;
  9. at sufficient strength to operate in high-threat environments; and,
  10. a service to complement existing UN and regional arrangements, with a first responder to cover the initial six months until Member States can deploy.(1)

[read more]

What’s Different?

A UNEPS would be a standing UN formation, ready to serve in diverse UN operations, immediately available upon authorization of the UN Security Council. With dedicated UN personnel, advanced doctrine, training and equipment, UN operations could get off to a good start quickly at the outset of a crisis.

As a multidimensional service, a UNEPS will include sufficient police to restore law and order, a military formation to deter aggression and maintain security, as well civilian teams to provide essential services for conflict resolution, human rights, health, disaster assistance and peacebuilding quick impact projects.

A multifunctional service ensures a cost-effective capacity to help with a wider array of task. With its modular formation, responses can be tailored for specific operational requirements.
A UNEPS is to be a first-in, first-out service, limited to deployments of six months. With a prompt, coherent start-up, it is to de-escalate and calm the crisis, averting the need for more or, if required, lay a solid foundation for follow-on efforts.

As a ‘UN 911’ first responder for complex emergencies, a UNEPS is not intended for war-fighting, but primarily to provide prompt, reliable help. Yet it may also serve as a vanguard, a strategic reserve, a robust protector and a security guarantor, both to deter violent crime and respond, when necessary, to prevent and protect.

Another distinct feature of a UNEPS is that it would be composed of devoted individuals recruited worldwide within a UN rather than national service. After screening and selection on the basis of merit, skill and commitment, its personnel would be co-located on a UNEPS base where they would be extensively trained, equipped and employed by the UN. Thus, a UNEPS is a new model.

Unlike previous proposals, a UNEPS is to complement existing UN arrangements, with a service that’s gender-equitable, which should help to develop higher standards system-wide. Aside from being a more rapid and reliable life-saver, this option is also a cost-saver.

The case for a UNEPS

From Rwanda and Srebrenica to Myanmar and Syria, the pattern of ‘too little, too late’ – incurring vast suffering, higher costs and wider consequences – has simply gone on for far too long. Instead of UN rapid deployment to prevent worse, routine delays allow worse.

People world-wide share a problem. According to research from the Institute for Economics and Peace, “the world is less peaceful today than at any time in the past decade”.(2) “After declining for much of the 1990s, the number of major civil wars has almost tripled in the past decade”.(3) Global armed conflicts are also killing more. (4) “The chances of nuclear war are higher than they’ve been in generations” – a warning the UN disarmament chief recently conveyed to the UN Security Council.(5) With the Global Peace Index 2018 reporting the annual economic cost of violence (war and armed conflict) at a staggering $14.7 Trillion (USD), people know this isn’t a safe or sustainable system.(6)

Countries world-wide lack the capacity to prevent armed conflict and to protect civilians at risk. What they do have is frequently either unavailable to the UN or inappropriate for UN peace operations. Coalition attempts to protect tend to be too destructive and even counter-productive.

UN peace operations definitely help, but they’re now relegated to post-conflict stabilization – putting a lid on a crisis once the fighting slows to allow the start of a peace process. For every operation, the UN faces an arduous process of renting the highly-valued resources of its member states, negotiating around their terms and accepting their conditions. Now it usually takes six-to-twelve months to deploy.

As a result, conflicts tend to escalate and spread, setting back the prospects for development and disarmament for decades. Then they require larger, longer UN operations at far higher costs.

Does it seem odd that countries could put a man on the moon fifty years back, but have yet to equip the UN to meet its primary objective – “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”? No, it’s not that governments don’t know how to start or what would work.(7) Yet they won’t develop such a service until they see a viable plan and feel the pressure of a broad-based, informed constituency.

The UNEPS proposal is one step toward meeting these serious, recurring challenges. Without a dedicated UN Service, national military establishments will remain reluctant to support UN peace operations, military transformation or any shift away from further preparation for more war.

The projected expense and cost-effectiveness

Developing a UNEPS will entail approximately $3 billion in start-up costs, with annual recurring costs of $1.5 billion, shared proportionally among 193 Member States. Clearly, there will be additional expenses in deploying a UNEPS, which would require strategic and tactical air-lift for early-in formations, as well as sea-lift for follow-on, heavier assets.(8)

With such additional costs, the advantages must be substantive. A UNEPS should help to prevent the escalation of volatile conflicts; deter groups from violence; and cut the size, length, and frequency of UN operations. Success in just one of those areas would provide a real return on the investment. And there are other positive benefits in this development, which merit further consideration and investment.

Origins of the proposal

There have been numerous precedents outlining the requirements of a UN standing force or UN rapid reaction capacity, usually developed in response to tragic wars and/or genocides.(9) One pivotal contribution arose from Saul Mendlovitz and Robert Johansen, who elaborated on UN Secretary-General Trygvie Lie’s idea of a UN Legion, with the idea of a permanent force composed of dedicated, individually-recruited personnel rather than drawing on national armed forces.(10)

The proposal for a United Nations Emergency Peace Service (UNEPS) largely stemmed from a former Canadian government study on UN rapid deployment.(11)

That study was a response to both the UN Secretary-General’s 1992 An Agenda for Peace and the Rwandan genocide. It was initially announced as a year-long, in-depth examination of various innovative proposals, including the creation of a permanent rapid deployment force under UN command. Two members of the core working group were tasked to examine diverse options for a UN standing force.(12) A brief summary of the proposed standing UN Emergency Group was included in the Government report submitted to the UN General Assembly in 1995, with elaboration in a related publication of the Pearson Peacekeeping Training Centre.(13)

The study was carried out in close consultation with multinational partners, military advisors, and the advice of UN officials. It was followed by a multinational initiative of twenty-eight UN member states in the Friends of UN Rapid Deployment.

Soon after being announced, events transpired to shift the official focus away from a UN standing force toward the more pragmatic, readily-agreeable reforms for UN rapid deployment over the short-mid-, to long-term. A Standing UN Emergency Group was not the preferred option of Canadian or other national military establishments. As such, it was relegated to the long-term concern and denied the attention and support announced.

Yet the study, process, impediments and prospects were deeply scrutinized in a subsequent, independent research effort. The lessons-learned created a better sense of what might work and what definitely wouldn’t.(14)

The inspiration for the earlier standing option and ongoing efforts was wider, but often from Sir Brian Urquhart, the study’s co-chair. As a pioneer of UN peacekeeping and former UN Under-Secretary General for Political Affairs, Urquhart had already stirred a high-level debate with his proposal for a ‘UN volunteer military force’.(15)

In 2001, Urquhart emphasized the need for a book elaborating on the Canadian study’s option of a UN ‘Standing Emergency Group’. A multi-dimensional service, with a multi-functional capacity to help, aligned with projected UN requirements. A civil society constituency was another objective. In response, with support from Don Krause at the Centre for UN Reform Education, Peter Langille published a book in 2002 that refined the concept, case, model, and plans for a UN Emergency Service.(16)

The UNEPS Initiative: a cooperative effort?

The World Federalist Movement-Canada (WFM-C) has been the institutional anchor of this initiative since 2000. It retains a small working group that collaborates with Langille.(17) Their plans are routinely updated to ensure they correspond to the more recent developments in UN peace operations.

A wider initiative for a United Nations Emergency Peace Service followed on from a 2003 forum in Santa Barbara, co-hosted by the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and the Simons Foundation, with three American NGOs assuming a lead role.(18)

This commenced with the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (NAPF), Global Action to Prevent War (GAPW) and the World Federalist Movement’s Institute for Global Policy (WFM-IGP). At their initial forum, David Krieger suggested that ‘peace’ be included in the title. There was also wider agreement that Langille’s 2002 book be their background book, with unanimous support for the idea of a United Nations Emergency Peace Service.

In 2005, Saul Mendlovitz of GAPW organized an encouraging global conference on UNEPS in Cuenca, Spain, with financial assistance from the Ford Foundation. Drawing on representatives of diverse sectors, there was consensus on the need to improve UN rapid deployment, as well as agreement that the UNEPS concept was appealing, the case was compelling, the model more appropriate and the political prospects appeared better than previous options.(19)

The need for gender-equitable composition in the proposed UNEPS was raised by Rebecca Johnson of the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy at a subsequent conference in Vancouver. Robert Johansen of the Kroc Institute also recommended that this service include a justice and corrections capacity as one of the diverse civilian elements. Robert Zuber was introduced as a new fund-raiser for UNEPS and GAPW.

In 2006, with financial support of the Ford Foundation, the three NGOs published a book edited by Robert Johansen, A United Nations Emergency Peace Service: To Prevent Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity.(20) The wider focus and four primary objectives of the UNEPS proposal shifted to the narrower preference of the American NGOs. Yet encouraging efforts were underway.

In 2007, thirty members of Congress supported H-Res 213, “expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that a United Nations Emergency Peace Service capable of intervening in the early stages of a humanitarian crisis could save millions of lives, billions of dollars, and is in the interests of the United States.”(21)

In 2008, another promising conference in Brisbane prompted high-level interest in Japan.(22) For a brief period, Japanese officials offered to host a UNEPS base and to provide related support.

In March of 2008, prior to his first election, Presidential candidate, Barack Obama responded directly to the UNEPS proposal by writing, “I do not support the creation and funding of the United Nations Emergency Peace Service”.(23) American support for the UNEPS proposal diminished.(24) A potentially promising international steering group was disbanded within a year. Two of the three American NGOs already had moved on, leaving GAPW to coordinate limited efforts, with insufficient resources. WFM-C cooperation continued both independently and in occasional partnership with GAPW.

In 2013, the Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford, where related research had been done in the nineties, hosted a seminar focused on UN rapid deployment and UNEPS. Their report generated doubts and divisions.(25)

Several case studies were published analyzing UNEPS applicability in specific conflicts.(26) Operational plans were developed for training, dovetailing with UN multinational operations, and sequencing deployments and support. The option attracted critical analysis, including regional perspectives.

GAPW affiliates subsequently published two books on UNEPS raising variations on the theme, its applicability to specific regions, even a different model with an American force structure.(27)

In 2014, a substantive International Peace Institute (IPI) review of UN rapid deployment acknowledged that the UN reforms of the past twenty years had been far from sufficient. It concluded that deployments would remain slow and largely incapable of prevention and protection without a UNEPS.(28)

Within the year, WFM-C submitted two detailed reports on the UNEPS option to two UN high-level reviews of peace operations.(29) Another book on UNEPS was published in 2015 to clarify further requirements and respond to several critiques.(30)

Support

The UNEPS proposal is endorsed by various senior UN officials, former leaders of UN peace operations and an array of experts on peace, security and conflict world-wide.

An encouraging boost to the initiative arose from the 2017 UK Labour Party Manifesto, “For the Many, Not the Few”.(31) It noted, “Labour will commit to effective UN peacekeeping, including support for a UN Emergency Peace Service.”(32) Bilateral discussions with other parties were reported to be encouraging.

Media coverage is positive but sporadic. For example, in 2016 the editorial board of the Toronto Star suggested that the Canadian government support UNEPS.(33) Yet support of the peace and disarmament community was thin until 2017, when a Group of 78 conference was held, ‘Getting to Nuclear Zero: Building Common Security for a Post-MAD World.’ Leading civil society organizations backed the initiative as part of a wider agenda entitled, “A Shift to Sustainable Peace and Common Security”.(34)

In May 2018 at an event in Toronto: “How to Save the World in a Hurry,”(35) a consensus was expressed for a broad platform of 25 proposals on a variety of issues: the “Platform for Survival.” The UNEPS proposal was one of the six proposals addressing the problems of “War & Weapons.”(36)

Impediments

The UNEPS initiative continues to make progress, despite an unfavorable environment.

People world-wide still bear the costs and consequences of a deeply entrenched war system, the unwarranted influence of a global military-industrial complex and, a dysfunctional, impoverished peace system. The UNEPS proposal has not been endorsed by UN Member States or the UN Security Council. Given heightened international tension, no government is in a position to express support, and the UN cannot adopt a contentious proposal without wide agreement from the Member States. After twenty years of austerity and financial cuts to the UN budget, the official preference is limited to pragmatic, incremental reforms of existing arrangements. The manta of ‘do more, with less’ is deeply institutionalized.

Similarly, foundations that support peace and security work have become reluctant to support a challenging proposal without high-profile political leaders or a network of other inclined foundations.

Although millions are mobilizing behind specific campaigns of resistance, civil society and NGO networks have yet to develop inter-sectoral cooperation (and joint campaigns) to address serious global challenges.

The lack of a transnational advocacy network (TAN) remains a problem. With neither government nor foundation support, the research and educational outreach efforts of WFM-C have been limited since 2004 to an all-volunteer effort.

The support of the UK Labour Party prompted challenges from where least expected. The Oxford Research Group (ORG) was at the forefront.(37) Richard Gowan berated the idea and its political proponents.(38) A GAPW affiliate wrote about the ‘demise’ of the UNEPS initiative, citing the absence of a TAN.(39) ORG’s senior fellow, Paul Rogers, proposed a compromise: a UN Standing Force, composed of national militaries, with UK forces in a lead role.(40)

The UNEPS proposal will encounter even more opposition if it acquires traction. Inevitably, national defence establishments and the global military-industrial complex will attempt to keep the old game alive. They control a network of embedded gatekeepers, academics, media and foundations with public-private partnerships. The unwarranted influence of appropriating and disrupting has already strained the UNEPS initiative.

Yet in the words of Stephen Kinloch, “driven back, the idea will, as in the past, ineluctably re-emerge, Phoenix-like, at the most favourable opportunity.”(41)

Next Steps

With pivotal elections ahead, progressive policy options, including UNEPS are on the agenda. A political shift may accompany a paradigm shift. Obviously, the prevailing approaches to security, peace, people and the planet are ineffective. An unfavorable environment may shift rapidly. Such a transformation may arise either after a tragic shock or when civil society reaches a tipping point of concern over the multiplying global challenges. Already, there is renewed interest in a more just world, in making the United Nations more effective, in military transformation and economic conversion. Now, the onus is to be prepared.

First, if there is to be a UNEPS, civil society must press political leaders to think big, bold and outward, encouraging multilateral cooperation, innovation and unprecedented shifts.

Second, it’s crucial to elevate the all-volunteer UNEPS initiative to a professional campaign. With modest financial support, a UNEPS may be adopted by other progressive parties.

Third, educational outreach must include political outreach, particularly among progressive parties world-wide. And indeed, some leaders are now encouraging a renewal of progressive internationalism.(42) To influence at a high level, this initiative needs a competent briefing team for national capitals, Member States Missions to the UN and the UN Secretariat. Aside from sharing understanding of the idea and addressing concerns, another objective should be to encourage another ‘Friends’ group of supportive Member States.

Fourth, links should be created between UNEPS support and the NGO communities that address climate change, social justice, and sustainable development. Clearly, there is a need to build bridges and partnerships. The umbrella of sustainable common security encourages such support and solidarity, as well as the substantive shifts urgently needed to address global challenges.(43)

Fifth, as noted in a 2012 publication of Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (foundation), “to attract a broad-based constituency of support, the UNEPS initiative needs to expand into a more formal network of civil society organizations, academic institutions and inclined member states. It is time to encourage global centers for UNEPS research and educational outreach.”(44)

Sixth, the UNEPS initiative needs a plethora of publications world-wide. As noted, “the UNEPS proposal requires further elaboration in a blueprint. An in-depth study is needed to provide details into the various requirements at the political, strategic, operational and tactical levels. A review by a panel of independent experts would also be helpful to clarify the potential costs, benefits, options and optimal approach.”(45)

A UNEPS is no panacea, but just one step toward a global peace system. With modest support, this option could make a world of difference. As William R. Frye noted, “that which is radical one year can become conservative and accepted the next.”(46)

Footnotes for this article can be seen at the Footnotes 1 page on this website (link will open in a new page).
[/read]

03. All states shall reduce their militaries and not plan war for “national security.”

Rapporteur: Metta Spencer

This is the key plank in the whole platform. It is also the hardest. We may not succeed with this one, friends, but if we do, the other 24 planks will come more easily, for militarism is the linchpin of the system —the problem that holds the five other threats in place. War and weapons not only kill people directly, but by exacerbating global warming, famine, pandemics, radiation exposure, and (probably next) cyberattacks.

War is hard to eliminate, though — not because anyone actually likes it but because people don’t know how to do without it. A few wars are fought over trivial matters, but most of them occur because a conflict is immensely important and neither side can think of other ways to settle it. So, we must propose some other ways to handle conflicts.

But first let’s consider the meaning of this plank. Notice that it calls upon “states” to reduce their militaries – but what about non-state militaries? ISIS, Al Qaeda, Al Shabab, the Taliban, Boko Haram, ETA and FARC, for examples, are not owned by states, and elsewhere there are still a few warlords and oligarchs with their own armies.

And United Nations Peacekeepers are also military. To get rid of war and weapons, we must probably eliminate (or anyway vastly reduce) all kinds of militaries except peacekeepers, who are supposed to be like a global constabulary. We will need more, not fewer, peacekeepers, as substitutes for the armed forces of national governments and rebels.

The value of an organization depends on its mission, so the question is whether military units are mandated to defend and protect people or to attack and destroy them. Nowadays, most armed forces are for war-fighting, but every city has a police force to protect its citizens. Our ancestor, the caveguy, stood guard at the cave entrance with a spear, lest a saber-tooth tiger arrive unexpectedly. That was for security. But even then, caveguy perhaps also belonged to a warrior gang that raided other settlements for booty. That was not for security. Lives were short in those days, partly because the police force and peacekeepers hadn’t been invented yet to protect citizens.

Basic civility requires us to honor “those brave men and women who risk their lives to defend our country,” though in fact many wars are not defensive in nature. And logically, for every military action that is truly defensive, there must be at least one — the opponent’s — that is offensive. Too often, it is impossible to know which side deserves the glory and which side the shame. Triumphant warriors can now all claim to be heroes, for if ever there was a clear distinction between protective military actions and aggressive attacks, that clarity has long been blurred.

This indistinctness has arisen from the increasing acceptability of two principles. The first is preventive war—military action against an adversary while he is presumably preparing to attack. If self-defence is justifiable, then it is not irrational to consider a pre-emptive strike moral too. But we know where that idea leads.

[read more]

The second principle is deterrence — the credible threat to massively retaliate if one’s adversary acts offensively. Mutual threats to shoot back are not as aggressive as actually shooting, but instead of increasing security on either side, they perpetuate situations of extraordinary mutual insecurity where defence and aggression blur together.

That is the condition of modern society; we all live under the sword of Damocles. About 14,000 nuclear weapons still exist on our planet(1), nearly 3,000 of which must be launched within three to six minutes after the alarm announces that an adversary’s missiles are on the way. And false alarms are common.

We should all be terrified, but we’re not. Of those 14,000, just one single bomb—a ‘Satan 2” from Russia — could obliterate the whole of Texas or France. It is supposedly equipped with stealth technology to dodge enemy radar systems. And America’s new submarine-based Trident nuclear missiles are now powerful enough to tempt an enemy strategist to launch pre-emptive strikes.(2) Should a fraction of those 14,000 bombs be exploded, civilization would end, and possibly even exterminate all of humankind. The DNA of our species would certainly be impaired, leaving future generations less able to cope. It’s uncertain which catastrophe to expect first — nuclear war or the climate crisis — but some people will deny until the end that either one is a risk.

Bizarrely, our rulers keep assuring us that these bombs are for our own “security.” And in a sense, they are right. Nine countries are armed with nuclear weapons, all aimed at each other, so naturally each one is afraid to disarm until the others do too. This could take a while! And it has — 75 years. But false alarms keep going off, and suicide bombers keep proving their resolve. You cannot deter a suicide bomber; what retaliation would you threaten him with? And now it may be possible for a hacker to launch the nuclear missiles of another country.(3)

After seventy-five years, the terror has worn off. Mutual deterrence seems normal now, but the experts say we’ve just had fantastic luck.(4) Two countries own 93 percent of those 14,000 bombs. Seven countries own the rest. But our plank demands that all states reduce their militaries, and this of course mostly means conventional armed forces, not nuclear.

This will be hard but not impossible. Already sixteen countries lack any conventional military forces. They are Andorra, Costa Rica, Dominica, Grenada, Kiribati, Liechtenstein, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Vatican City. A little arithmetic suggests that the remaining 181 sovereign countries have armed forces that can be reduced.

But by how much? The “How to Save the World in a Hurry” forum, which adopted the Platform for Survival, refrained from proposing any specific number, though the original motion had suggested an eighty percent reduction. Presumably, since states would no longer “plan wars for national security,” each one should retain a military sufficient only for civilian services. For example, some military units carry out search-and-rescue missions at sea, operate icebreakers in the Arctic, or help with disaster relief in case of earthquakes or epidemics. All other functions can be transferred to a new global institution, which Plank 4 calls the “United Nations Emergency Peace Service” (UNEPS).

Because conventional armed forces inevitably consume so many of the world’s resources, just cutting them back will automatically improve the environment and human health, as well as saving stupendous sums of money, which can be allocated instead to the Sustainable Development Goals or preserving biodiversity, limiting climate change, or improving life in some other way.

The size of these stupendous sums can be guesstimated with a few back-of-the-envelope comparisons. In 2018, the world’s military expenditures amounted to $1822 billion (that’s $1.8 trillion!).(5) If that sum were reduced by 80 percent, the human population would be healthier, happier, and $1457 billion richer every year. What could we do with all that money? Well, in 2016 it cost only $50 billion to run the entire United Nations.(6) Of that amount, $6.7 billion was budgeted for peacekeeping operations.(7) If the UN adds a new UNEPS to prevent armed conflicts around the world, peacekeeping may cost three or four times that much, so let’s be extravagant and estimate $30 billion. That leaves us with a surplus of around $1.4 trillion — approximately the amount the UN says it would cost per year to end poverty on earth.(8)

Or maybe we’d rather spend our savings instead on limiting global warming by stabilizing greenhouse gas emissions. The price will depend on how quickly we act, and we’re getting a late start, so according the International Energy Agency, it will cost a total of $44 trillion by 2050. Ouch. That’s more than our savings from reducing the military by 80 percent. But on the other hand, there will be huge savings from reducing the consumption of fossil fuel. In fact, the overall cost of switching over will yield a slight net savings, so we can still spend our $1.4 trillion military savings on something else—have our cake and eat it too.(9)

But of course, every realistic person knows that this is not going to happen. Any proposal to reduce national armed forces sharply would probably be defeated in every sovereign state today. It is proving to be hard just to abolish nuclear weapons, which obviously are no source of security to anyone. It will be even harder to persuade the public to limit their nation’s conventional armed forces, which they consider truly essential for security. It’s commonly believed that every country needs an army, and every family needs a gun, to stay safe.

Statistically, it is clear that access to guns generally reduces security instead of increasing it, both for families and for the world. But before the age of nuclear threats and globalization, weapons certainly did seem essential for security, for their main use is in defending a specific physical space — a home or a homeland. And by “homeland,” we mean a nation or state — a single territory controlled by a single government. “National security” once meant the defence of a nation’s territory, which is where its citizens lived and kept all their assets. In their whole lives, some people traveled less than a hundred miles from home. When interests were so territorially defined, a strong army was still plausibly an asset for protecting national security.

That is no longer the situation. We are all stakeholders, but now our interests are located all over the world, beyond the influence of our military or even our nation’s consulates and embassies.

Globalization has wrecked the Westphalian system for organizing the world. Not only do our friendships extend worldwide, but our physical security and health are determined by foreigners—the emitters of greenhouse gases; the destroyers of rainforests; the airplane passengers carrying new viruses; the politicians imposing tariffs on a product we had planned to export to their country; the bankers in nations where our swindled tax money is laundered; the tossers of plastic into the ocean because poor countries have no waste management systems. Our country’s military cannot protect us from such risks. Armies and sovereign states can control territory, but not even Donald Trump can reverse this new situation.

With our material interests extending beyond our borders, so should our political influence, though at present few global institutions provide much democratic accountability. This must change before any state can be expected to reduce its military forces and spend the savings on fixing the real sources of insecurity.

It is only slowly becoming apparent to the public that fewer major wars are occurring today, and that today’s real wars are quite different from the ones we used to prepare for. None of the new wars in the post-Cold War era are (thank heavens) nuclear or even geostrategic struggles for an ideology.(10) Technologically, the sophistication of “new war” weaponry ranges from the machete in Rwanda or the plastic jug of fertilizer for roadside bombing in Afghanistan to the CIA’s Predator drone-launched missiles in Pakistan. The great powers may be involved, but the main fighters often are not soldiers but illiterate local criminals.

Mary Kaldor has described this trend away from what she calls “old wars,” which are:

“wars between states where the warring parties are armies, the goals are geopolitical, the main method is the military capture of territory through battle, and the wars are financed through increased taxation and the mobilization of a centralized self-sufficient war economy.

“By contrast, in ‘new wars’ the warring parties are networks of state and non-state actors organized in loose horizontal coalitions rather than hierarchical military organizations. These can include regular armies and police or parts of the state security services, party militias, warlords, bandits, mercenaries, private security companies, insurgents, self-defence groups and so on. The political goals are largely about identity politics – that is to say, the claim to access to power and to the state apparatus on the basis of a label, be it ethnic, tribal or religious (Serb versus Croat, Sunni versus Shi’ia, Hutu versus Tutsi) as opposed to geopolitical (control of the seas or access to oil) or ideological (to promote socialism or democracy).

“In ‘new wars’ battles are rare, and most violence is directed against civilians. This can be deliberate, as in wars of ethnic cleansing (Bosnia and Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh and Baghdad) or in genocides (Rwanda and Darfur), or because it is impossible to distinguish combatants from non-combatants (as in counter-insurgency wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Chechnya and Kashmir).

“For this reason, the techniques of ‘new wars’ directly violate international humanitarian and human rights law. And finally, in ‘new wars’ taxation falls, and the wars have to be financed by a variety of methods that are dependent on violence. These include looting and pillaging, kidnapping and hostage-taking, skewing the terms of trade through checkpoints, the ‘taxation’ of humanitarian aid, outside support from the diaspora, smuggling of valuable commodities such as oil and diamonds, and other transnational criminal activities. Whereas ‘old wars’ were state-building, increasing the revenue base and the power of the state, ‘new wars’ are ‘state-unbuilding’. They establish a ‘new war’ economy that is exactly the opposite of the ‘old war’ economy – one that is globalized, decentralized, criminalized and in which employment is very low.”(11)

New wars tend to be long wars that are hard to end. Think of Iraq, of Afghanistan, and now of Syria. No decisive military battle ends the conflict; if foreign troops come to help, they may remain stuck there for decades. Once more, this illustrates the limits of military power as a source of national security. Wars don’t work very well anymore.

To fulfill Plank 3 by “not planning wars for national security,” we must stop planning “old wars” and look for ways of preventing, not only nuclear wars but also “new wars.”

Kaldor suggests that the new wars be addressed in a different way from conventional old wars. There will more often be a need for peacekeeping, but it involves the enforcement of human rights more than either war-fighting or traditional peacekeeping. It involves the protection of civilians and a strong commitment to implementing international law. It may involve not only soldiers but a combination of military, police, and civilians.(12) Some kind of protective units will still be needed for security, though national military units can be reduced substantially, or in some cases even entirely replaced with constabularies.

In short, to address new wars, we need to adopt an approach that Plank 25 calls “Sustainable Common Security.” That will require the creation of a new institution, which we are calling the “United Nations Emergency Peace Service.” (See Plank 24.) But such a change will meet extreme resistance that can be overcome only by introducing other major structural changes simultaneously or beforehand. For good reason, the U.N. is not now considered a reliable source of security. That is why many small, weak nations join military alliances, hoping that the combination of forces with other states can suffice to deter aggression from their enemies.

If the UNEPS is to be trusted more than, say, joining NATO or SEATO, it must be under the command of an organization that truly implements international laws impartially. It can only be authorized by the U.N. Security Council, which today is far from impartial. Much more needs to be done to enhance the credibility of the U.N. The Permanent Five’s veto power undermines the world’s confidence in the whole institution. The Security Council needs to be made more accountable to the whole of humankind, as also does the entire U.N. — probably by adding a parliamentary assembly directly elected by the citizens of all member states. Such changes can be attained only if the public demands it, reversing the current worldwide drift toward authoritarianism and nationalism.

Finally, it is important to recognize that this plank — indeed, the whole Platform for Survival — represents one perspective that has its own limitations. This is the perspective of liberal democracy: the assumption that the best way of protecting human security is to improve our political, economic, and legal institutions. But this essay should end by acknowledging that even excellent human institutions can go wrong, and often with tragic results. Democratic elections, for example, sometimes bring to power politicians who make terrible decisions that harm people and require change. Nothing in these planks offers remedy for such situations.

But when human beings need to protect themselves from their own governments, they often invent ways of defending their rights. The Platform for Survival should explicitly recognize the importance of such campaigns of civil resistance. Social change is inexorable, and founding governments never seem never to anticipate the need for their own overthrow.

Historically, nonviolent struggle has been the main (and always is the best) alternative to war. Fortunately, as Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan have shown, campaigns of nonviolent resistance have been more than twice as effective as their violent counterparts in achieving their stated goals. Moreover, civil resistance ushers in more durable and internally peaceful democracies, which are less likely to regress into civil war.(13) Thus, our Platform for Survival should be understood to include one extra, invisible plank: an endorsement of nonviolent opposition for those times in the future when the other planks turn out to require change.

Footnotes for this article can be seen at the Footnotes 1 page on this website (link will open in a new page).

[/read]

02. All states, including those in NATO, shall sign, ratify, and within 10 years comply with the TPNW.

Rapporteur: Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan

Attainment of this Platform plank will require expanded and sustained civil society activism, as well as significant support from activist governments. An early goal supportive of this Platform plank is multiple ratifications of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons by non-nuclear weapon and non-NATO states. Once the Treaty comes into legal force, non-nuclear NATO states will be under additional pressure to reject the alliance’s nuclear umbrella.

Current Status

Fifty to 100 nuclear weapons, which would be less than one percent of the nuclear weapons in the world’s currently known arsenal, if used in a regional armed conflict, would cause an environmental catastrophe, massive immediate and long term death, and radically change existence, such as through global famine, for the survivors and civilization.(1)

The threat of use of nuclear weapons is assessed by, among many others, a core group of nuclear scientists who publish the annually updated Doomsday Clock, which, as its creators note, “has become a universally recognized indicator of the world’s vulnerability to catastrophe from nuclear weapons.”(2) As of 2018, the clock stood at two minutes to midnight, the most dangerous measure since 1953.

[read more]

The understanding that nuclear weapons are a threat to human survival is not new. The first declaration of the United Nations upon its formation called for abolition of nuclear weapons.(3) Through extensive negotiations, the nations of the world, including its nuclear powers, have comprehensively banned nuclear weapons from Antarctica, Outer Space and the Sea Floor.(4) However, about 14,000 warheads remain.

Due to widespread fear of nuclear weapons, the nuclear weapons states made a bargain with the rest of the world: If other states renounced obtaining nuclear weapons, the nuclear weapons states would divest themselves of theirs; and the peaceful use of nuclear energy would be shared. This three-part bargain was enshrined in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). However, 48 years on, the nuclear weapons states have not lived up to their commitment to completely destroy their nuclear arsenals.

TPNW concluded

Frustrated by the lack of action by the nuclear weapons states (and NATO states who subscribe to nuclear weapons possession and deterrence), the majority of nations undertook to develop a binding international nuclear weapon ban treaty. On 7 July 2017 at the UN in New York 122 UN member states adopted the text of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). The treaty is now open for signature and ratification, and once it obtains 50 ratifications, the treaty will be in legal force. As of June 2019, there are 70 signatories and 23 states parties.

The TPNW was a “humanitarian disarmament” treaty. However, it was formulated without the participation of the nuclear weapon states. No NATO member state has signed the treaty. It was people-focused and is based on the principle of “first, do no harm” to humankind. As such, it has remediation elements within it, such as victim-assistance for populations negatively affected by the nuclear weapons cycle, including production and testing. Indigenous groups are believed to be disproportionately, negatively affected where nuclear testing and uranium production has occurred on indigenous lands. The TPNW is the first disarmament convention ever to specify indigenous rights within the text.

Humanitarian Disarmament approach

Humanitarian disarmament consists of a body of law, a norm, and a movement. Civil society has been of critical importance to the creation of the TPNW, without which it probably would not have occurred. This has been organized by the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), who were acknowledged for their role in creating this landmark convention by the awarding of the Nobel Prize for Peace in 2017. Continued civil society activism will be equally critical to the adoption of the TPNW by all states, if there is to be strengthening of TPNW momentum. ICAN modeled its organization and approach on the path opened by the International Campaign to Ban Landmines which has worked to universalize the Antipersonnel Mine Ban Treaty (Ottawa Convention).(5) A key element towards mobilizing governments to join these treaties and conventions and to adhere to their prohibitions is norm-building.

Norm-building for the goals of the TPNW did not begin with the commitment of 122 states when they adopted the treaty’s text. However, obtaining 50 ratifications in the near term is a focus of some civil society campaigners. Once that number is obtained the TPNW will be in legal force, and a meeting of states party to the TPNW will take place. Once half of UN member states have ratified, some believe it will be possible to start speaking about non-possession of nuclear weapons as customary international law. However, a major obstacle remains, which is the eschewal of the treaty, to date, by nuclear weapon possessing states, and nuclear “umbrella” states, such as members of NATO.

TPNW activism and NATO states

Nuclear weapon abolitionists in each NATO state are undertaking activities to encourage their government to join the TPNW without delay.

However, it is believed by many that a member of an alliance, such as Canada in NATO, in which there is a commitment to support nuclear deterrence, cannot join the TPNW without first indicating an intention to renounce the possession of, and threat to use, nuclear weapons. The Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (CNANW) in September 2017 issued a call, in which was included the following statement:

  • We call on the Government of Canada to sign the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and to state that Canada will, through dialogue and changes to its own policies and practices, persist in its efforts to bring NATO into conformity with the Treaty, with a view to Canada ratifying the Treaty as soon as possible.

The CNANW Call(6) was signed by about eighty(7) Canadian organizations.

Advocacy for increasing support for the treaty is pursued by popular education about the TPNW and popular mobilization. Parliamentary actions are pursued in some countries where appropriate. Divestment actions aimed at businesses, usually banks, involved in financial investment in the production of nuclear weapons is another way of both showing popular support for the abolition of nuclear weapons and the need for the government to reflect this by joining the TPNW (when possible). It is unknown which NATO state will be the first to do so. Many governments are currently caught between the demands of their own population and the demands of NATO. NATO sees its strategic interests and deterrence doctrines undermined by the TPNW.(8) The Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law School produced a paper arguing that a state could remain in NATO but would need to withdraw from its nuclear component (which resides within the strategic concept). NATO’s statutes are found within the North Atlantic Treaty, which does not refer to nuclear weapons.(9) The collective security element of that Treaty requires that members “separately and jointly . . . maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.”(10)

Until the first NATO member state decides to disavow the alliance’s nuclear component in order to sign the TPNW, there will be enormous pressure to refrain from doing so. It is to be seen what the result will be after one state “breaks out”, and whether the path for broad rejection of nuclear deterrence will be opened up.

Footnotes for this article can be seen at the Footnotes 1 page on this website (link will open in a new page).
[/read]

Overview: War and Weapons

Read Article | Comments

Author: Metta Spencer

Even before our primate ancestors began to walk upright, there were wars—times when whole human communities or groups within a community tried to kill each other. Scholars have reached this conclusion partly on the basis of Jane Goodall’s discovery that our closest primate relative, the chimpanzee, engages in war,(1) and partly on the basis of archaeological evidence. One site of skeletons was found in Kenya dating back 9,500 to 10,500 years showing that a group of 27 people had been massacred together.(2) Indeed, there is strong evidence that levels of violence were higher in prehistoric times than today.(3) One example is a cemetery about 14,000 years old where about 45 percent of the skeletons showed signs of violent death.(4) An estimated 15 percent of deaths in primitive societies were caused by warfare.

But life did not consistently become friendlier as our species spread and developed. By one estimate, there were 14,500 wars between 3500 BC and the late twentieth century. These took around 3.5 billion lives.(5)

Can we conclude, then, that war is simply an intrinsic part of “human nature,” so that one cannot reasonably hope to overcome it? No, for there is more variation in the frequency and extent of warfare than can be attributed to genetic differences. In some societies, war is completely absent. Douglas Fry, checking the ethnographic records, identified 74 societies that have clearly been non-warring; some even lacked a word for “war.” The Semai of Malaysia and the Mardu of Australia are examples.(6)

We may gain insights about solutions to warfare by exploring the variations in its distribution, type, and intensity. We begin with the best news: We are probably living in the most peaceful period in human history!

Infographic-Healthcare-Not-Warfare-GDAMS-3.jpg

Infographic, Global Day of Action on Military Spending (GDAMS)

Historical Changes in Rates of War

Steven Pinker is the scholar who most convincingly argues that violence has declined, both recently and over the millennia. Pinker’s book Enlightenment Now, contains a graph showing the numbers of battle deaths by year from 1945 to 2015. A huge spike represents World War II, of course, for that was most lethal war in human history, causing at least 55 million deaths. How can we reconcile that ghastly number with any claim that the modern era is a peaceful epoch?

Pinker’s proof is based on distinguishing sharply between absolute numbers and rates. To be sure, 55 million is a huge number, but the Mongol Conquests killed 40 million people back in the thirteenth century, out of a world population only about one-seventh the size of the world’s 1950 population. Pinker says that if World War II had matched the Mongols’ stupendous rate of killing, about 278 million people would have been killed.

[read more]

And there was an even worse war than the Mongol Conquest: the An Lushan Revolt of eighth century China, an eight-year rebellion that resulted in the loss of 36 million people — two-thirds of the empire’s population, and a sixth of the world’s population at the time. Had it matched that level of atrocity, considering the size of the world’s population in the 1940s, World War II would have killed 419 million people! Pinker calls An Lushan the worst war in human history. By his calculations, based on rates or percentages, World War II was only the ninth worst in history and World War I was the 16th worst.(7)

Moreover, Pinker shows that the two world wars were huge spikes in a graph of war deaths that has declined remarkably since 1950. There has been a slight upward bump since 2010, representing the civil war in Syria, but even that increase is minuscule in comparison to the rates of battle deaths over the preceding centuries.(8)

Pinker admits that there is no guarantee that this civilizing trend will continue, but he marshals much empirical evidence to explain it in terms of several historical changes. One was the transition to agriculture from hunting and gathering. This brought about a fivefold decrease in rates of violent death from chronic raiding and feuding.(9)

A second factor occurred in Europe between the Middle Ages and the 20th century when feudal territories were consolidated into large kingdoms with centralized authority and an infrastructure of commerce. This led to a tenfold-to-fiftyfold decline in homicide rates. There have been numerous other changes since then, including the abolition of such practices as slavery, dueling, sadistic punishment, and cruelty to animals. Since the end of World War II the downward trend has been remarkable.(10)

Nature

Unlike Steven Pinker, who attributes the current relatively wonderful degree of peacefulness to cultural and social changes in history, Dave Grossman attributes it to nature itself. In contrast to those who claim that human nature destines us to be killers, Grossman argues that people are “naturally” reluctant to kill members of their own species. In this respect we resemble other animals, for it is normal for animals to avoid killing their own species. When, for example, two male moose bash each other with their horns, they rarely do much real damage.

In fact, the human reluctance to kill their own kind poses a real problem for military leaders, who must induce their soldiers to fight wars. Lt. Col. Grossman himself had been responsible for training US Army Rangers, and he seems to have taken considerable pride in overcoming nature’s inhibitions.

Grossman cites Brigadier General S. L. A. Marshall’s book Men Against Fire, which showed that only 15 to 20 percent of the individual riflemen in World War II fired their weapons at an exposed enemy soldier.(11) Similar results can be shown in earlier wars as well, including for example the battlefield of Gettysburg, where of the discarded muskets later found there, 90 percent were still loaded.(12)

On the other hand, soldiers who work together as crews (e.g. in launching cannon-fire or flamethrowers together) do not show the same hesitation, nor do soldiers whose officers stand nearby, ordering them to fire. And distance matters too; stabbing an enemy is harder to do than shooting one a few meters away, and the farther away the enemy is, the easier it is to shoot him. Bombardiers rarely hesitate to drop shells on the people below, nor do drone operators sitting at controls in a different continent. Distance, team spirit and authority can apparently overcome nature’s misgivings.

In response to Marshall’s discovery, the U.S. military developed new training measures to break down this resistance. For example, instead of having soldiers fire at bulls-eye targets, the army now provides realistic human-shaped silhouettes that pop up suddenly and must be shot quickly. The training also relies on repetition; soldiers are required to shoot many, many times so they stop thinking about the possible implications of each shot.(13)

The best technological innovation for inuring fighters for battle is the video training simulator. As a result of using the equivalent to violent videogames, the military successfully raised soldiers’ firing rates to over 90 percent during the Vietnam War. Because of this “superior training,” Grossman claims that today “non-firers” are almost non-existent among U.S. troops.

While lauding the military for developing such excellent training systems, Grossman is scathing in criticizing the use of video games as entertainment. He maintains that the very methods that turn soldiers into superb killers will, and do, influence the players to become violent in real life. He blames the epidemic of school shootings, for example, largely on the exposure of teen-aged boys to violent films and especially violent video games.(14)

Moreover, the training of soldiers for battle does not protect them from the psychological consequences of fighting. In a study of World War II soldiers, after sixty days of continuous combat, 98 percent of all those surviving had become psychiatric casualties. One-tenth of all American military men were hospitalized for mental disturbances between 1942 and 1945.[14] Moreover, upon their return to civilian life, the incidence of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder remains high, and more veterans commit suicide than had been killed during the war. Also, the U.S. Army dismissed more than 22,000 soldiers for misconduct between 2009- 2016 after they returned from war with mental health problems or brain injuries.(15)

These facts clearly disprove the assertion that human nature itself destines us all to be killers; indeed, one might argue that, on the contrary, nature intends for us all to be peaceful. However, even that assertion is hard to sustain when we look at the evidence showing how widespread is the cultural pattern of glorifying war and warriors.

The Hero Warrior

Not everyone is reluctant to kill. On the contrary. For example, consider Mr. L, an Asian friend of ours whose brother was found decapitated on a forest trail. Mr. L knew who had done it — the army of Burma — so he went to the jungle and joined the resistance army. For seventeen years he was a sniper. Now living in Canada, he finds the memory hard to explain:

“Actually, I loved it. I probably killed about thirty men in all, and it was the greatest feeling! I was always so elated after killing an enemy soldier that I couldn’t sleep that night. That’s what I went to there to do, after all. But now? Well…”

No one in Canada glorifies Mr. L’s achievements, but in another time or place he might be considered a war hero. Brave, effective warriors have been honored by their own societies at least as far back as the ancient Assyrians and Greeks.

There were good reasons for it. When our ancestors still lived in caves, presumably some strong fellow volunteered to stand guard at night to keep out the saber-toothed tigers. His mother must have felt proud of him, and perhaps also praised him and his brave buddies for raiding the neighbors’ cave and bringing home valuable loot.

The Iliad is one long bloodcurdling story about heroes seeking to outdo each other in courage and brutality. Militarism is the belief or the desire of a government or a people that a state should maintain a strong military capability and use it aggressively to expand national interests and/or values.(16) Among the most intelligent militarists who glorified war was the philosopher Georg Hegel,(17) whose views were perfectly ordinary in the Prussian society of his day.

A century later in America militarism was not quite as popular, but the great American psychologist William James, who was a pacifist, could nevertheless understand and even respect it as a moral stance. He pointed out that young males need a thrilling opportunity to test their capacity for enduring physical hardship and surmounting obstacles. That is what sports are for, but James wanted this experience to involve sacrifice and a sense of service as well. He was seeking to innovate a rigorous substitute for military discipline whereby youths could instead contribute positively to society. James understood the emotional value and even romance of militarism, as shown in his sardonic depiction of war from the militarists’ point of view:

“Its ‘horrors’ are a cheap price to pay for rescue from the only alternative supposed, of a world of clerks and teachers, of co-education and zoophily, of ‘consumer’s leagues’ and ‘associated charities,’ of industrialism unlimited, and feminism unabashed. No scorn, no hardness, no valor any more! Fie upon such a cattleyard of a planet!”(18)

James believed that this “manly” yearning for hard challenges ought to be fulfilled. He proposed a system of national service whereby all young males would be conscripted to serve in a challenging role. (He called it a “war against nature,” which is a shocking notion today; we’d prefer to call it a “war for nature.”) He thought that privileged youths should have to experience at least once the hardships that poor people endure throughout their lives. And indeed, since James’s day, the United States and many other prosperous societies have developed programs such as the Peace Corps to fill that need. It is unlikely, however, that the challenges they offer overseas are comparable to the emotions of killing or stepping onto a landmine.

If Pinker’s fond hopes (and our own) could be fulfilled, the planet might indeed resemble what James’s militarists consider a boring “cattleyard” — but that seems unlikely to occur. Our war heroes are still celebrities. And many of them still commit suicide.

The Evolution or the Death of Warfare?

Pinker’s statistics are correct, but it is far too early to celebrate the impending death of war. Weaponry continues to become ever more deadly, and the history of warfare is best described in terms of the evolutionary improvement of weapons. We present in Table 1 the summary of those developments provided by Dave Grossman and Loren Christensen— who, oddly, have omitted today’s worst weapons of mass destruction, as well as the future of autonomous weapons and cyber weapons. These innovations require our utmost concern.

Table 1. Landmarks in the Evolution of Combat

Dates generally represent century or decade of first major, large-scale introduction

c. 1700BC Chariots provide key form of mobility advantage in ancient warfare
c. 400BC: Greek phalanx
c. 100BC: Roman system (pilum, swords, training, professional leadership)
c. 900AD: Mounted knight (stirrup greatly enhances utility of mounted warfare)
c. 1300: Gunpowder (cannon) in warfare
c. 1300: Wide scale application of long bow defeats mounted knights
c. 1600: Gunpowder (small arms) in warfare, defeats all body armor
c. 1800: Shrapnel (exploding artillery shells), ultimately creates renewed need for helmets, c. 1915
c. 1850: Percussion caps permit all-weather use of small arms *
c. 1870: Breech-loading, cartridge firing rifles and pistols
c. 1915: Machine gun
c. 1915: Gas warfare
c. 1915: Tanks
c. 1915: Aircraft *
c. 1915: Self-loading (automatic) rifles and pistols
c. 1940: Strategic bombing of population centers
c. 1945: Nuclear weapons
c. 1960: Large scale introduction of operant conditioning in training to enable killing *
c. 1960: Large scale introduction of media violence begins to enable domestic violent crime
c. 1965: Large scale introduction of helicopters in battle
c. 1970: Introduction of precision-guided munitions in warfare
c. 1980: Kevlar body armor provides first individual armor to defeat state-of-the-art small arms in over 300 years *
c. 1990: Large scale introduction of operant conditioning through violent video games begins to enable mass murders in domestic violent crime
c. 1990: First extensive use of precision guided munitions in warfare (approximately 10 percent of all bombs dropped), by Unites States forces in the Gulf War
c. 1990: Large scale use of combat stress inoculation in law enforcement, with the introduction of paint bullet training
c. 2000: Approximately 70 percent of all bombs used by United States forces in conquest of Afghanistan and Iraq are precision-guided munitions
c. 2000: Large scale use of combat stress inoculation in United States military forces, with the introduction of paint bullet combat simulation training *

* Represents developments influencing domestic violent crime.

Source: Grossman and Christensen, Evolution of Weaponry. Loc. 2058 in Kindle version

In a nutshell, weapons keep get more and more effective at killing, and the population keeps increasing (especially during the past century), so this might suggest a gloomy prediction: that we must expect a world war vastly larger than either of the two previous ones.

But neither Pinker nor Grossman have concluded that the magnitude of a war will inevitably be determined by either the population or the effectiveness of weapons. Pinker believes that the records of history show that war is rather randomly distributed over time and space, not following any discernable pattern.

Scholars know quite a lot about warfare in early civilizations, for we have epic stories such as Gilgamesh in Mesopotamia (about 2500 BCE) and Achilles versus Hector in Homer’s Greece (supposedly 1184 BCE).

The Hittites invented the chariot, and the Egyptians adopted it from them, though there were long intervals when chariots were not used in any Middle Eastern wars. Though the Greeks often used chariots, they would sometimes stop and dismount for hand-to-hand combat. The Greeks invented the phalanx, or row of middle-class citizen-soldiers(19) fighting side by side with their shields overlapping, with long pikes against an enemy’s phalanx.

But the elite warriors worked differently. Achilles, for example, would individually single out the enemy he considered a worthy match. Such a noble warrior might stroll across the battlefield to the enemy’s side, and call out their best fighter by name to come and fight him to the death. This kind of semi-organized warfare also has been practiced until recently in some paleolithic societies, such as in Papua New Guinea.(20)

We need not trace the complete evolution of weaponry from ancient times to now, except to mention a few dramatic innovations. One was the invention of gunpowder, which of course made it easy to kill large numbers of opponents. It was discovered in China during the late ninth century, but was not used in that country except for fireworks. It was adopted in the West, and ironically, much later, the Chinese were defeated by Westerners with firearms.

Historians debate why the Chinese did not use gunpowder(21) for military purposes, but the more interesting point is simply the fact that they did not. We can take this as evidence that technological innovation does not take an inevitable course, for sometimes a society opts not to perfect a weapon that offers the every prospect of improved effectiveness.

Much later, there were other extraordinary military discoveries that have been prohibited almost everywhere. Chemical weapons (notably chlorine, phosgene, and mustard gas.) were used in World War I. Although the Germans soon developed powerful nerve agents such as sarin, no chemical weapons were used in World War II. Some say that Hitler ruled out using them against troops because he had experienced gas poisoning during World War I. However, he did not hesitate to use them in his death camps. In the Geneva Protocol of 1925 the international community banned the use of chemical and biological weapons. In 1973 and 1993 the prohibition was even strengthened by the Chemical Weapons Convention, which bans the development, production, stockpiling and transfer of these weapons. By now 193 states have ratified that treaty and the whole world expresses shock whenever it is violated, as in the Syrian civil war in 2017.(22)

Likewise, biological agents could be, and have sometimes been, used effectively in warfare. For example, in 1763 the British forces defending Fort Pitt, near Philadelphia, gave blankets from smallpox patients to Indian chiefs who had come to negotiate an end to their conflict.(23)

Epidemics of disease have been a regular feature of warfare throughout the ages. Indeed, more people died of “Spanish flu” during World War I — between 20 million and 50 million(24) — than were killed by military action. When troops move around, they may be exposed to pathogens and carry them with them. However, such epidemics are not spread intentionally, and there is not only a norm against the use of biological agents to kill enemies, but it is also prohibited by the same treaty that bans the use of chemical weapons.

Thus it is evident that at times even the most horrible technological means of killing — gunpowder, chemical, and biological weapons — have been banned and the prohibitions against them have generally been obeyed. People sometimes opt not to use weapons that are available to them. Take heart, for this proves that war is not inexorable.

Yet not all of the worst weapons have been banned, and until they are abolished, one cannot be as optimistic as Steven Pinker in expecting the end of warfare. There are four crucial initiatives going on now to ban weapons. If all are fulfilled, such optimism will be wholly justified. These propose to (a) regulate the trade in conventional arms among nations to prevent the violation of human rights; (b) ban the existence of nuclear weapons, and (c) prohibit the development of lethal autonomous weapons — those sometimes called “killer robots” — and (d) regulate the potential for cyberattacks. Our Platform for Survival promotes each of these bans in specific planks.

The Arms Trade Treaty

It is not now realistic to ban all firearms or other conventional weapons, if only because we depend on states to authorize the use of weapons by police to protect citizens whenever necessary. Nevertheless, it is possible to reduce the incidence and violence of contemporary wars by preventing the transfer of conventional weapons (e.g. assault rifles and other military hardware such as armored personnel carriers) to insurgent groups or lawless states.

Most of the real wars in today’s world differ from what we previously thought of as war. Mary Kaldor calls them “new wars.”(25) For centuries, war had meant conflicts between states with the maximum use of violence. But these “new wars” combine war, organized crime, and human rights violations. They are sometimes fought by global organizations, sometimes local ones; they are funded and organized sometimes by public agencies, sometimes private ones. They resort to such tactics as terrorism and destabilizing the enemy with false information on the Internet.

What is a suitable response to such wars, given our historical assumption that, according to Max Weber’s definitions, a sovereign state is any organization that succeeds in holding the exclusive right to use, threaten, or authorize physical force against residents of its territory.(26) In a time of globalization, Kaldor insists that the monopoly of legitimate organized violence must be shifted from a national to a transnational level and that international peacekeeping must be redefined as law enforcement of global norms. Kaldor’s proposal is consistent with our Platform for Survival’s plank 25, which promotes the cosmopolitan notion of “sustainable common security.”

This approach can begin with the development of a treaty regulating (though not completely banning) the international trade in conventional weapons. Such an international law — the Arms Trade Treaty — was adopted in 2013, when 155 UN member states voted in favor of it and three against, with 23 abstentions. It entered into force on 24 December 2014 after the fiftieth state ratified it.

The treaty, if well enforced, can reduce the incidence and violence of wars. Although one might suppose that the main source of weaponry for “new wars” is the black market trade in illegal arms, that is not the case. Until now, most violent movements have obtained their weapons by purchasing them openly from states that are indifferent as to whether or not the “end users” are responsible. The Arms Trade Treaty prohibits countries from permitting the transfer of weapons to any group or state that violates human rights or international humanitarian law. However, the treaty is only a regulation between states, having no bearing on nations’ internal gun laws.

The Nuclear Bomb: The “Perfect Weapon”?

If there is such a thing as a “perfect sword,” or a “perfect storm,” then what would be a “perfect weapon”? Probably it would be a thermonuclear bomb. A nuclear bomb manifests precisely every attribute of an ideal killing machine; it is the consummate device for destroying enemies on an unlimited scale.

The largest hydrogen bomb that was ever exploded was the Soviet invention, Tsar Bomba, which was exploded by the Soviet Union on 30 October 1961 over Novaya Zemlya Island in the Russian Arctic Sea. It was equivalent to 58.6 megatons of TNT, and its fireball was five miles wide and could be seen from 630 miles away. It was ten times more powerful than all of the munitions expended during World War II combined. The blast wave orbited the earth three times. And even so, Tsar Bomba was only half the size that the inventors had originally planned to build. They had realized that exploding that a full-sized version might have been self-destructive. Indeed, such a weapon is too big ever to be used in a war. It is the “perfect weapon” — so good that it can kill everything, including its creators. No war with such weapons can ever be won. And, as Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan agreed, no nuclear war must ever be fought.

Tsar Bomba was only one bomb, and logically a single such perfect weapon ought to be enough — indeed, it should be “one too many.” You would want to dismantle it as soon as possible. But suppose your crazy enemy has such a bomb too. You might reasonably fear that, seeing you without one, he would take the opportunity to use his. To prevent that, you might want to keep some of these “perfect weapons” and declare that you will retaliate if he starts a fight.

That is what happened. The owners of nuclear weapons each kept a growing stockpile of them. Each side knew that any nuclear war would involve “mutual assured destruction” or “MAD” — the total annihilation of them all. Each side also knew that to explode one them in war would be an act of suicide, yet by 1986 there were 64,449 nuclear bombs on the planet.(27) Madness! But once such a situation of mutual deterrence is established, how can you end it?

The creators of “mutual assured destruction” proposed that the situation be reversed gradually by a process of “arm control.” The adversaries would meet, discuss their predicament, and agree to reduce their stockpiles in equal amounts, one step at a time. But this was tricky, for each side considered every weapon to be, not only a terrible threat, but also a necessity for “security.” It would be used only to deter the other side, keep the adversary from using his bomb.

But when your arsenals contain bombs of different sizes, in different types of delivery systems, it is hard to decide which combination of weapons to offer as your package, or what combination your adversary should offer to match yours. You could go on haggling over this kind of thing for decades.

As indeed the arms controllers have done. Negotiations for nuclear disarmament are supposed to take place by 55 states in Geneva — an organization called the Conference on Disarmament — “CD.” However, all decisions there require the unanimous consent of all parties— which never happens. No progress has been made at the “CD” since the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was negotiated in August 1996. In fact, the nuclear weapons states make it clear that they do not intend to relinquish their bombs within the foreseeable future, since they claim that their “security” depends upon retaining them.

In a strange sense, they are right. However weak a country may be, if it acquires a nuclear arsenal, any unfriendly country will think twice before threatening it. On the other hand, that is obviously an insane notion of “security.” The existence of a “perfect weapon” creates a logical paradox as well as a practical dilemma that no military leaders have solved.

The most humane solution to the paradox is one that the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev recognized and adopted in dealing with President Ronald Reagan during the Cold War. In this he was influenced by the German politician Egon Bahr, who explained in a 1994 interview:

“I came to a very astonishing result at that time. I thought, based on the mutual assured destruction, it’s quite obvious that neither side in a major nuclear exchange can win a war. So if this is true, then the result is in the political sphere — that the potential enemy becomes the partner of your own security and the other way around. In other words, despite the fact of the East-West conflict, both sides can live together or can die together. If this is true, we live in a period de facto of common security.

“And when I reached this result, I was surprised because this was against the experience of history. In history, when you fought, you had to beat the enemy. To become secure, you had to win a war. So, I wrote this down and I thought, better think it over.”(28)

This notion of common security became the guiding principle in the Palme Commission, which was then seeking solutions to the Cold War. The Russian participant in the Palme Commission, Georgy Arbatov, conveyed Bahr’s ideas to Mikhail Gorbachev, who was then the Soviet Minister of Agriculture. Evidently Gorbachev fully assimilated the notion to his own thinking. Shortly after he came to power, Egon Bahr met him and Gorbachev began explaining to him the idea of common security as if he had thought of it himself.(29)

Actually, however, Gorbachev’s notion of common security seems to have differed from that of Bahr, who believed that the situation of common security was created by, and even depended on, the existence of the relationship of mutual assured destruction. Gorbachev cannot have believed that, for it was he, more than anyone else, who sought to abolish all nuclear weapons for the sake of common security. And for about one day, October 11, 1986, in Reykjavik, Iceland he almost got his wish.

President Ronald Reagan shared Gorbachev’s recognition that nuclear war could never be won, and when the two men met in Iceland’s capital, Gorbachev offered to disarm every one of his nuclear weapons if the Americans would do the same with theirs. Since between them the two countries owned the vast majority of the world’s nuclear weapons, such a deal would have ended the arms race and moved humankind back closer to a state of genuine security.

Unfortunately, Ronald Reagan wanted to have both nuclear disarmament and a defence against nuclear weapons, lest any be kept and used to bomb the United States. He had developing a project called “Strategic Defense Initiative,” (then popularly called “Star Wars”) that he hoped would be able to intercept and destroy incoming nuclear missiles before they could reach their targets. If it worked, such a system would only be defensive; it could not attack an enemy but only defend against an enemy’s bombs. However, any country with such a “shield” would enjoy vast superiority over an enemy if it retained even a few nuclear weapons secretly, for its enemy would be helpless. Mutual Assured Destruction would no longer exist to confer its perverse version of “security” on both sides. Gorbachev realized that he could not trade away MAD for such partial progress. Thus the deal collapsed — much to the relief of Reagan’s advisers who had never wanted to give up their country’s nuclear arsenal at all. The subject was never officially broached again in the United States.

However, the conversation between the two superpower leaders did have benign effects. A year later the Soviet Union and the United States agreed to a new treaty, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of 1987. Both sides agreed to ban ground-launched missiles with a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. This removed the most frightening danger of that era, when both the Soviet side and the NATO side had been toe-to-toe, nearly installing weapons in Europe that would almost inevitably have led to a real nuclear war.

Indeed, Gorbachev went even further, removing Soviet troops from Eastern Europe and no longer promising to support any of the Communist regimes in that region, should their citizens wish to leave the Soviet sphere of influence — as indeed they did. In 1989, protests swept through those states and forced the Communist regimes, now lacking the support of Soviet military intervention, to relinquish power to formerly dissident political activists.

Nor was the Soviet Union itself exempt from opposition movements. In 1991 Gorbachev had to lower the Soviet flag from the Kremlin, for nationalism and the economic strains of transitioning to capitalism were fragmenting the union that he had led.

But the Cold War was over, and nuclear disarmament continued for several years, though relations between East and West never quite became cordial. Their last arms reduction agreement, the “New START” Treaty, was signed by Presidents Dmitri Medvedev and Barack Obama in 2010. Today there are still about 15,000 nuclear weapons on the planet, 90 percent of which belong to the US or Russia.(30) Moreover, to win approval of that treaty by the U.S. Senate, Obama had found it necessary to consent to modernizing the American nuclear arsenal, which is expected to cost about $1.5 trillion over the next thirty years—unless the Democrats now controlling the House of Representatives reverse that plan.

Tensions are still increasing, with Russia complaining that the US broke the promise it made to Gorbachev not to move NATO “one inch to the east” when he was so readily dismantling the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Indeed, he should probably have insisted that such a promise be recorded in a treaty, for most of the formerly Soviet bloc countries now hope to join NATO and several already have been admitted.

Moreover, although “Star Wars” never lived up to its promoters’ hopes, there is a continuing interest in defensive systems that can intercept incoming missiles in flight. NATO (read “the US”) is installing such a system called Aegis on ships in the Mediterranean, as well as ashore in Romania and Poland. Russia objects that these are not merely defensive, and in a recent paper Theodore A. Postol has shown that their objections are well founded. The canisters from which missiles can be launched in the Aegis Ashore system can easily have software installed that can launch cruise missiles, in violation of the INF Treaty.(31)

For its part, the US has accused Russia of violating the INF Treaty too by preparing to install a new missile that count hit Western European cities. Indeed, President Trump has announced his intention of withdrawing from the INF Treaty in six months and President Putin says he will develop new nuclear weaponry in response. We are in a new arms race.

Thus we see that the long experiment with arms control has failed to abolish nuclear weapons. What other options might succeed instead?

Though there is no prospect of speedy progress, the best alternative initiative is the “Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons” (TPNW), which was adopted (by a vote of 122 States in favour (with one vote against and one abstention) at the United Nations on 7 July 2017. It will enter into force 90 days after the fiftieth ratification has been deposited.(32)

The TPNW was the result, not of official arms control negotiations, but of action by civil society—notably an organization called the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN). According to all international public opinion polls, the majority of citizens of virtually every country have always wanted nuclear weapons to be abolished, but they have lacked any means of forcing the nuclear weapons states to comply. But the governments of Norway, Mexico, and Austria convened several conferences that flatly denied that nuclear weapons can ever make the world safer. The participants reminded everyone of the catastrophic humanitarian effects of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and showed that on numerous occasions nuclear missiles have nearly been exploded, sometimes by intention, sometimes by mistake. ICAN’s argument has been convincing, and nations are ratifying the TPNW more quickly than with most previous treaties.

So far, the nuclear weapons states just ignore the treaty. Nevertheless, ICAN was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2018 and continues pressing the nuclear states to comply, invoking shame to motivate them. To be sure, the leaders of all nuclear weapons states are shameless and are unmoved by humanitarian appeals to any ethical principles. On the other hand, they can no longer pretend to be progressing toward disarmament with the methods that they have used so far.

So the greatest threat lies ahead, when states are no longer inhibited by the INF treaty or, possibly, even by the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which may also be terminated if the nuclear arms race heats up. The US is making a new nuclear weapon only one-third the size of the Hiroshima bomb. One might consider such smaller bombs less dangerous than large ones, but that is not so. A small nuclear weapon is designed to be used in battle, not merely rattled ominously to intimidate or deter an enemy. We are in a post-MAD world now, and something new must be done to counter the threat.

Killer Robots and Cyberattacks

Gunpowder and nuclear weapons were “breakthroughs” in the development of weaponry. Now we must act quickly to prevent the development of other innovations with shocking potential: the application of artificial intelligence, robotics, and cyber-hacking to the development of weapons. Fortunately, we may still have enough time to stop lethal autonomous weapons, for the Pentagon is not yet working on producing them.(33) It is much harder to stop a weapons program after investors have sunk their savings into it and workers’ jobs would be lost by banning the weapon. Stopping cyberattacks will be harder to achieve, for there are already huge institutions using such systems.

In a way, it is entertaining to imagine two shiny robots fighting a duel — a nicer replay of the Iliad, when Achilles and Hector went mano-a-mano at Troy. If the two machines would merely kill each other we might even enjoy cheering for our side’s tin soldier, since no real blood would be shed. Unfortunately, lethal autonomous weapons will not be so restrained. Instead, they will be programmed to hunt down you or me–human adversaries. And if they have artificial intelligence, they may even learn to plan how to take over the world. Or at least such is the warning of some widely respected persons, including Elon Musk and Stephen Hawking.

But the Chinese rejected gunpowder, and we can reject killer robots and cyber war. The mechanism for opposing lethal autonomous weapons is a UN body that reviews and enforces a treaty called the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. Of course, killer robots are not plausibly considered “conventional,” but they are officially categorized as such because they are not chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. The common trait shared by all the banned so-called “conventional” weapons is that they are deemed “inhumane.” (Some of us do not consider any weapons humane except perhaps the darts that are used to tranquilize wild animals for medical treatment.) We must expect that lethal autonomous weapons, if allowed to select their own targets, would not be gentle, so there is an urgent need for such innovations to be prohibited.(34)

Cyberattacks are already a familiar experience for most of us, since we receive fraudulent phishing attacks or fake news in our social media all the time. Banks experience large losses through cyber theft, but prefer not to publicize that fact. There are even ransom attacks on civilians and hospitals, whereby the hacker promises to restore one’s computer to proper functioning only after receiving a large payoff. But these are mere annoyances when compared to an organized cyber war.

Indeed, a malevolent adversary can wreak terrible effects on any society today without firing any weapon. Already you are probably receiving “likes” on your Facebook account from foreign “bots” — fake accounts purporting to belong to someone who shares your values. The purpose is to lure you into reading posts that influence you to accept more extremist ideas or even to participate in extremist street demonstrations. We lack any easy means of identifying and intercepting these messages, though the political effects can indeed be significant in a democracy.

Still the effects of a violent cyber war can surpass these problems. It would be easy for the anti-ballistic missile defence system of any country or alliance to knock out the satellites belonging to its enemy. Already our electric grid and municipal water purification systems are vulnerable to attack, and we are entering the era of the “Internet of Things.” All our digital equipment— e.g. cars, door locks, kitchen stoves, phones — will be managed through remote systems that are vulnerable to hacking. If ten million electric cars stall at the same time on our streets, we will be helpless.

The plans to manage these threats are almost exclusively military: deter your enemy by proving that you can retaliate powerfully to any cyberattack. In 2010 the Obama Administration established a military Cyber Command in the military, and the US is not unique. Out of 114 states with some form of national cyber security programs, 47 assign some role to their armed forces.(35) Russia has already used cyberattacks against Estonia and Georgia; Israel has used them against Syria in conjunction with its bombing of a covert nuclear facility; and the US has used them (a cyber “worm” called “Stuxnet”) against Iran’s nuclear enrichment plant. None of these advanced countries seem genuinely interested in reaching an international agreement to regulate or ban any of their cyber activities.

On the other hand, there have been ostensible efforts to create limits. Obama’s administration called for some action and In 2011 China and Russia submitted a Code of Conduct for Information Security to the UN General Assembly. Most of the proposals in it were innocuous, but one clause asserted all states’ sovereign right to protect their ”information space”. The vagueness of this principle left others wondering whether the whole code of conduct was meant as a serious proposal or as only a cover for problematic intentions. There is an urgent need for international law to prevent cyber war.

Is Militarism the Main Problem?

War and weapons constitute only one of the six global threats that we must urgently address, since any one of them could destroy civilization within a short interval. If we are to strategize and decide how to solve the six threats together, it may be useful to identify which option may have the largest payoff. Probably the answer is this: reduce militarism.

You may ask: Why militarism? Answer: Because war and weapons cause or exacerbate all five of the other global threats. By reducing the national armed forces (we probably cannot eliminate them entirely) we will reduce all the other risks.

Global warming is a danger on the same scale as war. To solve it we must urgently halt the emissions of greenhouse gas from every expendable human activity. And war is not only expendable, but abolishing it would benefit every person involved.

Moreover, it harms all the rest of us by emitting vast amounts of carbon. Manufacturing each gun, each airplane, each tank, each bomb, each bomb or bullet emits greenhouse gas. Flying the planes, shooting the bullets emits it too. The Pentagon is the largest consumer of fuel in the world. When it conducts a military operation overseas, such as in Afghanistan or Iraq, forty percent of the cost goes for transporting the fuel for use there. Then that fuel is used for injuring people and destroying buildings that later must be reconstructed, emitting even more carbon.

Suppose every country reduces its military by, say, 80 percent by the year 2030. No one can say with certainty how much this would reduce the CO2 in the planet’s atmosphere. However, one of the strongest arguments for cutting military expenditures is to limit climate change.

But militarism imposes huge opportunity costs. Diverting the money from militarism could enable other essential innovations, including limiting climate change. Global military expenditures between 1995 and 2016 hovered at about 2.3% of the world’s total Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The Sustainable Development Goals could be met with about half of that amount. In other words, such a shift in expenditures would enable humanity’s unmet needs to be provided, for health, education, agriculture and food security, access to modern energy, water supply and sanitation, telecommunications and transport infrastructure, ecosystems, and emergency response, humanitarian work, plus climate change mitigation and adaptation.(36)

The most grave threat besides the risk of nuclear war is climate change, and the most promising way of reducing CO2 in the air is by planting about a trillion trees. But that will cost vast sums. The only likely source of such funds is by diverting budgets from military activities to afforestation. Reducing militarism is the best — maybe the only realistic — way to reduce climate change. Unfortunately, in Kyoto and Paris accords, no country is even obliged to report /em> its military activities as part of its commitment to reduce CO2 emissions.

The other global threats are also all connected to militarism. For example, the only famines in the world today are not the result of food shortages. They are all created deliberately as acts of war or to subdue a population. For example, Saudi Arabia has blockaded food shipments into Yemen precisely to starve the Yemeni population into submission. And the people of Venezuela are starving because of their government’s deliberate policies to suppress protests against a military-backed regime. Famines are designed to violate human rights. Ending militarism would be a decisive step toward ending famine.

Likewise, ending militarism would reduce the incidence of epidemics. Historically, soldiers on the move carry diseases with them and spread them wherever they go. Germ warfare is prohibited by international law now but, as usual, more of the famine victims in Yemen are dying from diseases such as cholera than are actually starving to death or dying in battle. When people are weakened by stress and deprivation, they succumb to diseases. War is a cause.

Furthermore, ending militarism would reduce the risks of massive exposure to radioactivity. The original reason for creating reactors was to produce plutonium for nuclear bombs. Only later did anyone think of using the heat from these reactors as a means of generating electricity. Today large swathes of land are poisoned by radioactive waste, as for example around Hanford, Washington, where the Manhattan Project produced the radioactive ingredients for America’s nuclear arsenal. Seventy years later, the Hanford area is still poisonous and, as Ronan Farrow has reported, “Clean up of the toxic material at the Hanford Nuclear Site is expected to take 50 years.”(37) Numerous other contaminated military sites exist around the world, including battlefields in Syria and Iraq littered with depleted uranium(38) and a leaking dome-shaped dump in the Marshall Islands.(39)

There are countless ways of using radioactivity as a weapon of war. Crashing a plane into an enemy’s reactor may create a plume that would circle the planet, falling everywhere or polluting the oceans. Terrorist organizations are known to be seeking access to radioactive materials, probably for “dirty bombs” that will not explode but will contaminate large areas. The more radioactive waste there is in the world, the more opportunities will inevitably exist for these to become weapons. A solution to the problem requires two approaches: (a) managing the radioactive waste itself for many thousands of years, and (b) reducing the militarism that misuses these wastes as weapons. The technological challenge of burying the waste is probably easier than the social challenge of changing militaristic thinking.

Finally, reducing militarism obviously will reduce the risk of cyberattacks. Indeed, when we speak of cyberattacks, most people assume that we are speaking of a military attack, though there are probably more such attacks waged every day by civilian criminals stealing from businesses and individuals than are sponsored by foreign governments.

All six threats tend to interact causally, so that we need to address them together as a system. Nevertheless, there may be more “leverage” available by quickly demanding a reduction of militarism than through any other direct policy changes.

Still, this will not be easy. People have their jobs and their live savings tied up in the military-industrial complex and will not readily change to projects that can actually save the world. And they will argue that their security depends on having a robust military to defend their country from attack. Their concerns cannot properly be disregarded. If militarism is to be reduced, some other form of armed protection is necessary. We would not, for example, abolish the police in a country or city, for doing so always results in more crime and violence. A few countries (notably Costa Rica) have abolished their armed forces, but they still have police. Something similar must be provided at the international level. Two planks in the Platform for Survival call for the development of “sustainable common security” and a United Nations Emergency Peace Service, which would quickly rush to protect people anywhere in the world who are in danger of attack.

But how many people would trust the United Nations to protect them? There are surely good reasons for skepticism, since the Security Council is controlled ultimately by the veto power of five major states. Only a more democratically accountable body in the United Nations can be trusted to protect people equally, without regard to alliances and enmities between states. Hence, in the Enabling Measures section of the Platform for Survival, we consider some reforms of the United Nations that will make the United Nations a more reliable source of security.

All of these reforms, if introduced together, can reduce militarism and the risks that flow from war and weapons. This argues for a policy assigning top priority to the drastic, worldwide reduction of armed forces as the best means of saving the world from all six global threats.

Footnotes for this article can be seen at the Footnotes 1 page on this website (link will open in a new page).
[/read]

To Post a Comment

Please wait a few seconds for the comments to load at the bottom of this page. Then read the ideas other people have shared and reply or add your own knowledge. The space for comments is in a pale font. It’s good to give your comment a title by selecting it and clicking the “B” (for “boldface”). And you can italicize passages with the “I”, indent, add hyperlinks (with the chain symbol) or even attach a photo or graphic from your hard drive by clicking the paperclip at the right side of the space. Have fun with it!